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Abstract 
     This thesis examines aspects of the relationship between reason, language and 
experience by means of an engagement with the legacy of the eighteenth century 
“linguistic turn” in German philosophy. The examination begins with the emergence of 
the idea of “pure reason”, including efforts to establish a calculus of thought inspired by 
innovations in mathematics and the natural sciences. These aspirations to formalise and 
mechanise reason have parallels with the “thin” conception of rationality in analytic 
philosophy in the twentieth century. Hamann and Herder’s works provide the basis for 
an alternative “thick” conception of language as a socially and historically situated 
“fabric of thought” which provides the conditions of possibility for both reason and 
experience. This conception has advantages over the twentieth century linguistic turn in 
accounting for how language structures experience and sustains social worlds, because 
the latter maintains a disproportionate focus on what Charles Taylor describes as 
language’s “designative” and “information-encoding” capacities. The works of the 
Early German Romantics and Nietzsche provide resources for a richer and more 
ambitious vision for the role of philosophy in creatively reshaping this fabric, 
articulating new ideals, and opening up horizons for new social, cultural and political 
ways of being. Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s work is used to suggest how human beings 
simultaneously shape and are shaped by language, how languages give form to 
experience, and how it is that language can be creatively reshaped in response to 
experience. Finally, the thesis examines how debates between Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
and Habermas’s critical theory echo Hamann’s encounter with Kant. These thinkers 
broaden the scope of what should be considered relevant to philosophy as a form of 
critical social and cultural praxis. 
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1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
 
 
“[A] critique of philosophizing reason cannot succeed without a history of philosophy.” – 
Friedrich Schlegel (Frank, 2004: 13-14) 
 
 
     In this introduction I will do three things. Firstly, I will briefly introduce some of the 
central philosophical concerns about the relationship between reason, language and 
experience which motivate this inquiry. Secondly, I will discuss how engagements with 
the history of philosophy might contribute to enriching contemporary debates about 
these concerns. Thirdly, I will explain why I believe that the particular period of 
German philosophy that I engage with makes such an important contribution, and why I 
have chosen Hamann’s 1759 public letter to Kant as my starting point. 
 
Rethinking the Relationship Between Reason, Language 
and Experience 
 
     In this thesis I examine how the legacy of the eighteenth century “linguistic turn” in 
German philosophy can contribute to advancing contemporary debates about the 
relationship between reason, language and experience. The thesis mobilises material 
which remains under-represented and under-appreciated in Anglophone philosophy in 
order to provide an alternative constellation of arguments and ideas which I contend has 
significant advantages over other much more familiar histories of philosophical debates 
around these topics. This constellation provides theoretical resources which can be used 
to provide a much more compelling account of how reason, language and experience 
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are related than other available accounts in contemporary Anglophone philosophy – 
including the legacy of classic debates between rationalism and empiricism on the one 
hand, and the legacy of the twentieth century linguistic turn in analytic philosophy on 
the other. 
 
     What is reason? What is experience? And how are they related? In Anglophone 
history of philosophy textbooks, debates about reason and experience are often related 
with reference to epistemological disputes between rationalist philosophers who place 
an emphasis on a priori structures of knowledge (such as Descartes) and empiricist 
philosophers who focus on a posteriori knowledge derived through the senses (such as 
Locke). Following rationalists like Descartes, the “light of reason” is modelled on 
insights and innovations from mathematics and the physical sciences – and the task of 
philosophy is to assist with the refinement of an a priori conceptual vocabulary through 
which to improve our processes of deductive reasoning in order to provide a more 
stable basis for human knowledge. Following empiricists like Locke, experience is 
considered as a kind of epistemological input through which we can improve our 
understanding of the world – and all knowledge is ultimately derived from the senses. 
The pictures of reason and experience associated with these two traditions remain 
influential in analytic philosophy today. For example, Christopher Norris argues these 
epistemological disputes are currently being “rerun” in debates about “philosophical 
methodology” in analytic philosophy – looking at whether philosophical inquiry should 
be conducted by means of thought experiments from the armchair, or modelled on the 
scientific methods of empirical experiments in the laboratory (Norris, 2013: 99). 
 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
3 
     Many of the thinkers which I examine in this thesis challenge these narrow 
conceptions of reason as a formal conceptual calculus and experience as raw empirical 
input – and propose that both reason and experience can be better understood by turning 
to language. However, the philosophical tradition that developed from the eighteenth 
century linguistic turn advances a different conception of language to that associated 
with the much better known linguistic turn in analytical philosophy in the twentieth 
century. Thinkers associated with the analytic linguistic turn looked to language in order 
to provide an account of rationality – both through the “ideal language” branch which 
aspired to create a universal metalanguage to unify the sciences, and through the 
“natural language” branch which sought to dissolve apparent philosophical problems by 
studying how philosophical language departs from how language is used in practice. 
Both of these branches follow in the footsteps of their rationalist and empiricist 
predecessors insofar as they continue to focus on what Charles Taylor characterises as 
the “designative” and “information encoding” dimensions of language as a transparent 
tool for argumentation and representation, at the expense of its other communicative 
capacities (Taylor, 2016). 
 
     By contrast to this “thin” conception of linguistic reason, the philosophical tradition 
which draws on the eighteenth century turn to language around the Berlin Academy 
articulates a broader and more compelling vision of language’s capacities. In the works 
of Hamann and Herder, naturalistic and historical conceptions of language are 
combined with insights from Kant’s transcendental philosophy in order to advance a 
conception of language as a living, evolving, socially constituted fabric of thought 
which provides the conditions of possibility for both rationality and experience. They 
place a much stronger emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of language and experience 
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– arguing for the paradigmatic importance of poetic language in understanding 
linguistic innovation. They also advance a “broad expressivist” conception of language 
which suggests that a wider range of “meaningful media” are relevant to providing an 
account of our reasoning and communicative practices than the philosophers of “pure 
reason” propose. These ideas about the relationship between reason, language and 
experience are taken up and developed in different ways by thinkers associated with a 
wide variety of different German language philosophical traditions over the next two 
hundred years – from Early Romanticism in the late eighteenth century, to 
hermeneutics, phenomenology and critical theory in the twentieth century. 
 
History, Philosophy and Hermeneutical Fictions 
 
      Why address these questions and concerns about the relationship between reason, 
language and experience with reference to philosophical traditions of the past? As I 
shall discuss further in later chapters, many of the thinkers in this thesis argue that it is 
not only advantageous but vital to appreciate the historical aspects of our philosophical 
concepts and the way they relate to each other. On this view, historical enquiry is a 
necessary precondition for philosophical reflection. Might this not be considered an 
instance of the genetic fallacy, such that we rely on the past to understand the present? 
Thinkers in the hermeneutical tradition examined in this thesis contend that we cannot 
so easily disentangle the ideas we use from their histories. This is because our outlook 
is historically constituted such that our language, our concepts, our ways of seeing the 
world are born out of institutions, practises and patterns of thinking which we cannot 
ever fully call our own (as I shall examine further in chapter seven, in relation to the 
works of Heidegger and Gadamer). We cannot but communicate in a language which is 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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given to us – which we can shape, influence and develop, but never totally reinvent. 
Only by appreciating the historical dimension of our ideas can we analyse and reflect on 
the linguistically mediated “world versions” that we inherit and inhabit, and through 
which we reason. This is the sense in which Schlegel contends that a “critique of 
philosophizing reason cannot succeed without a history of philosophy” (Frank, 2004: 
13-14). 
 
     With this in mind, we might ask: What distinguishes a philosophical reading from a 
historical reading of philosophical texts from the past? One does not have to delve too 
deep into debates about the relationship between philosophy and its history before one 
encounters a dichotomy between philosophical and historical interpretation. According 
to this dichotomy we may interpret ideas in philosophical texts of the past as 
philosophers – reformulating, interrogating, and measuring these ideas against our own. 
Or we may interpret such ideas as historical scholars, focusing on the reception of a 
given philosopher’s ideas amongst their contemporaries, agnostic as to whether or not 
these ideas are plausible, perhaps maintaining a principled silence about whether or not 
we agree with them. For example, Simon Blackburn writes in the Times Higher 
Education: 
 
Why does the history matter, to us, here, now? With characteristic insight, the late Bernard 
Williams made a distinction between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas. The 
former looks at great dead philosophers with an ear attuned to what they have to tell us, here and 
now; the latter looks at the contemporary matrix within which its subjects wrote and potentially 
highlights social and historical circumstances that have little or no echoes in the modern world. 
The two enterprises are not utterly distinct but, Williams thought, it is not possible simply to 
combine the virtues of both, any more than it is possible to have the Impressionist concentration 
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on the surface effects of light and at the same time a delineation of mass and structure as forceful 
as those that can be achieved by other means. 
     The vice of history of philosophy, especially according to historians of ideas, is anachronism. 
And the vice of history of ideas is antiquarianism. (Blackburn, 2007) 
 
     The archetypically historical interpreter is mainly (perhaps exclusively) concerned 
with a text insofar as it constitutes evidence of the views of its author and their times. 
They are more interested in what a philosophical author thought, rather than 
contemporary appraisals of what they thought. The archetypically philosophical 
interpreter, on the contrary, is only interested in a philosophical text insofar as it is of 
relevance to their philosophical ideas. Questions concerning biography, influence, 
context and so on are only relevant insofar as they alter contemporary philosophical 
readings of a text. The philosophical interpretation is one in which we deliberately 
bracket historical details in order to reveal a philosophically relevant kernel with which 
we can directly engage on our own terms, regardless of the intentions and 
circumstances implicated in the production of the text in question. 
 
     These two caricatures are the two banks between which interpreters of historical 
philosophical texts must navigate: the Scylla of antiquarianism and the Charybdis of 
anachronism. The two extremes are impossible positions to occupy. Toward Scylla, we 
are trapped in history, unable to speak to the present. The interpreter is confined to the 
historical particularities of a text and the concerns of its author. Toward Charybdis we 
are trapped in the present, unable to understand or relate to the past. The interpreter is 
doomed to deal with a reading of a historical text that is irremediably their own, of their 
own time, and about their own concerns.
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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     Luckily, this model of interpretation is a fiction. Traffic along our hermeneutical 
river is thickest along the middle, and its extremities are reductiones ad absurdum, 
cautionary scenarios to encourage interpreters to alter the course of their interpretation 
towards one bank or the other, towards history or towards philosophy. The historical 
scholar may invoke the image of the purely philosophical interpreter to warn against 
anachronism (for example against reading and evaluating Descartes as though he were 
writing as a contemporary analytic philosopher). The philosopher may invoke the image 
of the purely historical interpreter to warn against antiquarianism (for example, against 
the view that Spinoza’s context and concerns are so remote from our own, that his 
works have nothing to contribute to contemporary philosophical debate). 
 
     In the introduction to their volume on Philosophy in History, Richard Rorty, J. B. 
Schneewind and Quentin Skinner eschew this dichotomy between purely historical and 
purely philosophical interpretation as “two impossibly ideal types” (1984: 9) saying: 
 
An opposition between intellectual historians and historians of philosophy seems to us as factitious 
as would an opposition between scientists and engineers, or librarians and scholars, or rough-
hewers and shapers. It is an appearance created by the attempt to be sententious about ‘the nature 
of history’ or ‘the nature of philosophy’ or both, treating ‘history’ and ‘philosophy’ as names of 
natural kinds – disciplines whose subject and purpose are familiar and uncontroversial. Such 
attempts produce red-faced snortings about how a given book ‘isn’t what I call history’ or ‘doesn’t 
count as philosophy’. They take for granted that there is a well-known part of the world – the past 
– which is the domain of history, and another well-known part, usually thought of as a set of 
‘timeless problems’, which is the domain of philosophy. (1984: 8) 
 
They proceed to argue that if connecting the past to the present is anachronistic, then 
“every historian is always anachronistic” (1984: 10). A charge of anachronism can only 
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be levelled based on how we map past ideas and concerns to present ones, rather than 
that we do so, which is unavoidable for any kind of historical scholarship. Conversely, 
the historian of philosophy “cannot ignore intellectual history” and “nor, of course, does 
he ever do so for long” (1984: 10): 
 
No matter how philistine the historian of philosophy may want to be, he will need translations of 
what Spinoza wrote which will let him get a handle on the truth-value of Spinoza’s sentences. This 
will require him to examine present translations critically to see whether they are infected with the 
philosophies of some intervening epoch, and eventually to work out his own translations. He will 
become a historical scholar and re-translator whether he wants to or not. 
 
They introduce the guiding fiction of “The Intellectual History of Europe”, which is 
outlined as follows: 
 
Imagine a thousand-volume work entitled The Intellectual History of Europe. Imagine also a great 
convocation of resurrected thinkers, at which every person mentioned in the pages of this work is 
given a copy and invited to begin by reading the passages concerning himself or herself, and then 
to read alternately backwards and forwards until he has mastered the full thousand volumes. An 
ideal work of this title would fulfil the following conditions: 
     1. The person whose activities and writings are being described finds the description 
intelligible, except for the parenthetical remarks which say things like ‘This was later to be known 
as ...’ and ‘Since the distinction between X and Y was yet to be drawn, A’s use of “Z” cannot be 
interpreted as ...’, and he comes to understand even these remarks as he reads on. 
     2. On finishing the book, everyone described endorses the description of himself as, though of 
course insufficiently detailed, at least reasonably accurate and sympathetic. 
     3. The entire assemblage of the resurrected, at the point at which they have all read through the 
book, are in as good a position to exchange views, to argue, to engage in collaborative inquiry on 
subjects of common interest, as secondary sources for their colleagues’ works can make them. 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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     This seems a plausible ideal for intellectual history because we hope that such history will give 
us a sense of Europe as (in the phrase which Gadamer has adapted from Hölderin) ‘the 
conversation which we are’. (1984: 1) 
 
While this is clearly idealised to the point of impossibility, not least due to the “size of 
our brains and the span of our lives” (1984: 9), the “Intellectual History of Europe” 
picks out several important characteristics of the authors’ conception of what it is to 
enquire into the history of ideas. They advance a Gadamerian hermeneutical conception 
of scholarship modelled on conversation, and the possibility (in principle) of 
transposing concerns from one historical period into those of another. They believe in 
the possibility of narrative continuity in intellectual history. They reject the notion that 
different sets of concerns are incommensurable, and that we must treat intellectual 
history as “a series of ethnographic reports” or “a miscellany of self-contained 
traditions” (1984: 2). 
 
     They contend that while the history of philosophy involves mapping historical 
concerns (more or less anachronistically) onto our own concerns, approaches to 
interpretation in Anglophone analytic philosophy have had a particularly pernicious 
influence on the study of philosophical texts of the past. They argue that contemporary 
analytic philosophers tend to draw a sharp line between the current set of concerns in 
philosophy (the set of questions which really matter and which should be the core focus 
of philosophical enquiry) and concerns that have previously been described as 
‘philosophical’, but which with hindsight we may more accurately reclassify as 
religious, political, or aesthetic in nature. The authors express concern that the resulting 
picture of philosophy’s history – after it has been appropriately filtered and mapped 
onto present concerns – is often bizarre and implausible. 
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     While Rorty, Schneewind, Skinner’s caution against overly anachronistic readings 
by contemporary analytic philosophers is a welcome corrective, there is, of course, a 
long tradition of philosophers’ interpreting their predecessors to suit their purposes. 
Taking a longer view, perhaps the practice of aspiring to interpret the history of 
philosophy apart from our current philosophical interests is more unusual. It is entirely 
plausible that the polemical character of Nietzsche’s invocation of Goethe in the 
former’s On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life – “I hate everything that 
merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity” 
(Nietzsche, 1983: 59) – might simply have been lost on philosophical interpreters of the 
past, for whom “knowledge for knowledge’s sake” may have sounded more alien than 
“knowledge for the sake of life”. In order to open up further space for reflecting on the 
aims of philosophical interpretations of historical texts, I will proceed with a brief 
discussion of two recurring hermeneutical tropes: the philosophical ‘author’ and the 
philosophical ‘terrain’. 
 
     In his “What an Author Is”, Alexander Nehemas argues that philosophers and critics 
may benefit from an analytical distinction between the ‘author’ and the historical person 
that created a given text (Nehemas, 1986). The author is something that comes into 
being upon the creation of a text, which necessarily exists in relation to it, and which is 
indispensable in discussion of it. Nehemas presents the author as a construct in relation 
to which we obtain knowledge that lies outside of the text, but which is nevertheless 
relevant to its interpretation. The author is insofar as the text is. This conceptual fission 
is perhaps also reminiscent of the existentialist theologian’s attempt to derive from a 
reading of the gospels a “Jesus of History” and a “Christ of faith” – which is to say, the 
historical person whom is the focus and formal cause of the Christian tradition, and the 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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idealised figure whose life is to be interpreted insofar as it is relevant to the faith of the 
practicing Christian.1 In a similar vein, philosophical writing is filled with authors, 
names and personages that seem to exist as pegs upon which to hang certain views, 
attitudes and arguments. In the Platonic dialogues we encounter famous names in the 
history of philosophy – Cratylus, Parmenides, Protagoras, Socrates himself – which are 
used to allude to and articulate schools of thought, and whose views we must assume 
are part apocryphal, part embellished, part fabricated. The dialogue qua literary form 
(as exemplified, for example, in the Platonic dialogues and works such as George 
Berkeley’s Three Dialogues or Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion) has 
become a comparatively marginal specimen in contemporary philosophical writing. Yet 
the notion of a figure who holds certain types of views, and who would respond in such 
and such a way to question X, or hypothetical situation Y, remains of central importance 
in philosophical discourse. Indeed, one can imagine making the case that if an author 
cannot speak beyond the confines of what he or she actually said – if one cannot make 
meaningful assertions about what he or she would have said, or would say – then it is 
questionable whether they have a place in the history of philosophy, qua philosopher. 
 
     Perhaps we might imagine that upon the creation of a philosophical text, a 
philosophical author comes into being – just as a player comes into existence when a 
new person enters into a game. Unlike the mortal, historical person, the philosophical 
author lives on as long as there are people who are engaged in the practise of 
philosophy – just as a player might continue to be part of a game after the person who 
originally played them has left, as long as there is someone left at the table to continue 
                                                
1 The distinction is said to have originated from Martin Kähler, and may be traced back to Lessing. 
Perhaps its most well known articulation is by the theologian Rudolph Bultmann, a colleague of Martin 
Heidegger. 
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to take their turns. In philosophy, these personas change as the game evolves. They 
acquire and discard labels as new ideas and distinctions arise and fall out of favour. 
Thinkers and their theories become positivist, realist, nominalist, dualist, cognitivist, 
descriptivist, consequentialist, materialist, pragmatist, and so forth. They posthumously 
acquire opponents, and unwittingly enter into shifting alliances. Their writings and 
documented utterances are shadows cast by an edifice of thought that remains in play, 
but which is not in plain sight. It remains for those who are playing – philosophers, 
historians of philosophy – to try to establish the contours, limits and implications of 
these edifices: to map and model them, and to calibrate these maps and models against 
the available evidence. 
 
     We can thus imagine that philosophical authors and texts of the past are given life 
within the practise of philosophy in a manner not unlike that in which legal texts and 
legal decisions of the past are given life within the practise of the law. Historical 
documents become resources in contemporary debates. But while the law has its life in 
legal institutions which work to promote, protect and punish different patterns of 
behaviour in society – what structures the activity of philosophers? Prima facie one 
cannot envisage a single, meaningful answer to this question any more than one can 
envisage a single, meaningful answer to the question to what end writers write, 
regardless of whether they are novelists or journalists, poets or publicists, critics or 
chefs. Philosophical writing has come to encompass a very wide and diverse variety of 
concerns. But nevertheless we may be forgiven for imagining that philosophical activity 
is grounded in and organised around a kind of philosophical ‘terrain’, which all 
philosophers and philosophical theories occupy – for this is often the way we speak. 
The position of a given philosopher within this space is also subject to change and 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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contestation, as is the question of whether or not one can meaningfully assign them 
coordinates along a given axis. Hence we find encyclopaedias and introductory 
textbooks in the history of philosophy – from Michelet to Russell, Brucker to 
Copleston, Windelband to Kenny – organising philosophers around movements, schools 
of thought, regions of consensus. Upon graduating into the game and making it into the 
textbooks, philosophers are characterised in terms that they may not have used to self-
describe, and terms that they may not have even been familiar with. They are assigned 
sets of beliefs that they may not have known that they possessed: rationalisms, 
empiricisms, idealisms, materialisms, positivisms, and so on. Many philosophical 
careers have been devoted to arguing for the repositioning of a given thinker within this 
terrain, to eschewing the received interpretation that they fall under a certain “-ism” or 
that they anticipate a certain contemporary trend. Individual philosophers are assigned 
places within schools or subdomains – or as Kierkegaard writes of Hamann and Jacobi, 
“reduced to a paragraph in Michelet” (Kierkegaard, 1968). 
 
     These processes of re-interpretation and re-description in the history of philosophy 
take place within particular kinds of linguistic institutions. Philosophers and 
philosophies of the past are kept alive through linguistic institutions in which we 
unpack, translate, reconstitute, analyse, criticise and evaluate philosophical ideas, and 
give them a place in our own universe of concepts. These linguistic institutions also 
come with their own distinctive sets of hermeneutical norms, ideals and imaginaries. 
Whereas an intellectual historian may focus their interpretations of a text on the context 
and horizons of its, the historian of philosophy may rather focus on how historical texts 
sit within the current philosophical landscape: how texts of the past speak to us, and 
how they may inform our own philosophical activities. While there is clearly no sharp 
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distinction between the two – and indeed, there are many areas of significant overlap – 
nevertheless there is a meaningful spectrum of hermeneutical practices such that 
intellectual historians and historians of philosophy can have different areas of focus and 
genres of reading with respect to the interpretation of philosophical texts. 
 
     The current study is much more a history of philosophy than an intellectual history. 
It aims to explore the relationship between reason, language and experience through a 
series of snapshots from thinkers in the history of philosophy in the German tradition – 
and to look at how their ideas can inform our own. It does not attempt to evaluate 
documentary evidence for the transmission of certain ideas (where person X first 
encountered idea A), or for looking at influence or priority (whether there is a clear line 
of influence from person X to person Z, whether person X or person Y had idea A first). 
Rather it gives a comparative analysis of what several thinkers said about the 
relationship between the three concepts, based on the close reading of several key texts, 
and aims to show how these views are relevant to contemporary philosophical thought. 
 
    Finally, it is worth noting that many of the thinkers that we will examine in the 
following pages advance views about the question of how we, qua interpreters, should 
endeavour to read, understand and write about historical texts. This question starts to 
receive more systematic, theoretical attention towards the end of the eighteenth century, 
with the birth of modern hermeneutics. While this is not our main focus here, the 
present study delves into and draws upon the history of the philosophical hermeneutical 
tradition from Herder to Gadamer insofar as this is relevant to its core themes. 
 
 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
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Beginning in the Middle: Hamann’s 1759 Letter to Kant 
 
 
     Throughout the eighteenth century, ideas about the power and liberatory potential of 
reason swept across the world. The works of figures such as René Descartes, Gottfried 
Leibniz, John Locke, Isaac Newton, and Baruch Spinoza had an enormous influence on 
subsequent thinkers - catalysing the development of philosophical ideas and systems 
which could form the basis of new political institutions, new scientific theories, new 
moral codes, and new cultural values. This optimism was criticised by writers and 
philosophers who suggested that the narrow and mechanical conception of reason that 
was being advanced could not live up to its proponents’ promises, and that, furthermore, 
an uncritical faith in reason could have dangerous consequences. Many of these critics 
counselled reflection on the nature of language and experience as a corrective to narrow 
forms of rationalism. 
 
     This thesis spans a two-hundred-year period spanning from the publication of 
Johann Georg Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia in 1759 through to Habermas’s seminal 
work The Theory of Communicative Action in the 1980s. Before setting out, I will 
briefly address two questions: (i) why the German philosophical tradition? And (ii) why 
this particular period? 
 
     Lewis White Beck opens his Early German Philosophy with the question “Can there 
be, should there be, a history of German philosophy?” (Beck, 1996: 1). He proceeds to 
challenge many of the superficial justifications for embarking on a “national history of 
philosophy”: 
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Within the history of European culture we see thoughts expressed in various languages by men 
from different parts of the Continent. But these components are hardly well-formed unities with 
sharp edges. None of them is comprehensible by itself. In every one of them, important men and 
ideas from another must be included. No history of English or German philosophy can be 
understood without Descartes; no history of French or German philosophy can be understood 
without Locke; no history of French thought can be understood without Leibniz. If we add to this 
caution the recollection that few countries are now geographically what they were five centuries 
ago and that up to three centuries ago most philosophical works were written in a single language 
and passed, more freely than they do now, from one part of Europe to another, a national history of 
philosophy may appear at best episodic, at worst arbitrary. Why not write a history of philosophy 
mentioning only men whose names begin with the letter “p”? (Beck, 1996: 2) 
 
He continues: 
 
After reading a vast amount of writings purporting to list the distinctive and peculiar traits of 
German philosophy, I must report that I have found no generalization to which many important 
exceptions cannot be found in a moment’s reflection. Perhaps the notion of an ideal type or family 
resemblances may help us find the nongeographical meaning of “German philosophy”. But my 
experience of attempts to do this is little more encouraging. (Beck, 1996: 3) 
 
Beck argues that we cannot justify studying German philosophy, British philosophy, 
French philosophy, the philosophy of any other nation on the basis of defining, intrinsic 
properties that issue from something like the “national character”. But he says that we 
can nevertheless fruitfully undertake a history of philosophy in a given region or period 
insofar as that helps us to delineate a particular set of concerns which we may wish to 
study. 
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     Is Beck’s analysis plausible? For our present purposes, he eschews a complacent 
acceptance of “national philosophy” – in this case German philosophy – as something 
natural or given. As discussed in the previous section, the contours which delineate a 
tradition, school or period are subject to ongoing renegotiation through hermeneutical 
work. Some groupings will appear more natural to us than others. Take the example of 
how to classify books on library shelves. Some disciplines appear more suited to 
geographical sub-classification than others. For example, “French Literature” is less 
likely to raise eyebrows than “French biology” or “North American astrophysics”. 
Perhaps “German Philosophy” is somewhere in between. In the context of a library or 
on an undergraduate course syllabus, we would know what is meant. The more 
contentious question is whether a book by a German philosopher should be filed under 
philosophy, or under German history or German studies – whether a course should be 
structured according to topic, or geographical region. The answer that we give here is 
likely to depend on the context. We may be talking about an internationally influential 
figure, and we may wish to argue that they belong to “philosophy” as a two-and-a-half-
thousand-year old discipline that transcends national boundaries, rather than to the bit of 
space and time they happened to occupy. Conversely we may argue that a thinker does 
not make significant contributions to the discipline – and thus we should consider them 
in relation to the bit of space and time they happened to occupy. 
 
     Beck’s point is that – generally speaking – philosophy’s historical tributaries are too 
messily entangled to neatly subdivide the whole into national strands. National 
philosophical categories are more viable if we are speaking of specific episodes or 
concerns. For precisely this reason “French biology” doesn’t look so alien in the context 
of a book title like The Cuvier-Geoffroy Debate: French Biology in the Decades Before 
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Darwin. Beck is also challenging the image of German philosophy that has been put 
forward by its proponents and by its critics – from Hegel to Nietzsche. There is no 
immutable, mysterious force called “the German spirit”, Beck says. All we have are a 
disparate collection of people, scattered in space and time, responding to their own 
circumstances, united only by language and historical accidents related to what a patch 
of soil happens to be called at a certain point in time. Against Hegel’s unified cathedral 
of the spirit, Beck argues for a cacophonous amalgamation, with patches of overlapping 
resemblances and repeating patterns (Beck, 1996: 5). His own study of German 
philosophers from Albertus Magnus to Kant is parasitic upon a historical narrative 
about “interests and conflicts in politics, society, religion, literature and art” at different 
historical periods, rather than looking at how philosophy in Germany unfolds purely on 
the basis of its own “native” conceptual resources. 
 
     Having mentioned the core topics of this thesis above, I will briefly outline its main 
cast of thinkers – which can be construed as part of an evolving philosophical 
conversation. I take Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia as my point of departure: an open 
letter in which he rejects the rationalistic philosophies of his contemporaries. In order to 
understand what he is reacting against, in chapter two I look at the genesis of ideas and 
arguments about pure reason in German philosophy – in particular focusing on the 
works of Leibniz, Wolff, Kant and Frege. In chapter three I compare Hamann, Herder 
and Kant’s views on the limits of reason. In chapter four I look at figures associated 
with the analytic linguistic turn – particularly focusing on Carnap and Wittgenstein – in 
order to contrast it with the turn to language in the eighteenth century, which is the 
subject of chapter five, where I turn back to Hamann and Herder. In chapter six, I 
examine how elements of Hamann, Herder and Kant’s ideas are absorbed into and 
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surface in romantic philosophy, including in the works of Schleiermacher, Schlegel and 
Novalis – as well as by Nietzsche in the nineteenth century. In chapter seven I look at 
what Heidegger and Gadamer do with some of these ideas and themes in their 
respective philosophical works. In chapter eight I examine the debates between 
Gadamer and Habermas about the extent to which we shape and are shaped by 
linguistic tradition. 
 
     The thesis aims to animate these concerns into a philosophical conversation which is 
relevant to contemporary debates. Of all the thinkers and works we will look at, there 
are arguably only three which are widely known in Anglophone philosophy 
departments: Kant, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Generally, these three are regarded as 
isolates. One of my aims is to give a broader view of the tradition of which they are part 
– building on the work of those such as Lewis White Beck, Frederick Beiser, Isaiah 
Berlin, Andrew Bowie, Michael Forster, Richard Rorty, Ian Hacking and Charles 
Taylor. Following these scholars, a broader aim of the present study will be, in Forster’s 
words, to “encourage other philosophers to venture into this extraordinarily rich and 
underdeveloped territory” (Forster, 2010: 4). 
 
     I have chosen the metaphor of the “fabric of thought” in order to characterise a 
conception of language that develops from a “linguistic turn” in the eighteenth century, 
precipitated by debates about language around the Berlin Academy. Informed by the 
historical and naturalistic tendencies of the German enlightenment, it presents a “thick” 
view of language as that which enables reason, which gives form to experience and 
which is fundamentally interwoven into the practices, institutions and outlooks – or 
what Wittgenstein will later call the “forms of life” – of a society. This conception is 
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initially formulated by Hamann and Herder, and further elaborated by a range of other 
thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth century, as I examine in chapters three, five, six 
and seven. In my reading, this conception of language as a fabric of thought is 
contrasted with philosophical projects which advance a “thin” conception of language 
as a predominantly a tool for the representation and the communication of information. 
 
     The metaphor of language as a fabric of thought has been selected to contrast with 
conceptions which present it, for example, as a system for reasoning, or as an instrument 
for designation and encoding information– at the expense of its other capacities. The 
English term “fabric” descends from the French fabrique which originally meant “thing 
made”, which in turn came from the Latin fabrica meaning “trade” or “art” and faber 
meaning “artisan”. This is the sense in which a fabric is fabricated, or created by people 
as a kind of cultural artefact. This resonates with Hamann and Herder’s focus on poetry 
as a paradigmatic form of language. The Early German Romantics, Gadamer and 
Heidegger all examine the cultural capacities of language – as opposed to exclusively 
focusing on its semantic qualities from which a formal philosophical language or 
metalanguage could be derived. As such language helps to articulate and create new 
possibilities for experience – such as when we coin terms for new moods, shades of 
expression, or ways of being (such as Taylor’s examples of “cool” and 
“standoffishness”). While the fabric metaphor draws attention to the materiality and 
composition of language (what language is made of), in doing so it is intended to be 
broad enough to accommodate both the systematic, architectural ambitions of those 
wishing to refine languages suitable for specialised scientific and technical tasks, as 
well as the Heideggerian sensibility for dwelling in language through poetic expression.  
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     Many of the thinkers that I shall examine in the chapters below are keenly aware of 
the contingent and heterogeneous composition of language and the manifold contexts in 
which it is instituted as part of social worlds which stand in need of philosophical 
investigation rather than philosophical purification. The fabric metaphor is intended to 
allude to the social and intersubjective dimensions of language as a collective fabric of 
thought. This is the sense in which we may speak of the “fabric of society” or the 
“social fabric”. Hence Richard Palmer writes of Gadamer’s conception of language as a 
“fabric of shared understandings” and a “fabric and living medium of our life together” 
(Gadamer, 2007: 80, 357).  
 
     I will conclude this introductory chapter with a brief note on the starting point for the 
thesis. Socratic Memorabilia is one of earliest published works of Johann Georg 
Hamann, and represents the start of his philosophical authorship (insofar as we can call 
him a philosopher). It is addressed to two of his friends who were leading proponents of 
the Aufklärung, the German Enlightenment: the philosopher Immanuel Kant and the 
businessman Christoph Berens. It is essentially a tract against the disproportionate focus 
on “pure reason” in philosophy, at the expense of other capacities. From the outset 
Hamann challenges philosophical claims to universality, dedicating the work to “no 
one, the well known” – i.e. the “general public” apart from any particular person or 
group of people, an abstraction which does not literally exist – as well as “the two” 
specific people he is addressing, Kant and Berens (Hamann, 1967: 138, 143). He makes 
it clear from the outset that while he hopes these two addressees will find “a 
microscopically tiny forest” of meaning in the ensuing text, the “ordinary reader” may 
find “only mould” (Hamann, 1967: 143). 
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     The text revolves around a discussion of the character of Socrates. It is, Hamann 
says, a Socratic interrogation of the figure of Socrates – a kind of literary dialogue in 
which he aims to show the limits of the knowledge of his interlocutors. In particular, he 
challenges the figure of Socrates as a symbol for the success of rational dialectic, 
narrowly conceived. Instead, he contends, what makes Socrates truly wise is that he 
recognises the limits of human reason and human knowledge. Hence Hamann rewrites 
Socrates as a champion of intellectual humility – one who is modest about his faculties 
and abilities and recognises his finitude. He knows that he is a man who “knows 
nothing” and “has nothing” (Hamann, 1967: 161). Reacting to the way in which 
Socrates has been appropriated for the cause of philosophical rationalism and for the 
project of human knowledge, Hamann portrays him as a forerunner of his own pietism. 
It is this awareness of his ignorance which, according to Hamann, also makes Socrates 
so receptive to experience of the world around him – and what gives Socrates a 
worldliness which is opposed to the other-worldliness of the philosophy of Plato and 
Hamann’s rationalistic philosophical contemporaries. 
 
     Hamann presents us with a portrait of the physical person of Socrates in Athens, the 
son of a midwife and a sculptor. Hamann’s language paints a vivid portrait of Socrates, 
and the texture of his prose stands in stark contrast to Kant’s abstract, schematic texts. 
Hamann compares these two communicative modes with the difference between an 
animal and its skeleton (Hamann, 1967: 167), arguing that we should admire Socrates 
precisely because he spends his time grappling with language in the midst of life – in 
fields, markets, schools, streets and prisons – rather than because of his capacity for 
abstract philosophical reflection. Even though they may think they are operating in 
some other unworldly realm, philosophers are ultimately much more like artists, 
1. Why A History of Philosophy? 
23 
musicians and poet than they recognise. Through this rereading of Socrates, Hamann 
seeks to turn Kant and Berens away from a narrow philosophical interest in the 
“purification” reason, and to render them more sensitive and attentive to different ways 
of knowing, experiencing and making sense in the world. In order to become more 
attuned to these different registers of dealing with the world, philosophers will have to 
obtain a renewed appreciation of the central role of language in human understanding 
and experience. 
 
     In the next chapter I will look in more detail at some of the main features of the 
philosophies of pure reason that Hamann was reacting against – with a particular focus 
on the reception of Aristotle, Leibniz and Wolff – as well as how this aspiration to 
purify reason has later gained traction in the analytic philosophical tradition, including 
in the works of Frege and Russell. 
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2. The Purification of Reason: Leibniz 
to Frege 
 
 
“The only way to rectify our reasonings is to make them as tangible as those of the 
Mathematicians, so that we can find our error at a glance, and when there are disputes among 
persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate, without further ado, to see who is right.” – Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1951: 51) 
 
     This chapter outlines some of the principle features of philosophical projects to 
purify reason in German philosophy. It commences with a brief “prehistory of pure 
reason” looking at the reception of Aristotle and debates about reason in theology. It 
then looks at Leibniz and Wolff’s aspirations for a calculus of thought modelled on 
developments in mathematics, logic and methods from the natural sciences. Finally, it 
looks at the legacy of their views and how they served as a source of inspiration for later 
conceptions of rationality which aspire to distil a conceptual metalanguage in order to 
improve how we reason. In particular, I look at how this tradition came to inform the 
works of Kant (whose critique of pure reason was both drawn upon and challenged by 
Hamann and Herder) as well as Frege, Russell and the tradition of analytic philosophy 
which drew on their work. 
 
 
The Prehistory of Pure Reason 
 
     What exactly was Hamann reacting to in his 1759 letter? To which kinds of 
philosophical claims about the promise, potential and power of reason is he objecting? 
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While Hamann’s critique is immediately addressed to Kant and Berens, his work 
discusses ideas which have a much longer history. In order to understand the conception 
of “pure reason” in German philosophy of which Hamann is critical, I shall give a brief 
account of where it comes from with reference to: (i) the reception of classical 
philosophy (in particular Aristotle) amongst German thinkers, and (ii) debates about the 
role of reason and rationality in theology and how these anticipate later debates in 
philosophy. Many of the themes and tensions implicated in these controversies around 
the purification of reason will set the scene for discussion in the chapters below. 
 
     In Aristotle we find a conception of reason which is recognisably similar to that 
against which Hamann is reacting. In Europe Aristotle was predominantly known as a 
logician from works imported from Italy, until the influx of Arabic translations and 
commentaries in the 12th century. While his writings on various aspects of science and 
logic were welcomed, his Metaphysics and Physics were condemned and banned by 
various religious authorities in the early 13th century. The extent to which aspects of the 
Aristotelian worldview could be integrated with Christian doctrine was fiercely disputed 
in the thirteenth century, and there were several attempts to produce an orthodox 
Christian Aristotelianism. While a sharp, explicit distinction between mystical and 
scholastic approaches in theology would not emerge until later – the question of the 
relative importance of faith and reason in theology became central around this time. 
 
     Albertus Magnus claims (perhaps unexpectedly for this period) that the devil tried to 
discourage him from studying Aristotle. He was one of the first thinkers in Germany – 
indeed in Europe – to be able to read and interpret Aristotle’s entire corpus. He believes 
that reason is limited in the extent to which it can help theologians to apprehend, 
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understand and unpack the mysteries of the cross. Up to this limit, one can draw on 
secular sources – such as Aristotle – to exercise reason in relation to worldly matters. 
Beyond this limit, one has to turn to other sources, such as faith and tradition. He 
suggests that reason is not natural (of the world), but rather God-given. Its exercise is 
dependent on the grace of God – in the same way that the light of the moon depends on 
the light of the sun. Thus Albert Magnus builds on Aristotle in a way which avoids two 
dangerous options: the heresies of Averroism (where there are alleged to be two distinct 
and possibly incompatible sources of truth – the worldly and the divine), or using 
reason to attempt to shoehorn Christianity alongside heresies (such as those found in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics) into a single system. 
 
     In the fourteenth century we see a further divergence of theological approaches 
which: (i) draw on philosophical reason to explore matters of faith, and (ii) emphasise 
reason’s limits and turn to other means. The century witnesses the speculative 
mysticism of thinkers such as Meister Eckart and Nicholas of Cusa. Both of these 
thinkers are heavily influenced by the Neoplatonist thought, in particular in their belief 
that the world emanates from God, rather than simply being created and left alone. 
While for both of them the process of plunging oneself into the mysteries of divinity is 
still presented as an intellectual process (in the sense that they use rational argument as 
opposed to focusing on music, meditation, ritual or fasting) they nevertheless both 
emphasise the limits of the human intellect and of human reasoning. Eckart emphasises 
the finitude and fallenness of being, as opposed to the pure intellect of the divine. 
Nicholas of Cusa writes of “learned ignorance” as a way of coming to terms with the 
fundamental inadequacy of human understanding. “The door of Paradise is guarded by 
the most proud Spirit of Reason”, Nicholas writes, “and unless he be vanquished, the 
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way will not lie open” (Beck, 1996: 59). They both have pantheistic leanings, but avoid 
outright pantheism by asserting a Neoplatonic distinction between the primary reality of 
God and the subordinate unreality of the world. Directly and indirectly they both had an 
influence on later thinkers in the German philosophical tradition under examination in 
this thesis (e.g. Schelling read and was inspired by Nicholas of Cusa). 
 
     In the sixteenth century, theologian and church reformer Martin Luther – who says 
reason is “the devil’s whore” and Aristotle a “damned, arrogant, pagan rascal” – has a 
profound influence on the course of German thought. Many of the themes of his thought 
echo into Germany cultural and intellectual life in the centuries that followed him – 
from his stand against the papacy in Rome and confrontation of the institution of 
indulgences, to his translation of the Bible into the vernacular and his insistence of the 
primacy of the faith of the believer and the word of God over human reason and worldly 
institutions. Language – and particularly the language of God as revealed to humankind 
in the Bible – is central in Luther’s conception of human understanding. His “Theology 
of the Cross” emphasises the fallenness of human reason and the imperfection of human 
institutions, contending that our guiding light in matters of the understanding God and 
the world should be the cross and the crucifixion. While he accepts the importance of 
reason for secular learning (in particular Aristotle’s works on logic and rhetoric), he has 
little time or patience for reason in relation to matters of religion or salvation. 
 
     In his turn towards inner faith rather than external institutions, Luther is influenced 
by the Devotio Moderna – a fourteenth century lay movement responding to the 
perceived moral and spiritual failures of the clergy with a focus on inner devotion and 
meditation – as well as by the tradition of German mysticism. Later theological 
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tributaries drawing upon Luther’s thought – such as Pietism – place an emphasis on 
faith, feeling and spiritual practice, over rational calculation, demonstration and enquiry. 
Though this turn away from reason and towards faith in the Lutheran tradition is hardly 
novel – for debates about natural and revealed theology precede Luther by centuries 
(and not just in the Christian tradition) – Lutheranism and associated forms of 
Protestantism arouse a new wave of thought about the limits of reason and worldly 
institutions in Germany. As Beck writes, in Luther’s conception reason is “inherently, 
but not completely, corrupt” (Beck, 1996: 95). 
 
     The humanist Philipp Melanchthon seeks to introduce more systematic reflection 
into Lutheran thought. He shares many of Luther’s suspicion of claims for the reach of 
reason in theology, but helps to revive philosophy in relation to secular learning, 
drawing on Aristotle. French theologian John Calvin also has an important role in the 
development of European theological and philosophical thought. Calvinist thinkers are 
less hostile towards secular reason and more interested in the organisation of knowledge 
than their Lutheran counterparts. For example, German Calvinist minister Johann 
Heinrich Alsted and his student Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld are interested in 
encyclopaedias, the art of memory, topical logic, and universal languages – partly 
influenced by their readings of French humanist and logician Petrus Ramus and 
Majorcan philosopher and logician Ramon Llull. Bisterfeld’s work in this area is an 
influence on Leibniz, which we shall examine in more detail in the following section. 
 
     Today the sixteenth century is widely considered the era of Shakespeare and 
Cervantes, Marlowe and Montaigne, da Vinci and Dürer – renowned for innovations in 
cultural expression drawing on classical and Christian texts. The discoveries of figures 
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such as Copernicus and Columbus lead to dramatic transformations in how the world is 
seen, of its place in the universe, of its geographical makeup, and of its cultures that 
were previously unknown in the Europe. But it is the seventeenth century, the century 
widely held to mark the beginning of what we now call “modern philosophy”, that 
brings a huge surge of interest in reason, observation, and method – catalysed by a wave 
of scientific discovery and invention – that is carried over from empirical investigation 
into other areas of social, cultural and political life. Later debates about the value and 
limits of reason echo theological currents and counter-currents from previous centuries 
about the relative importance of reason and revelation, faith and argument, justification 
and prayer – but it is in the seventeenth century that we see the rise of a philosophical 
interest in creating a general and generalisable rational metalanguage or method. 
 
 
“Let us Calculate!” 
 
     As a young man Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is fascinated by the idea of an ars 
combinatoria – an art of combinations – which would enable us to generate novel ideas 
and inventions, as well as to analyse and break down complex and difficult ideas into 
much more simple, manageable components. In 1666, when he is around twenty, he 
publishes Dissertatio de arte combinatoria, an extended version of his doctoral 
dissertation, which aims to explain and illustrate this notion, showing how the most 
complex ideas can be derived from a few simpler ones through the use of a set of rules 
and analytical techniques, and how these can be applied in a wide variety of different 
areas – such as logic, law, theology, physics, and music. 
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     In his Dissertatio, Leibniz is inspired by Ramon Llull’s Ars magna (or ‘ultimate 
general art’) from 1308, which outlines a form of analysis and argumentation based on 
working with different permutations of fundamental attributes. Leibniz develops an 
interest in Llull and the idea of an “alphabet of human thoughts” through a group called 
the Herborn Encyclopaedists – which includes Johann Heinrich Alsted and Johann 
Heinrich Bisterfeld, to whom I alluded earlier in this chapter (Brown, 1999: 4ff; 
Loemker, 1973: 276-297). 
 
     In his works, Llull aspires to create a universal tool for helping to convert people to 
the Christian faith through formal logical argumentation. He proposes eighteen 
fundamental general principles (“Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, 
Virtue, Truth, Glory, Difference, Concordance, Contrariety, Beginning, Middle, End, 
Majority, Equality and Minority”), accompanied by a set of definitions, rules, and 
figures in order to guide the process of argumentation, which is organised around 
different permutations of the principles. The art is used to generate and address 
questions such as “Is eternal goodness concordant?”, “What does the difference of 
eternal concordance consist of?”, or “Can goodness be great without concordance?”. 
 
     Llull contends that the art, which he presents as the most general of all of the arts, 
enables the person who uses it to “banish all erroneous opinions” and to arrive at “true 
intellectual certitude removed from any doubt” (Llull, 2003). Llull’s vision draw on the 
medieval Arabic zairja (Lohr, 1984), described by historian Ibn Khaldūn as “a branch of 
the science of letter magic … the technique of finding out answers from questions by 
means of connections existing between the letters of the expressions used in the 
question” (Khaldūn, 1958: 182). The zairja was an algorithmic process for calculating 
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truth on the basis of a finite number of elements (Link, 2010). Its practitioners would 
give advice or make predictions on the basis of interpretations of strings of letters that 
would result from the calculation.2 This vision of reason based on calculation and 
combination was to inspire many later thinkers. As historian Frances Yates argues: “The 
European search for method … began with Ramon Lull” (Yates, 1982: 7). 
 
     Leibniz shares two key aspirations with Llull: the idea of fundamental conceptual 
‘primitives’; and the idea of a formal philosophical method (a combinatorial art) with 
which to calculate with them. The former enables us to reduce more complex ideas 
down simpler ones (“everything which exists or which can be thought must be 
compounded of parts”, Leibniz, 1989: 80). The latter enable us to reason with these 
elements precisely and without error. As I shall explore further below and in chapter 
four, these two aspects of Llull’s conception of rational argumentation are also reflected 
in the logical atomism and logical calculi of Frege and Russell. Llull and Leibniz both 
draw on a longer tradition of thought dedicated to these two aspects. Umberto Eco 
offers an account of attempts to create a language of fundamental concepts (Eco, 1995). 
As discussed in the previous section, the idea of a formal, rational method for 
argumentation is partly the result of the widespread influence of Aristotle amongst 
scholars, teachers and theologians. Leibniz says that he is closer to Aristotle than to 
Descartes, as the latter “abandoned his strict method” (Leibniz, 1989: 94). 
 
     Leibniz’s teacher Erhard Weigel presents mathematics as the main model for human 
thought and placed a great emphasis on the notion of rechnen: reckoning or calculation 
                                                
2 Some have pointed out that this would have been easier in Semitic languages than in European 
languages, which depend on vowels for strings of letters to make meaningful words or syllables. See 
Link, 2010: 259. 
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(Beck, 1996: 196; Mercer, 1999: 19ff). His teacher Jakob Thomasius nurtures Leibniz’s 
interests in Aristotle and in reconciling ancient philosophy with the new “reformed” 
philosophy inspired by the explosion of mechanical physical theory in the early 
seventeenth century. Leibniz is also familiar with the works of Joachim Jungius, whose 
Noematica influences Leibniz’s Dissertatio; Joseph Clauberg, a Cartesian who wants to 
develop German as a language suitable for philosophy; and von Tschirnhaus, a 
mathematician and philosophical rationalist who wishes to apply mathematical methods 
to our empirical knowledge. And he is well acquainted with the works of Thomas 
Hobbes, whom Leibniz writes to in 1670, full of praise for the elder philosopher 
(Leibniz, 1989: 105). In the first part of his Elements of Philosophy, Hobbes presents a 
vision of philosophy as “true ratiocination”, where reasoning is considered to be a 
fundamental mathematical operation, consisting in “addition” and “substraction”. “By 
ratiocination, I mean computation”, he writes (Hobbes, 1839: 4ff). Leibniz’s encounter 
with Robert Boyle in 1673 inspires him to pursue what he called “a science of the mind 
through geometrical demonstrations” (Loemker, 1995: 25). But what Leibniz does with 
these ideas establishes him as one of Germany’s greatest philosophers. 
 
    Leibniz’s work helps to establish logic and mathematics as the definitive paradigms 
for philosophical rationality to emulate. As a mathematician he is responsible for 
significant innovations such as a new system of mathematical notation (which is still in 
use today), refinements to the binary number system, several new designs for 
mechanical calculating machines, and his own infinitesimal calculus, independent of 
Isaac Newton’s. The question of who discovered the calculus first and whether or not 
Leibniz had plagiarised Newton’s discovery taints the reception of Leibniz in Britain 
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and Newton in Germany for decades to come. Lewis White Beck writes on the 
reception of Newton: 
 
.. the eighteenth century as a state of mind began in any country when the leaven of Newton was 
brought to it; for, depending upon the local ingredients with which it was mixed, it produced those 
characteristic doctrines of empiricism, deism, materialism, atheism, skepticism, utilitarianism, 
naturalism, and Kantian criticism which constitute the main body of thought of the century. (Beck, 
1966: 5) 
 
While Newton’s discoveries mainly pertain to understanding and predicting the physical 
world, philosophers across Europe and around the world are quickly keen to apply his 
methods to other areas of thought. For example, John Locke describes himself as an 
“under-labourer” to “the incomparable Mr. Newton” and David Hume subtitles his first 
work “An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral 
Subjects” (Beck, 1966: 4-5). However, Newton’s reception in Germany is said to be 
“hesitant and slow” (Israel, 2001: 523, 557), with his ideas not receiving widespread 
recognition, uptake or critical treatment in Germany until at least the mid eighteenth 
century, several generations after the first publication of his Philosophiæ Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica in 1687.3 Hence in Germany it is predominantly Leibniz’s ideas 
that helped to popularise and foment interest in the project of applying scientific 
methods across the whole of human life and thought. Conversely, Leibniz does not 
receive serious consideration in Anglophone scholarship until after the middle of the 
nineteenth century (Beck, 1996: 200; Brown and Pheminster, 2007: 12-16).  
                                                
3 Lewis White Beck and Jonathan Israel place the upturn of Newton’s influence in Germany around 1740, 
as a result of Leonhard Euler and others in the Berlin Academy of Sciences (Israel, 2001: 523, 557; Beck, 
1996: 200). Thomas Ahnert contends that it is not until the decades following the 1750s that 
Newtonianism begins to become more fashionable and considered a fully fledged philosophical system 
(Ahnert, 2004: 471-491). 
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     Leibniz wishes to overcome the limitations of ordinary language by creating a formal 
language for philosophical argumentation, such that everyone will be able to agree on 
what fundamental concepts there are and which predicates apply to them, as well as on 
a mechanical process for calculating with these concepts. Leibniz’s desire to eradicate 
ambiguity and aspire towards clarity and precision can also be seen in the context of his 
utopian social, political and religious interests – such as attaining universal peace, and 
reunifying the churches (to understand these concerns, one need only remember that the 
Thirty Years War, which ended just after Leibniz’s birth, and which devastated and 
bankrupted many of the countries that were involved – including many of the German 
states). In his Ars Combinatoria, one of the few of his philosophical works that was 
published during his lifetime, he explicitly mentions the contribution his proposed art 
might make towards a universal language: 
 
[…] this universal writing will be as easy as it is common, and will be capable of being read 
without any dictionary; at the same time a fundamental knowledge of all things will be obtained. 
The whole of such a writing will be made of geometrical figures, as it were, and of a kind of 
pictures – just as the ancient Egyptians did, and the Chinese do today. (Leibniz, 1966: 11) 
 
In a letter from 1671-72 to his first Hanoverian Patron, Duke Johann Friedrich, he 
writes of the art: 
 
In philosophy, I have found a means of accomplishing in all the sciences what Descartes and 
others have done in arithmetic and geometry through algebra and analysis, by the art of 
combinations, which Lullius and Father Kircher indeed cultivate, although without having seen 
further into some of its secrets. By this means, all composite notions in the whole world are 
reduced to a few simple ones as their alphabet; and by an ordered method, all things with their 
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theorems and whatever it is possible to investigate concerning them. (Gerhardt, 1875-90: 57-58; 
cited in Rutherford, 1995: 257) 
 
     This interest in creating a universal language, an alphabet of pure thought that will 
overcome the defects of ordinary language stays with Leibniz throughout his life. In his 
New Essays on Human Understanding, which were drafted in 1704-5 in response to 
John Locke’s 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he comments on and 
discusses Locke’s reflections on the imperfection and abuses of language, his distinction 
between the “civil” and “philosophical” uses of language, and his claim that while 
philosophers aspire towards precision and certainty, civil discourse is rife with 
“doubtfulness”, “imperfection” and “controversy” (Leibniz, 1996: 335). Leibniz cites 
Locke’s remark that: 
 
But I am apt to imagine, that, were the imperfections of language, as the instrument of knowledge, 
more thoroughly weighed, a great many of the controversies that make such a noise in the world, 
would of themselves cease; and the way to knowledge, and perhaps peace too, lie a great deal 
opener than it does (Leibniz, 1996: 339). 
 
To this end Leibniz adds that he hopes that “men would agree on certain rules” and that 
“changes in language” could help to resolve disputes, along the lines of his earlier work 
(Leibniz, 1996: 339). The idea of a characteristica universalis, or a “universal 
characteristic” recurs throughout Leibniz’s works. While there has been some debate 
about whether Leibniz in his later philosophical works intends this to be a means to 
achieving local formalisation for specific purposes or a fully blown universal formal 
language, it is clear that it is many elements of it are present in his De arte combinatoria 
(see Rutherford, 1995: 226). In a letter to Johann Friedrich from 1679 he describes the 
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characteristica as “the great instrument of reason, which will carry the forces of the 
mind further than the microscope has carried those of sight” (231). 
 
     Leibniz’s 1679 “On the General Characteristic” (eighty years before Hamann’s 
Socratic Memorabilia) argues that “there is nothing which is not subordinate to 
number” (Leibniz, 1989: 221). He sketches the project for “a kind of alphabet of human 
thoughts” from the De Arte Combinatoria of his youth, saying that the grammar and a 
dictionary of the most frequent cases of “this wonderful language” could be completed 
by a few people in five years (224). Leibniz contends that “reason will be right beyond 
all doubt only where it is everywhere as clear and certain as only arithmetic has been 
until now” (224). Through his characteristic, “there will be an end to that burdensome 
raising of objections”, and the deadlocking of debate which usually results in opponents 
resorting to emotion or violence means rather than reason, as they find themselves 
unable to “work out the entire table of pros and cons in any deliberation” or to 
dispassionately enumerate and weigh up expediencies and inexpediencies (224). 
 
     Leibniz spares no justification in advancing this project in his works, which 
sometimes read as if they were philosophical sales pitches (and there is little doubt that 
some of these early writings were indeed effectively intended to “sell” the proposal to 
prospective benefactors). The universal calculus is presented as being the world’s most 
powerful instrument, an end to all argument, one of humanities most wonderful 
inventions (fulfilling a timeless dream shared in some form by everyone from the 
Pythagoreans to the Cartesians); the ultimate source of answers to some of the world’s 
most complex and difficult theological, moral, legal or scientific questions; and a 
foolproof means to converting people to Christianity and propagating the faith, amongst 
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other things. In support of his project he argues that “no man who is not a prophet or a 
prince can ever undertake anything of greater good to mankind or more fitting for the 
divine glory” and that “nothing could be proposed that would be more important for the 
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith” (225, 262). 
 
     In his “On Universal Synthesis and Analysis, or the Art of Discovery and 
Judgement”, also believed to have been written in 1679, Leibniz discusses Athanasius 
Kircher’s recent work on the art of combinations, and his thoughts on how to ensure 
that the concepts used in the art are distinct rather than confused, primary rather than 
secondary, and fundamental rather than derivative. Here again, his paradigm examples 
are of “nominal definitions” (“the enumeration of signs or elements sufficient to 
distinguish the thing defined from everything else”) of mathematical concepts, and the 
discussion revolves around things like Euclid’s definition of a circle, curves, ellipses, 
cones, cylinders, and sections (230). Ultimately he hopes that the combination of a 
perspicuous thought language of “pure” concepts, combined with formalised processes 
and methods for reasoning, akin to those used in mathematics, would lead to the 
mechanisation of thought (for which he had numerous prototypes of various calculating 
machines, forerunners of modern calculators and computers). By means of new rational 
languages and methods, our ordinary and imperfect ways of reasoning with words and 
ideas would give way to a formal, symbolic, rule-governed science of reasoning: a 
calculus of purified thought. Disputes, conflict and grievances arising from ill-formed 
opinions, emotional hunches, biases, prejudices and misunderstandings would give way 
to consensus and agreement, peace and progress. 
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     There are few contenders in the history of philosophy to rival the optimism that 
Leibniz had for the characteristica universalis as a kind of panacea to solve many of the 
world’s problems. The idea of the project never left him. In a 1714 letter, two years 
before his death, he laments that he was unable to make more progress on it: 
 
I should venture to add that if I had been less distracted, or if I were younger or had talented young 
men to help me, I should still hope to create a kind of spécieuse générale, in which all truths of 
reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus. At the same time this could be a kind of universal 
language or writing, though infinitely different from all such languages which have thus far been 
proposed, for the characters and the words themselves would give directions to reason, and the 
errors (except those of fact) would be only mistakes in calculation. It would be very difficult to 
form or invent this language or characteristic but very easy to learn it without any difficulties. 
(Rutherford: 239) 
 
     While today Leibniz is widely considered to be one of the greatest German 
philosophers, relatively few of his writings were published during his lifetime. Aside 
from De Arte Combinatoria, he was mainly known in scholarly circles through 
occasional journal articles published between 1686 and his death in 1716 (Corr, 1975). 
It would not be until the middle of the eighteenth century when more substantive 
collections of his works began to be published (Wilson, 1995). In the early part of the 
eighteenth century, the philosopher Christian Wolff was far more influential than 
Leibniz.4 It is more likely to be Wolff’s rather than Leibniz’s ideas which elicited such a 
strong reaction in the mid-eighteenth century. Hence, to finish setting the scene for this 
reaction (including Hamann’s 1759 letter), we must look to the works of Wolff. 
                                                
4 In addition to English translations of his philosophical works, a good overview of Wolff’s reception in 
English and secondary literature on his thought from a wide variety of disciplines is contained in Senn 
(1997). See also Beck, 1996: 256-275. 
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     While commentators in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries strongly identified 
Wolff’s philosophy with Leibniz, contending that Wolff merely systematised Leibniz’s 
philosophy to give something which was widely called the “Leibniz-Wolffian” 
philosophy, this reading has been subsequently challenged.5 Born in 1679, Wolff is 
schooled in Catholic theology and philosophy in Breslau before moving to the 
University of Jena in 1699, where he becomes interested in applying mathematical 
methods to theological and philosophical argumentation, predominantly inspired by von 
Tschirnhaus, Descartes, Aristotle, Newton and their followers. Somewhat ironically 
given his later work, Wolff’s first contact with Leibniz is through a mutual acquaintance 
who forwards Leibniz a copy of Wolff’s dissertation which argued that the syllogism 
was not a means of discovering truth, a position which Wolff would soon come to 
completely reverse (Corr, 1975: 247). 
 
     This initial contact leads to a correspondence of over a hundred and twenty letters 
and three physical meetings, in 1706, 1713 and 1716 (Corr, 1975: 247). Leibniz seems 
to be largely unaware of Wolff’s philosophical work (which was mainly published after 
the former’s death in 1716), and Wolff seems to be only partially aware of depth and 
breadth of Leibniz’s interests outside of the few things that he had published at that 
time. Nevertheless, there are significant commonalities between Leibniz and Wolff’s 
thought in some areas, perhaps not purely attributable to the direct influence of the older 
man on the younger, but also because of common sources such as von Tschirnhaus, 
Aristotle, Descartes, and the mechanists. Wolff shares Leibniz’s belief in the power of a 
priori, deductive reasoning, and of applying mathematical methods to many other areas 
                                                
5 Charles Corr contends that Wilhelm Windelband and Eduard Zeller were a source of this identification 
in in 1870s and challenges this in Corr, 1975: 241. See also Beck, 1996: 257. 
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of thought. He also pursues a project to formalise our reasoning, which he sees as the 
central task of philosophy. At the heart of his project is syllogistic reasoning: a form of 
logical argumentation whereby a conclusion is inferred from two or more premises. 
Echoing Leibniz’s sentiment that through his art disputes should be resolved through 
calculation (as per the call to “Let us calculate!” in the epigraph to this section), in his 
1712 Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding Wolff writes: 
 
When the Meaning is determined, the Opponent sets about producing his Proof, and carries it on 
so far, till in his Syllogisms he comes to Premisses which are admitted by the Respondent. (Wolff, 
2003: 211) 
 
He also shares Leibniz’s frustration with reasoning and argumentation in ordinary 
language and discourse: 
 
… in Disputations we require pure, formal Syllogisms, and reject the method of common 
Discourse. For whenever the Disputants begin to discourse or talk, they commonly go off from the 
purpose, and never come to a point. (Wolff, 2003: 212) 
 
     Much like Leibniz’s “Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Wolff believes that “nothing 
exists without a sufficient reason for why it exists rather than does not exist” (Wolff, 
1730: §70). They both share a world in which everything is in principle cognisable and 
explicable, a universe with entities which essential, definite properties which can be 
identified, analysed and calculated with. They both propose that we inhabit a world with 
an essentially rational structure. Both the word of the creator and the nature of creation 
may be known through careful and systematic study: a combination of the enduring 
truths of reason (which it is the job of philosophy to clarify) and the facts presented to 
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us by experience. Wolff strives to integrate experience into his rational philosophy. He 
ultimately agrees with the scholastic maxim that there is “nothing is in the intellect that 
was not first in the senses”.6 Experience gives us the individual cases, through which we 
may arrive at knowledge of more general notions (Wolff, 2003: 108ff). General notions 
contain “nothing but from with they are abstracted” (34-36). He writes: 
 
We apply ourselves to gain general notions, in order thereby to extend the boundaries of our 
knowledge. For whatever is drawn from a general notion, agrees to all things contained under it: 
For example, to all right-lined triangles, whatever is deduced from the notion of a right-lined 
triangle; to all affections, what flows from the notion of an affection; to all fluids, everything that 
derives from the notion of a fluid, &c. (34) 
 
Wolff sees philosophy as a “science of the possibles insofar as they can be”, concerned 
with clarifying reason as an instrument for analysing, manipulating and weighing up 
possibilities, to be combined with history (which is concerned with facts) and empirical 
observation, in order to bring about practical value to people. Unlike the natural 
sciences which limit themselves to understanding and predicting physical phenomena, 
philosophy is general in nature, applicable to all areas of human thought, and hence 
superior to the new Newtonian philosophy. While the methods of philosophy might 
seem “childish” to people of experience (202), the discipline and patience they demand 
is necessary if we are to overcome dogma, prejudice and irrational authority, and 
progress towards truth. 
 
                                                
6 This formulation is said to originate from Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, and a similar version appears in 
Thomas Aquinas (see Fowler, 1999: 93). Regarding Wolff’s agreement with this view, see Beck, 1996: 
268. 
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     “More excellent a gift than the understanding, Heaven has not bestowed on man”, 
Wolff writes, and the only way we can make the most of this gift is to learn to “form 
just conceptions of solidly demonstrated truths” (53-54). Throughout his works he is 
insistent on the practical utility of his philosophy. He says that it is imperative that 
philosophy exist to be “of service to persons in their several future stations and 
conditions in life”, rather than being “matter idly to talk about in company”, to “furnish 
subjects of dispute in schools” or “matter of wrangling and contention [for the] learned 
world” (66). As Beck puts it, Wolff sees philosophy as an “omnicompetent instrument 
of public enlightenment” (Beck, 1996: 261). His philosophy is far more systematic and 
pedagogical than Leibniz’s which is fragmentary and sporadic in comparison to Wolff’s 
hefty and thorough tomes. Ultimately it is this comprehensive and uncompromising 
insistence on the priority of logical and mathematical methods in all matters of the 
understanding that precipitates what was to become one of the greatest scandals of his 
time (Israel, 2001: 541-562). 
 
     From their first publication in the 1720s, Wolff’s works are vociferously attacked by 
Pietist theologians at the University of Halle (where he taught), in a campaign led by 
theologian and philosopher Joachim Lange (Wilson, 1995: 450-452). His colleagues in 
Halle perceive Wolff as a threat to their faith – given his ability to pack lecture halls, 
command international attention, and revive the scholastic rationalism and natural 
theology that the Pietist movement is reacting against. His detractors accuse him of 
privileging logical and mathematical methods above faith and scripture on the path to an 
enlightened understanding and moral virtue. The Lutheran theologian and philosopher 
Johann Franz Buddeus attacks Wolff for seeking to “explain everything in a mechanistic 
way”, meaning that people are not free to determine their destiny such that the divine 
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judgement of humanity is equivalent to our passing judgement on clocks who cannot do 
other than what their mechanisms determine (Israel, 2001: 546). The Pietists wish to 
revive a widespread religious movement that was based upon faith and feeling, scripture 
and experience, not upon dogma or demonstration, arguing that the zealously 
rationalistic philosophy of Wolff seeks to extend its domain too far into religion.  
 
     This fear is not altogether unfounded. While both Leibniz and Wolff adamantly reject 
the charge of atheism and Spinozism, they are indeed culpable of submitting religious 
doctrine to their logical and mathematical scrutiny. Wolff is intransigent in his 
application of his syllogistic method to scripture, miracles, and religious belief. Leibniz 
tries to give mathematical demonstrations for the Trinity and the significance of the 
Lord’s Supper (Hagenbach, 1865: 8). In a farewell address to the university in 1721, 
Wolff lectures about the virtues of Chinese philosophy and ethics – in particular 
Confucianism – to an audience of over a thousand people, saying it is largely in 
agreement with his own moral principles, which fuels suspicion that he is fomenting 
atheism (Drechsler, 1997: 113). Pietist theologians at Halle suggest that Wolff’s doctrine 
of predetermined harmony implies that deserting soldiers cannot be held responsible for 
their actions (Drechsler, 1997: 113-114). In May 1723 Wolff’s philosophy is banned by 
all schools and universities under Prussian jurisdiction, and by November that year he is 
dismissed from Halle, and ordered to leave Prussia within forty-eight hours (see 
Drechsler, 1997: 114; Israel, 2001: 545). The incident boosts Wolff’s fame and 
notoriety, catalysing debates about academic freedom and the extent of his impiety 
across the German states, and bringing questions about the power and limits of reason 
and rationalistic philosophy to the fore. 
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     Wolff eventually returns to Halle in 1744, and is made Imperial Baron in 1745, but 
by this time the affair and its aftermath had deepened a fault line in German thought, 
polarising those who support and oppose Wolff, his methods and the imperial ban on his 
works. Another event which surfaces this growing rift is the publication of the 
“Wertheim Bible” in 1735, which attempts to give naturalistic, rational and logical 
explanations for everything supernatural and miraculous in the Hebrew Pentateuch 
(Israel, 2001: 552ff; Lifschitz, 2012: 50-52). In several places the word ‘God’ is 
substituted with phrases such as the ‘divine will’ or the ‘autonomous entity’ (Lifschitz, 
2012: 50). Johann Lorenz Schmidt, the anonymous author of the edition, is a dedicated 
Wolffian, and Wolff’s opponents did what they could to use this association to tarnish 
the latter’s reputation. The French philosopher Pierre Louis Maupertuis, president of the 
Berlin Academy from 1746 until his death in 1759, is vehemently opposed to Wolff and 
his methods and publishes several essays that are highly critical of him (Lifschitz, 2012: 
62; Wilson, 1995: 454ff). Despite this widespread opposition, ultimately Wolff’s 
influence on German philosophy is enormous. He is dubbed the second Praeceptor 
Germaniae (“teacher of Germany”), doing for eighteenth century what Melanchthon did 
for the sixteenth: furnishing German philosophy with a new vocabulary and methods 
which came to play a central role in the way philosophy was institutionalised in the 
early eighteenth century. 
 
The Legacy of Leibniz and Wolff from Kant to Frege 
 
     In the 1740s, though Wolff is still well established as a core part of the teaching of 
philosophy in Germany, his influence begins to wane (Reill, 1975: 30ff). The middle of 
the eighteenth century sees the start of a “Leibniz renaissance”, catalysed by the 
2. The Purification of Reason: Leibniz to Frege 
45 
discovery and publication of many of his writings in the 1750s and 1760s (Jauernig, 
2014: 298). Both thinkers come to play a significant role in the intellectual development 
of the Kant, who both draws on and reacts against both thinkers throughout his life. 
Leibniz becomes the single philosopher most cited by Kant, who later writes that his 
Critique of Pure Reason is “the true apology for Leibniz” (Jauernig, 2014: 289, 299). As 
we shall explore further in the next chapter Kant’s Critique both aims to establish the 
limits of what philosophers may hope for from pure reason, as well as giving a more 
realistic appraisal of how reason functions and its relation to experience. 
 
     When he is sixteen Kant studies the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff under the 
rationalist Martin Knutzen in Königsberg. Though the status of pietism is contested (due 
to significant opposition from orthodox political and religious authorities), Kant is well 
aware of the Pietist critiques of the Wolffian philosophy. Kant’s parents are 
acquaintances of Franz Albert Schulz, a Pietist theologian and philosopher who studied 
under Wolff, who tried to effect a kind of rapprochement between Pietism and Wolffian 
rationalism (Kuehn, 2001: 37-40). Kant later studies under Schulz at the University of 
Königsberg, who urges the former to contact him if he ever wanted to become a 
preacher (Kuehn, 2001: 70-72). Later, when Kant begins to lecture in the mid 1750s, he 
uses Alexander Baumgarten’s 1739 Metaphysica and Georg Friedrich Meier’s 1752 
Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (‘Extract from the Theory of Reason’) as the core 
textbooks for his students. Baumgarten is a Leibnizian and a follower of Wolff and 
Meier is Baumgarten’s student and also a Wolffian (Kuehn, 2001: 109). It is Kant’s 
“pre-critical” philosophy from around this time that is one of the triggers for Hamann’s 
Socratic Memorabilia in 1759. 
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     While over the next several decades Kant investigates the limits of pure reason – 
undertaking a critical examination of what reason can and cannot do in his 1781 
Critique of Pure Reason (as we shall see in the next section) – he nevertheless continues 
to confirm many of the assumptions and approaches of his rationalist forebears, albeit in 
a highly qualified and more limited form. His Critique simultaneously serves to curb the 
more extravagant claims of reason (particularly metaphysical claims) and to affirm and 
give a sound epistemological footing to its more modest claims. He says that his 
Critique should “really be only negative, serving not for the amplification but only for 
the purification of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors” (Kant, 1998: 133). He is 
still convinced of the paramount importance of pure reason in combatting dogma and 
prejudice to prepare the path for knowledge, and his critical analysis serves to provide 
philosophers with a manual for how to reason – including a more nuanced and 
sophisticated account of the differences between the eternal truths of reason and the 
facts of experience, distinguishing between propositions which are analytic and 
synthetic, and a priori and a posteriori. Crucially, Kant moves away from the narrow 
and mechanical conception of reason advanced by his rationalist predecessors and 
suggests that reason cannot be understood apart from an analysis of the structure of how 
human beings experience worlds – a move which is essential for Hamann and Herder’s 
subsequent linguistic metacritiques. 
 
     Kant’s later work proposes that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the way the 
world actually is and the way it appears to us, effecting a “transcendental” shift from the 
investigation of the nature of the world (metaphysics) and of what there is (ontology) to 
the investigation of how we know (epistemology) and how things appear to us. 
Notwithstanding these radical departures from his predecessors, his new philosophy 
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contains several elements that we may recognise from Wolff and Leibniz. He divides his 
task in the Critique into the “doctrine of the elements” and the “doctrine of the method 
of pure reason”, which is reminiscent of previous projects to distil a set of fundamental 
elements through conceptual analysis and the watertight logical apparatus or 
methodology through with we can reason with them. Through his ‘transcendental 
deduction’ Kant derives twelve fundamental ‘categories’ or concepts of the 
understanding – a process which Manfred Kuehn contends can be read against a 
background of Wolffian philosophy (Kuehn, 1997). His turn from the content of 
philosophical claims towards the process of arriving at such content also mirrors 
Leibniz’s and Wolff’s preoccupations with formalising reasoning processes – and he 
develops his own ‘transcendental logic’ as a contribution to this endeavour (Gabbay & 
Woods, 2004: 85-130). However, Kant’s relationship with pure reason is certainly 
ambivalent, and his works are also a very important source for thinkers who were more 
critical of the idea of pure reason (which I shall examine in chapter five). On the one 
hand – as Hamann and Herder contend – Kant retains an interest in the purification of 
reason from experience and tradition in order to inform sound deliberation in 
philosophy. On the other hand, his Critique explicitly targets the rationalist dogmatic 
metaphysics of what he calls the “Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy” and his 
transcendental aesthetic and transcendental analytic represent a ground-breaking shift in 
the understanding of reason from a focus on the specification of a formal calculus to an 
analysis of the conditions of possibility of worlds of experience. This shift will prove 
vital for Hamann and Herder’s work, as well as for many of the thinkers drawing on the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn that I will examine later in this thesis. 
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     Later in the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century there is a broader shift 
amongst many German philosophers away from a picture of reason as calculation, and 
towards a richer and more historically grounded conception – under the influence of a 
succession of thinkers from Herder (who was taught by Kant) to Hegel, who has a 
profound influence on the direction of German philosophy. Logic continues to retain a 
special place in the speculative constructions of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, who said 
its object was “pure knowledge” or “pure thought” (Sluga, 1980: 11). 
 
     Towards the middle of the nineteenth century controversies about the big claims of 
reason are replaced by controversies about the big claims of scientific materialism. 
Scientific and technological developments, industrialisation and urbanisation pose new 
challenges to philosophical views of the previous decades. As an antidote to the 
speculative excesses of Hegelianism, various forms of materialism and naturalism 
modelled closely on the physical sciences come to dominate – led by a new generation 
of thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott, Ludwig Büchner, 
Heinrich Czolbe and Ernst Haeckel (Sluga, 1980: 17). Hans Sluga claims that during the 
period between 1830 (Hegel died in 1831) and 1870 “philosophy was wholly on the 
defensive in German thought”, and that one of the ways in which it was able to justify 
its broader societal utility and relevance after 1870 was through the “investigation of the 
logical structure of mathematics, science and language” (Sluga, 1980: 10). 
 
     The 1860s see a resurgence of interest in Kant’s philosophy, leading to the 
emergence of what becomes known as “neo-Kantianism”: one of the most influential 
developments in German philosophy for the rest of the nineteenth century (cf. Beiser, 
2011). This resurgence of Kant is an important influence on Gottlob Frege, who plays 
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an important role in reanimating interest in pure reason in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Frege wishes to draw on the Kantian philosophical tradition in order 
to investigate and strengthen the foundations of mathematics (Sluga, 1980: 43). He 
shares Kant’s sharp distinction between analytic and the synthetic propositions. Frege’s 
work is also influenced by the Neo-Kantian philosopher Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s work 
on logic, validity, and value theory (Sluga, 1980: 52-58). Husserl later says that he is 
indebted to Lotze, and Heidegger urges his students to read Lotze’s Logik, calling it “the 
fundamental book [Grundbuch] of modern logic” (Sluga, 1980: 40, 53; Gabriel, 2002: 
44). Lotze maintains that on the one hand all natural processes can be given a 
mechanical explanation, and on the other hand mechanical explanations stand in need of 
metaphysical foundations, broadly along the lines of the idealist tradition that was 
rejected by the century’s dominant materialisms (Sluga, 1980: 27, 53; Gabriel, 2002: 
39-51). Frege also reads Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, another philosopher who 
believes in the importance of philosophical traditions rejected by the new materialists – 
in particular Plato and Aristotle (Sluga, 1980: 49). In particular, Frege reads 
Trendelenburg’s essay “On Leibniz’s Project of a Universal Characteristic”, which 
traces Leibniz’s work on the characteristica universalis back to earlier work on 
universal languages by Llull, Kircher, Dalgarno and Wilkins. Frege draws upon this 
tradition in his own work to create a pure logical language, which – adopting 
Trendelenburg’s term – he calls the Begriffsschrift, or “conceptual script” (Sluga, 1980: 
49). Frege writes about Leibniz: 
 
Leibniz has strewn such an abundance of intellectual seeds in his writings that hardly anyone can 
measure up to him in this respect. Some of these seeds came to fruition in his own time and 
through his co-operation; others were forgotten but later rediscovered and further developed. That 
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justifies the expectation that much in his work that apparently lies dead and buried will one day 
come back to life. Among these I reckon the idea of a lingua characterica. (Sluga, 1980: 60) 
 
     Frege’s readings of Lotze and Trendelenburg, are predominantly orientated towards 
providing him with material that he can work into his own emerging conceptual 
architecture. His Begriffsschrift, published in 1879, is intended to help to overcome the 
ambiguities and impurities of natural language. Like Leibniz he recognises the wealth 
and indispensability of natural language, and yet also is frustrated by its imprecision 
which he desires to ameliorate with the assistance of a formal, logical supplement. “The 
business of the logician”, he writes, “is a continuous fight against the psychological and, 
in part, against language and grammar” (Sluga, 1980: 64). His new concept language is 
intended to assist with the process of submitting inferential arguments to forensic 
scrutiny by determining the “objective conceptual content” of a given set of statements, 
translating this into the conceptual notation, performing the relevant calculation to 
check whether the inferential chain is logically watertight, and then interpreting the 
results back into ordinary language. Frege develops a sophisticated system of symbolic 
notation and writes extensively about how a wide variety of things we say – from 
ordinary utterances to complex mathematical propositions – can be resolved into a 
parsimonious and perspicuous new logical language. 
 
     While Frege’s teacher Lotze writes at the end of his Logik that he hopes that 
philosophy will aspire to “understand the course of the world, and not merely to 
calculate it”, it is precisely towards the latter that Frege’s project is directed: to grasp the 
objective “propositional content” of our utterances and to calculate the validity of our 
inferences about them (Sluga, 1980: 73). In this sense he can be considered a 
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philosophical descendent of Llull and Leibniz’s twofold aspiration towards logical 
primitives and a logical calculus. He is particularly interested in how to render the 
various argumentative expressions we have in ordinary language (like ‘and’, ‘or’, 
‘therefore’, ‘if … then’, ‘is’, ‘the’) and mathematical concepts and functions (‘+’, ‘–’, 
‘number’, ‘set’, ‘variable’) into a bare minimum of logical operators. The purpose of 
this project is to determine how truth flows through the apparatus of argument. He also 
devotes himself to explaining how it is that the basic elements of this logical apparatus 
and the formulations generated from it relate to the world. His 1892 paper “On Sense 
and Reference”, now considered a foundational text in the history of English language 
analytical philosophy, analyses proper names, descriptions and sentences in terms of 
their “reference” (what they refer to) and their “sense” (how they refer). He contends 
that for sentences, the “sense” is the thought they contain, and their “reference” is their 
‘truth-value’, thus effectively making “striving for truth” the end of all meaning, the 
telos of his universal logical language (Sluga, 1980: 157-161). 
 
     In 1902 the English philosopher Bertrand Russell writes to Frege in order to clarify 
various aspects of the latter’s work for a book on the Principles of Mathematics, 
enquiring about an apparently relatively minor contradiction he had found in Frege’s 
system. This correspondence came to simultaneously challenge the foundations of 
Frege’s logical project, and to secure his legacy and influence in an analytical tradition 
of philosophy that continues into the present day, from his own and Russell’s logical 
works, to the works of thinkers such as Moore, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Tarski, 
Popper, Quine, Austin, Grice, Davidson, Putnam, and many others. Many of the 
approaches and assumptions that we have examined in this section are still very much 
alive in this tradition, which dominates the way philosophy is taught in the English 
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speaking world – from the importance of formal conceptual analysis, to the idea that 
ordinary language stands in need of clarification through a logical language or 
metalanguage, to the notion of reasoning as a form of specialised calculation which 
aims to preserve the “flow of truth” from premises through to conclusions. The growth 
of interest in this picture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century led to another 
resurgence of interest in Leibniz, and the publication of some of his logical works which 
had previously not seen the light of day. In an article in Mind in 1902, Russell argues 
that Leibniz’s logical work should be seen as the heart of his philosophy, claiming that 
his “metaphysic rests solely upon the principles of his Logic, and proceeds entirely from 
them” (Frankfurt, 1972: 366).7 He later re-iterates and strives to substantiate this 
reading in his 1937 book on Leibniz.8 
 
     In this section, I have examined some of the main aspects of a conception of reason 
and its purification that still has traction in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this 
picture reason is considered to be a formal instrument for conceptual argumentation, 
which it is the job of the philosopher to purify and develop. To realise reason’s 
potential, philosophers of pure reason must construct an apparatus of a priori axioms 
and principles which should be separated from the ambiguities and imprecision of our 
ordinary forms of communication. Human understanding can be more or less sharply 
divided into those things which are part of the apparatus of pure reason, and those 
things to which it must be applied: such as history, culture, language, morality, 
experience, the law, society, politics, the natural sciences, technology, and everything 
else. The philosopher must operate this apparatus of pure reason in the same way that 
                                                
7 Russell says his interpretation is largely derived from M. Couturat’s reading. 
8 He writes: “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic” (Russell, 1937: v). 
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scientists or engineers work with their own specialised technical languages. In this 
picture, philosophers qua philosophers should be more concerned with understanding 
the form rather than the content of our utterances. Like the mythical zairja, a well-
constructed conceptual apparatus should help us to answer questions and guide our 
judgement on any topic, and the job of the philosopher should be simply to assemble 
and operate it. 
 
     In the next section I will examine critiques of this picture of reason – focusing on 
Hamann and Herder’s metacritiques of Kant, and their articulation of an alternative 
picture in which language plays a central role. I will suggest that we should not forget or 
overlook the utopian Leibnizian seed – the promise of universal peace, emancipation 
and the advancement of humankind – which originally motivated many of the 
philosophers of pure reason. As I shall explore further in chapter seven, the challenge is 
how to retain rather than reject the promise of the universality of reason by formulating 
an alternative to the philosophical project of purification. As I shall explore in the next 
two chapters, language will play a central role in this alternative project, albeit a 
conception of language which significantly differs from that of the twentieth century 
linguistic turn in analytic philosophy. 
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3. The Limits of Pure Reason: Kant, 
Hamann, Herder 
 
 
“Not only is the entire faculty of thought founded on language […] but language is also the 
centerpoint of reason’s misunderstanding with itself” (Hamann, 2007: 211) 
 
     Having looked at the rise of pure reason in German philosophy, in this chapter I will 
compare Hamann, Herder and Kant’s respective views about the limits of pure reason. 
From his Socratic Memorabilia onwards, Hamann portrays the philosophical project of 
purifying reason as myopic – overlooking many other ways of understanding and 
engaging with the world. Hamann and Herder contrast an impoverished conception of 
philosophical rationality with other historically situated and socially constituted sense-
making practices. While they draw on elements of the British empiricist tradition 
against philosophical rationalism, they advance a richer conception of experience which 
is as much informed by debates in aesthetics, theology, philology and a Neoplatonist 
conception of emanationism as it is by the role of experience in scientific 
experimentation which is paradigmatic for Bacon, Locke and Hume. Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason also aims to highlight the limits of pure reason and is informed by various 
critical reactions to Wolffian philosophy’s zeal for abstraction and formalisation – as 
well as aspiring to overcome the dichotomy between rationalism and empiricism 
through the transcendental analytic. However, in their respective “metacritiques” in 
response to Kant’s Critique, Hamann and Herder argue that he remains committed to an 
overly abstract and ahistorical conceptual schema which is in fact dependent on 
language – as that which gives form to both rationality and experience. 
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Hamann and Herder on the Purification of Reason 
 
     As I have shown in the previous chapter, debates about the potential and limits of 
reason stretch back to before the beginnings of German language philosophy – from the 
controversy surrounding the reception of Aristotle, to theological debates about the 
source of truth in religion. When Hamann published his Socratic Memorabilia in 1759 
he was writing against the background of decades of controversy between Wolffian 
rationalism and its Pietist opponents, and centuries of theological disputes about the 
comparative value of reason and revelation. 
 
     Why is this piece so important? The letter marks the beginning of the authorship of 
Hamann, one of most prominent opponents of the purification of reason of the period in 
question; and it is addressed to Kant, whose ideas about pure reason continue to 
exercise a profound influence on the practise of philosophy to this day – to the extent 
that Modern European Philosophy after this period is often simply described as “Post-
Kantian”. Many of the concerns raised in Hamann’s letter have subsequently become 
central themes in European philosophy for the next two centuries: the limits of formal 
instrumental rationality and the corresponding turn towards other sources of meaning 
and understanding such as language, history, culture, experience and the body. While 
these themes were of broader intellectual interest to many Enlightenment thinkers 
around this time, they were often interested in analysing and exploring these topics from 
the perspective of philosophical reason. Hamann’s move was to turn this around, 
arguing that the pure reason of philosophers should be considered subordinate to other 
ways of making sense. While Hamann’s 1759 letter responds to Kant’s thought from his 
“pre-critical” period – Hamann and Herder both draw extensively on Kant’s critical 
work, in particular his transcendental analytic in his Critique of Pure Reason. 
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     According to Hamann, proponents of the Leibnizian-Wolffian project to distil a 
conceptual meta-language possess a misplaced optimism in reasoning processes which 
possess far less power and utility than they believe. In the midst of their purification and 
boiling down, these philosophers risk underestimating other forms of understanding 
which may be far more valuable than they realise and upon which their formal 
reasoning processes in fact depend. As we shall examine further in chapter five, 
Hamann contends that it is ultimately language which is responsible for “reason’s 
misunderstanding with itself” (Hamann, 2007: 211). 
 
     What does Hamann say about the limits of reason? As we briefly examined above, in 
his 1759 Socratic Memorabilia he challenges the portrayal of Socrates as a champion of 
pure reason and rational argumentation, instead suggesting that his wisdom lies in his 
apprehension of his mortality and his ignorance – which is in fact a kind of “sensibility” 
(Hamann, 1967: 167). This sensibility means that Socrates is able to be receptive to the 
world, language and experience: 
 
His philosophy was suitable for every place and every situation. The market, the field, a banquet, 
the prison were his schools, and whatever medley of human life and intercourse he happened to 
encounter served him as a place to sow the seed of truth. (Hamann, 1967: 177) 
 
     Hamann portrays Socrates as a sculptor, whose receptivity to the world informs his 
cultural craft, reshaping and working with a broad range of linguistic material. By 
contrast, the Athenians – his murderers – are associated with elaborate formality, 
theoretical artificiality and a zeal for abstraction. “Between sensibility and a theoretical 
proposition”, Hamann writes “is a greater difference than between a living animal and 
its anatomical skeleton” (Hamann, 1967: 167). Hamann says that even the false idol of 
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“the public” that Kant and Berens proclaim to serve is an abstraction, which does not 
see or hear, which wants to know and judge everything, but learns and understands 
nothing (139). Hamann anticipates a range of thinkers who challenge the abstract 
conception of the public in favour of a more granular understanding of specific publics. 
This includes Kierkegaard, who was significantly influenced by the works of Hamann 
(cf. Hay, 2008; Gray, 2012), as well as Dewey, Lippmann and Habermas in the 
twentieth century (Dewey, 1922, 1954; Lippmann, 1993, 1998; Habermas, 1991). 
 
     Hamann suggests that Socrates’s philosophical accomplishment resides in his ability 
to take the arguments of his interlocutors, and to use this material to interrogate their 
positions through dialogue – including through his use of rhetoric, metaphors, irony and 
analogy. Hamann himself aspires to do this throughout his works, using the terms of his 
contemporaries, but completely changing their context or meaning. This is his strategy 
for re-reading Socrates “in a Socratic way”, for offering a “metacritical” perspective on 
Kant’s critique, and for his sceptical reading of Hume. While philosophers are prone to 
decontextualisation, taking concepts out of the world and considering them in isolation, 
Hamann’s pursues a strategy of recontextualisation, placing ideas back into their 
(previously forgotten) contexts. Hence, Hamann does not write for an abstract “general 
public”, but rather for particular people: Kant and Berens. While philosophers may 
imagine themselves to operate in accordance with purified argumentative structures, 
they are in fact “just as subject to the law of imitation as the poet” (169), and they must 
deliberate with the same communicative repertoire as the rest of us – complete with its 
historical connotations and contingent associations with many different contexts in life. 
Thus, Hamann writes: 
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Like numbers, words derive their value from the position which they occupy, and their concepts 
are, like coins, mutable in their definitions and relations, according to time and place. (163) 
 
While philosophers can attempt to arbitrarily redefine linguistic terms, they cannot shed 
the broader associations that they accrue as a result of their usage in life, any more than 
they can escape their own limits as mortal, embodied creatures. 
 
     Hamann’s insistence on the situated, embodied and intersubjective character of 
communication can be seen as a performative challenge to ideals of disembodied 
universality, impartiality, and timelessness. Does this mean that Hamann’s works have 
little applicability outside of the particular situations he is addressing? On the contrary, 
Hamann’s works contain several themes that persist over many decades and which 
continue to have a broader philosophical relevance today. His 1758 London writings 
have two main concerns – nature and scripture (both understood in a broad sense) – and 
in them he alludes to many of the ideas that will preoccupy him throughout his life: the 
primacy of the aesthetic modes of engaging with the world embodied in cultural 
expression (Betz, 2008: 59), the aesthetic and spiritual dimensions of experience (54), 
the limitations of overly narrow conceptions of reason (47), and – following the biblical 
notion that “we know in part” (I Corinthians 13:8-9), the inescapable partiality of 
human knowledge (57). 
 
     After the Socratic Memorabilia in 1759 Hamann revisits many of these themes in his 
works of the early 1760s. Following the 1759 Berlin Academy prize contest (which I 
discuss in chapter five), language becomes a major focus for Hamann’s writings during 
this period. In a similar vein to his re-reading of Socrates as a sculptor, in Cloverleaf of 
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Hellenistic Letters (1762) Hamann portrays Aristotle and Plato as a draftsman and 
colourist respectively, and foregrounds their role as conduits for ancient sources of 
wisdom, against dominant readings focusing on their logical and rational discursive 
methods rather than on the content of their insights (Hamann, 2007: 45). In his 1762 
Aesthetica in Nuce, he is at his most condemnatory towards the philosophical zeal for 
abstraction, writing: 
 
Oh for a muse like a refiner’s fire, and like a fuller’s soap! – – She will dare to purify the natural 
use of the senses from the unnatural use of abstractions, by which our concepts of things are as 
maimed as the name of the Creator is suppressed and blasphemed. (79) 
 
Throughout the piece Hamann alludes to Francis Bacon’s critique of abstract rationality 
in favour of an experimental empiricism. Though Hamann’s views on experience differ 
significantly from Bacon and other empiricists (as we shall see further in chapter five), 
he nevertheless leverages their work against what he sees as the dangerously narrow and 
misleading rationalism of his philosophical contemporaries, appealing to something 
much like what Bacon calls the lumine naturae et experientiae or “light of nature and 
experience” (Bacon, 1863: 85). However, Hamann does not share the empiricists’ 
narrow experimental conception of experience as a kind of epistemological input or 
evidence (as per the natural sciences). Instead he proposes an aesthetic and spiritual 
conception of experience, which is given form in language. Hamann challenges lovers 
of abstraction to read the Iliad without the vowels alpha or omega (80). Ultimately he 
concludes that, regardless of whether they notice or not, even the most rationalistic of 
philosophers cannot help but depend on the imperfections of human language and 
linguistically mediated experience in order to advance their views and to make sense of 
the world around them. 
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     Hamann met Herder in Königsberg around 1763 (Clark, 1955: 46). Hamann taught 
Herder English, and together they undertook readings of Shakespeare, John Milton, 
Edward Young, Laurence Sterne and David Hume (46). Although some scholars have 
suggested that Hamann’s influence on Herder’s mature philosophical views has been 
somewhat exaggerated (see, for example, Clark, 1955; Forster, 2010, 2011a), it is clear 
that Hamann made a profound impression on the younger man. Herder also attended 
Immanuel Kant’s classes in Königsberg between 1762 and 1764, more than a decade 
and a half before the latter’s Critique of Pure Reason of 1781. 
 
     In his 1765 “How Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the 
Benefit of the People”, Herder dialectically argues against abstract philosophy for 
philosophy’s sake, and advances a kind of philosophy which is closer to the concerns of 
ordinary people. The main question which the essay seeks to address is: “how can 
philosophy be reconciled with humanity and politics so that it also really serves the 
latter?”. In responding to this question he alternates between a deep cynicism about the 
utility of philosophy and a measured optimism, if some fundamental adjustments are 
made in its scope, aims and methods. In his cynical mode, he paints a picture of 
rationalist philosophers as “a troglodyte-people living in caves with Minerva’s night-
owls” (Herder, 2002: 7), peddling the “machine-like” teaching of “school Logic” (9), 
which is “full of holes” (12) and “eternal errors” (16). 
 
     While philosophers are often convinced that their discourses and discoveries will 
somehow lead to improving the world, rationalistic philosophy is a kind of “siren song” 
(17) luring us to “a labyrinth full of distinctions” (24) and “endless doubts and errors” 
(15), leading us to “get lost in the thorns” (24). The mathematical apriorism of 
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philosophy is ultimately “useless for human beings” (18), “useless for the state” (7), 
“harmful for society” (18) and “plunges [us] into ruin” (17). He writes: 
 
Our philosophical reason only, like Daedalus, creates for itself labyrinths, in order to make itself a 
guiding thread; it ties knots in order to be able to untie them; it throws itself into battles where 
swords and arrows wound in order to play the part of a holy art. O doctor, aid yourself. Lucky is 
the people that does not need your aid. (Herder, 2002: 11) 
 
Like Hamann, Herder argues that philosophers of pure reason are blind to the evolving 
world of life, nature, history and human sociality, and attempt to subordinate their 
experience of it to abstract categories and inflexible formal systems and methods. In 
doing so, they perpetuate harmful fictions. Following Hamann’s account in Aesthetic in 
Nuce, Herder comments on the destructive potential of the overzealous purification of 
reason: 
 
O you who wish to tear away with a bold hand the veil that nature wove before things, may your 
hand tremble back. You schoolteacher, who force your pupils to abstract philosophy, you work 
contrary to nature – feverishly and yet uselessly, indeed as a destroyer of nature. (Herder, 2002: 
17) 
 
     Herder says that in order to redeem itself, philosophy must stop “clinging to 
creations of our own reason”, and stop renouncing the “habit of lively regard for the 
creations of nature and society” (11). “Philosophy must descend from the stars to human 
beings” (19), he writes, and develop a “healthy understanding” (11) which speaks of 
and speaks to the world: 
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If philosophy [Philosophie] is to become useful for human beings, then let it make the human 
being its center. Philosophy, which has weakened itself by far too huge overextensions, will 
become strong when it restricts itself to its center. (Herder, 2002: 21) 
 
If it is to become useful for humanity, philosophy must become leave its caves and 
darkness and become literate with the world. He presents us with a vision of people 
reclaiming the resources of philosophy, and putting them to work in the service of 
humanity: 
 
So push forth, O people, into the holy places of philosophy. Tear down all the idols, and construct 
there state buildings, assemblies where instead of philosophical nonsense the healthy 
understanding counsels the state, humanity. Tear from the philosophers their Diogenes-capes and 
teach them pillars of the state. (Herder, 2002: 18) 
 
     Would there be anything recognisably philosophical about a philosophy which is 
literate with the world as Herder describes it? Would such a philosophy not simply 
dissolve into other disciplines? While he closes the essay with provocative thought that 
“philosophy becomes anthropology”, in his more optimistic moments he argues that 
“only philosophy can be an antidote for all the evil into which philosophical curiosity 
has plunged us” (18), and that “all the shortcomings of the healthy understanding must 
be capable of being removed by itself” (11), a thought which anticipates Kant’s critical 
project of the following decades. 
 
     As we shall examine further in chapter five, in his 1767-1768 Fragments on Recent 
German Literature Herder argues that philosophers’ relentless quest for abstraction 
leave them impoverished. He opens the essay with the thought that “the exactitude of a 
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language diminishes its richness” (Herder, 2002: 33), echoing Hamann's claim that “the 
purity of a language dispossesses it of its wealth” (Hamann, 2007: 31). Under the 
influence of philosophers like Christian Wolff, who wish to “determine [words] 
precisely”, philosophical language has been “greatly reduced in synonyms” and thereby 
in its expressive repertoire. Happily, Herder says, philosophers’ pushes for purification 
don’t have much effect on discourse outside the academy. In the Fragments Herder also 
reiterates Hamann’s claim that “poetry is the mother-tongue of the human race” 
(Hamann, 2007: 63). Thus Herder writes: 
 
You cannot determine them all, philological philosopher! You will presumably want to throw those 
ones away? But does everyday language also throw them away? No! Your jurisdiction does not yet 
extend that far, and still less into the land of the poets. The poet will inevitably become furious if 
you rob him of synonyms; he lives from superfluity. And if you determine them? But aside from 
the fact that you cannot, then beautiful prose and beautiful poetry disappears completely, 
everything becomes a rosary of counted-out terms of art. It is ever a stroke of luck for the poet and 
a stroke of bad luck for the philosopher that the first inventors of language were not philosophers 
and its first developers were mostly poets. (Herder, 2002: 36) 
 
     In a series of essays in the 1770s, Herder argues that while reason is language. 
However, many philosophers view reason as a “compartmentalized, separately effective 
force” (85) above and beyond language and experience. Herder laments philosophers’ 
“single cold gift of abstraction” (138) and their love of “cold, slowly reasoned, carefully 
abstracting experiments” to extract nature’s secrets (135). Contrary to this philosophical 
vision of abstraction, in his view reason is social and historical, imitating “resounding, 
acting, stirring nature” (Herder, 2002: 103). 
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      In 1772, Hamann wrote several essays that responded to Herder’s views on reason 
and language in Treatise on the Origin of Language, including The Last Will and 
Testament of the Knight of the Rose-Cross and Philological Ideas and Doubts. While he 
disagrees with many aspects of Herder’s account (and doubts that it hangs together as a 
coherent argument), Hamann agrees that our reason is derived from language, and that 
language is very often the origin of philosophical confusions and misunderstandings. 
He argues that reason “has its source in the twofold instruction of sensible revelations 
and human testimonies” and that, through their conceptual analyses, philosophers “[put] 
asunder what nature has joined together”.  
 
     Herder’s views about reason in the Treatise are developed throughout his works in 
the 1770s. In his 1778 On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul, he argues 
that philosophical reason is derived from and dependent upon language and experience. 
While philosophers might attack natural language for its imperfections, they 
nevertheless have no alternative through which to formulate and articulate their ideas 
and systems: 
 
The philosophers who declaim against figurative language and themselves serve nothing but old, 
often uncomprehended, figurative idols are at least in great contradiction with themselves. They do 
not want new gold to be minted, while on the other hand they do nothing but ever and ever spin the 
same threads out of precisely such, often much worse, gold. (Herder, 2002: 188) 
 
Herder argues that philosophers’ passion for the purification and mechanisation of 
reason means that they risk becoming absorbed by what are effectively irrelevant 
games: 
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Now it is in the face of this sort of deep abyss of obscure sensations, forces, and irritations that our 
bright and clear philosophy is horrified most of all; it crosses itself before it as before the hell of 
the soul’s basest forces and prefers to play on the Leibnizian chess-board with a few empty words 
and classifications about obscure and clear, distinct and confused ideas, about cognition in and 
outside oneself, with oneself and without oneself, and so forth. This method is so lovely and easy 
that it has already been chosen as a basic principle to introduce into philosophy nothing but empty 
words, with which, it is held, one is as little required to think as the calculator with his numbers: 
this, it is held, will enable philosophy to attain the perfection of mathematics, that one can keep on 
inferring without thinking – a philosophy from which may all the Muses save us! (196) 
 
     Whereas the pure reason of philosophers “unwinds everything from out of itself” 
(208), Herder argues that philosophers should rather look at how reason is constituted 
by language as a set of evolving social institutions. Like Hamann, he alludes to 
empiricist critiques of philosophical rationalism – albeit with a very different 
conception of experience. Hamann and Herder argue that experience is given form by 
language and a broader range of meaningful media. Instead of taking the methods of the 
natural sciences as models for understanding experience, Hamann and Herder propose 
that philosophers should look beyond the purification of rationality and the abstract 
relations between ideas (like pure mathematicians dealing with formulae) – and towards 
the numerous contexts, social interactions and cultural forms which give shape to our 
language, understanding and experience. 
 
  
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 66 
 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
 
     While Hamann and Herder published their missives on reason and language in the 
1770s, Immanuel Kant was busy working on a project which would come to redefine 
the terrain of modern European philosophy in the following centuries. These were his 
so-called “silent years”, from the 1770s until the publication of the Critique of Pure 
Reason in 1781. Quite a few of the key elements of this work date back to his inaugural 
dissertation “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World” of 
1770, given on the occasion of being made Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the 
University of Königsberg. Kant considered this the first work of his critical period, 
proposing that a compilation of his writings began with this piece (Kuehn, 2001: 190). 
In this piece he maintains a distinction between “sensibility”, “in virtue of which it is 
possible for the subject’s own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the 
presence of some object”; and “intelligence (rationality)”, “the faculty of a subject in 
virtue of which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality 
come before the senses of that subject” (Kant, 1992: 384). According to Kant these two 
sources of our knowledge of the world – the world of the senses and the world of the 
intellect – are separate and neither one can be understood purely in terms of the other 
(Kuhn, 2001: 190). Experience can be considered in terms of a combination of the two, 
and comes about when sensory appearances are related to each other through the 
intellect (Kant, 1992: 386). 
 
     In this dissertation, Kant accuses Wolff of turning philosophers away from the 
“noblest of the enterprises of antiquity” of investigating the nature of phenomena and 
noumena, towards the discussion of comparatively inconsequential details in logic 
3. The Limits of Pure Reason: Kant, Hamann, Herder 
67 
(387). Instead Kant proposes to examine the interaction between sense and intellect, 
what we can know of them and how we can know through them, and how they co-
operate to produce the “phenomenal universe” of our experience (391). This move – to 
effect a shift in philosophical discussions of reason from a narrower focus on formal 
logical rules to a broader exploration of the conditions of possibility of experience – 
will be immensely important for German philosophy for the following two centuries, as 
well as playing a defining role in Hamann and Herder’s respective metacritiques. While 
he suggests that philosophers of pure reason aspired to “a genuine metaphysics without 
any admixture of the senses” (Kuehn, 2001: 190) – Kant proposes a complementary 
“propaedeutical” science which could aid metaphysical speculation by identifying, 
analysing and conceptually clarifying the ideas which structure our experience: 
 
Since, then, empirical principles are not found in metaphysics, the concepts met in metaphysics are 
not to be sought in the senses but in the very nature of the pure understanding, and that not as 
innate concepts but as concepts abstracted from the laws inherent in the mind (by attending to its 
actions on the occasion of an experience), and therefore as acquired concepts. To this genus 
belongs possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc., together with their opposites or 
correlates. Such concepts never enter into any sensory representations as parts, and thus they could 
not be abstracted from such representation in any way at all. (Kant, 1992: 387-388)  
 
He proceeds to give an analysis of the concepts of space and time, as “formal principles 
of the phenomenal universe”, “schemata and conditions of everything sensitive in 
human cognition” which are “absolutely primary and fundamental” (391). Time and 
space, says Kant, are “pure intuitions”, “presupposed by the senses” which structure and 
enable experience. They are fundamental conditions of “all possible objects of the 
senses”, “subjective and ideal” and “issuing from the nature of the mind” rather than 
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“objective and real” as substances, accidents or relations (397). As they are pure 
intuitions rather than general concepts, “all the fundamental properties of these concepts 
lie beyond the limits of reason, and, thus, they cannot in any way be explained by the 
understanding” (399). 
 
     Through this propaedeutic project, Kant wishes to disentangle our sensibility from 
our intellect, in order to obtain a clearer distinction between the two domains: each with 
its own principles and methods. Many forms of philosophical misunderstanding arise 
from mixing the two domains. In particular, he is motivated to insulate the operations of 
pure reason from “principles of sensibility” which have “disastrously permeated the 
whole of metaphysics” (407). He does this through the examination of “fallacies of 
subreption” or “subreptic axioms” which lead philosophers to treat matters of pure 
reason in the same way that we think about matters of sensibility (408-409). For 
example, we are led by the forms of sensibility of space and time to think that 
“whatever is, is somewhere and somewhen”, but this notion will lead us to absurd 
conclusions if we try to apply it to immaterial entities such as the soul (409-410). Kant 
presents this work as a contribution to the broader endeavour to purify reason such that 
it may be more effectively utilised by “all who intend to penetrate the very recesses of 
metaphysics” (415). Moreover, he contends that such a project of the purification is 
necessary if we are to avoid being misled by reason and in order to realise its full 
potential: 
 
Here, in pure philosophy, method precedes all science. And everything which is attempted before 
rules of this method have been properly hammered out and firmly established will appear to have 
been rashly conceived and deserve to be relegated to the vain playthings of the mind. For, since it 
is the right use of reason which here sets up the very principles themselves, and since it is in virtue 
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of the natural character of reason alone that objects and also the axioms, which are to be thought 
with respect to objects, first become known, the exposition of the laws of pure reason is the very 
genesis of science; and the distinguishing of these laws from suppositious laws is the criterion of 
truth. (406-407) 
 
     Many of these themes in his inaugural dissertation preoccupied Kant for the 
following decade, and prepared the way for work on his Critique of Pure Reason (which 
in 1771 had the working title of “The Limits of Sensibility and Reason”). As mentioned 
above, his Critique serves to demonstrate both the limits of pure reason, by highlighting 
the contradictions that arise from its more extravagant claims, as well as giving a more 
realistic account of its constitution and potential utility. This dual function of the 
Critique mean that various aspects of Kant’s thought served as an inspiration for both 
critics as well as advocates of rationalistic philosophy. 
 
     Against “dogmatic” rationalist metaphysicians who say that we can derive 
substantive truths about the world on the basis of reason alone, he argued that there is 
little we can surmise about the world without drawing on experience. Correctly 
understood, pure reason is a limited instrument that enables us to formally analyse 
certain aspects of our understanding. Kant contends that many philosophers in the past 
have been over-optimistic about reason’s potential to uncover substantive truths about 
the world through its own resources. In his “antinomies of pure reason” Kant constructs 
rational arguments for metaphysical theses, immediately followed by counter-arguments 
for their antitheses: effectively a reductio ad absurdum argument for the impotence of 
reason without experience. As opposed to the powerful panacea of rationalist 
metaphysicians, Kant ends up defending a much more modest conception of reason as 
an instrument for keeping our understanding in check: 
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The greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is thus only negative, namely 
that it does not serve for expansion, as an organon, but rather, as a discipline, serves for the 
determination of boundaries, and instead of discovering truth it has only the silent merit of 
guarding against errors. (Kant, 1998: 672) 
 
     In 1771, in response to Kant’s inaugural dissertation “On the Form and Principles of 
the Sensible and Intelligible World”, Hamann translates the conclusion of Book I of 
David Hume’s 1738 Treatise of Human Nature. Hamann titles the translation “Night 
Thoughts of a Skeptic”, alluding to Edward Young’s 1742 Night Thoughts, one of the 
most popular English language poems of the 18th century, which follows the 
protagonist’s nocturnal ruminations as they come to terms with their own mortality. As 
Manfred Kuehn comments, Hamann’s translation was intended to highlight the 
“existential despair” at the end of the first book of Hume’s treatise – drawing 
implications from the text other than those that Hume would have likely intended 
(Kuehn, 2001: 199). Hume writes of having “narrowly escap’d ship-wreck” in a “leaky 
weather-beaten vessel” perilously casting out into the “immense depths of philosophy”, 
and the “wretched condition, weakness, and disorder of [his] faculties” (Hume, 1896: 
263-264). Hamann connects the dark honesty and confessional tone of Hume’s thoughts 
about the “manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason” (268) and the 
“chimerical systems” of metaphysics (273) to Young’s nocturnal ruminations on the 
frailty of humankind and the human intellect. The opening lines of his Night Thoughts 
tell us of his “wreck’d desponding thought”, “emerging from a sea of dreams / 
Tumultuous”, “her helm of reason lost”, and of the restorative power of “silence and 
darkness”, the contemplation of “fathomless Abyss” and “dread Eternity” (Young, 1989: 
37). “Reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds”, writes Hume (Hume, 1896: 269). 
Instead of trusting in a narrow conception of formalised rationality, we must look to our 
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linguistically mediated traditions, experience, habit and the imagination in order to 
account for human understanding, and the scope and limits of our knowledge. 
 
     Hume was written about in Germany from around the early 1740s, and his reputation 
was well established in philosophical circles prior to the translation of his An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding in 1755 (Kuehn, 1987: 49). Kant lectured about 
Hume in Königsberg in the 1750s, and as well as hearing about him from Hamann (who 
alluded to him in his Socratic Memorabilia), he discussed Hume extensively with his 
close friend, the British merchant Joseph Green, from the mid 1760s (Kuehn, 2001: 
154). In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of 1783, Kant famously wrote that 
Hume interrupted his “dogmatic slumber”, specifically regarding Hume’s challenge to 
the idea that reason alone, independently of experience, can give us knowledge of cause 
and effect (Kant, 1997: 10). Such was Hume’s influence on Kant that his Critique and 
the Prolegomena were initially seen as continuations of Hume’s project. Indeed, Kant 
himself said that he thought of the Critique as “the execution of Hume's problem in its 
widest extent” (Kuehn, 2001: 231).  However, even if Hume’s analysis of causation 
spurred Kant into “a completely different direction” (as he wrote in the Prolegomena), 
Kant nevertheless maintained that there were very crucial gaps in Hume’s empiricist 
philosophy. While Kant agreed with Hume that the rationalist cannot account for our 
understanding of causation on the basis of pure reason alone, he contends that neither 
can the empiricist account for it on the basis of the senses alone: 
 
So I tried first whether Hume’s objection might not be presented in a general manner, and I soon 
found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect is far from being the only concept 
through which the understanding thinks connections of things a priori; rather, metaphysics consists 
wholly of such concepts. I sought to ascertain their number, and as I had successfully attained this 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 72 
 
in the way I wished, namely from a single principle, I proceeded to the deduction of these 
concepts, from which I henceforth became assured that they were not, as Hume had feared, 
derived from experience, but had arisen from the pure understanding. (Kant, 1997: 10) 
 
Throughout his works in the 1780s, Kant argues that we cannot explain how the world 
appears to us, for our phenomenological experience of the world, with reference to 
either reason or the senses in isolation. The world comes to us packaged up and 
structured through “intuitions” of space and time, and the twelve “categories” of unity, 
plurality, totality, subsistence, causality, community, possibility, existence, necessity, 
reality, negation and limitation. These basic intuitions and categories that structure our 
experience of the world cannot be purely derived from or assumed to correspond with 
the world “out there”, in itself, apart from our experience of it. Hence, Kant contends, 
our experience of the world must be mediated through our own conceptual resources 
which are in place prior to our experience, but which cannot be reduced to or derived 
from our pure reason. This he calls the “pure understanding”: the fundamental 
conditions of possibility for experience. Like the elements of pure reason, concepts of 
the pure understanding are a priori, and stand in need of clarification and separation 
from the senses. Thus while pure reason is the “faculty that provides the principles of 
cognition a priori”, Kant suggests that the understanding is a “faculty for judging” with 
concepts (Kant, 1998: 149, 205). 
 
     As in his inaugural dissertation, “On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and 
Intelligible World”, in the Critique Kant maintains that we need to carefully analyse the 
distinction between reason and the senses, and this analysis is essential preparation for 
any future philosophical speculation. However, while philosophical analysis aims to 
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separate out these different capacities, it is only through their interaction that we are 
able to know: 
 
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as 
necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to 
make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts). Further, these two faculties 
or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting 
anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can 
cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix up their roles, rather one has great cause to 
separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of 
the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in 
general, i.e., logic. (Kant, 1998: 193-194) 
 
     Kant’s work in the 1770s and 1780s came to transform the philosophical landscape 
in Europe over the coming centuries. His Critique of Pure Reason posed significant 
challenges to rationalists and empiricists of all stripes and demanded a response from 
those who would wish to argue in a binary fashion for either reason or experience as the 
primary source of evidence or justification for our knowledge. His “transcendental” 
analysis led subsequent generations of philosophers to focus on how the world as it 
appears to us is structured and mediated. 
 
     Kant’s work from this period contributed to a picture of reason as obtaining its 
power and universality by virtue of its limited ambitions and scope. According to Kant, 
mathematics provides “the most resplendent example of pure reason” and philosophy 
has “every cause to hope for a sisterly union with [mathematics]” (Kant, 1998: 630, 
641). While he shares the admiration for mathematics as other philosophers examined in 
the previous chapter, Kant ultimately denies that mathematics can serve as an adequate 
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model for philosophy. The task of philosophers is rather to guard against the errors of 
reason to which they are so predisposed: 
 
Reason falls into this perplexity through no fault of its own. It begins from principles whose use is 
unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently warranted by it. With 
these principles it rises (as its nature also requires) ever higher, to more remote conditions. But 
since it becomes aware in this way that its business must always remain incomplete because the 
questions never cease, reason sees itself necessitated to take refuge in principles that overstep all 
possible use in experience, and yet seem so unsuspicious that even ordinary common sense agrees 
with them. But it thereby falls into obscurity and contradictions, from which it can indeed surmise 
that it must somewhere be proceeding on the ground of hidden errors; but it cannot discover them, 
for the principles on which it is proceeding, since they surpass the bounds of all experience, no 
longer recognize any touchstone of experience. The battlefield of these endless controversies is 
called metaphysics. (Kant, 1998: 99) 
 
“One can regard the critique of pure reason”, Kant wrote, “as the true court of justice 
for all controversies of pure reason” (649). Kant thought that the minimalism of reason 
was a natural corollary of its universality. The fact that reason was stripped and 
separated from experience, language, tradition, culture, history and society was also 
what meant that it was generally rather than only locally applicable. Like the smelting 
of precious metals from unrefined ore, Kant hopes his “court of justice” will help to 
sufficiently raise the temperature in the furnace of his enquiry, so as to melt, burn and 
boil away all that is inessential, extraneous and contingent – leaving a thin but powerful 
substrate of conceptual material which, if properly deployed, will assist us in unlocking 
the secrets of both “the starry heavens above” and “the moral law within” (Kuehn, 
2001: 313). 
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     Kant’s work after his Critique represents a crucial turning point in discussions about 
reason, language and experience in German philosophy. On the one hand, Kant draws 
on the legacy and ideals of the philosophers of pure reason discussed in the previous 
chapter, in order to offer a global and abiding analytical vocabulary through which to 
obtain an unprecedented degree of clarity, certainty and precision in philosophical 
deliberation in all contexts and settings. On the other hand, Kant offers a penetrating 
critique which highlights the limits of rationalist metaphysics which predominantly 
focuses on the logical form of the syllogism (including through his Antinomies and 
Paralogisms of Pure Reason) – suggesting instead that philosophical discussions of 
reason must provide an account of what it is for human beings to possess a world. His 
transcendental analysis of the conditions of possibility of experience will become a vital 
reference point for later philosophers who draw on the legacy of the linguistic turn in 
German philosophy. As we shall see below, Hamann and Herder question whether such 
an analysis can succeed on its own terms in order to provide a universally applicable set 
of categories and conditions which structure experience regardless of time or setting. 
Instead they both argue that Kant overlooks the way in which the structure of reason 
and experience depend upon and vary in accordance with language. 
 
Hamann and Herder’s Metacritiques of Kant 
 
     As will be examined at greater length in chapter five, both Hamann and Herder took 
issue with Kant’s zeal for the purification of reason and for separating it from language, 
culture, experience and history in their responses to his Critique of Pure Reason. 
Hamann was well acquainted with Kant’s publisher, Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, who 
secretly gave him proof sheets of Kant’s Critique as they became available, at 
Hamann’s request (Surber, 2001: 51). Hamann wrote a review of the new book that he 
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didn’t end up publishing. His Metacritique on the Purism of Reason was written in 1784 
based on notes from the previous few years, but, again, this did not see the light of day 
during his lifetime, apparently so as not to offend Kant (Kuehn, 2001: 301). Hamann’s 
Metacritique opens with a quote from Virgil lamenting the “emptiness of things” and 
goes on to allude to Berkeley and Hume’s views on the derivation of abstract general 
terms from concrete particular ones, and on how the former are parasitic on the latter 
(Hamann, 2007: 205). This sets the scene for Hamann’s broader argument, which 
essentially challenges philosophers’ prejudice for abstraction – and specifically Kant’s 
attempts to purify reason from tradition, experience and language. He argues that surely 
Kant cannot have seriously dwelt upon the mysterious and problematic “double 
impossibility” of “the human knowledge of objects of experience without and before 
any experience” and “the possibility of a sensible intuition before any sensation of an 
object” (206). For “how is the faculty of thought possible?”, Hamann asks, “the faculty 
to think right and left, before and without, with and beyond experience?” (211). He 
contends that Kant’s prejudice for the a priori betrays “an old, cold prejudice for 
mathematics” (210) and “a gnostic hatred of matter or else a mystic love of form” (209). 
While various branches of mathematics are able to fix and focus their enquiry with 
reference to “empirical signs and figures” metaphysical abstractions are at risk of 
unhinging themselves from the concrete, socially and historically situated institutions of 
meaning: 
 
metaphysics abuses the word-signs and figures of speech of our empirical knowledge by treating 
them as nothing but hieroglyphs and types of ideal relations. Through this learned troublemaking it 
works the honest decency of language into such a meaningless, rutting, unstable, indefinite 
something = x that nothing is left but a windy sough, a magic shadow play, at most, as the wise 
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Helvétius says, the talisman and rosary of a transcendental superstitious belief in entia rationis, 
their empty sacks and slogans (210) 
 
     Hamann’s rejoinder to the Kant’s vacuous “doctrinairism, doubt, and 
connoisseurship” of pure reason is language and experience. Though he doesn’t 
recognise it, Hamann contends that language underpins Kant’s whole enterprise – from 
his identification of fundamental categories and concepts which structure our 
experience, to his methodology and mode of reasoning, which all fundamentally takes 
place in language, albeit of a highly rarefied and unusual variety. Hamann’s critique of 
Kant’s critique is a metacritique in the sense that he turns to the conditions of possibility 
of the latter’s philosophy: the linguistic practices and institutions upon which Kant’s 
critical project depends. Thus Hamann writes: 
 
no deduction is needed to demonstrate the genealogical priority of language, and its heraldry, over 
the seven holy functions of logical propositions and inferences. Not only is the entire faculty of 
thought founded on language […] but language is also the centerpoint of reason’s 
misunderstanding with itself (211) 
 
While Kant seeks to conceptually distinguish the senses and the understanding (which 
Hamann describes as “a violent, unjustified, willful divorce”), Hamann contends that 
there is a fundamental unity between them. Alluding to a passage from Cicero, Hamann 
says he wishes to turn Kant and others from the “clenched fist” of narrow and fruitless 
logical manipulations, to the “open palm” of eloquence, developed through free, 
creative and sociable engagement with language, letters and experience. Hamann would 
have been intimately familiar with this distinction between logic (as exemplified by 
mathematical proof and extolled in medieval scholasticism) and rhetoric (as later 
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propounded by Renaissance humanists in the fourteenth and fifteenth century), from his 
immersion in classical literature and its reception in the world of letters. 
 
     Hamann is said to have corresponded extensively with Herder about Kant’s Critique 
in the early 1780s. While unfortunately very few of Herder’s letters to Hamann from 
this period have survived, Hamann acknowledges his debt to Herder for ideas in his 
Metacritique in several later letters (Clark, 1955: 397). After Hamann’s death in 1788, 
and riled by a disagreement with several Fichteans in Jena in the late 1790s, Herder 
used Hamann’s unpublished manuscript as the basis for his own response to Kant: A 
Metacritique on the Critique of Pure Reason (Herder, 1799). Herder’s arguments in the 
Metacritique broadly overlap with those of Hamann – to the extent that he was accused 
of plagiarism by a Kantian philosopher who had obtained a copy of Hamann’s earlier 
piece (Clark, 1955: 397). Herder says that Kant entirely neglects to see the extent to 
which his philosophy is dependent on language. All forms of abstraction, reasoning and 
philosophising fundamentally depend on language. Philosophers neglect this at their 
peril, and if they do they risk – like Kant – succumbing to all kinds of monstrous 
misunderstandings, “illusions”, and “spells”, getting lost in elaborate “word games” 
(Wortspielerei), and unwittingly creating “metaphysical delusion images” (406), “empty 
word bags” and “transcendental steam” (Cloeren, 1988: 51). Like Hamann, Herder 
thinks that language is the source of “reason’s misunderstanding with itself”: 
 
many of the misunderstandings, contradictions and absurdities attributed to reason are probably 
not due to it, but to language, as its insufficient or ill-used tool (Cloeren, 1988: 47) 
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     Herder approvingly alludes to the British empiricist John Locke’s discussion of 
language in the third book of his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and 
quotes a passage from Locke on the inseparability of language and knowledge: 
 
I must confess, then, that, when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding, and a good 
while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. 
But when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the 
extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with words, that, unless 
their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said 
clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge: which being conversant about truth, had constantly 
to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part so much by 
the intervention of words, that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. (Locke, 
1894: 118-119) 
 
While the reception of Locke’s account of language will receive further treatment in the 
next chapter, for our present purposes it is crucial to note that in his Metacritique, 
Herder agrees with Locke on two essential points. Firstly, that language plays an 
essential role in our understanding of the world. As Herder puts it, Locke was “not 
indifferent” to language as “the organon of our reason” (Surber, 2001: 90). Secondly 
that language is a significant source of misunderstanding and misconception –
particularly in rationalistic philosophy. In a chapter of his Essay titled “Of the Abuses of 
Words”, Locke details a wide variety of ways through which language can lead us 
astray – from confusions about things which do not exist, to using language in unusual 
and fantastical ways. Along these lines, Herder accuses Kant of conjuring vacuous 
phantasms through the idiosyncratic misuse of ordinary words. Though he doesn’t 
realise it, this purified reason of Kant’s is parasitic upon language, causing the “healthy 
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language of our understanding” to “become a body full of transcendental tapeworms, 
full of verbal schemata slithering all around” (Surber, 2001: 114). 
 
     Furthermore, Herder is suspicious of Kant’s preoccupation with purifying the a 
priori, reiterating Hamann’s complaint of the impossibility of access to anything before 
or outside of experience. Herder also shares Hamann’s distrust of philosophers’ 
overzealous pursuit of abstractions. “The more abstract a concept is”, he writes, “the 
more the pictorial content of its expression is reduced, until finally it seems entirely to 
disappear” (Sikka, 2007: 39). While he recognises that abstraction is an essential 
operation of language, in the hands of philosophers this is transformed into a 
pathological obsession. Thus he contrasts Kant’s “old hollow wreath of winter straw 
called transcendentalism” with the “young spring” of our actual linguistic practices 
upon which our lived experience depends. Echoing Hamann, Herder writes of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy: 
 
With ghostly words it constitutes a "super-reason" [Übervernunft] which terminates all philosophy 
and makes possible only figments, figments ex nullis ad nulla, an a priori which creates itself 
before it exists, separated from itself and without any experience. (91) 
 
     Some commentators have argued that Herder’s review fundamentally misunderstood 
Kant’s project and represents a reversion to form of naïve, pre-critical empiricism, 
whereby we should turn to the senses for insight into the nature and functioning of our 
understanding (Sikka, 2007: 31; Haym, 1954). However, it is clear that Herder is not 
advocating a position akin to that of his British predecessors, and he acknowledges that 
the senses alone are not sufficient to account for how we experience the world. In this 
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sense, Herder draws on Kant’s transcendental analytic, but argues that it is language 
which gives structure to experience: 
 
To the old saying, “Nothing is in the understanding that was not in the senses,” one can and must 
add the counterclaim. In human beings, there is no sensible concept in which the understanding 
had no part and which it did not form […] That organon of all concepts of the understanding, 
imagination, and the senses, language, provides a secure guarantee of this. (Surber, 2001: 121) 
 
Like Hamann, Herder argues that “[reason] itself is and is called language”, that 
“language is the criterion of reason” (128). To understand our reason and how it 
functions, we should not, following Kant, look to undertake a systematic project of 
purification and formalisation of reason in the abstract, but instead look at how 
languages shape our understanding – including at their textures, structures, relation to 
canonical texts and our experience, and their aesthetic and affective as well as 
conceptual dimensions. Rather than a “Critique of Pure Reason” we should undertake a 
“Physiology of the Human Powers of Knowledge” (92), through the study of our 
language and experience. Thus, Herder suggests that philosophers should cultivate a 
more holistic conception of the genesis and constitution of linguistically mediated 
reason: 
 
[...] instead of transcending, reason must turn to the origin of its endowment, i.e., back to itself and 
ask the question, “How did you come to yourself and to your concepts; how have you expressed 
these and employed, linked and unified these; how is it that you attribute to them universal, 
necessary certainty?” When reason neglects this question and isolates itself from all experience, it 
would also do well to isolate itself from language, since it certainly has language only through 
experience. (91) 
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The fetishisation of the mathematical method manifested in the works of rationalistic 
philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz – the desire to turn philosophy into a form 
of calculus such that the “external form” given to concepts is determinative of 
philosophical theses – is to put the cart before the horse, according to Herder. While 
philosophers are misled into thinking that the purification, abstraction and formalisation 
of reason might lead them to more certain conclusions, to new and unexpected insights 
(like Newton’s discoveries in the physical sciences), in fact, Herder says, “method 
means manner of presentation [Lehrart]” (126), and “method … is not everything” 
(127). If we model philosophical enquiry on formal mathematical or scientific method, 
we arbitrarily restrict ourselves to a very narrow section of our reason and 
understanding. By doing so, not only do we risk being met with “shame, boredom and 
derision”, but we exclude many other dimensions of expression and exploration in “the 
cultivation of reason”: lucidity, fluency, translation, craft, tone, metaphor, imagination 
and many other things (127). He contends that the conception of reason that Kant 
inherits and develops is one which is comparatively impoverished. 
 
     This disagreement about the character of the human understanding between Kant and 
his former pupil Herder went back at least until the mid 1770s. According to Theodor 
Gottlieb Hippel, a mutual friend of Kant and Hamann, Kant did not like, nor fully 
understand Herder’s On the Oldest Document of the Human Race (Kuehn, 2001: 224). 
In this piece Herder argues that the biblical book of Genesis is the earliest written record 
we have of a much older oral tradition, and that through the study of this and other 
theological texts, we may shed light on the relationship between humanity and the 
divine. In particular, Herder urges us to turn from the dry and unelucidating abstractions 
of philosophy to the study of (the development of) human language in all of its richness 
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– including its poetic and affective dimensions, rather than just its conceptual function. 
Kant wrote to Hamann about what Herder meant by the piece, and never wrote back to 
Hamann’s reply. In 1785 Kant published a very critical anonymous review of Herder’s 
1784 Ideas on a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, in which the latter argues that 
“there is no such thing as an isolated faculty of reason” and that philosophers should 
“[return] from the world of fantasy to the world of empirical reality” and “recognize 
that the whole chain of human development is characterized by man’s dependence on 
his fellows” (Herder, 1969: 311). In his review Kant said he hoped that philosophy 
would help Herder in “pruning … superfluous growth” (Kuehn, 2001: 293). The review 
profoundly upset Herder, who wrote to Hamann that he thought it was “malicious” and 
“mean-spirited”, that its criticisms were “infantile” and patronising, and concluded to 
break off contact with Kant, saying he could keep his “metaphysical-critical throne”, 
“conceptual fancies”, “[metaphysician’s] pride and … unbearable self-importance” 
(295-296). 
 
     These two contrasting analyses of reason – exemplified by Kant on the one hand, 
and Hamann and Herder on the other hand – were to prove highly influential in the 
following century. Kant’s project sought to provide an analysis of reason in response to 
the excesses of dogmatic metaphysical rationalism. It demanded the analysis, 
clarification and determination of concepts, as well as the scrutiny, elaboration and 
documentation of the mechanics of argumentation. Crucially Kant departed from the 
thinkers examined in the previous chapter in that he argued that an analysis of reason 
required that we account for the constitution of worlds of experience, as well as the 
mechanics of logical argumentation. Hamann and Herder’s analyses drew on Kant’s 
transcendental shift to look at how reason depends on language as a living, evolving 
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medium. Contra philosophers who want to better understand reason through 
purification, Hamann and Herder propose a turn to the plethora of contexts which shape 
how we apprehend and interact with the world, to gain a richer conception of human. 
Surber (2001: 12-13) contrasts the “conceptual” or “categorical a priori” of Kant’s 
Critique to the “linguistic a priori” of Hamann and Herder’s Metacritique – a term 
which Karl-Otto Apel also uses with reference to Heidegger’s work (Apel, 1973: 39).  
Rather than attempting to distil our understanding down to its essential, necessary and 
universal components, Hamann and Herder highlight how the apparatus of our 
understanding evolves over time and the manifold contingencies implicated in shaping 
our apprehension of the world around us. 
 
     Are the metacritiques of Kant’s critique of pure reason proffered by Hamann and 
Herder ultimately compelling? While Kant does acknowledge the role of natural 
language in philosophy in several places throughout his works (see, e.g. Forster, 2012), 
he nevertheless underestimates how our structures of understanding evolve and are 
situated in various historical, social and cultural contexts, treating his analysis of the 
categories and concepts which give structure to human worlds as universal rather than 
culturally and historically particular. As Hamann and Herder suggest, Kant does indeed 
focus his attention on abstract and ahistorical philosophical speculation, rather than 
incorporating reflection on where these ideas come from, how they evolve, and how 
they are used in different settings. 
 
     However, might not we object that Hamann, Herder and Kant are talking at cross 
purposes, and the former two miss the point of Kant’s project? Certainly neither 
Hamann nor Herder explicitly acknowledges the crucial differences between Kant’s 
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earlier work before the 1770s (where his ideas are arguably closer to Leibniz and Wolff 
in some regards) and his later critical, transcendental philosophy after the 1770s, which 
is an important source of insight for their respective metacritiques. While their 
metacritiques focus on the extent to which Kant’s account fails to see how our 
understanding and apprehension of the world is underpinned by language, perhaps they 
underestimate his aspiration to create something more universal. Just like the general 
applicability of Newton’s laws, or the global aspirations of Christian spirituality, Kant is 
fundamentally motivated by the prospect of a distilling a purified philosophical reason 
that can be applied across different settings. To what extent is understanding the 
evolution of concepts or arguments a precondition for using them effectively? For 
surely, we constantly use words and ideas in ways which significantly depart from their 
original meanings, and we need not let the past dictate the future? As Schlegel later 
comments, “the best way not to be understood or, rather, to be misunderstood, is to use 
words in their original meanings” (Schlegel, 1991, 20). Can’t our ideas depart from 
their past contexts of use? Must we really turn to history, linguistics or literature to do 
science or international law, and if not, why must we with philosophy? Is there not 
something conservative and limiting about Hamann and Herder’s retreat back towards 
language, culture, history, which fundamentally misinterprets the nature of Kant’s 
project? Why not recognise Kant’s project to purify reason as a form of linguistic 
innovation? 
 
     Many of these potential objections are reasonable – we can indeed do what we want 
with language, languages change, and there exist countless formal and technical 
vocabularies that people have developed for specialised applications, which in turn have 
shaped the meaning of ordinary terms. As we shall see in chapter five, Hamann and 
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Herder are particularly attentive to linguistic innovation and change, predominantly 
through the paradigm case of literature. However, for both of them the crucial question 
is whether or not Kant can successfully achieve what he sets out to through his project, 
and this is where they have their doubts. Hamann and Herder contend that philosophy is 
part of a broader set of linguistic traditions: pre-existing worlds of historically formed, 
culturally specific and linguistically mediated meanings. In order to have currency in 
this world, philosophy cannot totally disregard how meaning is created and how it 
functions, how people make sense. To the extent that Kant wishes his project to be of 
general relevance, he must obtain a less unrealistic conception of how linguistically 
mediated human understanding actually operates in different forms of life. 
 
     If these criticisms of Kant are fair and well founded, what are their implications? 
How might we rethink Kant’s project? Do Hamann and Herder have a more compelling 
picture of a historical, linguistically mediated reason that we should heed? As we shall 
see, Hamann, Herder and others will argue that we need to think about reason with and 
through language, history and experience, rather than subordinating these to formalised 
rational methods, as they argue that Kant, Wolff, Leibniz and other previous rationalistic 
philosophers have done. While Hamann and Herder propose a linguistically mediated 
picture of reason in contrast to the purification of reason that we examined in the 
previous chapter, their conception of language differs from those associated from the 
much more widely known linguistic turn in twentieth century analytic philosophy. In the 
next chapter I shall examine the analytic linguistic turn in more detail, arguing that the 
picture of language that is advanced retains an interest in abstracting conceptual content 
and purifying a formalised vocabulary for rational argumentation, at the expense of 
other capacities of languages. 
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4. Conceptual Cartographies: 
Wittgenstein and the Analytic Linguistic 
Turn 
 
 
“In order to find the real artichoke we divested it of its leaves.” (Wittgenstein, 2001: 164) 
 
     Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritiques of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
suggest that philosophers should turn to language in order to understand how reason is 
constituted and experience is structured. However, their conceptions of language differ 
from those of the much better known linguistic turns of the twentieth century. In this 
chapter I shall outline some of the main features of the linguistic turn in analytic 
philosophy – focusing on the work of Wittgenstein. On the one hand, this tradition has 
some important commonalities with the earlier German linguistic turn. On the other 
hand, it often retains an overly aprioristic conception of language, which – despite 
Wittgenstein’s later work – focuses on an idealised and abstracted conception of 
language rather than looking at language as an evolving, historically situated, socially 
constituted institution, which not only serves as a vehicle for designation and the 
encoding of information, but which also mediates experience and reason, and sustains 
social worlds. 
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The Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy 
 
     Richard Rorty is widely held to have popularised the phrase “linguistic turn” as it is 
now often used to refer to developments in English language analytic philosophy in the 
twentieth century (see, e.g. Hacker, 2007: 132, 2013: 926; Glock, 2008: 121). In his 
classic 1967 edited volume of essays The Linguistic Turn, Rorty says he borrowed the 
phrase from Gustav Bergmann whom he believed to have coined the term (Rorty, 1992: 
9). While both Rorty and Bergmann use the phrase to refer to the turn to language in 
Anglophone analytic philosophy in the early 20th century, a few contemporary 
commentators have argued that there is another important and earlier turn to language in 
philosophy commencing in the eighteenth century, which will be the subject of the next 
chapter. In this chapter, I will start with a brief outline of some of the main features of 
the more widely known linguistic turn in Anglophone analytic philosophy in the 
twentieth century, in order to compare it with the conception of language associated 
with the eighteenth century linguistic turn in German philosophy. I shall argue, 
following Taylor, that the analytic linguistic turn ultimately remains committed to an 
overly idealistic and conceptual picture of language. While the analytic linguistic turn 
represents an important step towards understanding reason as a linguistically mediated 
institution, it retains a disproportionate focus on the purification and clarification of 
language’s designative, truth-bearing and informational capacities at the expense of its 
many other capacities (as discussed in chapters five to seven below). 
 
     There is some dispute as to when the linguist turn in analytic philosophy begins. A 
few commentators claim the turn has its roots in Frege’s work in the late nineteenth 
century (e.g. Dummett, 1993: 5, 7; Williamson, 2005a), as manifested in the “deep 
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currents driving towards the investigation of thoughts through the analysis of language”, 
the broader implications of which Frege was “not fully conscious” and which he “never 
explicitly acknowledged” (Dummett, 1993: 6-7). More often it is claimed that the 
analytic turn to language doesn’t really get started until the 1930s (Hacker, 2007, 2013; 
Glock, 2008: 35; Rorty, 1992), under the influence of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and his 
other early work, and manifested - for example - in the works of the Vienna Circle or in 
the post-war group of thinkers associated with “Oxford philosophy”. 
 
     What are the main features of this turn to language? Rorty argues that it is 
characterised by “the view that philosophical problems are problems that may be solved 
(or dissolved) either by reforming language or by understanding more about the 
language we presently use” (Rorty, 1992: 3). The linguistic turn is presented as a way to 
release philosophers from apparent philosophical problems by understanding how they 
arose through errors, misapplications and misinterpretations of language – such that the 
task of the linguistic meta-philosopher is essentially therapeutic. The first section of the 
book presents a range of short pieces concerning “the thesis that philosophical questions 
are questions of language”. The following two sections present a range essays divided 
into what Rorty considers the two main schools or branches of the linguistic turn – 
“ideal language philosophy” and “natural language philosophy”. I shall contend that the 
ideal language branch shares many of the same aspirations and problems as the 
philosophical project to purify reason examined in chapter two, albeit with an interest in 
refining a conceptual metalanguage suitable for connecting and coordinating scientific 
research. While the natural language branch advances a broader conception of the 
different functions language, it does so in a way which focuses on the hypothetical 
rather than actual uses and practices of language – and does not account for how 
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languages evolve, nor for their role in structuring experience or articulating social 
worlds. 
 
The Tractatus and Ideal Language Philosophy 
 
     Ideal language philosophy is characterised by an interest in developing formalised 
systems of language or meta-language that overcome some of the shortcomings of 
natural language, as well as reforming and clarifying the usage of natural language. The 
work of thinkers associated with the Vienna Circle can be considered in this vein. In 
“The Scientific World Conception”, the unofficial manifesto for the Vienna Circle 
which was signed by many of its members and sympathisers, Otto Neurath writes of the 
search for “a neutral system of formulae”, “a total system of concepts” which is “freed 
from the slag of historical languages”, in the service of a “unified science” and the 
“rational transformation of the social and economic order” (Neurath, 1973). The 
“neatness and clarity” of such a system is contrasted with the “dark distances and 
unfathomable depths” of “metaphysical philosophy”. Indeed, the aspiration towards a 
“science free of metaphysics”, and the rejection of metaphysics is described as the 
shared ground and “common goal” of the circle. Given the breadth and diversity of 
thought associated with the Vienna Circle (see, for example, Uebel, 2014), for present 
purposes we shall further illustrate the “ideal language” aspirations of the analytic 
linguistic turn with reference to the work of one figure: Rudolph Carnap. 
 
     Carnap said he was deeply influenced in his approach to philosophy by Frege, 
Russell and Wittgenstein (Coffa, 1993: 207). Upon learning of Russell’s proclamation 
that “all this supposed knowledge in the traditional systems must be swept away, and a 
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new beginning must be made” Carnap said that he felt that the “appeal had been 
directed to [him] personally” (208). In particular, he was influenced by the Russellian 
sentiment that “by means of the study of syntax, we can arrive at considerable 
knowledge concerning the structure of the world” (Russell, 2013: 347). Drawing on 
conceptual and notational innovations in formal logic from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, Carnap sought to develop a formal meta-language which would provide 
common ground for the empirical sciences, paving the way for a new “unified science”. 
In this regard Carnap aspired to use a more granular understanding of language to 
augment a philosophical project which had many similarities with Leibniz and Wolff’s 
universal calculus of thought. 
 
     Why was Carnap interested in developing such a formalised meta-language? There 
were two initial motivations. Firstly, following Wittgenstein’s Tractatus to separate 
sense from nonsense, what could be said from that about which one must (ideally) 
remain silent. Through logical analysis, Carnap sought to prove that the “pretended 
propositions of metaphysics” were nothing but “empty word arrays” (Carnap in Rorty, 
1992: 54), thus – hopefully – liberating philosophers from servitude to futile and 
meaningless intellectual toil. This impulse, to “tear apart the stagnant, pointless inquiry 
that called itself philosophy” as Peter Galison puts it, was shared by many others in the 
Vienna Circle and arguably reflected and encouraged other broadly modernist social, 
cultural and political movements which sought to clear the debris of tradition, 
superstition, conservativism and old power structures to make way for new worlds - 
from constructivism to Bauhaus, from revolutions in physics to experiments in social 
democracy (Galison, 1990: 713). Making a similar comparison, Hilary Putnam 
describes Carnap’s project as a kind of “futurist intellectual architecture”, suggesting 
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that analytical philosophy “is best understood as part of the larger phenomenon of 
modernism” with its “extreme form of the rejection of tradition” (Putnam, 1983: 174, 
180). In his Philosophy and Logical Syntax, Carnap approvingly cites Hume’s 
instruction to “commit […] to the flames” the “sophistry and illusion” of metaphysical 
texts without “abstract reasoning convening quantity or number” or “experimental 
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” (Carnap, 1935: 36). 
 
     Secondly, as well as demarcating sense from nonsense, Carnap wished his project to 
provide a shared semantic structure to support and connect endeavours promoting the 
“scientific world view”. He argued that philosophy should turn away from traditional 
metaphysical questions (e.g. concerning ontology, or what there is) and towards the 
examination of the logical syntax of languages. “The method of logical syntax, that is, 
the analysis of the formal structure of language as a system of rules”, he wrote, “is the 
only method of philosophy” (Carnap, 1935: 99). Specifically, he singled out the logical 
syntax of the language of science as being of particular importance to philosophers, 
suggesting that “philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science” (Carnap, 2001: 
xiii). According to Carnap, the analysis of the logical syntax of a language entailed the 
“systematic statement of the formal rules” governing a language, “together with the 
development of the consequences which follow from those rules” (1). While 
philosophers wishing to pursue this line of inquiry could borrow lots of material from 
the past work of logicians, Carnap argued that the critical contribution remained to 
develop “an exact method for the construction of these sentences about sentences” 
(Carnap, 2001: xiii). 
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     A committed physicalist, Carnap dedicated himself to the creation of a 
Konstitutionssystem or “system for the constitution of concepts” that would underpin 
the development of empirical knowledge about the world. Such a system would enable 
its users to “construct a system of propositions which stand in a certain fundamental 
coherence with one another” (Carnap in Rorty, 1992: 56), providing a unified basis for 
both statements about individual perceptions, so- called “protocol sentences”, as well as 
intersubjective enquiry. Much like Llull, Leibniz and Wolff’s interest in analytically 
decomposing complex ideas into fewer simpler characters which could be calculated 
with, Carnap proposed that all concepts in his proposed language could be “derived 
from a few fundamental concepts” (Carnap & George, 1969: 5). Drawing connections 
with the agenda of the Bauhaus movement, Peter Galison describes the Vienna Circle’s 
commitment to what he calls “transparent construction”, namely an interest in “building 
up from simple elements to all higher forms that would, by virtue of the systematic 
constructional program itself, guarantee the exclusion of the decorative, mystical, or 
metaphysical” (Galison, 1990: 710). 
 
     Like Leibniz, Carnap saw the “system of language” as a “calculus” (Carnap, 2001: 
4). He did admit a broader view of language, suggesting that it is “an historically given 
method of communication, and thus of mutual influence, within a particular group of 
human beings, and as such is the object of sociology” (5). This entailed acknowledging 
the existence of other capacities of language beyond the formal semantic properties 
which he focused on accounting for. Carnap indicated that the formal study of the 
syntax of language as a system was just one element amongst others – including “the 
semasiological, … the psychological, and … the sociological” (5). However, he was 
ultimately unambiguous that the role of the philosopher was to pioneer the formal 
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syntactical “analysis, interpretation, clarification, or construction of languages of 
communication”, in the service of their logical improvement (Carnap in Rorty, 1992: 
83). This did not necessarily entail the study of actual syntax in natural languages, or 
“descriptive syntax”, which would entail looking at the “syntactical properties and 
relations of empirically given expressions” (Carnap, 2001: 7). It was sufficient to study 
the “possible arrangements” of elements of a language, which Carnap described as a 
“wholly analytic” exercise in “combinatorial analysis” (7). Intriguingly in the context of 
our present inquiry, Carnap said that there were significant overlaps between his project 
and what he described as the “theory of the structure of experience” (Carnap, Creath, & 
Nollan, 1987: 470). This echoes a comment from Bergmann who suggested: “The ideal 
language, as I conceive it, is not a language actually to be spoken but a blue print or 
schema, complete only in the sense that it must show, in principle, the structure and 
systematic arrangement of all the major areas of our experience.” (Bergman in Rorty, 
1992: 134). 
 
     As alluded to above, the ideal language branch of the linguistic turn shares many 
features of the philosophical projects to purify reason. However, rather than considering 
reason in isolation, Carnap, Wittgenstein and others turned to language precisely in 
order to understand the capacities and limits of reason. However, they largely retain the 
same “thin” conception of reason that stood in need of purification and formalisation, at 
the expense of other capacities of language. Carnap was predominantly interested in a 
language suitable for scientific observation, and hence advanced a narrow conception of 
experience as evidence and reason as calculation. While Carnap does more explicitly 
recognise and prominently discuss the central role that language plays in organising our 
thoughts than the philosophers of pure reason, he retains a very similar interest in the 
4. Conceptual Cartographies: Wittgenstein and the Analytic Linguistic Turn 
95 
purification of reason: in expressing complex ideas in terms of the combination of a few 
fundamental concepts, and in deriving a universal, formal method in order to perform 
rational calculations without ambiguity or disagreement. 
 
     Is this a fair characterisation of Carnap’s work on language? The legacy and 
contemporary relevance of different aspects of Carnap’s work has been debated. While 
there appears to be overarching consensus in the secondary literature that Carnap’s ideal 
language project as he conceived it was a failure, there are different views about its 
main innovations and what made it interesting. Coffa argues that one of his main 
contributions was the sophisticated articulation of a “conceptual holism” (Coffa, 1993: 
218) – anticipating later thinkers who drew on this perspective such as Quine. In a 
similar vein, some scholars argue that a crucial move was Carnap’s turning away from 
atomism, foundationalism and the representationalism of the “picture theory” of 
language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, towards a more flexible “meta-logical” account of 
language (e.g. Awodey & Carus, 2006). Quite a few others have suggested that despite 
Carnap’s strong attack and dismissal of Heidegger and others from the 
phenomenological tradition, there is more in common between their respective outlooks 
(both developing out of a shared neo-Kantian background) than is often assumed (see, 
e.g. Friedman, 2000, 2002; Stone, 2006). While I agree that his work is indeed more 
nuanced than it is often made out to be – nevertheless I would maintain that Carnap 
remains committed to a conception of linguistically mediated rationality which has 
similar flaws to the philosophical aspirations to purify reason examined in chapter two. 
While Leibniz and Wolff advance a very narrow conception of reason, Carnap translates 
this narrow conception of reason into a very narrow conception of language. In the next 
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section I shall look at the analytic linguistic turns attempts to overcome some of these 
limitations and to pay attention to other capacities of natural language. 
 
The Investigations and Natural Language Philosophy 
 
     In this section I will look at the second branch of what Hacker calls the “dual 
carriageway” of the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, namely “ordinary language 
philosophy” – or “natural language philosophy”, as Hacker compellingly argues is a 
more appropriate label. In order to do so we must step back and look at the development 
of the works of Wittgenstein, a figure who is centrally implicated in both branches of 
the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy, albeit at different stages in his philosophical 
work. While the natural language branch does indeed offer a much broader picture of 
language than the ideal language branch, it nevertheless remains committed to 
prioritising the designative, conceptual and argumentative capacities of language. 
Wittgenstein also focuses on the analysis of fictitious accounts of the historical 
development and social constitution of language as he focuses on advancing a 
deflationary project of dissolving apparent philosophical problems which arise through 
language rather than providing a broader philosophical account of reason, language and 
experience. This means that for Wittgenstein a philosophical analysis of natural 
language can be largely conducted through thought experiments by linguistically 
competent speakers from an armchair, rather than developing a philosophical interest in 
the actual historical development or social constitution of language as a living 
institution. While there have been significant innovations in post-Wittgensteinian 
analytical philosophy of language – such as Austin’s work on the performative 
dimensions of language or Geertz’s work on “thick descriptions” in ethnography 
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influenced by Ryle – nevertheless the natural language branch of the linguistic turn 
remains committed to a narrowly conceptual, static and instrumental picture of 
language, and remains unable to account for other aspects of language as a living and 
evolving social institution. 
 
     Wittgenstein’s 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (so titled in homage to Baruch 
Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, at the suggestion of G. E. Moore) was of 
paramount importance for the ideal language aspirations of the Vienna Circle. The book 
opens and closes with the now infamous notion that “what can be said at all can be said 
clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1922: 
§7). He contended that “all philosophy” is “a critique of language” (§4.0031), 
specifically aimed at the “logical clarification of thoughts” (§4.112): 
 
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine 
but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not 
result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without 
philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give 
them sharp boundaries. 
 
Wittgenstein argued that philosophers should delimit thinking such that within the limit 
thought could be clarified with the assistance of logical analysis, and outside of the limit 
would lie “nonsense”. He thought that logical analysis (following in the vein of Frege 
and Russell) provided a powerful tool for the clarification of thought, and that it could 
help to either resolve or dissolve most philosophical questions and problems of the past. 
Central to this enterprise was the application of logical analysis to language, as he made 
the case that “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (§5.6). 
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     Hacker outlines six ways in which Wittgenstein’s Tractatus contributed to the 
linguistic turn in analytic philosophy (Hacker in Martinich & Sosa, 2001: 76): firstly, by 
identifying the limits of thought with the limits of language; secondly, by focusing on 
the logical analysis of sentences; thirdly, by showing how metaphysical assertions 
attempt to transgress the limits of language and therefore the limits of sense; fourthly, 
by contributing to the analysis of “the general propositional form”, beyond any 
language in particular; fifthly, undertaking the logical analysis of linguistic descriptions 
of phenomena; and sixthly and finally, investigating logical necessity by means of the 
analysis of symbolism. The Tractatus was programmatic and provided the direction of 
travel for the “ideal language” branch of the linguistic turn in Vienna, Cambridge and 
beyond. The focus of this early period was the development of an analytical method for 
philosophers to untether themselves from obsolete concerns by analysing the structure 
of language, drawing on tools such as “truth tables” and propositional formulae, in 
which form some of the central arguments of the book are made. This is the sense in 
which Putnam comments that analytical philosophy can be considered modernist: as a 
kind of liberation from the philosophical traditions of the past, by means of a much 
simpler and more scientific analytical vocabulary – a calculus of thought that is 
constructed through attentiveness to the logical and conceptual structures of language. 
 
     A major shift of focus and approach occurred in Wittgenstein’s work after he 
returned from a break from philosophy in 1929. The extent of this shift – and whether 
there is an unbridgeable gulf versus a salvageable continuity – has been widely debated 
in recent Wittgenstein scholarship (see, e.g. Crary & Read, 2000). In the current context 
it will serve our purposes to characterise this shift and to explore its repercussions for 
the development of the linguistic turn in analytical philosophy, setting aside the debate 
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about the extent of continuity versus change. The Philosophical Investigations (first 
published in 1953) was the centrepiece of this new agenda, setting into motion a fresh 
constellation of concerns for a generation of philosophers, much as the Tractatus had 
done for thinkers in Cambridge in Vienna. One of the big moves of the Investigations 
was to transition away from the construction of a parsimonious yet expressively 
adequate formal logical meta-language, towards a richer and more nuanced 
philosophical account of the many different ways in which language is actually used. 
The Tractatus contains a kernel of this sentiment that that the philosophers should be 
more attentive how language is put to work in different settings with its suggestion that 
“the tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are 
enormously complicated” (Wittgenstein, 1922: §4.022). This interest in the concrete 
practices, conventions and institutions of natural language will become paramount in 
the Investigations, which can be read as a multi-layered dialectical exploration of the 
philosophical implications of a more comprehensive and wide-ranging vision of natural 
language than had been undertaken by analytic philosophers in previous decades. 
 
     In one of his central metaphors in the Investigations, Wittgenstein compares 
language to an ancient city: 
 
Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of 
new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (Wittgenstein, 2001: I, §18) 
 
In this city there are different “suburbs” for different kinds of language: each with their 
own vocabularies, sentence structures, and ways of using words. Language, like a city, 
is diverse and has developed over many generations. Parts of it remain unchanged for 
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centuries, reflecting circumstances which we may now have forgotten about. Its many 
architectural styles reflect a plethora of different functions and types of human activity. 
Throughout the book, Wittgenstein highlights the stark contrast between formal 
philosophical conceptions of language, and how it is actually used in different settings. 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations can read as a series of “weird little imaginary dialogues 
with himself”, as the late novelist David Foster Wallace puts it (Wallace, 2007), as he 
Socratically interrogates different inadequate and one-sided philosophical conceptions 
of language, aided by impressionistic sketches, architectural drafts, road maps and 
schematic diagrams of the city of “language”. 
 
     He targets philosophical interpretations of language which aim to reduce it to a 
single function, which aim to eliminate its imperfections, or which aim to reformulate 
what is meaningful using a parsimonious and expressively adequate logical language – 
and discard what is left as superfluous. For example, he looks at philosophers' claims 
that “individual words in language name objects” (I, §1), that “every word in language 
signifies something” (I, §13), that “every assertion contains an assumption” (I, §22) or 
that “the purpose of a language is to express thoughts” (I, §501). He goes on to explore 
these claims by representing them in basic models, or “language games”, iteratively 
adding complexity, and exposing their flaws, limitations, inadequacies, and one-
sidedness using metaphors, examples, and anecdotes. Augustine’s picture of language at 
the beginning of the Investigations assumes that all words are like basic nouns which 
refer to objects, or like people’s names – but what do words like “red”, or “five” refer to 
(I, §1)? Frege thinks that all sentences are essentially assertoric, and can be expressed in 
the form “it is asserted that such-and-such is the case”. But if we prefix every sentence 
with “is it asserted that”, does this prefix not become superfluous? This is rather like 
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saying that we can express every sentence as a question answered by “yes”, hence 
language consists of nothing but questions (I, §22). Language, Wittgenstein suggests, 
does more than one kind of thing. 
 
     He compares language to a toolbox containing different tools for different purposes 
(I, §11). Philosophers often try to posit the essential function of all the tools, perhaps 
suggesting that “all tools modify something”. But, he asks, what do the ruler, the glue 
pot or the nails modify (I, §14)? Alternately he takes the case of controls in the cabin of 
a locomotive – which all do different things, despite their apparently uniform 
appearance. While philosophers of language often espouse what we might effectively 
consider a form of functional monism (or monomania), instead he urges us to compare 
these functionally flat portraits of language (including, he says, his own work in the 
Tractatus) with the multiplicity of different ways that language can be used: 
 
Giving orders, and obeying them – 
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements – 
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) – 
Reporting an event – 
Speculating about the event – 
Forming and testing a hypothesis – 
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams – 
Making up a story; and reading it – 
Play-acting – 
Singing catches – 
Guessing riddles – 
Making a joke; telling it – 
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic – 
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Translating from one language into another – 
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. (I, §23) 
 
While philosophers imply that language can be reduced to one or two fundamental 
operations, Wittgenstein cautions that actually words function differently in different 
contexts, and philosophers should spend more time surveying and scrutinising the 
different kinds of contexts in which language is used before assuming that they are 
reducible to a simple model. Words possess an apparent simplicity, like the tools in the 
toolbox or controls for a train, which may mislead us into thinking they all do similar 
things whereas in actual fact they possess many different functions (I, §12, §14). 
Against the over-simple modelling of language undertaken by his predecessors and 
colleagues – including Frege, Russell and the Vienna Circle – Wittgenstein writes: “a 
main cause of philosophical disease – an unbalanced diet: one nourishes one's thinking 
with only one kind of example” (I, §593). He was reportedly at one point planning to 
give the Investigations the subtitle “I’ll teach you differences” quoting a line from King 
Lear (Malcolm, 1981). However, it is worth noting that the toolbox and train controls 
metaphors both convey an instrumental conception of language as a kind of 
communicative tool to be used by human beings, rather than accounting for the ways in 
which language fundamentally shapes our experience and provides the conditions of 
possibility for our sense of being in the world – as, for example, discussed by Heidegger 
and Gadamer. The portrayal of language as a tool to be used for various purposes (as per 
the examples above) broadens the lens of philosophical inquiry from the semantic 
content of linguistic utterances to how these utterances function in their possible uses in 
different social settings. However, it stops short of reflecting on the actual role that 
languages play in articulating the worlds of which these social settings are part. 
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     Wittgenstein argues that what philosophers may mistake for dispensable contingency 
is actually part of language’s wealth: 
 
The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and 
our own requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of 
investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in 
danger of becoming empty. – We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a 
certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We 
want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (I, §107) 
 
Analytical philosophers in the tradition that influenced Wittgenstein’s Tractatus aspired 
to discover the “essence” or “underlying logic” of language – whether by explicating 
the logical structures inherent in our natural languages (with all of their imperfections 
and ambiguities) or by constructing new logical languages. But, Wittgenstein argues, 
there is no secret essence, no hidden underlying structure waiting to be discovered. 
Language “already lies open to view” (I, §92), and “since everything lies open to view 
there is nothing to explain” (I, §126). The philosophical search for the “essence of 
language” is a pernicious wild goose chase. Like the missive in Edgar Allan Poe's The 
Purloined Letter, language is in plain view, hidden from philosophers only because they 
expect it to be elaborately concealed. Furthermore, they are like the man who killed the 
golden goose to get to the source of its golden eggs – striving to rid language of the 
same ambiguities and roughnesses that give it its expressive wealth and power. “In 
order to find the real artichoke”, Wittgenstein writes, “we divested it of its leaves” (I, 
§164). 
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     Wittgenstein’s “language games” are used to demonstrate the inadequacy of many 
traditional philosophical conceptions of what language is and how it works. For 
example, one consists of a scenario based on a referential theory of meaning – which 
holds that the meanings of words are the objects to which they correspond. He posits a 
language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, and “beam”, for a builder and 
an assistant who are constructing something using these materials. He then examines 
how we may be tempted to see this as a complete language, by making assumptions 
based on our own much richer and more developed language – such as that by “Slab!”, 
the builder really means “Bring me a slab!”. Thus he writes: “It is primarily the 
apparatus of our ordinary language, of our word-language, that we call language; and 
then other things by analogy or comparability with this” (I, §494). Wittgenstein often 
emphasises that in these scenarios there are various crucial steps missing – and hence 
indicates the gap between natural language, and these philosophical models. 
 
     One of Wittgenstein's most important points in the Investigations is that “the 
meaning of a word is its use in the language” (I, §43). As he writes later in the book, 
“Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed 
into it there? – Or is the use its life?” (I, §432). Along similar lines, in notes published 
in The Blue and Brown Books he writes: “But if we had to name anything which is the 
life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use.” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 5). The 
meanings of words, the meanings of signs, are dependent on practices and institutions 
of interpretation that we learn when we learn a language. We must learn to look from 
“wrist to fingertip” when somebody points at something, not vice versa (Wittgenstein, 
2001: I, §185). There is nothing intrinsic about this gesture which means that we should 
interpret it this way. He says that “a person goes by the sign-post only in so far as there 
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exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom” (I, §198). Knowing how to obey a rule is to 
know how to follow a “custom”, an “institution” - and to understand a language “means 
to be master of a technique” (I, §199). 
 
     These uses and practices are not permanently fixed, but are subject to change, to 
renegotiation. Language is a living set of practices evolving with and embedded within 
linguistic communities, reflecting their manifold forms of life. As Wittgenstein writes in 
the Investigations: “We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of 
language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal chimera” (I, §108). In On Certainty 
which was finished shortly before his death in 1951, he wrote along similar lines: 
“When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the 
concepts the meanings of words change” (Wittgenstein, 1975: §65). While allusions to 
the history and development of language in Wittgenstein's work are relatively scarce, in 
Part II of the Investigations he gives this question a more extended treatment, which it is 
worth quoting here: 
 
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in 
grammar, but rather in that nature which is the basis of grammar? - Our interest certainly includes 
the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do 
not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back on these possible 
causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history – 
since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. 
 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different 
concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely 
the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize 
– then let him imagine very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and 
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the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. 
(Wittgenstein, 2001: II, §xii) 
 
While he does not advocate that philosophers should be interested in the development of 
language per se – Wittgenstein maintains that it is important to recognise that it is a 
matter of contingency that language has developed the way it has. He also proposes the 
use of “fictitious natural history” – looking at how things might have developed, rather 
than looking at how they actually did develop. This is another weakness of the analytic 
linguistic turn as compared with the German linguistic turn, which exhibits a much 
stronger interest in the actual historical and social aspects of language. Perhaps this 
residual commitment to a “science of the possible” is partly due to Wittgenstein’s 
overarching objective to dissolve apparent philosophical problems – as opposed to 
examining other dimensions of language and the role it plays in social, political and 
cultural life. Wittgenstein also focuses much more on what Saussure will call the 
synchronic as opposed to diachronic aspects of language – and does not focus on the 
question of how languages change and how linguistic innovation is possible (as, e.g. 
Herder and Heidegger discuss in their work). 
 
     In the Investigations, Wittgenstein writes that philosophy aims to supply “remarks on 
the natural history of human beings; [...] observations which no one has doubted, but 
which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes” (I, §415). In 
On Certainty, he suggests that there is a core of assumptions in language that in practice 
we do not doubt (unless we are engaging in philosophical speculation or have 
psychological issues). He suggests there is an “inherited background”, “a kind of 
mythology”, “a whole system of propositions” which is passed down to us when we 
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learn language (Wittgenstein, 1975: §94, §95, §141). He suggests this is like a river – 
with some parts that are very fluid, like the waters, some parts which are more fixed, 
like the sandy river bed, and some parts which are practically immutable, like the hard 
rock of the riverbank (§97, §99). Elsewhere he suggests that certain propositions “stand 
fast” like “the axis around which a body rotates” (§152). These are propositions which 
we are implicitly taught when we learn language – and are more practices, ways of 
acting, than things which we consciously learn. It is in this sense that, quoting Goethe's 
Faust, he writes: “Im Anfang war die Tat” (“in the beginning was the deed”). 
Wittgenstein claims that “essence is expressed in grammar” (Wittgenstein, 2001: I, 
§371) and that we can think of “theology as grammar” (I, §373), a remark which – as 
we shall see – is reminiscent of Hamann and Nietzsche's views about the relationship 
between language and God. 
 
     In the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that philosophical problems arise from the 
misuse and misunderstanding of language. As discussed above, this is a view that 
Carnap and others in the Vienna Circle also share, partly under Wittgenstein’s influence. 
This position is developed much more extensively in the Investigations. Wittgenstein’s 
views on this topic are intimately connected with his overarching vision about the role 
and purpose of philosophy. In the Investigations he says that “philosophical problems 
arise when language goes on holiday” (I, §38) – and that philosophy is “a battle against 
the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language” (I, §109). “When we do 
philosophy”, he writes, “we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions 
of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest 
conclusions from it” (I, §194). For example, philosophers have often take our figurative 
ways of speaking literally, mistaking the vehicle of the metaphor for its tenor – thinking 
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of “time as a queer medium” or “mind as a queer kind of being” (I, §196). Given this 
danger, Wittgenstein proposes that we must scrutinise the way philosophers use 
language – to ensure that they do not interpret ordinary language in highly unusual 
ways.9 In On Certainty he suggests how strange philosophers’ use of the word “know” 
is. He gives an example of two people sitting in a garden and one repeatedly saying to 
the other “I know that that's a tree”. Without knowing that they are doing philosophy, 
we may think they are crazy (Wittgenstein, 1975: §467). To remedy this, in the 
Investigations, he suggests: 
 
When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” – 
and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually 
used this way in the language which is its original home? (Wittgenstein, 2001: I, §116) 
 
Wittgenstein suggests that philosophers stray from normal to abnormal uses of language 
– and the “more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say” (I, 
§142). To give an example, we talk, in an ordinary sense, of the different states it is 
possible for a machine to be in: its different “possible actions” or “possible states”. 
From this the philosopher may infer that the different possible states are in some 
“mysterious sense” already present (I, §193, §194). 
 
     To give another example, he suggests that philosophers may infer that there is 
something in common between things that we designate with the same term – some 
                                                
9 Though as several commentators have pointed out, this is not to say we must draw a firm distinction 
between everyday and philosophical language. For present purposes I mean to draw attention to the 
contrast between cases which we are familiar with and very unusual philosophical cases, such as those 
discussed by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. For more on this see Baker, 2002. 
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essential property which can be described. In The Blue and Brown Books and the 
Investigations he examines the case of games. Philosophers say “there must be 
something common, or they would not be called ‘games’”, but Wittgenstein urges us to 
“look and see” – arguing that there is not a common denominator, but rather a whole 
series of similarities and relationships (I, §66). He says these Familienähnlichkeiten, 
family resemblances, are like overlapping fibres in a thread – and there is no reason to 
assume that there is one fibre which runs through the whole thread: 
 
And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the 
strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, 
but in the overlapping of many fibres. But if someone wished to say: “There is something common 
to all these constructions – namely the disjunction of all their common properties” – I should 
reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: “Something runs through the 
whole thread – namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres”. (I, §67) 
 
     The Investigations are filled with these and other kinds of philosophical mistakes 
which arise from misunderstanding our ways of speaking. Wittgenstein thinks it is the 
role of philosophy to identify and eradicate these mistakes. However, his vision is one 
of a therapeutic philosophy that helps to show “the fly out of the fly-bottle” (I, §309). 
He says that philosophers, qua philosophers, should not “interfere with language” and 
that philosophy should leave “everything as it is” (I, §124). He holds that “in 
philosophy we do not draw conclusions” (I, §599), nor do we try to “advance theses”, 
for if we did “it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree 
to them” (I, §128). In The Blue and Brown Books he suggests that  
 
It is wrong to say that in philosophy we consider an ideal language as opposed to our ordinary one. 
For this makes it appear as though we thought we could improve on ordinary language. But 
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ordinary language is all right. Whenever we make up ‘ideal languages’ it is not in order to replace 
our ordinary language by them; but just to remove some trouble caused in someone’s mind by 
thinking that he has got hold of the exact use of a common word. That is also why our method is 
not merely to enumerate actual usages of words, but rather deliberately to invent new ones, some 
of them because of their absurd appearance. (Wittgenstein, 1958: 28) 
 
     Wittgenstein contends that philosophers should not aim to solve philosophical 
problems, but rather dissolve them by highlighting at what point a wrong turn was 
taken, giving rise to the misinterpretations and mistakes that made them appear in the 
first place. In this vein he argues: 
 
Our investigation is a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by 
clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among 
other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language. 
(I, §90) 
 
If philosophical problems can be compared to illnesses, Wittgenstein argues that we 
should consider philosophy to be a range of therapies to treat them, to make them go 
away. He writes that: “The real discovery is the one that gives philosophy peace, so that 
it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself into question.” (I, §133). 
Wittgenstein thinks philosophy should try to identify the kinds of misunderstandings of 
our way of speaking – to reveal “disguised nonsense” as “patent nonsense” (I §464). He 
wants to debunk unusual philosophical and metaphysical interpretations of language, 
and to restore ordinary meanings of words. “What we do”, Wittgenstein says, “is to 
bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (I, §116). Hence the 
philosopher must carefully examine the multiplicity of contexts in which words are 
used, nourish their diet with lots of examples – and try to see where we have gone 
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wrong. We must strive to “command a clear view of the use of our words”, to gain a 
“perspicuous representation” (I, §122) and we must look to see how words function, 
rather than guessing. In doing so he leaves behind what he describes as the “illusion” of 
logical analysis (which he shared in the Tractatus), which seeks to uncover the 
“essence” of thought comprised of “the purest crystal”, “prior to all experience, 
[running] through all experience” and unaffected by “empirical cloudiness or 
uncertainty” (I, §97). He develops an avowed interest in what he describes variously as 
an “anthropologische Betrachtungsweise” or an “ethnologische Betrachtungsweise” 
– an anthropological or ethnological method – as a legitimate part of philosophical 
enterprise (see, e.g. North, 1999: 39; Gálvez, 2010). As we shall see, this 
anthropological interest in how language is used and deployed in human societies is 
also an important feature of the eighteenth century linguistic turn. However, 
Wittgenstein’s “historicism without history”, as Hacker aptly calls it (Hacker in Gálvez, 
2010: 15ff), stops short of the philosophical interest in the eighteenth century linguistic 
turn not just in fictitious histories to inform conceptual and theoretical analysis, but in 
the actual histories, development and contemporary usages of language and concepts. 
 
     Alluding to the metaphor of language as an ancient city (as discussed above), he says 
that philosophical problems have the form “I don't know my way about”, and urges 
philosophers to “look around” and see where they have taken a wrong turn (I, §123). In 
his view, philosophy should consist of assembling reminders to prevent philosophers 
from getting lost or confused (I, §127) – and in this sense we might read the 
Investigations as a kind of catalogue or cartography of different recurring kinds of 
errors to be avoided, as well as guidance on how to unravel knots, to see things clearly. 
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Hacker summarises some of the crucial differences between the Tractatus and the 
Investigations as follows: 
 
The Tractatus was possessed by a vision of the crystalline purity of the logical forms of thought, 
language, and the world, the Investigations was imbued with a sharpened awareness of the motley 
of language, the deceptive forms of which lead us into confusion. The Tractatus advocated 
conceptual geology, hoping to disclose the ineffable essences of things by depth analysis of 
language, the Investigations practiced conceptual topography, aiming to dissolve philosophical 
problems by a patient description of familiar linguistic facts. (Martinich & Sosa, 2001: 81) 
 
While the analytic turn to language should be considered to be more than mere 
footnotes to Wittgenstein, charting the development of his work nevertheless captures 
some of the most important differences between the “ideal language” and “ordinary 
language” (or “natural language”) branches. 
 
     Wittgenstein’s turn away from the “ideal” formal and artificial languages intended to 
clarify the use of natural language or to support the production and systematisation of 
scientific knowledge and towards taking “ordinary” or “natural” language much more 
seriously as an object of philosophical analysis was immensely influential amongst 
philosophers in post-war Oxford. These thinkers were influenced by many of 
Wittgenstein’s insights – but, as Hacker says, ordinary language philosophy in Oxford 
was “more of a flourishing field fertilized by Wittgenstein’s ideas than bare soil in 
which Wittgenstein’s seeds grew” (Hacker, 2013). In his historical account of the 
analytic linguistic turn, Hacker posits four main centres of gravity of ordinary language 
philosophy in Oxford: the “logical geography” of Ryle; the “linguistic phenomenology” 
of Austin; the “linguistic botanising” of Grice; and the “connective analysis” of 
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Strawson. For present purposes I shall provide a brief account of the contributions of 
Ryle and Austin – two of the most important and influential figures of these four 
developments – to further illustrate some of the main features of the ordinary language 
branch of the analytic linguistic turn in post-war Oxford. 
 
     Ryle appealed to the notion of logical “geography” or “cartography” to map the 
compatibilities and incompatibilities of different words and phrases in order to see 
where philosophers go wrong. In a metaphor with clear parallels to Wittgenstein’s 
notion of language as a city, Ryle said that members of a linguistic community were like 
“villagers” and the role of the philosopher was to chart the structure and composition of 
the terrain in which they operate. He strove to use the study of networks of concepts in 
order to reveal and correct systemic errors in philosophical attempts to make sense of 
different aspects of our world – such as, he most famously contended, the “category 
mistakes” we make when thinking about the mind (Ryle, 2009). Much as Wittgenstein 
had challenged the philosophical tendency to try to boil down their conceptions of 
language such that it is only considered to possess one or a small number of functions, 
Ryle argued against the aspiration towards “thin descriptions”. Under the “thinnest 
description” we might say that all the ancient geometer Euclid is doing when he is at 
work is “muttering to himself a few geometrical words and phrases, or scrawling on 
paper or in the sand a few rough and fragmentary lines” (Ryle, 2009: 494ff; cf. Ryle, 
1968). With a thin description a meaningful wink might be indistinguishable from an 
accidental twitch. Thicker description provides us with a greater sense of context to be 
able to make sense of actions or utterances. This notion was later taken up by the 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz who explicitly drew on Ryle and Wittgenstein in order to 
argue for the importance of a broader sense of context for interpreting culture in 
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anthropology, as an antidote to positivist, behavioural or overly scientistic approaches 
which strip objects of study from their contexts (Geertz, 1973). 
 
     J. L. Austin became renowned for analysing subtle distinctions between different 
usages of words for the purposes of philosophical analysis. For example, he undertook a 
detailed survey of different kinds of excuses and their various functions and contexts. A 
crucial contribution of his work was to look beyond what he called “constative 
utterances”, or utterances about which we might make truth claims, and “performative 
utterances” which do not simply aspire towards true descriptions of states of affairs, but 
perform, act or intervene in the world for a variety of different purposes. His widely 
influential How to Do Things with Words aimed to broaden philosophers’ conceptions of 
language – in particular introducing the notion of what he called “speech acts” (Austin, 
1975). He distinguished between what he described as a “locutionary act” (e.g. the 
phrase “Are you going to finish that sandwich?” as a linguistic utterance), its 
“illocutionary force” (e.g. the performative function of this phrase beyond its semantic 
content, such as to request the remains of said sandwich), and its “perlocutionary effect” 
(e.g. the effective persuasion of the sandwich eater to hand over said sandwich or to 
finish it more speedily, etc.). In an address to the Aristotelian Society in 1956, Austin 
argued that language is a “common stock of words” embodying distinctions drawn and 
connections made “in the lifetimes of many generations” (Austin, 1956: 8). Like 
Wittgenstein and Ryle, he argued that understanding these different distinctions about 
how language is used and the contexts in which it is deployed is essential in order to 
unpick and resolve philosophical problems. He argued the patient and careful study of 
these distinctions and connections is likely more likely to lead to pertinent philosophical 
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insight than the “favoured alternative method”, namely what philosophers happen to 
“think up in our armchairs of an afternoon” (Austin, 1956: 8). 
 
The Limits of the Analytic Linguistic Turn 
 
     In this section we have looked at some of the main characteristics of the linguistic 
turn in analytic philosophy – from “ideal language” varieties inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus (including Carnap’s work to construct a logical syntax), to “natural language” 
varieties in the vein of Wittgenstein’s Investigations (such as those espoused by Ryle 
and Austin). What is the legacy of the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy? A great 
deal of contemporary analytic philosophy in the English speaking world draws on 
figures, works and insights from this tradition. On the one hand, that there is a much to 
be admired in the analytic linguistic turn – from the internationalist ambition and 
progressive modernism of the Vienna Circle, to the dialectical breadth and contextual 
sensitivity of the later works of Wittgenstein, to the seminal contribution of Austin’s 
notions of performativity and speech acts. 
 
     However, on the other hand, there are also several critical flaws and shortcomings. 
As Wittgenstein and others very convincingly argue, earlier proponents of the “ideal 
language” branch are often overzealous in their drive for logical and conceptual 
purification. While such a drive for purity and parsimony might be valuable in the 
context of creating artificial languages that are useful for performing certain functions 
in specific domains of enquiry (e.g. formalised vocabularies for biomedical research), it 
is less likely to be useful when generally applied to the study of all languages in all 
settings. This is partly due to what might be considered an inadequate conception of 
meaning. The representationalist “picture theory” of meaning as formulated in the 
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Tractatus is intended to make sense of only a very small sub-portion of how language is 
used – namely cases focusing on description and truth assertion. His earlier commitment 
to atomism means that he believed that all other more complex and nuanced 
applications of language could be understood as elaborate assemblages (or 
misapplications) of simple descriptive or assertoric utterances. Such a conception of 
language risks de facto dismissing vast swathes of linguistic usage as redundant, 
shoehorning linguistic utterances into over-simplistic metalanguages, or adopting a very 
wide-ranging principled quietism beyond that which formal models are able to account 
for. 
 
     What can the “ideal language” branch of the analytic linguistic turn bring to 
philosophical inquiry about “equality”, “nature” or “work”? The forms of analysis of 
early “ideal language” thinkers drew heavily on mathematics and logic and placed a 
corresponding emphasis on structures of rational argumentation that were amenable to a 
wide variety of different inputs. Elements within these systems could be arbitrarily and 
flexibly defined and re-defined, which was part of their power and appeal. If we 
establish clear definitions and conditions for, for example, “justice” or “art”, focusing 
on what is essential and stripping out what is contingent, and if we have consensus 
around these definitions, then we can calculate with them as per the Leibnizian dream. 
If concepts are not amenable to clear definition then maybe we should either break them 
down into meaningful chunks, or retire them in favour of concepts which can be 
meaningfully defined. Either way, the philosophical task was more narrowly re-defined 
in terms of the construction of an engine for argumentation, the logical apparatus for the 
calculation and manipulation of concepts that were provided by society, in the service of 
a rational-scientific world-view. Language was simply the medium by means of which 
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messy social and cultural meanings were sorted out and fed into the engine. If meanings 
were not amenable to analysis, then this was surely the fault of history or society, not 
the philosophical analyst whose role consisted in the provision of robust argumentative 
equipment. The net result of this project in the medium term was a massive scaling back 
and deferral of philosophical ambition, and a huge loss of social, cultural and political 
relevance. Philosophy was understood as a specialist technical task, and generations of 
thinkers joined the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for concepts for which 
no such things could be generally obtained, and into the symbolic manipulation of 
versions of concepts only nominally resembling the contested terms that were actually 
put to work in a world in different settings. 
 
     The “ordinary language” or “natural language” branch of the analytic linguistic turn 
addressed some of these problems by providing a more compelling account of meaning, 
as well as a less militantly purist account what constituted legitimate philosophical 
argumentation. By being less narrow minded about the many diverse functions of 
language, and by looking towards meaning-in-the-making through being attentive to the 
manifold forms and contexts of use of language they opened up the terrain for more 
hermeneutically compelling and less esoteric and conceptually implausible 
engagements with the role of words in the world. However, I shall argue that there were 
still several important limitations with this approach. While they were (at least in 
principle) more open to other approaches and sources of evidence for thinking about 
meaning than their “ideal language” predecessors and colleagues – such as 
Wittgenstein’s stated interest in anthropology, or an interest in natural language that 
began to direct philosophical attention towards areas which overlapped with the 
disciplinary concerns of linguistics – I would nevertheless contend that they did not go 
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far enough, and remained overly constrained in their conception of the role of the 
philosophy. In particular, I would argue that notions such as “linguistic competence” 
and “philosophy as therapy” may have held them back. The notion of “linguistic 
competence” meant that the philosophical engagements with language and meaning 
could remain at the level of “armchair analyst”. In a sense the focus on competence 
rather than deployment implied that it was more important to understand possible uses 
of language and of concepts than actual uses. In this sense, the various forms of “logical 
geography”, “linguistic phenomenology”, “linguistic botanising” and “connective 
analysis” that issued from the turn to natural language remained committed to a basic 
picture of an argumentative structure inherited from the “ideal language” branch, 
attenuated and enriched with snapshots of the nuance and complexity of language 
derived from the hypothetical exploration of what it is logically or conceptually 
possible to do with words. 
 
     This focus on types of usage and conceptual possibility meant that thinkers 
associated with the “natural language” branch stopped short of more substantive 
exploration of our actual linguistic infrastructure in several crucial ways. Firstly, the 
basic picture of “ordinary language” that many thinkers associated with this branch 
espouse is arguably historically impoverished. There is little sense of the historical 
contingencies and contestations that underpin the production of meanings, concepts and 
modes of argumentation, nor the extent to which language as a complex and hugely 
diverse edifice is deeply interwoven into many different aspects of human life and 
experience, as historically situated phenomena. In many cases the meanings and usages 
of words today will exhibit a profound variance from their meanings and usages in the 
past. This is not only because the uses of words changes like the uses of individual 
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objects – but also because of the complex networks of interdependencies between the 
connotations of different words (as we shall see in the following chapters, the 
conceptions of languages that came out of the eighteenth century linguistic turn were 
arguably more attuned to these aspects – as exemplified in literary language). Many 
ordinary language philosophers retained something like a picture of language as a 
conceptual system, albeit a more complex and nuanced system than the artificial 
metalanguages of their logicist contemporaries and forebears (as discussed in chapter 
two). This prematurely closed off more substantive exploration of the contested 
meanings and multivalence of linguistic terms, as well as more serious engagements 
with historical, social and cultural research that might serve to challenge or complicate 
the apparently stable, steady and commonsensical grasp of the linguistically competent 
analyst. 
 
     Secondly, many ordinary language philosophers in practice restricted themselves to 
one language and an arguably limited social, cultural and geographical base of evidence 
about its contexts of deployment. As we shall examine in the next section, the 
philological and theological roots of the eighteenth century linguistic turn, informed by 
the more widespread dissemination and translation of texts from significantly different 
linguistic traditions, gave it with a comparative breadth and subtlety that left it better 
equipped to more seriously examine the phenomenological and world-making functions 
of language – in particular the way in which language gives form not only to reason, but 
also to experience. Insofar as it possessed a vision of universality, this was predicated 
on piecemeal translation and intercultural communication to compose a universality that 
is held together by communicative action which must be proactively maintained rather 
than one of the discovery or formalisation of a latent order that lay beneath the 
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contingent semantic formations of natural language (as per the ideal language branch), 
or the universal cultural praxis of therapeutic restraint informed by a lightweight 
linguistic cartography to “look around”, albeit from the comfort of one’s armchair as a 
competent linguistic speaker (as per the natural language branch). The natural language 
philosophy in the analytical tradition that began to be known outside of the academy in 
the mid-twentieth century became much more marginal over the following decades. 
There have been major theoretical contributions from thinkers whose work was shaped 
by the linguistic turn – from Donald Davidson to Richard Rorty – yet many have 
questioned the value of the philosophy of language in the analytical tradition. As Hacker 
laments, 
 
At its worst, analytic philosophy moved into a characteristically scholastic phase in which 
pedantry displaced vision, and all that was left of an era of philosophical achievement were empty 
forms – the employment of the technical tools of analytic philosophy. (Hacker, 2013) 
 
While some recent analytic philosophers such as Timothy Williamson have questioned 
the value of the linguistic turn – making the case for an “armchair philosophy” which 
aspires to “analyse thought directly without taking a diversion through the analysis of 
language” through things like “thought experiments” and “counterfactual thinking” 
(Williamson, 2005a; see also a scathing critique of this position in Hacker, 2009) – there 
has also been a recent resurgence of interest in the relevance of the natural language 
branch to contemporary philosophy (see, for example, Baz, 2012; Laugier, 2013). 
 
     To take the linguistic turn seriously is to realise the vital role that language plays in 
articulating social worlds. The extent to which linguistic competence is adequate to 
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understand how language shapes the composition of these worlds is highly 
questionable. As I shall discuss further in my concluding chapter – on the one hand I 
will argue that more serious engagements with social and historical research is one route 
towards a more compelling philosophical conception of language. On the other hand, I 
shall argue that by letting go of the largely analytical and deflationary conception of 
philosophy in the analytic linguistic turn (following Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy 
as a form of therapy to dissolve apparent problems), we can open up space for reflecting 
on the expressive, performative and normative dimensions of philosophy as a form of 
linguistic praxis. In the following three chapters I shall contend that the linguistic turn 
in the eighteenth century is a fertile resource for rethinking contemporary philosophical 
conceptions of language, providing insights which can contribute to a more ambitious 
agenda on both of these fronts. 
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5. Remediating Rationality: Hamann, 
Herder and the German Linguistic Turn 
 
 
“Language is creative; to it we owe the existences and structures that populate our world-
versions.” (Hacking, 2002: 139) 
 
 
     In contrast to the better known linguistic turn in analytic philosophy which I 
examined in the previous chapter, in this chapter I look at the turn to language in 
eighteenth century German philosophy. While the former often retains a focus on 
certain aspects of language which derive from philosophical projects to perfect and 
purify reason (as discussed in chapter two) – namely its designative and information 
encoding capacities – I argue that the latter offers the basis for a more compelling 
account of how language gives form to both reason and experience. The eighteenth 
century German linguistic turn reaches its apex in the linguistic metacritiques of 
Hamann and Herder. Their works fuse the historical and proto-anthropological 
conception of language arising from discussions around the Berlin Academy (informed 
by a broad constellation of aesthetic, theological, naturalistic and political concerns), 
with innovations from Kant’s transcendental philosophy which strive to overcome both 
the Scylla of empty rationalisms and the Charybdis of flat empiricisms by looking 
towards conditions of possibility for reason and experience. Hamann and Herder 
suggest that these conditions of possibility can be found in language, as a historically 
and socially situated fabric of thought. While Forster advances a “narrow expressivism” 
on the basis of his reading of Herder (Forster, 2010), I argue for a “broad expressivism” 
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that encompasses not only written and verbal language (narrowly conceived), but also 
other forms of what Taylor characterises as “meaningful media” (Taylor, 1985). The 
chapter is divided into four sections looking at: (i) debates about language around the 
Berlin Academy that informed Hamann and Herder’s works, (ii) Hamann’s views on 
language, (iii) Herder’s views on language, and (iv) how Hamann and Herder’s views 
contribute to an alternative philosophical agenda around language to that which I 
examined in the previous chapter on the analytic linguistic turn. 
 
Language in the Air 
 
     With a few notable exceptions, the eighteenth century turn to language has remained 
marginal in English language philosophy. One of the most prominent figures associated 
with the popularisation of this tradition – and in particular the works of Hamann and 
Herder – is Isaiah Berlin. He portrayed Hamann and Herder as part of an irrationalist 
“Counter-Enlightenment”. His work on this topic commenced in the 1960s, but much of 
it was not published until the 1990s (see, e.g., Berlin, 1965, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2013). 
As we shall see later in this chapter, other philosophers and critics challenged his 
portrayal of Hamann and Herder as being irrationalist, contending their work could 
more fruitfully read as contributions to thought associated with the Enlightenment rather 
than as a sharp departure from it (see, e.g. Bayer, 2012; Lukács, 1980; O’Flaherty & 
Berlin, 1993). Berlin’s student Charles Taylor was another prominent figure in 
promoting historical and philosophical readings which placed Hamann and Herder at 
the centre of a turn to language in the eighteenth century, which was also read as a pre-
cursor to romanticism and “hermeneutic” philosophers such as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(Taylor, 1985, 1995). Taylor helped to give rise to a reading of what he called the 
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“Herder-Humboldt view” (Taylor, 1985), “Hamann-Herder understanding” (Taylor, 
2009: 755-756), the “HHH conception” or “triple-H theory” after Hamann, Herder and 
Humboldt (Taylor, 1985: 256), which helped to cement the centrality of this group of 
thinkers with shared views about the importance of language in philosophy.10 Fred Rush 
claims that the “teacher-student line of Isaiah Berlin-Charles Taylor-Frederick Beiser” 
helped to further this interpretation (Rush, 2011). More recently, the importance of 
Hamann and Herder’s turn to language has been promoted by contemporary 
Anglophone philosophers and historians of philosophy such as Frederick Beiser, 
Andrew Bowie, Michael Forster and Ian Hacking (see, e.g. Beiser, 1993, 2006; Bowie, 
1996, 2003, 2010a, 2013a, 2013b; Forster, 2010, 2011a; Hacking, 2002). 
 
     While Hamann and Herder are indeed of seminal importance for the linguistic turn in 
the eighteenth century and its mediation into the nineteenth century and beyond, more 
recent scholarship has sought to recontextualise their views within a broader turn to 
language that commences before their key works on this topic. Hence, before going on 
to examine Hamann and Herder’s views about language, I shall start this chapter by 
situating their work within eighteenth century debates about language in philosophy 
amongst their predecessors and contemporaries. In surveying the background to their 
work I am indebted to Avi Lifschitz’s recent Language and Enlightenment monograph, 
which gives an invaluable account of the genesis of debates on this topic amongst a 
group of thinkers around the Berlin Academy. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. 
                                                
10 This thesis draws on my previous research on Hamann and Herder (e.g. Gray, 2012), and I have chosen 
to give a more detailed account of the development and legacy of their ideas on language at the expense 
of including a broader range of thinkers. Wilhelm von Humboldt is a notable omission from the “HHH” 
tradition. For an account of his contributions to the philosophy of language, see, for example, Forster, 
2011a. 
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Cloeren, 1988), the roots of the so-called “HHH” tradition have remained relatively 
under-examined in Anglophone history of philosophy. 
 
     Lifschitz contrasts the linguistic turn in the eighteenth century with what he calls the 
“traditional view” advanced by thinkers from Aristotle to Descartes, in which language 
“encodes” pre-existing “ready-made thoughts” or “communicates ideas we have formed 
in the mind independently of [language]” (Lifschitz, 2012: 1-2). Many thinkers in the 
eighteenth century rejected this conception in favour one in which language “plays a 
major constitutive role in human cognition” (2). He presents language as a critically 
important lens through which philosophers and others were attempting to make sense of 
the development of human life, consciousness and society. He identifies two major 
genres of inquiry around language in the mid-eighteenth century. Firstly, there were 
various synchronic attempts to make sense of the interdependencies between language, 
thought and the mind – including through comparative analysis of different languages 
and cultural outlooks. Secondly, there were attempts to investigate language 
diachronically, looking at the history of the development of language as a proxy for 
understanding the development of the human mind, culture, social relations and political 
formations. This included what Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Dugald Stewart 
characterised as “conjectural histories” (Lifschitz: 3) or what we might now call 
“speculative genealogies” that informed contemporary philosophical and theoretical 
accounts of language (Nietzsche’s speculative historical accounts may be viewed in 
light of – and in contrast to – these earlier works). These two topics were respectively 
the subjects of two prestigious essay prize competitions at the Berlin Academy, the 
responses to and debates around which had a formative influence on the works of 
Hamann and Herder. 
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     There has been some historiographical debate about ideas about language during this 
period upon which I will not dwell, but which cannot be entirely ignored in the context 
of my argument for the importance of an eighteenth century linguistic turn in German 
philosophy. In brief, this concerns to what extent it can be said that there is a distinctive 
linguistic turn that takes place in the eighteenth century, as opposed to the continuation 
of a broader series of exchanges about language amongst a transnational “Republic of 
Letters” that goes back decades, if not centuries earlier. For present purposes, I will 
argue that what makes talk of an eighteenth century German linguistic turn plausible is 
not the interest in language per se but the particular character of this interest and the 
conceptions of language associated with it, which we shall unpack in this chapter. 
 
     Lifschitz alludes to the works of Hans Aarsleff, contemporary historian of linguistics 
and philosophy, who contested claims for the originality of a turn to language in 
German philosophy in this period throughout his works. In his 1974 essay on “The 
Tradition of Condillac”, Aarsleff – as Lifschitz puts it – “challenged the then-dominant 
view that Herder’s 1771 prize essay on the origin of language was a decisive break with 
all preceding inquiries” (Lifschitz, 2012: 10; Aarsleff, 1982a: 146-209). Aarsleff 
claimed that Herder’s prize-winning essay to the 1771 competition of the Berlin 
Academy had been “almost universally misinterpreted both in regards to its doctrines 
and its originality” (Aarsleff, 1982a: 147), that it was “indebted to eighteenth-century 
French linguistic thought and especially to Condillac” (335), and in particular that it 
bore significant similarities with Condillac’s seminal 1746 essay on language. In a 
similar vein he argued that Humboldt’s dependence on Herder was overstated, and both 
drew on common, predominantly Francophone or Francophone inspired sources (335-
355). In a series of heated exchanges with Isaiah Berlin in the early 1980s, Aarsleff 
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attacked Berlin’s claims for the originality and importance of Hamann, Herder and Vico 
(Aarsleff, 1981, 1982b). 
 
     Ian Hacking published several pieces in response to Aarsleff and Berlin’s public spat, 
questioning Aarsleff’s contention that whatever is good in Hamann and Herder is “mere 
transmission” (Hacking, 1988: 151; cf. Hacking, 1982). He suggested that Aarsleff may 
not have recognised the change of character in discussions about language in the 
eighteenth century debates around the Berlin Academy partly because of his own “true 
enthusiasm” for “radically private language” (Hacking, 1988: 152). According to 
Hacking, this left Aarsleff “unable to discern the profound changes effected by the 
German romantic and philological tradition” (152-153), as well according both 
epistemological and genealogical priority to the Lockean tradition (and in particular 
French adherents to this Lockean tradition such as Condillac) which retains an 
essentially representational and private conception of language. Hacking argues that 
with Hamann and Herder’s work, language “becomes essentially public” thus breaking 
with some of the key tenets of this flawed representationalist tradition (Hacking, 1988: 
152). In relation to Berlin and Aarsleff’s disagreement about whether Hamann could be 
considered Herder’s teacher (the former arguing that the historical record points towards 
this, the latter doubting this), Hacking suggested that with respect to the (in his view 
pivotal) argument about the publicness of language, “Hamann was clear and less of a 
backslider about this than his more widely read successors” – including Herder (152). 
 
     Hacking expounds this view on the importance of Hamann and Herder in his article 
“How, Why, When and Where Did Language Go Public?” (Hacking, 2002). Drawing on 
Isaiah Berlin’s work on Herder, Hacking says that the seminally important changes in 
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thought about language in this period include the realisations that there can be “no 
thought without language”, that “a language characterizes a culture”, and “that language 
is the medium in which a human being becomes a person” (128). He dubs Berlin’s 
tripartite conception of pluralism, populism and expressivism the “culture concept” 
(129). While it is true that Condillac and others made points that anticipated elements of 
the “culture concept”, they remained committed to a representationalist and essentially 
private conception of language. For example, he notes that Condillac says “it appears 
that every language expresses the character of the people that speak it”, but – Hacking 
counters – “it never occurred to him that a language and a people are co-constitutive” 
(130). While he says it would be an anachronism to read Hamann as though he were 
making the same claims as Wittgenstein in his later works, he nevertheless argues that 
there are kernels and insights which do anticipate many of Wittgenstein’s main points, 
in particular what has become known as the “private language argument” (137). 
Hacking also argues, however, that one effect of Wittgenstein’s work was to 
“depoliticize the idea of language as essentially public”, and overall his work has 
effectively “vaccinated analytic philosophy against more radical transformations” (136). 
Within Hamann’s work, Hacking argues we may find a conception of language as 
fundamentally creative and “profoundly nonrepresentative” (139). He says that for 
Hamann, language is that through which human awareness, sociality, thought and 
rationality are possible, and “to it we owe the existences and structures that populate our 
world-versions” (139). 
 
     Following Hacking, I shall hence argue that what matters about the debates about 
language in eighteenth century is not the preoccupation with language per se, nor views 
about its central role in philosophy, nor the novelty of these claims, but rather the 
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convergence of a particular constellation of conceptions about language that will 
become central in German philosophy for the next two and a half centuries. This 
constellation does not represent a set of shared common denominators, but rather 
consists of an overlapping network of insights, arguments and concerns that might be 
better characterised in terms of “family resemblances” (to use Wittgenstein’s phrase). 
While I follow Berlin, Taylor, Hacking and others in considering Hamann and Herder to 
be paradigmatic, in the present context I am less directly concerned with arguing for 
their priority, nor with the intellectual history of how the different elements of the 
constellation came together. Aarsleff is of course right to challenge any notion that there 
might be a self-contained and wholly original German tradition of the philosophy of 
language, and right to call for further historical scholarship about the complex trans-
national and trans-cultural interdependencies of scholarship during this period. For 
present purposes I will limit myself to several key texts and thinkers in order to 
delineate this constellation, while also recognising that its edges are porous and it 
heavily draws on and contributes to philosophy in other languages and places. As we 
shall see in the coming pages, this constellation includes claims for languages’ public 
and social rather than private and individual characters, their expressive and constitutive 
functions as opposed to representational functions, and cognisance of their historical 
and material affordances as public communicative infrastructures. 
 
     With these qualifications in mind, I will return to Lifschitz’s account of philosophical 
debates about language around the Berlin Academy in the eighteenth century, to which 
Hamann and Herder’s reflections of language were indebted. Lifschitz describes how 
around this time there was a widespread sentiment that “material and intellectual culture 
could be properly observed only in linguistic, symbolic and historical terms” (Lifschitz, 
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2012: 64). He argued that Leibniz, Wolff and Condillac all believed that signs had a 
“constitutive role in cognitive processes”, and that they all viewed language as a “tool 
enabling human beings to reverse their initial immersion in sense data” (47). The 
rediscovery of naturalistic accounts of language from Epicurus and Lucretius, prompted 
debates about reconciling natural history and human artifice on the one hand, and 
natural and Biblical accounts of the origins of language on the other. As noted above, 
naturalistic accounts of language were part of a broader enterprise (associated with what 
would later be characterised as the Enlightenment) to chart the development of human 
consciousness, society, institutions, culture and values. Language was seen as 
something that developed in tandem to these other elements of human societies – to 
meet different sets of needs and interests. Lifschitz claims that the rising popularity of 
these kinds of naturalistic and historical accounts led many thinkers away from an 
interest in the creation of universal languages, because a language that was fixed and 
universal – rather than malleable, responsive and context sensitive – might actually 
represent a hindrance rather than an advantage (37). Likewise, Aarsleff argued that 
universal language schemes remained marginal during this period, against some 
historical accounts from the nineteenth century which overstated their prevalence and 
importance around this time (Aarsleff, 1982). 
 
     What kinds of views about language were “in the air” around the Berlin Academy 
running up to the time of the first prize competition on language in 1759? There were 
debates about symbolic cognition drawing on the works of Descartes, Leibniz and 
Wolff. As alluded to above, there were debates about rationalism and pietism in 
theology as well as in philosophy which contributed a religious subtext to discussions 
about making sense of language and meaning. Controversial attempts to rationalise 
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and/or systematise biblical teachings (such as the Wertheim Bible) and subsequent 
backlashes led to an increased hostility towards the unabated formalist aspirations of 
Wolffian school philosophy in some quarters (Lifschitz, 2012: 50). This mistrust 
towards formalisation and calculation corresponded with a rising interest in other forms 
of meaning, expression and sense-making. According to Lifschitz, by the mid-1750s, 
the idea that a society was reflected in its language and vice versa was widespread (not 
least due to the influence of the works of Condillac and Diderot), as were attempts to 
combine naturalistic and Epicurean approaches to understanding language with “the 
modern thesis of the close interdependence between signs and thinking” (84). He argues 
that Condillac, Diderot and Rousseau “all regarded ancient languages as closer to the 
primordial, expressive language of action” (92), a view which Hamann and Herder both 
share, as we shall see shortly. 
 
     Condillac’s 1746 Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge and La Mettrie’s highly 
controversial 1747 Machine-Man both contributed to bringing language to the forefront 
of intellectual debates in the mid-eighteenth century (Condillac, 2001; La Mettrie, 
1996). Pierre Louis Maupertius, the President of the Berlin Academy took a keen 
interest in these issues, and himself penned an essay on the origins of language in 1752. 
The 1759 question was proposed by another member of the Berlin Academy, Pierre Le 
Guay de Prémontval, who wished to use the competition as a means to undermine 
Wolffian philosophy. The question was posed as follows: 
 
The Class of Speculative Philosophy proposes for the ordinary Prize of 1759 the following 
question: What is the reciprocal influence of the Opinions of a People on the language, and of the 
Language on the Opinions? This should be demonstrated by a number of selected examples: 
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1. How many strange turns of phrase and expressions there are in Languages, born manifestly from 
certain opinions received among the peoples where these Languages were formed: this first point 
will be the easiest. 
2. It will be essential to show, in certain turns of phrase typical of each language, in certain 
expressions, and even in the roots of certain words, the seeds of this or that Error or the obstacles 
to the reception of this or that Truth. 
This double point of view should give rise to very important reflections. After explaining how a 
turn of mind forms a Language, which then imparts to the mind an outlook more or less favourable 
to true ideas, one could search for the most practical means of remedying the inconveniences of 
Language. (93) 
 
     The winning essay, Johann David Michaelis’s A Dissertation on the Influence of 
Opinions on Language and of Language on Opinions, presented a picture whereby 
“language is a democracy where use or custom is decided by the majority” (Michaelis, 
1771: 2). The essay helped to strengthen a view of language as having a fundamental 
dependence on its relationship to a linguistic community who shape and reshape its 
meanings through linguistic practices, such that all members have the chance to 
“become contributors to that immense heap of truth and errors, of which the languages 
of nations are the repositories” (3). As we will see in the works of Hamann and Herder 
(and in the later works of Wittgenstein, as we saw in the last chapter), Michaelis 
opposed what he characterised as the over-zealous and tyrannical prescriptive 
manoeuvres by scholars and linguistic reformers to rationalise, formalise and purify 
natural language, whether through “grammatical pedantry”, to reduce it to a formal 
system or to attempt to remove ambiguities and synonyms in the service of obtaining a 
purified language “as void of graces or ornaments as the signs of algebra” (76-77, 90). 
He argued that the democratic nature of language could act as a preventative to such 
measures, such that a linguistic community could de facto veto attempts to impose 
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unwanted changes by refusing to change their linguistic patterns and habits to 
accommodate proposed changes (89). 
 
     Against the philosophical drive to eradicate synonyms that were considered 
“superfluous”, Michaelis advocated a “copiousness of terms” and a “fecundity of 
etymologies and expressions” (33). As we shall see Hamann, Herder and others arguing 
later, Michaelis contended that a language could be enriched by means of translations, 
and that examining the quality of translations was “the surest method for determining 
the richness” of a language – acting as a proxy for things like the repertoire, range, 
nuance, musicality and expressive capacity of a given language (36). His experience as 
a philologist of biblical and oriental languages no doubt contributed to his appreciation 
of these aspects of a language, as contrasted with the formal-logical or designative 
aspects which were the favoured objects of study of other philosophers. 
 
     Michaelis contended that the science of scholars who wrought their intellectual 
innovations into “the language of common life” would always have greater traction and 
more successful longer term adoption “than when delivered in a technical language” 
(91). This focus on making philosophical language accessible would also have 
resonated with the Popularphilosophen or “popular philosophers”, who lamented the 
state of academic philosophy and called for a “philosophy for the world”, a cause with 
which Herder also identified in many of his works (Beiser, 1993: 165-169; Zammito, 
2002: 15-42, 2006; Giovanni, 2011; Lifschitz, 2012: 61-63). Michaelis’s essay would 
have struck a political chord with members of the Academy who were interested in the 
relationship between languages, cultures, peoples and nations. This included the so-
called “genius” of language, which by the seventeenth century included discussion of 
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how the qualities of a vernacular reflected various characteristics of its speakers (cf. 
Schlaps, 2004; Pountain, 2008; Lifschitz, 2012: 65-94). While the debates about 
language amongst members and followers of the Berlin Academy nominally had a more 
hypothetical or intellectual character, they had many different social, cultural and 
political implications which were not lost on the academy’s members – from questions 
around the languages of scholarship (whether French, Latin or German), the pre-
eminent influence of French culture and ideas in Prussia (which Frederick the Great was 
so enamoured with), to shifting geopolitical relations (including around the Seven 
Years’ War from 1754 to 1763). Over the following decades, these discussions acquired 
an even sharper political dimension as they informed various projects to provide social 
and cultural foundations for German nation-building aspirations. 
 
     The vision and concerns embodied in Michaelis’s 1759 essay helped to establish the 
frame for debates about language in German intellectual circles for years to come. 
Whilst it drew on many other thinkers and traditions – including the French language 
Lockean tradition – it painted an influential picture of language as a living social, 
historical, cultural and political phenomenon that should be studied and understood in 
relation to specific linguistic communities. This picture of language was explicitly 
formulated in opposition to philosophical views of language that focused on cognitive 
representation and language as an imperfect system that stood in need of formalisation 
and purification. In Michaelis’s view language cannot be understood apart from in 
relation to its deployment, namely its users and the uses to which it is put. The 
contingency and contexts of the development of a given language were seen as critically 
important determining factors and assets in relation to a language’s expressive capacity, 
rather than as circumstantial details to be redacted and boiled away through 
5. Remediating Rationality: Hamann, Herder and the German Linguistic Turn 
135 
philosophical analysis. The power and wealth of a language resided precisely in its 
ability to bring together the experiences of a linguistic community. As such languages 
bore the traces of past societies and civilisations in a way which was directly analogous 
to their objects or buildings, documents or archaeological traces – a position which 
Michaelis’s philological work would no doubt have warmed him towards. Arguably the 
essay contributed towards language “going public”, as Hacking put it, being conceived 
as a social and intersubjective medium, rather than a tool for representing the pre-
formed ideas or independent sensory perceptions of individual language users. This 
conception of the “democratic” character of language remains influential amongst many 
contemporary linguistic researchers. For example, the linguist and popular science 
writer Steven Pinker portrays language as a collective enterprise which is more like “a 
wiki that pools the contributions of millions of writers and speakers” than “a protocol 
legislated by an authority” (Pinker, 2014). While Pinker’s often aggressively 
reductionistic account of language is not without its problems (see, e.g. Bowie, 2007), it 
is interesting to note that this democratic picture of language in the mid-eighteenth 
century is still considered to have empirical plausibility. 
 
     Hamann and Herder’s views about language were both deeply informed by and 
developed in relation to the 1759 essay competition in general and Michaelis’s essay in 
particular. For the rest of this chapter I shall unpack their respective views about 
language, and how these conceptions might contribute to enriching contemporary 
philosophical debates about language. Before I do this I’ll mention a brief caveat with 
respect to their role in the eighteenth century linguistic turn in German language 
philosophy. Michael Forster has recently argued that Herder’s views “not only 
chronologically prior … but are also markedly superior” to Hamann’s and 
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interpretations which see Hamann as the “original genius” and Herder as a “mere 
epigone” do a “historical injustice” to Herder (Forster, 2010: 310, 314). However, I 
would contend that Forster’s appraisal of Hamann’s works is overly unsympathetic and 
downplays several contributions which will become fundamentally important in a 
constellation of views about language that we will look at in the next chapter. I think it 
is likely that both figures may have drawn more heavily on discussions around the 
Berlin Academy than has previously been recognised. I agree with Forster’s appraisal 
that it is unfair to see Herder as wholly derivative from Hamann, but disagree with the 
claim that nearly all of the most interesting insights and conceptual moves from this 
period should be attributed to Herder. Instead I’d like to propose a reading whereby 
Hamann and Herder are considered two particularly noteworthy thinkers in a broader 
turn to language in the eighteenth century, who drew on common sources and inspired 
each other in a number of important ways (as we shall explore below). 
 
Hamann on Language, Creation and Revelation 
 
     In Hamann’s work there are three main clusters of his work on language that I will 
focus on: firstly, around the time of the first essay competition of the Berlin Academy in 
1759-1762; secondly, around the competition around 1772-1773; and finally a period 
around 1784-1786. I shall mainly focus on his published works (as opposed to his 
extensive correspondence), in particular a recent edition of his philosophical works 
translated and edited by Kenneth Haynes (Hamann, 2007). For the purposes of my 
thesis, two of the most significant contributions are his 1762 Aesthetica in Nuce on 
aesthetics, language and experience, and his 1784 Metacritique on the Purism of 
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Reason, a response to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason which is his most important work 
for the philosophical issues under discussion in this thesis. 
 
     In 1760 Hamann published Essay on an Academic Question, his own response to the 
Berlin Academy’s competition in which he affirmed many elements of the picture of 
language in Michaelis’s winning essay, at the same time as challenging the latter’s 
approach and the framing of the competition’s question, which he accused of lacking 
clarity, and being “dry”, “indeterminate” and “ambiguous” (Hamann, 2007: 9-19). He 
shares a fundamentally social, historical and cultural vision of language as a living 
institution, arguing that: 
 
The lineaments of a people’s language will therefore correspond with the orientation of its mode of 
thinking, which is revealed through the nature, form, laws and customs of its speech as well as 
through its external culture and through a spectacle of public actions. (13) 
 
Hamann criticises Michaelis for adopting “many prejudices of philosophical myopia” 
(14). He considers the latter’s approach too narrowly rationalistic, scholarly and 
historicist in the sense that his works focus on turning language into an object, and risks 
prioritising the residual signs of language over the living spirit which animates it as an 
institution. In this regard he contrasts the overall “resemblance of a painting” with “the 
regularity of the design or of the blend of colours or the light and shadow”. He thus 
intimates that we should not lose sight of seeing language as a living whole by 
becoming distracted by the study of the patterns, structures and functioning of its parts. 
In other words, we should not lose sight of the wood for the trees. Hamann will unpack 
this accusation at greater length in his Aesthetica in Nuce. The holism that this metaphor 
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is intended to communicate (in relation to both language and the world) will become a 
central tenet throughout Hamann’s life’s work. 
 
     The imperative of a more holistic perspective and greater awareness of context is 
reiterated with a juxtaposition of two excerpts from Hesiod. The first quote is about 
showing “the measures of the resounding sea, being altogether unskilled in seafaring 
and ships”. The second quote is about “[telling] the thought aegis-bearing Zeus”, having 
been taught by the Muses to “sing unlimited song”. This echoes and augments the 
appeal above: that should not let the specialised, technical study of language (skill in 
“seafaring and ships”) eclipse a picture of it as a living institution (witnessing the vast 
“resounding sea”). Nor do we need knowledge of the former in order to obtain a 
perspective on the latter. Both quotes also can be quite plausibly read with a theological 
lens, gesturing to a broader divine context around historical and natural accounts of 
language. Such a theological reading need not concern us in the present context per se, 
but it is worth noting what will later become an archetypical Hamannian move: the 
insistence on gesturing outwards towards a broader frame of reference, towards 
different ways of knowing and experiencing, and towards a recognition of the 
limitations of human cognitive and intellectual capacities (which are all consonant with 
the kind of Pietist outlook that was discussed in chapters two and three). 
 
     Hamann’s 1760 essay gives an account of language which portrays it as a creative, 
holistic, partial and living institution. His account focuses on language’s role in 
mediating human experience of creation – in relation to which we must understand 
tradition and translation. He suggests that anyone who wishes to answer the Berlin 
Academy’s question must study the dialectical tension between the “craving for 
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translation” on the one hand and for “logical demonstration” on the other (15). These 
two elements have “kept each other going”. An unmoderated drive for translation would 
lead to a “rosary of enumerated neologisms” (i.e. a mass of unintegrated vocabulary) 
and an unchecked impulse for logic would lead to a “net that captures and takes good 
and foul fish of every class” (i.e. structures which agnostic to that which they organise). 
He argued that translation “can very reasonably be considered the most ancient”, and 
logical demonstration “as the most recent”; the former “the immovable mode of 
thinking of a people”, the latter “movable”. Thus Hamann polemically reverses the 
epistemological hierarchy of Wolffian philosophy, which prioritises logical 
demonstration (and patterns of necessity and deductive inference thereof) over the 
contingent terms which fill the placeholders that it articulates. He makes the case that 
any viable account of language must take account of both of them. 
 
     While he opposes the epistemological prioritisation of abstract logical structures, as 
we shall see throughout his works, it is worth noting at the outset of this exposition that 
there is a clear recognition and appreciation in Hamann’s works of the value and 
indispensability of the logic and rationality inherent within language. This arguably runs 
against the “Counter-Enlightenment” and “irrationalist” interpretations of his work – as 
can be found in some nineteenth century histories of philosophy and as popularised by 
Isaiah Berlin – that portray Hamann as being critical of or opposed to reason per se (cf. 
O’Flaherty, 1988; Haynes, 2012). As alluded to above, a much more plausible reading is 
that he opposed the totalising purification of reason, and the subordination of the 
manifold ways of experiencing, knowing, expressing and acting with language to the 
disproportionately formal and narrowly analytical moulds that were often privileged by 
philosophers. 
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     The picture of language as a living medium of human consciousness and society is 
reinforced by Hamann’s suggestion of two metaphors for its inter-subjective, inter-
generational and historical character. Firstly, he alludes to a short fable by Christian 
Fürchtegott Gellert called “The Story of the Hat” (Gellert, 1769: 9-10). In this story a 
hat is passed down from generation to generation, with each of its owners adjusting, 
modernising and reinventing it to suit their functions, fashions and purposes. Each 
owner has their own, often grandiose, aspirations about their reinvention of the hat, only 
to perish and pass on the hat for its next round of reinvention. In the final line Gellert 
suggests that that hat is “like philosophy”. This message of the changing fashions and 
the hubris of philosophy is surely directed towards Michaelis and his philosophically 
minded colleagues at the Berlin Academy. 
 
     In a second metaphor alluding to Plato’s Symposium, Hamann compares language to 
the human body which is “constantly transformed” every few years, yet “remains the 
same” (Hamann, 2007: 15-16). In a footnote he quotes the Symposium, saying that 
“since each living thing is called living, he is continually becoming a new person”, “not 
only in his body but in his soul: manners, habits, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or 
fears” (16). Through these metaphors Hamann portrays language as a living fabric that 
is constantly being rewoven to meet the needs and circumstances of its users. As a 
model to study this, he suggests that there has already been substantial research 
undertaken to investigate the “relation of language to its variable usage” - including 
Montesquieu’s 1748 The Spirit of the Laws, which included comparative study of 
different legal systems in relation to their various social, cultural, environmental, 
geographical, political, economic, religious and historical contexts. Many have argued 
that Montesquieu’s approach in this and other texts is an important precursor to the later 
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creation of the fields of sociology and anthropology (see, e.g. Durkheim, 1965; Wolff & 
Cipolloni, 2007: 4). 
 
     The relationship between language and experience is a recurring theme in this essay, 
as well as in many other of Hamann’s works. He gestures towards the interdependence 
between language and experience in his discussion of the “agreement” between 
“sensory impressions” and “coil springs of human speech” (Hamann, 2007: 14), as well 
as in relation to the “hermeneutical principles” of “an ear that keeps good time and a 
throat rich in tones” in prelinguistic forms of communication (15). He also emphasises 
the importance of the study of translation processes, suggesting that “whoever writes in 
a foreign language must like a lover accommodate his mode of thinking to it” and 
“every language demands a mode of thinking and a taste that are proper to it” (18). 
 
     Many of the themes from Hamann’s reaction to Berlin Academy’s essay competition 
on language and opinions are echoed in another piece from 1760 called Miscellaneous 
Notes on Word Order in the French Language. The piece contains three suggestions 
about language which can be read as proto-Wittgensteinian – as Hacking also argues 
(Hacking, 2002). 
 
     Firstly, that on the critical importance of the usage and exchange of words in 
determining their value and meaning, a point which he makes by means of a comparison 
between language and money. He talks of the “public treasury of language” (Hamann, 
2007: 32) and says “money and language stand in a closer relationship than one might 
expect” (22). The comparison between money and language is made by many before 
Hamann (see, e.g. Gray, 1996), but it seems he is using it to make a very contemporary 
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point – that monetary transactions can be structurally compared to linguistic 
transactions. He writes “the wealth of all human knowledge rests on the exchange of 
words” (Hamann, 2007: 22). Both economic and linguistic exchanges take place against 
the background of other past exchanges. Every transaction becomes part of the history 
of transactions which affect future exchanges. The value or “wealth” of language 
depends on a living and evolving mass of exchanges. In a similar vein, Gilbert Ryle 
later wrote “Roughly, as Capital stands to Trade, so Language stands to Speech” (Ryle, 
2009: 420). 
 
     Secondly, Hamann argues that philosophical attempts to formalise and purify 
language risk impoverishing it (which also echoes Michaelis’s claims about the 
importance of synonyms and arguments against rationalisation of “redundant” terms). 
Thus, he writes, that the “purity of a language dispossesses it of its wealth” and “a 
correctness that is all too rigid takes away its strength” (Hamann, 2007: 31) – a point 
which anticipates Wittgenstein’s claim that the philosophical demand for purity is in 
conflict with the need for “friction” – the impurities, ambiguities and roughness that 
enable language to function (Wittgenstein, 2001: I §107). 
 
     Thirdly and finally, he suggests that many philosophical misunderstandings issue 
from lack of awareness about the use of language. Thus he writes that “ignorance of 
scholars in the depths of language lends a hand to abuses without end” (Hamann, 2007: 
23). Scholarly reconstructions try to retrospectively rationalise the linguistic leftovers of 
social and cultural forms of life which they neglect to study. In a footnote he includes a 
quote from Fontenelle, which says that: “languages were not established by academic 
5. Remediating Rationality: Hamann, Herder and the German Linguistic Turn 
143 
reasonings and discussions but a combination, bizarre in appearance, of an infinite 
number of complicated accidents” (24). 
 
     Hamann’s 1762 Cloverleaf of Hellenistic Letters may be read as a companion piece 
to Aesthetica in Nuce, which was composed in the same year. Both texts are about 
debates about language in the New Testament. Both essays evoke a contrast between 
visions of language as vibrant living tradition mediating between creatures and creation, 
and the rationalistic study of the linguistic bones of philosophers and philologists (and 
Michaelis in particular). In this vein, Hamann writes in the Cloverleaf of Hellenistic 
Letters, “no language can be surveyed from books alone” and “the language of an 
author is as a dead language compared to the language of social life” (37). Echoing his 
claim for the importance of usage in his Miscellaneous Notes on Word Order in the 
French Language, he writes that “since words and usages are signs, their history and 
philosophy is very similar and mutually dependent” (40), elucidating that “the purpose, 
place, time of an author all qualify his expression” and that “court, school, the business 
of everyday life, closed guilds, gangs, and sects have their own dictionaries” (41). He 
grounds the use of language in the social reality of living, experiencing human beings, 
contending that “every imperceptible gradation of feeling colours the expression of our 
concepts” (37). In adopting this approach, part of his aim is to recover a sense of how 
the biblical text and biblical language is but a faint shadow of the bright, living reality 
of circumstances, colours and characters depicted in the books – a shadow of what some 
theologians will later call the Sitz im Leben, or “setting in life” of the text. 
 
     Hamann reiterates this distinction – between the “dead bones” analysed by scholars 
and the daylight of living creation – in his discussion of relationship between 
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philosophy, as a faculty for abstract analysis; and poetry, as a faculty for experiential 
synthesis (46). In order to understand language, we need to look beyond grammar, 
beyond the arrangements of words on the page, towards its living deployment amongst 
speakers. Thus he writes, “the voice of the people is the voice of God” and quotes the 
British theologian John Lightfoot’s suggestion that “the dialect of God is 
ungrammatical” (39). Against Michaelis’s philological analysis of biblical texts, 
whereby he strove to correct mistakes and to extract the essential meanings or teachings 
from the contingent circumstances surrounding the text, Hamann writes “I care more 
about the genius than the grammar of the Greek language” (43). In a similar move to his 
Socratic Memorabilia’s attempt to recast Socrates as a pious proto-Christian figure 
(against his appropriation as a hero of the Enlightenment), he describes Aristotle as “an 
exemplary draftsman” and Plato as “a colourist”, in order to highlight their expressive 
use of language, rather than its purely formal, rational character (45). While Michaelis 
looks to “gather and reconcile the scattered limbs of the people” (58) in the field of 
history, which is like “that open valley that was full of bones”, Hamann facetiously 
states that he would prefer to turn to anatomy as a means to “know thyself” rather than 
to “seek the art of living and ruling in our historic skeletons” (46). This is consistent 
with his ongoing appeal for holism about the human person as an embodied, mortal, 
sensuous, living, loving creature as opposed to the ahistorical, disembodied, cerebral 
subject of overly rationalistic philosophers. 
 
     Many of these themes continue to be central in Hamann’s Aesthetica in Nuce, where 
he unpacks them at greater length and articulates his case in a way that makes its 
relevance beyond his theological dispute with Michaelis clearer and more explicit (even 
if this is not what Hamann intended). The organising metaphor of living constellations 
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of language in society against dead systems and empty tenets of rationalistic scholarship 
remains central in the text, as he urges that “we must become even as little children if 
we are to receive the spirit of truth” (72) against the “original mathematical sin” of 
Michaelis and his colleagues. Addressing Michaelis, Hamann quotes Bacon’s statement 
that “as to seek theology in philosophy is to seek the living among the dead, so to seek 
philosophy in theology is to seek the dead among the living” (71-72). At the opening of 
the piece he refers to Michaelis as “the Archangel over the relics of Canaan’s language” 
(62). The main point of contention in the piece is how to read biblical language. While 
Hamann argues that Michaelis opts for overly literal and rational reconstructions, 
Hamann emphasises the many other functions of language, especially its aesthetic, 
poetic and expressive functions. 
 
     While – as noted above – Hamann acknowledges the role of “philosophical or 
characteristic” language, alongside language which is “poetic or curiological”, 
“historical or symbolic or hieroglyphic”, he opposes attempts to maximise the former to 
the exclusion of the latter. Contra Berlin, I would argue that the opposition of a 
maximalist position regarding a particular “thin” conception of rationality (as opposed 
to a “thicker” and more holistic conception of rationality, as mediated by language) 
should not invite the label “irrationalist”. Hamann recognises the role of narrow, 
formalised practices of reason – but takes issue with philosophical claims that these 
should be considered the sole or dominant model for human reason and understanding. 
Thus he writes of how “the large and small Masorah of philosophy” – the Masorah 
being the marginal annotations on religious texts – “has overwhelmed the text of nature, 
like the Great Flood” (80). He ridicules the marginality and niche appeal of philological 
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and philosophical modes of inquiry, saying that their “world of readers” is like a 
“lecture-hall which a single Plato filled” (82). 
 
     Against the literal and rationalistic theological readings of Michaelis and his 
contemporaries which focus on extracting essential meanings from contingent 
circumstance and redundant decorative expression, Hamann inverts their case and 
argues for the centrality of figurative language. Thus he writes: 
 
Poetry is the mother tongue of the human race, as the garden is older than the ploughed field; 
painting, than writing; song, than declamation; parables, than logical deduction; barter, than 
commerce. (63) 
 
In the vision of language that Hamann presents in Aesthetic in Nuce, images are central 
to the creation of meaning. He writes that “the senses and passions speak and 
understand nothing but images” and that “all the wealth of human knowledge and 
happiness consists in images” (63). Images are the locus between language and 
experience. But for Hamann experience is not envisaged as the sensory input that 
grounds an individual’s knowledge of an object in the “external world” (as for 
empiricist philosophers), but rather a collective medium for bearing witness to creation 
which is given form through the word. Hamann’s Aesthetica draws heavily on imagery 
from opening passages of the Gospel of John, including the notions that “in the 
beginning was the Word”, that “the Word was God”, that “through him all things were 
made”, that “in him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind” and that bearing 
“witness to the light” (as per the Gospel of John) is a model expression of faith for 
Christian believers. According to this Johannine creation story, the coming-into-being of 
language is coterminous with the coming-into-being of human consciousness of 
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creation. In this conception, language is very literally “world-disclosing” – a term 
associated with Heidegger’s thought which many have also used in relation to the HHH 
tradition, Gadamer, Habermas and others (see, e.g. Kompridis, 1994, 2011; Lafont, 
1999, 2000). While Hamann believes that languages play a significant role in 
structuring our experience, he also suggests that they do not exhaust our experience of 
the world. 
 
     Hamann quotes the ancient saying “Speak that I may see you!”, and argues that to 
speak is to translate from “an angelic language into a human language”. He suggests 
that creation is “speech to creature through creatures”, but that all that “all we have left 
in nature for our use are jumbled verses and disjecti membra poetae”, the latter being a 
phrase from Horace referring to the “limbs of a dismembered poet” (65-66). This 
metaphor is central to Hamann’s view of language, as well as to his own authorship. It 
conveys a sense of language as a living bricolage of fragments or exemplary phrases, 
sayings, expressions, quotations and allusions that are continually re-adapted and given 
fresh life in new contexts and circumstances. He presents a division of labour in which 
poets and creative users of language play a leading role in recalibrating and reorganising 
our semantic apparatus: 
 
To gather these together is the scholar’s modest part; to interpret them, the philosopher’s; to 
imitate them – or bolder still – bring them into the right order, the poet’s. (65) 
 
This epistemological reversal places poet (denigrated by philosophers of pure reason) at 
the apex of human knowledge, whilst formal philosophical systems are relegated. If 
philosophers argued for universal reason, Hamann advanced an aesthetic conception 
predicated upon universal passion, suggesting that “you can observe for yourselves the 
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phenomena of passion everywhere in human society” (81). It was “passion alone”, he 
contended” that “gives hands, feet, and wings to abstractions as well as to hypotheses” 
as well as giving “spirit, life, and tongue” to “images and signs” (81). 
 
     Hamann esteems language for its creative, revelatory and expressive capacities: for 
its power to help people to collectively apprehend and negotiate their way through the 
world, rather than for its capacities for logical demonstration or philosophical 
argumentation. Following Cervantes, he compares translation to looking at “the wrong 
side of a tapestry” (66). Through this comparison he may be read as pointing towards 
the imperfection of human language in mediating the experience of creation, as well as 
drawing attention to its capacity to render worlds as a whole (similar to his metaphor of 
a painting in his Essay on an Academic Question). He suggests that poetic language can 
help to bring about awareness of creation, whereas philosophical language may 
sometimes only serve to mask it through abstraction and the fabrication of elaborate 
distractions. Hamann suggest that this philosophical tendency may verge on blasphemy. 
This disdain is in no small part theological. He suggests that ordinary experience is a 
manifestation of the individual's relationship with God, a sentiment which resonates 
with later notions such as Kierkegaard's “existence-communication”, or Rudolph 
Bultmann's existential conception of “realised eschatology”. Drawing on the Gospel of 
John, Hamann writes: “if one single truth like the sun prevails, it is day” (78). A 
philosophical preoccupation with the “unnatural use of abstractions” may distract us 
from language's relationship with the aesthetic dimensions of experience, and from our 
relation to creation, such that “every reaction of man unto created things is an epistle 
and seal that we partake of the divine nature, and that we are his offspring” (79). 
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     He contends that poetic language can bring us into a closer relationship with 
creation. In a line which could come straight from romantic writers (such as Novalis), 
Hamann writes that: “Nature and Scripture, then, are the materials of the beautiful, 
creative, and imitative spirit” (85). In this context nature stands for the witnessing of the 
“light” of creation and is essentially revelatory, as opposed to the staid and studied 
naturalisms of the Enlightenment. For Hamann, “scripture” is understood more broadly 
to refer to the mediation of this revelation of nature in tradition – including many kinds 
of literary texts and forms of cultural expression. In this sense, he anticipates later 
moves to take biblical hermeneutics as the basis for a universal hermeneutics. 
 
Herder on Language, Consciousness and Culture 
 
 
     Herder's “Fragments on Recent German Literature” of 1767/68 is one of his earliest 
works on language. As well as discussing debates about language around the Berlin 
Academy and Hamann’s ideas about language, experience and the primacy of poetic 
expression, Herder theoretically recasts many of these concerns, and sets forth his own 
distinctive agenda around translation, literature, culture, history and the relationship 
between reason, language and experience. 
 
     The essay opens with the notion that “the exactitude of a language diminishes its 
richness”, echoing Michaelis and Hamann’s thoughts that the philosophical drive for 
abstraction, parsimony and boiling away contingency can have an impoverishing effect 
on the expressive repertoire of a language (Herder, 2002: 31). While philosophers find 
near synonymous words “annoying”, and feel the need to “determine them precisely”, 
to “[order] into classes and [wash] away the excess”, Herder contends that “almost-
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 150 
synonyms” enable richer “many-sided” descriptions language and it is precisely 
language’s superfluity which gives it expressive reach and power (34-36, 64). Following 
Hamann's Aesthetica in Nuce, Herder argues for the primacy of poetry over philosophy. 
“The oldest languages”, Herder contends, “have a sort of sensuous formation” (60). 
Echoing several Hamannian metaphors, Herder says that older languages are a kind of 
“living expression”, which “bear witness” to the circumstances of its users (61). For the 
ancients “speaking and singing … were one thing”, and the earliest languages consisted 
of “singing and speaking nature” with “flying fragments” (62). Herder considered the 
oldest languages to be a kind of “living noise” (63) – “rushing with the whirlwind”, 
“resounding in the battle”, “raging with the sea”, “roaring with the river”, “cracking 
with the collapsing rock”, “speaking with the animals” (61). As with Hamann, Herder 
thus portrayed early languages as existential sound rather than as proto-rationalistic 
system. He suggests that in addition to the emergence of new terms and synonyms to 
reflect new objects, conditions and practices, another important way to increase the 
potency of a language is through literary translation. In this sense, a literary translator is 
like “a merchant who really enriches the state” (37). 
 
     Following Michaelis, Hamann and debates around the Berlin Academy, Herder sees 
language as being intimately connected with the circumstances of its users. He says that 
“each original language which is the native growth of a country develops in accordance 
with its climate and region” and that “each national language forms itself in accordance 
with the ethics and manner of thought of its people” (50). Much like Michaelis’s 
emphasis on the de facto democratic character of language as the living aggregate of 
contingent transactions amongst its users, Herder writes that he regards language, and 
modes of understanding that it enables and articulates, as: 
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[...] a composition of millions of heads, as a product of whole millennia, and as a creation to whose 
formation and endless confluence of accidents and trivialities, an intervention of countless 
missteps and situations, had to contribute! (57) 
 
As we saw Wittgenstein taking issue with the monomania of philosophers who tried to 
study language as though it were essentially doing one type of thing (such as 
designating or declaring), Herder rejects that there is a “single idea” underpinning the 
“great mass and variety” of natural language (57). 
 
     He also goes beyond the notion that language reflects the circumstances of its users, 
to make the case that thoughts take shape “not only in” but “also in accordance with” 
language, and that “language sets limits and outline for the whole of human cognition” 
(48-49). This is a crucial statement of a position which will become definitive for both 
Hamann and Herder, namely that reason and experience are given form by language. 
Reason is articulated by language, rather than pre-existing as an ahistorical, immutable 
structure that is imperfectly represented in language (like Plato’s forms). Developing 
this position, Herder writes: “the nurses who form our tongues are therefore our first 
teachers of Logic” (48). The task for the philosopher is, he says, “to be able to explain it 
as a development of reason and as a production of mental forces” (58). 
 
     Like Hamann, Herder does not thereby mean that we should be passive in our 
relation to our linguistic inheritance. Echoing Hamann’s claim in his 1760 response to 
the Berlin Academy’s prize essay question that “a head that thinks at its own expense 
will always trespass on language” (Hamann, 2007: 18), Herder says: 
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Every head who thinks for himself will also speak for himself, and so his manner of expression 
gets formed in his own way too: he will impress on his language characteristic features of his 
manner of seeing and characteristic features of the weaknesses and virtues of his manner of 
thought, or in short, a distinctive form of his own, into which his ideas have cast themselves. 
(Herder, 2002: 51) 
 
     Herder also shared Hamann’s view that human creative expression can be seen as a 
kind of homage to the original divine act of creation, such that cultural works articulate 
their own microcosmic worlds. Both Hamann and Herder were deeply influenced by 
Edward Young’s views on literary originality, and the notion the original compositions 
developed out of a linguistic tradition like vegetables out of soil, forging new forms out 
of pre-existing elements. Their shared readings of Shakespeare – whom they regarded 
as a paragon for literary originality – confirmed and encouraged this view and provided 
a model for later attempts to fashion a distinctive German literary culture as the basis 
for a unified people and a new unified state (Gillies, 1937). 
 
     In 1772 Herder entered and won the Berlin Academy prize essay competition with 
his Treatise on the Origin of Language, responding to the questions: “Supposing men 
abandoned to their natural faculties, are they in a position to invent language? And by 
what means will they arrive at this invention?”. In the winning essay, Herder rejects 
both what he perceives as the over-reductive naturalism of Condillac and Rousseau 
(who respectively “made animals into human beings” and “human beings into 
animals”), as well as the speculative supernaturalism of Johann Peter Süßmilch (whose 
account he compares to the idea of a tree bursting forth fully formed from the ground, as 
opposed to having grown from seed). Central to his alternative account is the concept of 
Besonnenheit, or reflection, which is what enables us to pick out “a single wave” from 
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the “ocean of sensations” which floods us (87). The first moment of the recognition of a 
Merkmal or “characteristic mark” (such as the bleating of a sheep) as such is identified 
as the beginning of language, as well as the beginning of human reflection, awareness 
and consciousness. Herder describes this as the moment at which “Prometheus's 
heavenly spark catches fire in the human soul” (97). 
 
     Herder’s account of the genesis of language describes the development of a 
constellation of characteristic marks for phenomena which give different languages 
their specific composition. In this respect his account overlaps with that in his 
Fragments: the oldest language is poetic language which is derived from impressions of 
nature. Here Herder also shares something of the Hamannian conception of experience 
as revelation of creation, rather than epistemological building blocks. The way in which 
nature is depicted in older languages is fundamentally aesthetic, rather than scientific in 
character. Early languages do not arise in response to a concern for accurate 
representation, for correspondences between words and objects, for “picturing facts” (as 
per Wittgenstein’s Tractatus). They are rather portrayed as fundamentally musical, 
expressive, unfolding in concert with creation, and projecting worlds that emerge from 
this constellation of resonances. Herder describes them as being richer in synonyms and 
as containing fewer abstract terms, more verbs than nouns, and more poetic-expressive 
terms deriving from experience of creation – such that they are like a “vocabulary of 
nature”, “a living epic of resounding, acting nature” or “a vocabulary of the soul which 
is simultaneously a mythology and a wonderful epic of the actions and speaking of all 
beings” (121-122, 103). This is the sense in which he means that poetry is older than 
prose (103). 
 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 154 
     But what about words for things which don't make sounds? Things for which there is 
nothing sensuous for language to imitate? Here Herder suggests that we reach for a 
“neighbouring sound” (106-107). All of our abstract concepts arise out of more 
sensuous ones. “Spirit” and “soul” come from the word for “breath”, for example (118, 
121). Different concepts are abstracted in different regions and different cultures, with 
the consequence that higher order concepts may have no analogous term in other 
languages. Thus, he says, there are no words for “time, duration, space, essence, matter, 
body, virtue, justice, freedom, gratitude” in the Peruvian language (119). This means 
that different cultures have different fundamental metaphysical, political, social, 
cultural, moral and scientific concepts, which contributes to the formation of 
correspondingly different outlooks and “world views”, a claim which anticipates what 
became known as the “linguistic relativity” hypothesis of later linguists, anthropologists 
and philosophers (such as Sapir and Whorf) – namely the idea that languages shape or 
determine thought. Though the relationship may not be straightforward or direct, Herder 
suggests that the different material conditions, the Klima or “climates” of different 
places – including the weather, food and drink, customs, clothing, culture – contribute 
to the formation of different constellations of concepts. 
 
     This conception of language as a mediator of different social, cultural, political, 
religious and metaphysical worlds gives rise to ambitious new modes of enquiry. Like 
Michaelis, Herder considered language as a repository for the study of the human spirit, 
the spirit of “a people” constituted by virtue of being members of a linguistic 
community. Much as in Michaelis’s 1759 essay, Herder emphasises how (at least in 
principle) everyone can influence the languages they use, describing the latter as “a 
treasure room of human thoughts to which each person contributed something in his 
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own way” and “an epitome of the efficacy of all human souls” (156). He considers 
language – and the consciousness, culture and world-making that he argues comes with 
it – to be the defining feature of humanity, like the honey-comb for the bee, or the 
cobweb for the spider. Language is the characteristic fabric of human thought, human 
society and human world-making. As Hacking notes, Herder appears to oscillate on the 
question of whether language is essentially public, social and intersubjective, suggesting 
in one place that “the savage, the solitary in the forest, would necessarily have invented 
language for himself” (90). But for the large part Herder presents language as what we 
might consider to be a kind of collective material and semiotic infrastructure: a shared 
repository and living institution of marks and sounds, fragments and phrases, works and 
traditions, lenses and frames that provides the conditions of possibility for different 
ways of knowing, experiencing, communicating and acting in the world. As he will later 
write, language is the “grand assistant” of humankind, through which they have been 
able to build cities and transform deserts into gardens. 
 
     What implications, if any, does this picture hold for philosophy, and in particular for 
philosophical conceptions of rationality? For Herder language is constitutive of human 
rationality. He writes that “without language the human being has no reason, and 
without reason no language” (91). This entails that any philosophical project which 
aspires to understand and clarify rationality and the logic of human thought must place 
language at the centre of their inquiry. Herder contends that philosophers have tended 
towards reforming and refining language without first understanding it and how it 
operates (138). Herder urges philosophers to leave their “dead museum” and to become 
students of language, “which lives” (135-137). In what is surely a nod to Hamann’s 
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tapestry metaphor from Cervantes, Herder warns that unless they do they will “only 
ever see the weave of the back of the carpet” (105). 
 
     What might this look like in practice? In the closing passages of his Treatise Herder 
remarks that he has effectively “supplied no thesis” in response to the question, and that 
instead he advocates working towards “collecting firm data from the human soul, 
human organization, the structure of all ancient and savage languages, and the whole 
household-economy of the human species” (164). As language defines the nature, 
constitution and limits of human worlds, philosophers should strive to understand 
language as it is actually used and as it has been used in a wide variety of contexts. This 
includes through genealogical inquiry and etymological mappings of the contingent 
development of concepts, comparative study of different languages, and the study of 
how language is used by different people in different settings. Like Hamann, Herder 
retains a profound holism about human beings, their capacities and their worlds. 
“Language was born with the whole unfolding of the human forces”, he argues (138). 
Likewise, reason is “no compartmentalized, separately effective force” but rather “an 
orientation of all forces that is distinctive to his species”, “the whole domestic economy 
of his sensuous and cognizing, of his cognizing and willing, nature” (83-85). In order to 
“make visible … that web called human nature”, we must study the web of language. In 
turn, if we want to understand language we must study its evolving material 
articulations, its practises, contexts, usages, institutions, how it is given form in sound, 
how it is breathed in music, its inscription in manifold forms of what Taylor calls 
“meaningful media”. 
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     But philosophical sensitivity to linguistic nuance need not be constrained to 
describing language, but also might play a role in contributing to it as a form of 
linguistic praxis. Herder's linguistic critique of philosophy and proposed philosophy of 
language must be understood against the background of his broader philosophical 
programme which was, broadly speaking, to radically overhaul philosophy to make it 
serve the needs and interests of ordinary people. In his 1765 essay How Philosophy Can 
Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People Herder made a very 
similar case to the “popular philosophers” of the mid-eighteenth century (which 
Zammito argues that we should see Herder as part of), arguing that philosophical reason 
“creates for itself labyrinths” and “ties knots in order to be able to untie them” (11). In 
response to this, Herder advocated that people should “push forth … into the holy 
places of philosophy” and “construct there state buildings, assemblies where instead of 
philosophical nonsense the healthy understanding counsels the state, humanity” (18). A 
philosophy that was more intimately engaged with the details of the linguistic 
institutions of the publics that it stood to serve would not be compelled to simply 
passively accept languages as they are, but might play a role in contributing to them – to 
articulate new forms of experience, new kinds of social, cultural and political action. 
 
     Like Hamann, Herder was a believer in the creative power of language, and through 
his own works hoped to exemplify an expressively richer, dialectical alternative to 
philosophies which focused on purifying language and formalising rationality. At the 
end of his Fragments, for example, he wrote that his “scattered fragments” were 
intended to be “anything but a philosophical language”, and instead said that he pursued 
a “poetic language” that was “full of images and passions, idioms and pleonasms, word 
transformations and stubborn idiosyncrasy, which sang and gestured, painted for eye 
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and ear”. Though his work is not explicitly philosophical in intent (cf. Haynes, 2007), 
this description is also very fitting for Hamann’s work, which also performatively 
articulates an alternative to the philosophical language that he mistrusts with an arsenal 
of literary figures and rhetorical tropes. Over the coming decades, Hamann and 
Herder’s works both contributed to bolstering ambitions to create new ways of 
knowing, new ways of being and new worlds through language – from the literary 
experimentation associated with Sturm und Drang to the philosophical writings of the 
Early German Romantics. 
 
Hamann and Herder’s Metacritical Philosophies of 
Language 
 
     In this final section of this chapter I shall examine how Hamann and Herder’s views 
on language took shape towards the end of the eighteenth century, before going on to 
discuss their main contributions to the eighteenth century linguistic turn and how they 
contribute to an alternative tradition of the philosophy of language that is able to 
address some of the limitations of the analytic linguistic turn. 
 
     As we saw in the first chapter, both thinkers developed linguistic “metacritiques” of 
Kant’s 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, wherein they expounded their views on the 
implications of reason’s dependence upon and constitution in language. Hamann’s 1784 
Metacritique on the Purism of Reason brought to bear many of his views about 
language from the early 1760s as well as echoing Herder’s stronger formulations from 
the late 1760s and early 1770s. It may be read as a kind of satirical immanent critique of 
Kant’s Critique, demonstrating the dependency of pure reason on language in all of its 
richness. Herder’s 1799 Metacritique of the Critique of Pure Reason – written eleven 
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years after Hamann’s death in 1788 – may be read as an attempt to develop Hamann’s 
succinct metacritical seed into a more fully fledged philosophical agenda. 
 
     Both contend that Kant’s Critique is fundamentally mistaken in advancing an 
aggressive agenda of the purification of reason and understanding that abstracts and 
redefines certain philosophical concepts, at the same time as significantly 
underestimating that which gives these concepts purchase – namely language. In order 
to make the case for his puritanical project, Kant deploys a communicative apparatus 
which he inherits, upon which he depends, but which remains almost completely 
invisible, unrepresented and unexplored in his philosophy. In this regard, both Hamann 
and Herder consider Kant’s project to be (somewhat ironically) profoundly uncritical 
and unreflective, as it fails at the first hurdle to recognise the character and formative 
importance of that through which it is articulated. 
 
     At the same time, both Hamann and Herder draw on and reconfigure Kant’s project 
in the service of a linguistic metacritique, such that Kant’s transcendental categories are 
replaced by a multiplicity of languages as historically situated, evolving and contingent 
institutions and practices. In this picture (to which I dedicate the remainder of this 
chapter), there is no such thing as a pre-given universal rationality, only rationalities 
which may (with no small degree of communicative work) be put into conversation with 
each other. Nor is there language as such, but rather languages, both living and dead. 
These languages may be philosophically investigated, and the way in which they project 
worlds can indeed be studied in order to understand how they articulate various 
conceptions that give structure to our worlds – including but not necessarily limited to 
the two intuitions and twelve categories which Kant discusses (including space, time, 
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quantity, quality, causality and suchlike). However, undertaking such an exercise in one 
language should not be mistaken for an endeavour of mapping the universal ahistorical 
cognitive infrastructure of mankind, especially if the concepts under investigation are 
arbitrarily redefined beyond all normal recognisability. This is what Hamann satirises in 
his metacritique, such as when he ironically reinterprets Kant’s philosophical concepts 
of analysis and synthesis in terms of tailors’ cutting and joining of cloth. 
 
     Insofar as we can speak of a synthetic a priori in Hamann and Herder’s respective 
metacritiques, this is to be found in particular languages rather than in the abstract, 
purportedly universal transcendental categories of Kant’s inquiry. Languages both 
transcendentally structure, organise and give shape to our experience, as well as being 
subjectable to revision and re-articulation in light of the usages and experiences of those 
who use them – from the Shakespeares and Dantes who enrich language with troves of 
new metaphors and expressions, to the more modest interventions of anyone who coins 
a combination of words which happens to be adopted by other language users. In a more 
fundamental way, languages are the sum of interactions and usages to which they are 
put. The meanings of linguistic terms can be understood with reference to their 
institutionalisation and their recorded “footprints”, whether now or in the past. 
 
     It is worth noting the striking contrast between the respective conceptions of 
language of these two linguistic turns on the eighteenth and twentieth centuries: 
between the austere, architectonic minimalism of early Wittgensteinian conceptions of a 
universal metalanguage, and the densely woven tapestries of Hamann and Herder’s 
writings, abundant in synonyms, quotes and expressions montaged from fragments of 
tradition. This latter conception of language deriving from the eighteenth century 
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linguistic turn is one in which thought and experience of worlds is mediated and 
constituted by language as an evolving rich, historical, social, cultural and material 
fabric. As Herder writes in his Metacritique:  
 
Human speech becomes a copy of everything, a living image of our manner of thought, full of 
light and shadows, full of terms and articulations. And this living operation continues on. As long 
as our understanding understands, it becomes, forming concepts as it regenerates itself 
unceasingly. Just as the understanding has experience, so reason has for its sphere the broad 
domain of human thoughts through the medium of speech. (128) 
 
     But if language is malleable and can be reshaped by its users, on what basis can we 
build a case against the universal aspirations of Kant’s Critique? If poets can remake 
languages, why can’t philosophers? Might not the construction of a logical calculus or 
the derivation of fundamental categories of our experience be considered in a similar 
light to the construction of a poem: as a kind of compositional praxis? In fact, is there 
not a case to be made that if one is committed to a broadly liberal cosmopolitan outlook, 
then it might make eminent sense for a philosophical avant-garde to forge ahead with 
the development of a meta-linguistic communicative infrastructure to in order to 
facilitate trans-cultural deliberation and consensus and to compose trans-national 
political orders and institutions towards the laudable goal of perpetual peace? Might the 
rejection of Kant’ transcendental meta-language constitute a cultural, political or 
theological aversion to projects of liberal universalism or proto-modernist abstraction, 
rather than philosophical objections about their possibility or plausibility? How might 
we distinguish between what Rorty characterises as squeals of political disapproval or 
cultural distaste (Rorty, 1987: 573-574), and more substantive philosophical 
disagreement based on a competing conception of language and meaning? 
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     Herder and Hamann both recognise the importance of abstraction as a fundamental 
aspect of language. If they were committed to an epistemological picture that adopted a 
principled insistence upon “lower order” linguistic terms which remained closer to 
experience, a principled stand against abstraction per se, then I think we would have 
reason to challenge their philosophical views. Such a view might be held to privilege 
something like a representational view of language such that the epistemological value 
of utterances is proportional to their fidelity to, or correspondence with, experience-as-
epistemological-input. But Hamann and Herder’s objections can be read as being 
directed towards a totalising obsession with abstraction and logical form at the expense 
of language’s other capacities (perhaps analogous to the distinction between money and 
the love of money). Thus Herder writes “without abstraction, neither reason nor 
language would exist” and that we can pursue abstraction “as far as its capacity and the 
expression of it can extend” (Surber, 2001: 128). He also has no principled objection to 
abstract, formalised and specialised technical languages, saying that “every exact 
science deserves its own” in order to “emphasise exactitude and order”, which is 
something of which they should “not be ashamed” (127). Likewise, as we have seen 
above, Hamann considers proposes that we should understand language in terms of a 
dialectical movement between both “logical demonstration” and “translation” – and not 
just the former at the expense of the latter. What is objectionable is “empty forms and 
schemas” being taken as a kind of “master account” of language. 
 
     In other words, perhaps the question is: what is to be gained by making the moves 
that Kant makes? What work does his philosophical system enable us to do? What 
exactly is it for, and how does it measure up to the objectives which it sets out to 
achieve? To the extent that Kant is interested in uncovering a universal transcendental a 
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priori, and a single, definitive set of categories which structure experience and give 
form to rationality in all times and all places, Hamann and Herder think that his project 
cannot succeed on its own terms. That which structures our experience, organises 
cognition and gives form to rationality is language – or, more accurately, specific 
languages. While Kant claims to be uncovering ahistorical structures of universal 
rationality, Hamann and Herder contend that what he is actually doing is abstracting 
from particular, contingent and somewhat arbitrarily selected concepts and forms of 
rationality from the German language, re-articulating them in a highly formal and 
unusual way, and presenting them as universal. On their view his account doesn’t 
account for the cultural, social and historical variance in language that could well lead 
to quite different conceptions about the central structuring features of reason and 
experience. 
 
     But – taking a charitable reading of Kant’s Critique – might we suggest that what his 
account lacks in descriptive or explanatory plausibility (as it is gives a poor and unlikely 
account of how experience and rationality are actually structured for everyone in all 
times and places), might we nevertheless adopt a view where it could be read as a kind 
of trans-cultural normative programme or ideal about how rationality and experience 
could or should be structured? Might Kant’s transcendental idealist programme be read 
as aspirational – as trading expressive wealth or communicative fidelity for the 
advantages of rational consensus, universality and scientific precision? To put it another 
way, might there be strategic advantages to a thinner conception of rationality rather 
than a constellation of conflicting and contradictory epistemological world-projections 
celebrated for their expressive and poetic wealth, but perhaps arguably less useful for 
developing consensus in science, politics or diplomacy? As Kuehn highlights in his 
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intellectual biography, Kant contended that “all natural science proper requires a pure 
part upon which the apodictic certainty sought by reason can be based” (Kuehn, 2001: 
302), and that in relation to morality “a rational belief is on which is based on no other 
data than those inherent in pure reason” (307). These kinds of statements make it clear 
that Kant was more interested in obtaining epistemological certainty than in using a thin 
conception of reason to as a means to obtaining consensus within scientific or political 
communities, through which certainty could be constructed rather than uncovered. But 
could we nevertheless fruitfully read him against these intentions – as contributing to 
the institutionalisation of practices of pure reason, despite his questionable account of 
the derivation of immutable, context-agnostic and quasi-Platonic certainties of pure 
reason? Perhaps we might separate the practices of the purification of reason from 
Kant’s unconvincing account of them, in the same way that we might accept the work of 
a scientist proposing formulae governing the motion of physical objects whilst at the 
same time rejecting their account of their own work in terms of a purely rational 
enterprise to uncover the eternal laws of nature? 
 
     In order to extend the analogy between philosophical projects to purify reason and 
the cultural practices of modernism, what if we compare Kant’s Critique to initiatives 
such as Otto and Marie Neurath’s Isotype Institute in the twentieth century? Otto 
Neurath wished to develop a universal picture language as a contribution to a process of 
“debabelization” against a background of “warring interests and broken connections” 
(Neurath, 1936: 13). He believed that while “words make division”, by contrast 
“pictures make connection” and could be used to devise a communicative scheme that 
was “free from the limits of language” (18). By having “as small an amount of detail as 
possible” (64), the proposed picture language would be an “education in clear thought”, 
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“by reason of its limits” (22). While there is a sense that this picture language would 
appeal to widespread (if not universal) aspects of human perception of graphical forms, 
Neurath also explicitly recognises that his picture language is dependent on (and not “in 
competition” with) natural languages, as well other social and cultural genres of visual 
representation. Ultimately Neurath’s project did contribute to the development of an 
internationally recognised system of pictographic representation, by virtue of its 
institutionalisation as a form of cultural and communicative praxis in exhibitions, 
books, signs, labels, global standards bodies and by influencing the practices of graphic 
designers (Twyman, 1975). Neurath hence aspired for communicative universality in 
the form of a transnational system of pictographic symbols and to some extent achieved 
this through the investment of time and energy with teams of designers and researchers 
to develop, institutionalise and build alliances around their work. 
 
     Perhaps, along similar lines, Kant’s project could be re-read as a contribution 
towards the construction rather than the discovery of a universal project of “pure 
reason? Thus the operational metaphor would switch away from one of implausibly 
boiling down to obtain common elements of pure reason in one language, and towards 
an initiative to compose a minimalist expressive repertoire that was fit for Kant’s 
philosophical purposes. If language users are sovereign, and if languages are amenable 
to creative redefinition and the institutionalisation of new linguistic practices and 
structures, are formal rationalistic meta-languages not perfectly legitimate form of 
expression – like more highly regimented sub-regions of modernist architecture in 
linguistic cities? Might the dispute between Hamann, Herder and Kant not collapse into 
one of linguistic-architectural expression – between the rich organic ornamentation of 
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gothic dwellings and the parsimonious universalism of Kant’s designs as “the first real 
Modernist”, as Clement Greenberg called him (Pissarro, 2009)?  
 
     Setting aside the question of whether Hamann and Herder shared Kant’s universal 
aspirations, they clearly had different conceptions not only regarding style but about 
communicative means. If Kant favoured distillation of the a priori as the basis of his 
“thin” and minimalist conception of a universal pure reason, Hamann and Herder 
favoured a “thicker” conception of multiple rationalities that were entangled and 
institutionalised in different contexts of life – which could be mediated and 
reconfigured through translation as well as interpersonal acts of communication and 
expression (exemplified by the language of poetry and literature). They saw languages 
as more than merely decorative media which could be considered superfluous to a latent 
universal rational structure – arguing instead that reason is constituted and given being 
in languages. In chapter seven I shall argue that Habermas’s work in this area – drawing 
on both the eighteenth and twentieth century linguistic turns – can be read as an attempt 
to reconcile the universalist aspirations of a communicative meta-language with a 
“thicker” conception of communicative rationality, shifting the focus away from the 
derivation of a universal meta-language through boiling down and towards the 
institutionalisation of bridging practices between linguistic repertoires as instantiated in 
“communicative action”. 
 
     Ultimately Hamann and Herder thought that the combination Kant’s threefold 
purification of reason from tradition, experience and language, his fundamental 
underestimation of language as that which structures rationality and experience, the gulf 
between his ambitions for the project of pure reason and understanding and its lack of 
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clear applications (e.g. in social, cultural, political or moral life) meant that his project 
could not succeed on its own terms. Instead they suggested a different direction for 
Kant’s critical philosophy by looking at how (i) his ground-breaking shift towards 
examining reason in relation to a world and (ii) his transcendental analytic of the 
categories which provide the conditions of possibility for understanding and experience 
could be developed with reference to language. 
 
     I shall briefly recap the main features of Hamann and Herder’s metacritiques. First of 
all, both Hamann and Herder hold that thought and rationality are dependent on, shaped 
by and given form within languages. As Charles Taylor puts it, according to this picture, 
languages are “constitutive-expressive” and disclose and give shape to worlds. 
Languages have their life in usages, practices and institutions (in the broader 
Wittgensteinian sense) and arise from, fundamentally structure and are continually re-
calibrated in accordance with the experiences and life circumstances of their users. 
Philosophers should develop an appreciation of the plurality of different applications 
and contexts of languages – against their zealous pursuit of abstract a priori meta-
languages. Languages are fundamentally social, historical, and deeply interwoven with 
the forms of life and experience which they articulate. Languages are partial and it is 
precisely this partiality which gives them their expressive wealth as well as giving rise 
to the importance of translation as a means to enrich expressive repertoires through the 
importation of terms and expressions from other traditions and cultures. This partiality 
is why languages both reveal and conceal different aspects of the world, as Heidegger 
suggests. 
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     Both Hamann and Herder compare the creativity of human beings in language with 
divine creation, and see poetic and literary language as paradigmatic for language’s 
expressive capacity as well as for attempts to actively reshape and reforge it with new 
terms and structures. They both suggest that philosophers can go above and beyond the 
passive working out of assumptions embedded in a language, but that hitherto poets 
have been more successful than philosophers at reconfiguring language to create, 
project and organise new worlds. As Herder comments, “Homer and Sophocles, Dante, 
Shakespeare and Klopstock have supplied psychology and knowledge of humankind 
with more material than even the Aristotles and Leibnizes of all peoples and times” 
(Herder, 2002: 189). They are both committed to what Sonia Sikka describes as the 
“ultimately empirical derivation of all concepts” (Sikka, 2011: 205). They are both 
committed to a fundamental holism about the world – including in relation to the lives 
of human beings and their languages. This holism becomes an important tenet that 
inspires and underpins philosophies in the nineteenth century – in particular romantic 
conceptions of the unity of life (including of science and culture, politics and religion) 
and in the notion of Bildung, which can be translated as education, development or 
formation – the “taking shape” of a person. 
 
     As per Schlegel’s metaphor, Hamann and Herder oppose a “thick” conception of 
rationality and the fabric of thought, as to a “thin” conception advanced by 
philosophical projects of pure reason and in the “ideal language” branch of the analytic 
linguistic turn. In light of thick accounts of reason, we may question the plausibility of 
projects to discover the fundamental features of rationality in order to provide semantic 
infrastructure to tackle as yet unspecified issues across a plurality of different domains. 
There may well indeed be advantages to the artificial reform of language to obtain a 
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specific form of rationality within a specified local domain (such as a technical or 
specialised language where, for example, there may be advantages to having a 
parsimonious formal vocabulary in which to model phenomenon), but this is not 
sufficient to make the case for a thin conception of rationality in general, given that in 
many situations there are likely to be distinct pragmatic advantages in the expressive 
range and nuance of natural language in complex human interactions and negotiations 
with phenomena. 
 
     If philosophers aspire to, for example, advance understanding of social and cultural 
concepts, an artificial aprioristic meta-language may not be the best tool for the job. 
Indeed, according to this “thicker” view of rationality as mediated through language, if 
we want to investigate, theorise and advance our understanding of concepts which have 
been historically central to philosophical investigation – such as “truth”, “justice” or 
“art” – then we cannot afford to be agnostic as to the lives of these concepts, both in the 
past and in the present, nor the genres of reasoning through which they are dealt with in 
different contexts. In light of the thick conception of reason, we must look at how they 
have been put to work – both in the past and in the present. On this view the limits to 
“armchair inquiries” of any kind begin to look very serious. Whether it comes to 
mapping rationality or obtaining workable cartographies of the conceptual affordances 
of our concepts, the “thick” picture of reason in language implies that we may need to 
augment our investigation with an understanding of the practices, institutions and 
contexts in which language is actually used. Against several thinkers in the “natural 
language” branch of the analytic linguistic turn, perhaps “linguistic competence” is not 
enough, and there is a case to be made for philosophical inquiry being more directly 
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informed by the historical and empirical study of deployments of concepts and forms of 
reasoning. 
 
     Furthermore, given the historical character of our communicative infrastructure, we 
cannot assume the enduring relevance of “timeless” philosophical concerns or problems 
– and perhaps philosophers should instead look towards concepts and forms of 
reasoning which have traction in the world and which play a more substantive role in 
giving shape to contemporary life and thought. In this regard we might look towards the 
work of contemporary philosophers and thinkers in the tradition of critical theory, who 
proactively look to engage with concepts which have traction in the contemporary 
world but which have been comparatively understudied – from “dependency” to “debt”, 
“transparency” to “territory” (see, e.g. Fraser & Gordon, 1994; Lazzarato, 2012; Han, 
2012; Elden, 2013). In my concluding chapter I shall discuss how the constellation of 
views drawing on the eighteenth century linguistic turn might inform a more 
interdisciplinary conception of philosophy as a form of critical praxis that draws on this 
“thick” picture of reason and language. 
 
     I shall finish with a final hermeneutical aside before concluding this chapter. For the 
last section of this chapter I have focused on the common elements of a picture of 
language that I argue can be derived from Hamann and Herder’s works. My focus here 
is on a philosophical reading and a reconstruction that can be put into dialogue with 
later developments as well as with contemporary questions and concerns. In this I 
follow from Berlin, Taylor and Hacking and others who have made the case for a 
common picture (what has been called the “HHH” tradition – after Hamann, Herder and 
Humboldt). However, it is important to note that both Hamann and Herder are clear 
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about the differences between their views about language. For one thing, Hamann 
explicitly repudiates the naturalistic picture of language that Herder paints in his 1772 
essay for the Berlin Academy. As with other thinkers, no small part of this is 
theological. Hamann considers Herder’s naturalistic picture to underplay the revelatory 
character of language. As with Michaelis’s 1759 essay, Hamann thinks Herder puts the 
cart before the horse, and focuses on secondary detail rather than substance, which is 
language’s fundamental mediation of creation as a living expression of divinity. 
 
     While Forster takes a rather dismissive view of Hamann on the grounds of the 
“Christian religious mysticism” that underpins his work as opposed to the “perfectly 
secular” character of Herder’s work (Forster, 2010: 309), I’d be inclined to take a more 
nuanced reading. As Nietzsche will later (in my view very convincingly) argue, the 
fabric of contemporary Western thought (and especially German philosophy) and 
civilisation is literally saturated with organising metaphors, motifs, arguments and 
values from Christian theology. Ironically this is particularly palpable in the case of 
Nietzsche’s own work – but also in the case of philosophers like Hegel and Marx. 
Herder is no exception. Compelling broadly secular (or at least non-theological) 
readings of texts with a strong theological component will often entail more than simply 
chopping “God-talk”. 
 
     Kenneth Haynes raises the question: “should Hamann be considered a philosopher at 
all?” (Haynes, 2007: xviii-xix). From a historical perspective, it is clear that Hamann 
viewed his texts as theological (and aesthetic, in the broader sense of the term that he 
advances in his Aesthetica in Nuce) incursions into philosophical territory: thick, tightly 
woven, fragmentary missives cast into hostile territory. It is also clear that Hamann 
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relished these aspects of his authorship, of disrupting and complicating philosophical 
enterprise and scholarly society. This disruption was not (as with later thinkers) 
deconstructive per se, nor was it irrational or arational. Hamann demonstrates an 
expressive, thick-rational alternative to what he sees as Kant’s austere, thin-rational 
philosophising. This means that we must proceed with some degree of hermeneutical 
caution in reading him straightforwardly as a contributor to the German philosophical 
tradition (as nineteenth century commentators from Hegel to Michelet were prone to 
doing). 
 
     While Haynes raises the question of whether some of his works might be better read 
in the “tradition of learned wit” rather than in philosophy proper, I would argue that he 
makes important contributions to German philosophy. However, in doing so we must 
acknowledge that, as Michael Morton comments, if we wish to read Hamann as a 
philosopher, we must do so “both selectively and, in part, also against his own 
intentions” (Morton, 1989: 133). Regardless of his intentions, Hamann’s work certainly 
has important philosophical consequences, which we shall trace the direct and indirect 
reception of in the following chapter. As Morton succinctly summarises, amongst these 
philosophically relevant claims is the view that we should “acknowledge the rational 
dimension necessarily inherent in any form of intelligibility and yet effectively deny the 
right of (mere) rationalism to speak for the totality of the human being” (134). By 
contrast, comparatively less hermeneutical work is required to obtain a sense of the 
relevance of Herder’s broadly naturalistic outlook (albeit it with some important 
theological dimensions and concessions) to secular philosophical enterprise. Several 
scholars argue that he makes important contributions to the intellectual foundations of 
anthropology – including, as Forster argues, his “historicist hermeneutics”, 
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“methodological empiricism”, contributions to the development of the concept of 
culture and “pluralist cosmopolitanism” (Zammito, 2002; Forster, 2010: 199-243). 
 
     One crucial point of difference that Forster suggests is between what he characterises 
as Herder’s “refined narrow expressivism” and Hamann’s “broad expressivism” 
(Forster, 2010: 107). While he acknowledges that this is a “difficult question to 
answer”, he “tentatively” suggests that narrow expressivism is “more correct” (107). 
Forster suggests that what he argues is Herder’s focus on the “material-perceptual 
media” of speech and writing, “there is … no need to make room for non-linguistic, 
non-verbal fundamental vehicles of thought and meaning” (113). In his discussion he 
gives examples of how – for example – the intelligible interpretation of non-linguistic 
artworks is dependent on language. I would argue that the issue of whether a narrow or 
broad expressivism is preferable depends on the context in which we are asking and the 
question we are attempting to answer. The questions that Forster raises are as follows: 
 
Is the dependence of thought and meaning on external symbols really one on language and words 
(in the usual sense of “language” and “words”)? Or is it not rather a dependence on a broader 
range of symbolic media that includes, besides language and words (in the usual sense), also such 
things as painting, sculpture, and music – so that a person might be able to entertain thoughts and 
meanings which he could not express in language and words but only in some other symbolic 
medium? (102) 
 
Forster suggests opts for “narrow expressivism” and proposes that this is the position 
that Herder advocates in his work. He adds two “concessions” to broad expressionism: 
that “language’s expressiveness is in certain areas deeply dependent on that of the non-
linguistic arts”, and that “spoken and written language is not the only possible 
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fundamental vehicle for thought and meaning, but other forms of language, including 
some which at least border on art, could, and perhaps even to some extent actually do, 
serve as such fundamental vehicles as well” (113). 
 
     I would argue that rather than accepting “narrow expressivism” with concessions and 
caveats to “broad expressivism”, advancing a “broad expressivism” with porous borders 
between linguistic and non-linguistic forms of media and a broader conception of 
language is a much more compelling position. I also think that this position is more 
plausible following on from the picture of “thick rationality” that I have outlined above. 
If we take seriously the notion the shift from thinking of language as a tool for private 
mental representation and communication, and towards thinking of it as a social, 
intersubjective fabric such that meanings and rationalities are best understood in terms 
of usages, practices and institutions which are entangled with various forms of life – one 
implication of this is that the site of inquiry shifts from individual intelligibility to 
collective mediation. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is what Heidegger and 
Gadamer mean when they say that language speaks us. While several thinkers have 
offered compelling cases for a broader expressivism with reference to discussions about 
the meaning and expressivity of non-linguistic arts such as music, I would further add 
that there is a stronger case to be made that in many other areas of human life, our 
concepts, our rationalities and our genres of sense-making are highly dependent on 
forms of mediation and communication which are non-linguistic (as argued in Bowie, 
2007, 2010b). 
 
     For example, many researchers in the history and philosophy of science and in 
science and technology studies have argued that the production of scientific knowledge 
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is often best understood as an elaborately structured choreography that includes “non-
human” actors and processes such as laboratory equipment, machines, communication 
devices, peer review protocols, data standards, as well as human scientific investigators 
(see, e.g. Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1993, 2007). Many of these things are 
arguably an integral part of the reasoning processes and meanings essential to scientific 
inquiry. Hamann and Herder’s work challenges the traditional conception of language as 
a transparent instrument that autonomous subjects can use to represent and argue about 
their objects of inquiry, towards a picture which redistributes our communicative 
infrastructure across a broader range of meaningful media, and portrays it as much more 
entangled with different settings of life – a point which I develop in relation to 
Heidegger and Gadamer below. Their work also anticipates Cassirer’s discussion of a 
broader range of “symbolic forms”. 
 
     The picture of language articulated in Hamann and Herder’s work calls for attention 
to the complex interdependency between language and forms of media and practice 
such as painting and music that might not be considered linguistic (in a narrower sense). 
I would contend that for contemporary philosophy there is a greater danger in drawing 
an overly sharp distinction between linguistic intelligibility and other forms of non-
linguistic practices, rather than in not drawing a distinction which is sharp enough. In 
many cases I would argue that philosophy remains disproportionately focused on the 
conceptual a priori and aprioristic frameworks rather than on looking at how the fabric 
of thought is contingently articulated and given form in the world. It retains a prejudice 
for the logical and conceptual, at the expense of other aspects of human understanding 
and experience which are crucial for negotiating our interactions with each other and 
with the world. 
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     Charles Taylor tends towards a “broader expressivist” reading of Hamann and 
Herder, in his discussion of the “whole range of meaningful media” and “the range of 
symbolic forms” (Taylor, 1985: 216, 235). The emphasis of the dependence of linguistic 
meanings on non-linguistic social practices in his interpretation also cautions against 
too narrow a conception of expression. In this vein Taylor writes: “you cannot 
understand how words relate to things” without understanding “the nature of the (social) 
activity, the form of life, in which they get so related” (291-292). In his view the “HHH 
tradition” also entails a shift from understanding language as a conscious 
representational tool to its plummeting beneath the waves, into a subconscious substrate 
that structures human thought, worlds and activities. Ian Hacking proposes that it is this 
split in the understanding of human thought and language is what partly underpins the 
divergence between Chomsky and Foucault in their infamous televised debate 
(Hacking, 2002: 131-132). As Taylor summarises, according to Hamann and Herder’s 
picture: 
 
Language is not an assemblage of separable instruments, which lie as it were transparently to hand, 
and which can be used to marshal ideas, this use being something we can fully control and 
oversee. Rather it is something in the nature of a web, and to complicate the image, is present as a 
whole in any one of its parts. To speak is to touch a bit of the web, and this is to make the whole 
resonate. Because the words we use now only have sense through their place in the whole web, we 
can never in principle have a clear oversight of the implications of what we say at any moment. 
Our language is always more than we can encompass; it is in a sense inexhaustible. The aspiration 
to be in no degree at all a prisoner of language, so dear to Hobbes and Locke, is in principle 
unrealizable. (231) 
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     In the next chapter I shall examine how this broad expressivist picture of language is 
further developed by philosophers later in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – 
from the Early German Romantics to Nietzsche. 
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6. The Plasticity of Thought: Novalis to 
Nietzsche 
 
 
“What's commonly called reason is only a subspecies of it: namely, the thin and watery sort. 
There's also a thick, fiery kind that actually makes wit witty, and gives an elasticity and electricity 
to a solid style.” (Schlegel, 1991: 12-13) 
 
     In this chapter I look at how Hamann and Herder’s conception of language is 
refined, developed and extended in the century following their metacritiques of Kant – 
from the Early German Romantics in the late eighteenth century, to Nietzsche’s works 
towards the end of the nineteenth century. The Early German Romantics follow 
Hamann and Herder’s metacritical move of recontextualising thin conceptions of 
philosophical rationality within a broader conception of life, history, society and nature 
in order to argue that such conceptions should not be abandoned, but rather considered 
in a manner which is commensurate with their comparatively limited role in a broader 
ecology of thought, meaning and experience. They also develop a “broad expressivist” 
conception of language in order to accommodate a wider range of meaningful media, 
and to enable a richer, more expressive, more versatile repertoire of different linguistic 
modes beyond the focus on designation and information encoding – placing an 
emphasis on the creativity and multimodality, rather than the purity, of linguistically 
mediated reason. Nietzsche’s take on the linguistic turn focuses on how language 
reflects and articulates different kinds of social worlds – with a focus on the values, 
ideals and metaphors which organise collective life. While his influential early essay 
“Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense” will become an important point of reference for 
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philosophy and theory associated with other turns to language in the twentieth century, 
the conception of experience advanced in this account arguably reverts to a kind of pre-
Kantian empiricism which is much less compelling than Hamann and Herder’s account. 
His later works elaborate a more compelling picture of the role of language in 
organising social worlds, and how language may reflect or embody contestation 
between different regimes of value. I highlight two main aspects of his work: 
genealogical inquiry as a means to reflexively interrogate the contingent development of 
linguistically mediated reason, and a performative conception of philosophy which 
aspires not only to interpret but also to change our linguistic traditions. 
 
The Early German Romantics on the Movement and 
Musicality of Reason 
 
     In the last chapter I looked at the development of Hamann and Herder’s ideas about 
the relationship between reason, language and experience. In particular, I looked at how 
these ideas evolved in response to both debates about language around the Berlin 
Academy and Kant’s transcendental philosophy which sought to establish the limits of 
reason as well as to understand and clarify the conditions of possibility for experience. 
The picture of language which comes to fruition in Hamann and Herder’s works 
remained central to philosophy over the coming decades – informing a very fertile 
period of innovation spanning the period between the publication of Kant’s Critique in 
1781 and the death of Hegel in 1831. This period saw important contributions from the 
Early German Romantics – including the brothers Friedrich and August Schlegel, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ludwig Tieck and Friedrich von Hardenberg (who wrote 
under the pseudonym Novalis). The extended network around this group included 
philosophers such as Hegel and Schelling. At various points members of this network 
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were in close contact with the philosopher, linguist and educational reformer Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, who influenced and was influenced by some of their ideas about 
language, partly through periods spent living in Jena. 
 
     This period has been comparatively neglected in Anglophone histories of philosophy. 
Recently there has been a rise of interest in this period, as evidenced by the publication 
of a series of monographs and multivolume collections, as well as with translations of 
important German language expositions and interpretations (see, e.g. Ameriks, 2000; 
Beiser, 1993, 2006; Bowie, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2010a, 2013a; Boyle, Disley, & Ameriks, 
2013; Chaouli, 2002; Forster, 2010, 2011a; Frank, 2004; Heinrich, 2008; Kompridis, 
2006; Millan-Zaibert, 2000, 2007; Nassar, 2013, 2014; Pinkard, 2002; Safranski, 2014; 
Saul, 2009; Wirth & Burke, 2014; Wirth, 2015). Broader interest has also been fuelled 
by recent readings of the works of thinkers from this period in support of contemporary 
philosophical projects – such as Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Schelling in support of his 
Lacanian Marxism or Iain Hamilton Grant’s interpretation of him as an important 
resource for more recent “material turns” (see, e.g., Žižek, 2007; Grant, 2008). In his 
recent work, Michael Forster has made a broad and compelling case for the centrality of 
what he describes as the “Herder-Hamann tradition” for views about language during 
this period – including its influence on Schleiermacher, Schlegel, Humboldt, Hegel and 
beyond (Forster, 2010, 2011a). His two books contribute much needed reconstructions, 
clarity and context for these thinkers’ views and arguments about language (though I 
argue that the “broad expressivist” view of language is more compelling than the 
“narrow expressivism” that he advocates). 
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     In the current context I shall limit myself to picking out a few key points and moves 
from thinkers during this period in order to demonstrate how they challenge and 
complicate the analytic linguistic turn, and provide resources for a more convincing 
“thick” conception of reason as linguistically mediated and socially and historically 
situated – which philosophers can aspire not only to analyse, but also to participate in 
and contribute to through their work. Central to my argument are the views of 
philosophical reason put forward by the Early German Romantics. Against 
interpretations which read romantic philosophers from this period as irrationalist, 
arational, anti-rational counter-Enlightenment figures, recent accounts have argued that 
their work signals a shift towards more holistic and balanced forms of philosophical 
reasoning as opposed to the myopic narrow-mindedness of maximising a formal-logical 
conception of rationality to the exclusion of other faculties, and modes of thought, 
understanding and sense-making (see, e.g. Millan-Zaibert, 2000; Beiser, 2006: 43-55; 
Nassar, 2013). While they are critical of attempts to totalise “thin” formal-logical 
philosophical systems, they were by not opposed to systems and systematisations per se, 
as we shall explore below. 
 
     Indeed, to the extent that the early German romantics can be considered to have a 
common project, this might be understood in terms of the convergence of Kant’s critical 
philosophy and Hamann and Herder’s conception of “thick” linguistically mediated 
reason. For our purposes this can be considered to be a combination of (i) what we 
might characterise – following Habermas (e.g. 1999b) – as a broadly 
“detranscendentalising” perspective with (ii) a modified philosophical aspiration for 
unity and universality. The combination of these two stances in German Romanticism 
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inspired a range of influential philosophical projects – from Hegel’s world-historical 
rationality to Habermas’s conception of “communicative rationality”. 
 
     Many of the Early Romantics portray philosophy as an expressive craft which aims 
not only to reflect on and make sense of the world as a unity, but also to remake it in 
accordance with their romantic ideals. This is driven by an aspiration to bring together 
and to resynthesise what overly rationalistic philosophers were accused of prising apart. 
In their works we find blends of poetry and politics, technology and theology, science 
and sexuality intended to bring about new analogical insights and intellectually and 
creatively productive combinations. Rather than rejecting scientific and technological 
ways of knowing, the romantics sought to integrate them as part of a broader, unified 
conception of life, nature and the human spirit. They drew on the naturalism, historical 
sensibility and analytical drive of the Enlightenment, as well as a holism that was very 
Hamannian in character. While Enlightenment narratives often utilised naturalistic and 
historical frames to fashion their accounts of diverse practices, objects and ideas into a 
coherent narrative, thinkers in the German Romantic period strove for a holism that was 
more multivalent, dialectical, and relational, rather than making sense of things with 
reference to a single explanatory mode. This anticipates some of the hermeneutically 
playful tendencies commonly associated with post-structuralism (see, e.g. Bowie, 
2013a; Newmark, 2012). However, as Manfred Frank rightfully points out any such 
comparison must be moderated with an understanding of the Early German Romantics’ 
overarching concern with “the Absolute” (Millán-Zaibert, 2007: 39-40). Hamann’s 
insistence on the persistence of the manifold individuality of phenomena within the 
ultimate unity of creation can be considered analogous with this concern. 
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     Many Early German Romantic thinkers a strong interest in the power of dialectical 
tension, and the desire to harness this as an engine for creative and intellectual 
expression. This is particularly exemplified in the works of Novalis, Schlegel and 
Schleiermacher (as I shall discuss below), as well as in Hegel’s dialectical conception of 
rationality, Schelling’s interest in tensions, and Nietzsche’s interest in the unexpected 
dynamics of contingent historical antagonisms. A sentiment like this finds its way into 
the works of Adorno and Benjamin in the twentieth century – for example in the 
negative dialectics of the former and the concept of the dialectical image in the latter. 
The romantic notion of the productive juxtaposition of elements in tension is closely 
related to an interest in the movement of thought – including its performativity, 
musicality, colour and rhythm. This mirrors the shift away from epistemological 
justification to creation, from proof to poetry and performance that can be found in 
Hamann and Herder’s metacritiques of Kant. The philosophical implications of views 
about the relationships between reason, language and music during this period has been 
studied by Andrew Bowie (Bowie, 2007). As Bowie compellingly argues, the notion of 
schematism plays a central role in connecting these three elements, in looking at how 
language and music (rather than Kant’s transcendental categories) give form and shape 
to thought and experience. The German Romantics’ reading of Kant follows Hamann 
and Herder in their linguistic and historical re-appropriation of the former’s 
transcendental analysis. They augment this with their own emphasis on Kant’s views on 
the creative and productive (as opposed to merely passive) role of human understanding 
in shaping experience. This combination of elements – the free play of a historically and 
linguistically mediated reason, dialectically and musically progressing towards the in-
practice-unattainable but nevertheless hermeneutically vital regulatory ideal of “the 
absolute” – is presented as an alternative to the search for foundations. 
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     After setting the scene for the broader philosophical project of the Early German 
Romantics, I shall proceed to look at how they develop the picture of language 
discussed in the previous chapter – commencing with Friedrich Schlegel. It is from 
Schlegel that I derive the contrast between “thick” and “thin” conceptions of rationality, 
which he alludes to in the quote which opens this chapter. It is crucial to note that 
Schlegel follows Hamann and Herder in not dismissing thin reason, but in seeing it as a 
late addition to a “thick” conception of reason as mediated by language as a social and 
historical phenomenon. While Hamann and Herder’s metacritiques foreground the 
linguistic institutions upon which Kant’s pure reason is dependent, Schlegel and the 
German Romantics go a step further by advocating the creative use of formalised 
systems of pure reason. Hence Novalis describes rationalist philosophy and the quest for 
“pure thought” and “pure experience” as a kind of “magical idealism” (Novalis, 2012: 
152, §826) in the service of romanticisation or poetisation in order to creatively 
transform perception or provide a palette of abstracted elements for recomposition. In 
this vein he claims that there are strong affinities between mathematics and music, 
drawing structural connections between numbers, vowels and the grammatical 
construction of language, adding that “language is a musical instrument of ideas” (97, 
§547). 
 
     However, while recognising the role that thin rationality could play within the 
broader ecology of human understanding, Schlegel opposes the totalisation of thin 
reason to the exclusion of other forms. For example, he argues for the importance of 
recognising the fundamental historicity of reason. In this regard Schlegel argues that 
Kant’s critical project does not go far enough, and accuses him of being a “half-critic” 
because of his neglect of the history of philosophy (Millán-Zaibert, 2007: 89-90). 
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Philosophical reason is essentially historical, and attempting to philosophise without 
any historical dimension is to philosophise naively and uncritically: 
 
[A] critique of philosophizing reason cannot succeed without a history of philosophy. [This] is 
proved to us by Kant himself. His work as a critique of philosophizing reason is not at all historical 
enough even though it is filled with historical relations and he attempts to construct various 
systems. (Frank, 2004: 13-14) 
 
Like Hamann and Herder, he laments philosophers’ exaltation of mathematics as the 
predominant model for philosophy, arguing that philosophy “mars” its “proper form” 
when “it attempts to mimic the rigorous method of mathematics”, and as it presents 
“mere example of accurate computation” as bringing the world “nearer to the truth” to 
“something higher” (Schlegel, 1855: 14). Rather than sticking rigidly to one conceptual 
and rationalistic mode which privileges deductive calculation or logical argumentation 
(as examined in chapters two and four), Schlegel suggests that we should look at 
philosophies of pure reason historically – as part of the arguments and counter-
arguments of the “ever-growing tree of human consciousness” which evolves in relation 
to different forms of life and historical settings (Schlegel, 1855: 15). To be truly critical, 
philosophy must explicitly recognise and engage with its own contingent development. 
Schlegel holds that despite its many innovations, Kant’s Critique fails to address the 
contingency and historicity of the linguistically mediated fabric of thought upon which 
his critical project depends. 
 
     Schlegel shares Hamann and Herder’s suspicion of the philosophical zeal for 
purification, precision and conceptual clarification. The abstract reasoning and 
conceptual analysis of rationalist philosophers predominates at the expense of 
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recognising other communicative capacities of language. Wit, style, irony, emotion, art, 
philological sensitivity, historical understanding, and cultural literacy also play a crucial 
role in philosophical inquiry. “Philosophy is the real homeland of irony” (1991: 5), he 
suggests. Throughout his work, Schlegel contends that irony is an invaluable aspect of 
philosophical reason. While Schlegel recognises the paradigmatic role of irony in 
Plato’s dialogues of Socrates (as highlighted by Hamann), he also advances a 
conception of irony as a momentary flash gesturing towards the infinite by means of the 
finite – as a way of pointing beyond (Bowie, 1996: 69). There is clearly a performative 
dimension to his conception of irony, and he also portrays it as functioning in a way 
which is much more complex and sophisticated than – for example – the modes of 
designation discussed in the analytical philosophical tradition. The fact that 
philosophers have often tried to boil down the expressive wealth of language 
exemplified by his analysis of the concept of irony, is partly what motivates Schlegel’s 
renowned claim that “poetry and philosophy should be made one” (1991: 14) – a call 
which has subsequently been echoed by countless writers and thinkers, from 
Nietzsche’s insistence on the value of style in philosophy (Nehemas, 1985), to Jorge 
Luis Borges’s speculations about metaphysics as “a branch of the literature of fantasy” 
(Borges, 1999: 74), to Richard Rorty’s affirmation that philosophy may indeed be 
fruitfully read as “a branch of literature” (Rorty, 1987: 572). 
 
     Schlegel’s vision of philosophy is one of perpetual longing and striving, rather than 
of establishing and building on firm foundations. In this sense he differs from his 
predecessors who are concerned by the lack of foundations, and motivated by the 
prospect of securing solid ground from which philosophy could grow – from Kant’s 
critical conception of pure reason, to Fichte’s self-positing “I”. Alluding to a classical 
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literary device in epic poetry, Schlegel argues that philosophy cannot but begin “in 
medias res”, in the middle of things. He preferred to think of love – that is, eternal 
striving towards, but never fully reaching, the object of love – rather than certainty as a 
central metaphor for philosophising. He considers the culture and ethics of love to be 
more edifying than the formal foundations of Kant’s systematic philosophy. Like 
Hamann and Herder, Schlegel is critical of the philosophical zeal for system-building. 
“It is equally fatal for the mind to have a system and to have none”, he writes, “it will 
simply have to decide to combine the two” (1991: 24) – arguing that philosophers 
should aspire towards thought which is systematic rather than constructing systems per 
se. As an alternative to system-building, Schlegel advocates a programme of philosophy 
which would place emphasis on the maturation of the thinker through an ongoing 
process of Bildung (education or development). The concept of Bildung is central for 
Herder and later, notably, for thinkers such as Hegel and Gadamer. For these thinkers 
Bildung is conceived of as a holistic programme of education and experience that 
supports the becoming and self-realisation of the learning subject. 
 
     For Schlegel, Goethe’s 1795-6 Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, which Novalis 
calls the “Absolute Novel” (Bernstein, 2003: 229), exemplifies this broader conception 
of individual growth and development, depicting – as Schlegel puts it in his 1798 
review – in “high, pure poetry” (275), “the education [Bildung] of an aspiring spirit 
quietly unfolding” (269, translation modified) and his “apprentice years in the art of 
living” (277). Schlegel’s account of the protagonist Wilhelm’s “infinite impulse towards 
education [unendlicher Bildungstrieb]” (278), reflects his views about the aims, virtues 
and limits of philosophy. He admires the continual “feeling, willing, aspiring” (271) of 
Wilhelm, as well as the lightness and wit of Goethe’s portrayal of his development. The 
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characters are not without their flaws and limitations (which make them human), and 
Wilhelm’s striving for cultivation and growth is an imperfect process, characterised by 
its provisionality and incompleteness. The concept of Bildung corresponds with a shift 
from the externalisation of philosophical thought into formalised systems, towards 
seeing philosophy as a process performed by embodied human subjects in a state of 
ongoing learning and development. Given the broader theological background to these 
philosophical debates that shaped the cultural and intellectual environment in the 
eighteenth century (as discussed in chapters two and three), this shift may also be 
considered in light of the Pietist emphasis on the development of the conscience and 
inner spiritual life of the believer in the New Testament, as opposed to the observance of 
external and pre-determined rules of the Pharisees in the Old Testament. This also 
echoes Hamann’s critiques of the historically objectivising, naturalistic or philological 
study of the letter of the law (as per his readings of Michaelis), at the expense of 
awareness of language as a living and evolving process. 
 
     Like other Early German Romantic thinkers, Friedrich Schlegel thinks that 
philosophical genius was much more like literary or musical genius than the aptitude for 
the derivation and application of mechanistic procedures. Schlegel suggests that 
philosophy should be driven by the free intellectual inquiry and creative engagement of 
the philosopher with and through the traditions and structures which shape their 
thought. The true philosopher should be a virtuoso, and capable of switching between 
modes, discourses, and drawing on arguments and evidence from different times, 
places, genres and disciplines “quite arbitrarily, just as one tunes an instrument, at any 
time and to any degree” (1991: 7). As we shall examine further in the next chapter on 
language, there was a strong connection between German romantic conceptions of what 
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it meant to do philosophy, and theories of literary and aesthetic creation. Schlegel and 
others argue that Kant’s vision of philosophy as a means to overcome illusions and 
establish limits is inadequate, and that philosophers can also contribute to the more 
substantive task of creatively articulating visions, values and ideals. 
 
     Schlegel holds that not only do the philosophers of pure reason risk fetishising an 
“empty and totally abstract mode of thinking, which is divorced from life and the 
realities of things”, but that they risk uncritically inheriting all kinds of presumptions 
and presenting them as part of an objective philosophical worldview. In this sense the 
rationalistic critical philosophy which claims to challenge authority and tradition, and 
purify the understanding from prejudice is surprisingly uncritical and naïve about its 
own origins and status (Schlegel, 1855). Hence, he writes, with apparently abstract and 
technical philosophical systems we may find that: 
 
[…] we have only to pierce through the systematic exterior to find that it is nothing but an ill-
connected and chance-medley of conflicting assumptions and opinions taken from all quarters, and 
the crude views of the author himself, devoid of all solidity, and resting on no firm basis, without 
character, and wholly destitute of true intrinsic unity? 
 
“Every proof already presupposes something proved” (Frank, 2004: 205) and 
philosophers ignore the way in which language, culture and society structure and 
mediate their understanding of the world at their peril. 
 
     Rather than engaging with contingency and historicity of their thought, philosophers 
very often long for a fresh start: to demolish the systems of their predecessors to make 
way for new, clearer, more comprehensive systems. However, these new systems are 
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ultimately inevitably condemned to the same fate as their forebears, leaving us with 
nothing but Babylonian ruins, abstract “lifeless stones” like cryptic messages without a 
key. This “dead and abstract thinking” is thinking that has been “reduced to empty 
lifeless formulae”, like coins whose “stamp of intrinsic truth is quickly abraded and 
lost” (a metaphor which Nietzsche also famously employs in his “Truth and Lie in an 
Extramoral Sense” a few decades later). Schlegel argues that the best way to make sense 
of these philosophical remains is to examine them historically, rather than taking them 
at face value. 
 
     Schlegel argues that philosophy should not be conceived as a narrow, technical 
discipline focused on identifying and rectifying errors in our thought, nor as aspiring to 
construct a formal architecture of the understanding in the form of a philosophical 
system, but rather as the process of developing the understanding dialogically by 
breathing life into a constellation of empathetic readings of exemplary texts and a wide 
variety of different views and positions, drawing on the full range of human beings’ 
capacity for communication and expression. According to many of the thinkers 
associated with German Romanticism, thought, like nature, should be dynamic, alive 
and in motion. Schlegel contrasts the zeal for abstraction, formalisation and 
mechanisation of thought with a vision in which philosophy is a living process which is 
continually rearticulated through the creative interpretation of life and tradition, as takes 
place in literature, music or the visual arts. Rather than securing gains through the 
application of logical proofs or formal demonstrations, Schlegel holds that philosophy 
should progress by means of allegory, irony and wit, through dialectical explorations 
driven by a love of wisdom that aspires but never fully attains. Philosophy should be 
pieced together through “sketches, studies, fragments, tendencies, ruins and materials” 
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(Frank, 2004: 213). Philosophical insights are necessarily tentative, fragile, one-sided 
and incomplete – reflecting the “fragmentary character of human consciousness” 
(Frank, 2004: 216) in its attempt to grasp the complexity and heterogeneity of life. 
Schlegel holds that such insights are much more likely to come about through flashes of 
illumination induced by the aesthetic dimensions of exemplary prose or productive 
tensions between different positions, rather than through system building or logical 
analysis. As we saw with Hamann and Herder, for Schlegel philosophical reasoning is 
part of the same universe of meaning as science, law, theological texts, artworks and 
ordinary discourse. And like Hamann and Herder, Schlegel sees poetry rather than 
mathematical proof as paradigmatic for philosophy in its ability to illuminate, and – like 
other romantics – sees philosophy as fundamentally connected to other disciplines in 
part of a broader programme for Bildung. 
 
     This vision is shared by other thinkers associated with the early romantic circle, like 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Novalis, who consider poetry, art and dialogue better 
models for understanding philosophy than mathematical calculation. As we shall see, 
language is central in both thinkers’ conception of philosophy. Novalis is critical of the 
philosophical tendency to break things down into atomic facts and the aspiration to 
develop a calculus with which to mechanise and externalise reason: 
 
The crude, discursive thinker is the scholastic. The true scholastic is given to mystical subtleties. 
He builds his universe out of logical atoms. He destroys all living nature in order to put a mental 
trick in its place – his goal is infinite automaton. (Novalis, 1997: 49) 
 
Novalis considers formal logic to be a kind of extrapolation from the grammar of 
natural language (51), a point which would be later explored by Nietzsche, Wittgenstein 
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and others. Like Schlegel, Novalis contrasts the pallid abstractions of logical philosophy 
with the living thought of poetry, which he thinks is a much better exemplar for 
philosophical inquiry than mathematics, mechanics or logic in and of themselves. As he 
writes in an aphorism titled “philosophical pathology”: “an absolute drive towards 
perfection and completeness is an illness”, and “destructive and averse towards the 
imperfect, the incomplete”, which is an essential characteristic of all human knowledge 
(131). Like Hamann, Novalis thinks that “language is a poetic invention” and that 
language profoundly shapes our experience of the world such that “all revelations and 
phenomena … are poetic in origin” (129).  Language does not just interfere with our 
ability to see the world clearly, but is implicated in its disclosure. In this sense language 
is a precondition for experiencing the world.  
 
     Rather than abandoning or turning away from the more formal operations of 
mathematics and logic, Novalis suggests they should be combined with other disciplines 
to create a higher art or science, which put formal reasoning to work in the service of a 
broader project of romanticising the world and creating new mythologies and forms of 
reflection that draw on both the arts and the sciences. Hence, he says, “every branch of 
learning becomes poetry” (132), coordinated by the imagination which he considers an 
“extramechanical power” (135). Like Schlegel, Novalis calls for a more balanced 
ecology of reason, understanding and the imagination (155). Schleiermacher also holds 
that philosophising cannot be purely mechanical or rule based, and that philosophy is an 
art based on “disposition and talent” (Schleiermacher, 1996: 62). He also agrees that 
deductive reasoning is contingent upon on the formation of concepts which are different 
in different languages and which change over time (57). He argued that conversation (as 
exemplified by the Platonic dialogues) rather than calculation, is the sine qua non of the 
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understanding, and that only by means of dialectic, the “organon of all sciences” is 
“genuine knowing possible” (7). For Schleiermacher, dialectics is an approach to 
resolving disputes through conversation. However, unlike Leibniz’s formal approach to 
dispute resolution with reference to a formalised metalanguage of purified concepts, 
Schleiermacher pays heed to the evolving character of our linguistic capacities – 
suggesting that the schematism that organises our thoughts is a “living drive” and that, 
as Bowie puts it, “true concepts do not pre-exist in a ‘Platonic’ manner; they are, rather, 
the normatively constituted aim of the activity of thought in a community” (Bowie, 
1998: xxii). This conception of dialectics effectively shifts the emphasis from 
establishing and refining the enduring “rules of the game” to attentiveness to how 
conversation is enacted as a living, evolving process which entails more complex 
dynamics than are accounted for through a formal calculus with only a few simple 
operators. 
 
     Romantic reservations about the nature, possibility and potential of pure reason had a 
significant impact on European philosophy in the nineteenth century and beyond. 
Notably, they profoundly shaped Hegel’s social and historical conception of reason. 
Hegel appreciated the importance of Kant’s critique of pure reason and its exposition of 
the limitations of dogmatic metaphysics through the antinomies (which, as examined 
above, presented arguments in support of metaphysical theses, followed by arguments 
for their antithesis, and then a brief explanation about the inadequacy of pure reason 
alone in addressing the question posed). However, like Schlegel, Hegel thought that 
Kant did not go far enough with his critique, and contended that he neglected the 
historical dimensions and dialogical motion of his ideas. Hegel held that Kant’s 
obsession with deriving an unconditioned, external standard for truth led him away from 
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investigating the logic of the concepts we use, to “radically abstract thinking” which 
was “in fact nothing but empty understanding” (Hegel, 1991: 100; cf. Beiser, 2005: 156-
159). Like his early romantic contemporaries, Hegel rejected a mechanical, calculating 
ideal of reason modelled on mathematics (Beiser, 2005: 80ff). “Although these 
[mathematical] methods are essential, and are brilliantly successful in their own field”, 
he wrote, “they cannot be used for philosophical cognition” (Hegel, 1991: 299). In his 
lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel ridicules the “barbarism of pedantry” of 
Wolff’s syllogistic exercises (Hegel, 1896: 356), invoking by now familiar metaphors 
about their “wooden and lifeless” and “contentless” “barrenness” (353-354), and poking 
fun at Wolff’s attempt to derive insights about architecture and military strategy through 
means of mathematically inspired syllogisms (355). According to Hegel, Wolff’s 
dogmatic popularisation of mathematics as a model for philosophy served to bring 
about “definite consciousness of the reason why the geometric method is not the only 
and ultimate method of knowledge” and “an immediate consciousness of the foolishness 
of its applications” (356). Rather than dismissing these naïve views about reason per se, 
Hegel argued, like Schlegel, that we should step back and see them as particular 
moments within a broader history of the evolution of human philosophical 
consciousness like branches in a tree, branches which have contributed in their own way 
towards the development of the linguistically mediated worlds of thought which we 
inhabit today. 
 
     Hegel favoured a conception of reason which was “thick”, historical, organic and 
dialectical, against the “thin”, narrow, formal conception of his philosophical forebears. 
He argues that reason is a fundamental part of the structure of the world and of human 
consciousness. In an infamous passage in his lectures on the philosophy of history, a 
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passage whose meaning is still heavily disputed amongst scholars, Hegel argues that 
“reason governs the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process” 
(Hegel, 2011: 79). This is the culmination of a line of thinking which inverts the 
philosophical project for the purification of reason, instead arguing that reason is 
articulated and manifested in history. Thus in order to understand reason we need to 
look beyond projects of formalisation and purification and towards an understanding of 
it as a historically situated medium, embodied in living subjects whose experience of 
the world is constituted through their relations to others. While Hegel’s – often 
laudatory – review of Hamann presents him as overly singular and incapable of 
systematic thought (Hegel, 2008), in fact Hamann and Herder’s social and historical 
conception of linguistically mediated rationality was an important predecessor to 
Hegel’s own work. 
 
Nietzsche on the Fabrication of Linguistic Worlds 
 
     The pictures of language and reason advanced by the Early German Romantics, 
Humboldt and Hegel exercised a profound influence on later thinkers into the 
nineteenth century and beyond. Their challenging and complication of “thin” 
conceptions of rationality, and insistence on the social and historical nature of human 
reason and thought can be seen as the background for the more radical 
detranscendentalising programmes of the triumvirate of late nineteenth century thinkers 
whom Paul Ricœur would later dub “the masters of suspicion”: Sigmund Freud, Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche (Ricœur, 1970: 32). These three thinkers explored the 
discrepancies between stories of autonomous, self-transparent, rational agency in 
morality, politics and philosophy, and proposed to recontextualise human agency and 
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rationality within broader pictures that took account of other forces at play – from 
subconscious sexual drives, to economic and class structures, to subterranean power 
dynamics operating in the most unexpected ways. In this section I shall look at how 
Nietzsche took up a “thick” conception of rationality, and the role that this played in 
relation to some of his key ideas: from the genealogical analysis of concepts, to his view 
of a future philosophy as a creative force to reshape the human values which organise 
collective life in a post-theological world. 
 
     Nietzsche’s comments about language are scattered throughout his works – most 
notedly in his 1873 “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, his 1882 The Gay Science 
(in particular the much studied fragment §354), his 1886 Beyond Good and Evil and in 
other unpublished writings from the mid to late 1880s (see, respectively, Nietzsche, 
1989: 246-257, 1974, 1966, 2003, 1968). As Claudia Crawford contends, Nietzsche’s 
writings “evince a complex, constantly modified and developing view of language”, 
influenced by a wide range of different sources, and addressing a broad range of 
different concerns (Crawford, 1988: 1). Hence it might be better to think of Nietzsche’s 
works on language in terms of a plethora of sketches in productive dialectical tension 
with each other (perhaps more like Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations), rather 
than a single architectural plan. This is commensurate with Nietzsche’s inheritance of a 
dynamic conception of philosophy as a movement, rather than as a system. Here I shall 
argue that whilst his earlier works (such as “Truth and Lie”) advance a conception of 
language draws on an implausible pre-Kantian conception of experience (and which are 
thus less plausible than Hamann and Herder’s works which draw on Kant’s 
transcendental analytic), his later works provide many interesting resources for thinking 
through the implications of a “thick” conception of linguistically mediated reason – 
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including proposals about the role of genealogical inquiry, and about the performative 
function of philosophy in shaping the fabric of thought. 
 
     Much like the Early German Romantics, Nietzsche tends to prefer to model 
philosophy on musical movement and expressive performativity over rational 
justification or argument per se. As with the romantics, this of course does not mean 
that philosophy should not aspire to be systematic or to articulate logical and conceptual 
structure, but rather that these things are not the predominantly criteria on which the 
success of philosophy should be judged. Both Nietzsche and the Early Romantics 
introduce a stronger sense of the expressivity, affectivity and musicality of philosophy. 
Nietzsche also presents his writings as edifying in a manner which shares much with the 
Romantic conception of Bildung, as pragmatic spurs for the development of his readers, 
towards the flourishing of “life”, rather than contributing to reactive rationalisation. In 
this vein he suggests that “we never communicate thoughts”, but rather “movements” 
which can be “read backwards” in retrospect as thoughts (Constâncio & Branco, 2011: 
46). As with Hamann, Herder and the Early German Romantics before him, Nietzsche is 
a thinker whose work is explicitly performative, gesturing towards, enacting and 
embodying his views about language and rationality as much as arguing for them. 
 
     What does Nietzsche take from and share with the thinkers we have examined so far 
in this chapter and the last? While I am not primarily concerned with the question of 
influence, I shall briefly touch on this before further exploring how Nietzsche adds to 
our story about reason, language and experience. Nietzsche was clearly acquainted with 
the works of Hamann and Herder, which he alludes to in several places throughout his 
corpus. For example, in a letter in 1873, Nietzsche wrote that the Hamann was “very 
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deep and profound”, that he felt “very edified” in reading him, and that in doing so “one 
sees into the birthplace of our German literary and philosophical culture” (Nietzsche, 
1988: 46). While he is less kind about Herder (for example saying he was “no great poet 
and inventor” and “none of the things he induced others to suppose he was”), he 
nevertheless affirms that he possessed “fire and enthusiasm” and an “ability to scent the 
wind” (Nietzsche, 1986: 338, §118). Christian Emden suggests that Nietzsche may also 
have been acquainted with lectures by Wilhelm Wackernagel, one of his fellow 
professors in philology at the University of Basel including one titled “Über den 
Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Sprache” (“On the Origin and Development of 
Language”) which was predominantly based on Herder's work on the origin of language 
(Emden, 2005: 63-64). Wackernagel's lecture describes how language originally was 
originally poetic and became increasingly abstract – losing touch with its sensual origin 
as it developed. The lecture was published in 1872, the same year that Nietzsche's 
influential essay “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” was composed. 
 
     Many commentators have argued that there are striking resemblances between 
Nietzsche’s view of language and those of Hamann and Herder (see, e.g. Crawford, 
1988; Parkes, 1996; Emden, 2005; Zusi, 2006; Betz, 2008; Forster, 2011a; Sikka, 2011; 
Constâncio & Branco, 2011, 2012; Gray, 2012). Others have commented on the 
affinities between Nietzsche’s ideas and those of the Early German Romantics (Bowie, 
2013a; Forster, 2011a; Gray, 2009; Richardson & Gemes, 2013). Judith Norman has 
argued against this last point, suggesting that “the influence simply is not there” and that 
Nietzsche “does not belong to this historical lineage” of the Early German Romantics 
(Norman, 2002: 519). I would argue that whilst it is important to analytically distinguish 
between their overall philosophical projects (where there are indeed some important 
6. The Plasticity of Thought: Novalis to Nietzsche 
199 
differences), this is not incompatible with there being significant affinities between 
different aspects of their work. In my introduction I proposed a metaphor of the history 
of philosophy as a kind of a multidimensional space in which philosophers occupy 
different positions and possess different relationships to each other in relation to 
different topics, positions which are continually redefined with new readings, 
interpretations and reconstructions. With this kind of model, we can obtain a sharper 
analytical picture of the affinities and contrasts between different kinds of philosophical 
projects. For example, the fact that Schlegel and Nietzsche have different views about 
temporality, the absolute, Plato or the New Testament does not preclude them from 
having overlapping views about music, schematism, Euripides or Apollo and Dionysus 
(Bowie, 2013a; Henrichs, 2004). In this sense I will argue that there are substantive 
philosophical overlaps between Nietzsche and the Early German Romantics, which I 
shall highlight in my discussion below. 
 
     One of the most important threads running through Nietzsche’s ideas about reason, 
language and experience is what I shall characterise as the fabrication of language. I 
have chosen this term as it possesses a connotative range which resonates with some of 
Nietzsche’s recurring concerns, as well as drawing on the “fabric of thought” metaphor 
which is the title of this thesis. I shall argue that this notion of fabrication can help us to 
make sense of how Nietzsche thinks about reinterpreting and reshaping linguistic 
worlds. The Oxford English Dictionary gives two main definitions for the word 
“fabrication”. The first definition is “the action or process of fabricating” (as in 
“construction, fashioning, manufacture”) or “the process of fabricating in the 
manufacture of finished products”. The second definition is “the action of fabricating or 
‘making up’”, “invention (of a statement)” or “forging (of a document)”. These two 
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definitions correspond quite neatly with two key claims that Nietzsche makes about 
language. Firstly, Nietzsche claims that language is fabricated in the sense that it is 
manufactured by human beings, as opposed to somehow issuing directly from the world 
(or from another hidden world beyond or beneath it). Nietzsche draws on the “thick” 
conception of rationality as a historical and social fabric, as something composed, 
intersubjective, materially mediated, evolving and world-projecting. This is reinforced 
by his metaphors of language as a “social” and in some sense “natural” (which I shall 
qualify below) product-in-progress created by creatures – comparable to spider’s web, 
hives of beeswax or anthills on the one hand, or architectural edifices on the other. In 
this sense he builds on – and, I shall argue, goes further than – the naturalising and 
detranscendentalising approach to language exemplified in the eighteenth century 
linguistic turn around the Berlin Academy. Secondly, Nietzsche argues that language is 
fabricated in the sense of being a fiction, something which is “made up”. His claims 
about this second point vary throughout his work. In different periods and texts, he 
suggests that language lies, misleads, simplifies and fictionalises. Sometimes he implies 
that language highlights or articulates certain aspects of the world, and in other places 
he suggests – much less plausibly – that language “lies” about the world. On the one 
hand, he draws on a picture of language as projecting fictitious worlds in which we live, 
are entangled and which structure our experience. This is the sense in which language 
compels us to be “much more of an artist than one knows” (Nietzsche, 1996: §192). On 
the other hand, he sometimes makes stronger claims that all that we know and 
experience is predicated on “error”. Here I shall make a distinction between his weaker 
and stronger claims regarding this second kind of fabrication – suggesting that the 
weaker version (that language is a fiction) is much more plausible that the stronger 
claim (that language is a lie). 
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     While his 1873 “Truth and Lie” essay has perhaps become Nietzsche’s best known 
and most influential text on language, knowledge and truth, we may also find 
anticipations of some of its main themes in a short essay called “On the Origin of 
Language” from 1869-1870. Echoing earlier claims from Hamann, Herder and 
Humboldt, in this essay he writes that “all conscious thought is possible only with the 
help of language” (Nietzsche, 1989: 209). He explicitly discusses the Berlin Academy 
essay prize on the origins of language in the 1770s, as well as views on this topic from 
Plato, Rousseau, Maupertuis, Herder, Kant and Schelling. He concludes with a quote 
from Schelling which is essential for his argument: 
 
Since without language no philosophical consciousness, indeed no consciousness at all, is 
conceivable, the foundation of language could not be laid with consciousness; and yet the deeper 
we penetrate into it, the more definitely we discover that its depth far exceeds that of the most 
conscious product. Language's situation is like that of organic beings; we believe we see them 
originating blindly and yet we cannot deny the unfathomable intentionality of their formation 
down to every detail. (211) 
 
Like Herder, Nietzsche suggests that it is implausible to think of language as the 
product of consciousness. Thus he writes: “language is neither the conscious work of 
individuals nor of a plurality”, arguing that it is “much too complex to be the work of a 
single individual” and “much too unified to be the work of a mass” (209). 
 
     His proposed solution to this “old riddle” is to suggest that language is “the product 
of an instinct, like among the bees – the anthill, etc.”, defining instinct as “the most 
proper achievement of the individual, of a mass, stemming from its very character”. He 
praises Kant for recognising the “remarkable paradox” that “something can be 
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purposeful without a consciousness”, which is the “essence of instinct” (211). This view 
shares something with discussions of the “genius” of language around the Berlin 
Academy, the particular character that a language has as a result of the live 
circumstances, practices and institutions of “a people”. In one sense, he draws on this 
Enlightenment tradition of providing natural historical accounts of human cultures, 
societies and institutions (though this must be modified with some important caveats 
about his conception of “nature” and “naturalising”, as I shall suggest below). Thus he 
focuses on the subterranean instincts, drives and forces which have shaped the 
emergence of the conscious human world which philosophers try to make sense of on 
its own terms (thereby missing a crucial point). He suggests that “the development of 
conscious thinking is harmful to language”, adding that “decadence is caused by 
advanced culture” and that “the formal element” of language, that which has 
“philosophical value”, is “damaged”. This particular notion of “conscious thinking”, 
closely related to “rational thinking” and opposed to intuitive, instinctive, musical 
thinking, will be unpacked in greater detail in “Truth and Lie”, as well as in The Birth of 
Tragedy which was also published in the same year. A final point in this early essay 
which it is worth noting: he says that “the deepest philosophical insights are already 
implicitly contained in language”. As an example, he says that “the subject and the 
predicate developed into the categories of substance and accident” (209). This too will 
become a recurring theme in many of his later comments on language, philosophy and 
human worlds. 
 
     In his 1873 “Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” Nietzsche opens with a cosmic, 
“world historical” fable of how “clever animals invented knowledge”. The essay 
epitomises both senses of “fabrication” that I outlined above: the sense in which 
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language is both made and made up. He presents this “arrogant and most untruthful 
moment” of the invention of human knowledge as an inconsequential flicker, just before 
the extinction of the species, illustrating “how pitiful, how shadowy and fleeting, how 
purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect appears within nature” (Nietzsche, 1989: 
246). The keystone in his conception of the emergence of human knowledge is the 
development of human language, and his story is indebted to naturalistic and historical 
accounts of language associated with the eighteenth century linguistic turn. His 
metaphorical frame contrasting the vibrant rivers and fiery liquid of experience with the 
dry, brittle architectures of abstract concepts echoes the oppositions between living and 
dead, flesh and bone, light and dark of Hamann and Herder. He also shares their 
genealogical and epistemic prioritisation of poetic language which is closer to 
experience over abstract concepts which risk spinning off into orbit, confusing 
philosophers with aprioristic fictions rather than being attentive to how language 
actually operates as a complex social and historical set of practices. This follows the 
eighteenth century inversion of Plato and Aristotle’s prioritisation of mathematics over 
experience. However, perhaps ironically, as a philosophical fable, Nietzsche’s account 
in “Truth and Lie” arguably risks returning to a pre-critical opposition between reason 
and experience – assigning epistemological priority to experience rather than rationality, 
rather than building on the more sophisticated model about the relation between reason, 
language and experience that developed in the wake of the eighteenth century linguistic 
turn. In this sense Nietzsche’s account of language represents a step backwards from 
Hamann and Herder’s respective linguistic metacritiques of Kant, which draw on the 
latter’s transcendental account of the role of human understanding and categories in the 
production of experience. 
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     Like Herder, Nietzsche believes that linguistic terms originally arose from picking 
out waves from the ocean of our experience. Over time they come to give structure and 
form to our experience, to see the world “as” the world. Thus Nietzsche writes – with 
reference to an example which Herder also uses in his Metacritique (see, Sikka, 2011: 
202-203) – that we pick out an arbitrary aspect of something in our experience such as 
the twisting, schlingen, of a snake, and then assign it a designator, Schlange, the word 
for snake, literally “twister”. Like Herder, Nietzsche points to the arbitrariness of gender 
and the “one-sidedness” of the properties highlighted by linguistic terms as examples of 
how language does not so much represent the world as “distort” it. This “artistic 
metaphor-formation” underpins the fabrication of human lifeworlds. It is the human 
equivalent of the manufacturing of semantic material, out of which more elaborate 
edifices can be constructed. However, while Herder’s discussions of language 
emphasise how language articulates new possibilities for experience, Nietzsche’s 
presentation of language as a “lie” often looks like it reverts to a pre-Kantian empiricist 
epistemology, such that experience is presented as a raw input which grounds our 
knowledge. Thus he speaks of the “hardening and rigidification of the mass of images 
that originally gushed forth as hot magma out of the primeval faculty of human fantasy” 
(252), and portrays the development of language and knowledge as a gradual departure 
from the epistemic superiority of pre-linguistic experience, rather than as the 
development of an apparatus which provides the conditions of possibility for 
experiencing the world in ever more rich and subtle ways. 
 
     In this sense, Nietzsche polemically presents the development of human knowledge 
as a kind of hubris, a fall from grace or a departure from a “state of nature”. Hence, 
human beings forget that “the original intuitive metaphors are indeed metaphors” and 
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mistake them for “the things themselves”. In the gradual process of manufacturing 
human worlds, these rough-hewn metaphors are mistaken for ideal “concepts” and 
“forms”. These concepts in turn form the basis of “schemata”, which structure the world 
(250). The production of human knowledge as a project can be compared to the bee 
which “simultaneously builds the cells and fills them with honey”, such that human 
knowledge creators work “incessantly at the great columbarium of the concepts”, 
“forever constructing new and ever higher levels, buttressing, cleaning, renovating old 
cells, and striving especially to fill this enormous towering edifice and to arrange the 
whole empirical, i.e., anthropomorphic, world in it” (254). These metaphors of the 
fabrication of knowledge through language, culminate in the following image to 
represent the “all too human” epistemological institutions of the modern world: 
 
In this respect man can probably be admired as a mighty architectural genius who succeeds in 
building an infinitely complicated conceptual cathedral on foundations that move like flowing 
water; of course, in order to anchor itself to such a foundation, the building must be light as 
gossamer-delicate enough to be carried along by the wave, yet strong enough not to be blown apart 
by the wind. (251) 
 
Nietzsche presents this edifice as a sophisticated instrument for survival, facilitating the 
organisation and ordering of human life and activity.  However, in what he does with 
this account Nietzsche departs from the eighteenth century linguistic turn, and arguably 
goes into an over-generalised, over-romanticised account that owes more to Rousseau’s 
account of the pre-civilised “noble savage” or to British empiricist accounts which 
reject rationality in favour of experience than on more developed engagements with 
language in the post-Kantian philosophical tradition. In this sense “Truth and Lie” is 
less a philosophical account of language, and more a fable about the hubris of human 
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knowledge – highlighting the contradictions of the fabric of thought, which is portrayed 
as more of a kind of Tower of Babel than that which provides the conditions of 
possibility for experience, thought and social action. The following passage in particular 
was to exercise a significant influence on the twentieth century “linguistic turn” 
associated with French post-structuralism: 
 
What is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, anthro-pomorphisms, in short, a sum of 
human relations which were poet-ically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and 
after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about which it 
has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which 
have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no longer as coins. We still do not 
know where the desire for truth originates; for until now we have heard only of the obligation 
which society, in order to exist, imposes: to be truthful, i.e., to use the customary met-aphors, or in 
moral terms, the obligation to lie according to an established convention, to lie collectively in a 
style that is mandatory for everyone. (250) 
 
     Here we may perhaps detect shades of Schopenhauerian pessimism infused with a 
Kantian picture of the “all too human” character of our phenomenological apparatus, 
beyond which we cannot venture. If there are hints of Schopenhauer in the diagnosis, 
then perhaps so too in the cure: as Nietzsche advocates an inversion of the Platonic 
opposition between knowledge and art. To the “intuitive mind”, the edifice of 
knowledge appears as a “prison fortress” from which it can escape through “myth” and 
“art”. The “web of concepts” is “torn apart by art”, Nietzsche writes, which “scrambles 
the metaphors and shifts the boundary-stones of abstraction” and “constantly confuses 
the categories and cells of the concepts by presenting new transferences, metaphors, and 
metonyms” showing the apparently organised world of knowledge to be “irregular”, 
“incoherent”, “exciting and eternally new, as is the world of dreams (254). However, 
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Nietzsche’s discussion of language in “Truth and Lie” in fact perpetuates many of the 
oppositions that receive more plausible treatment by other thinkers that we have 
examined. Rather than drawing on attempts to overcome oversimplistic philosophical 
dichotomies between reason and experience, logos and mythos, knowledge and art, in 
many ways Nietzsche adopts a rhetorical strategy of polemically privileging what he 
considers to be the subordinate term. The distinction between the fiery liquid of 
experience and the austere architectonics of abstracted concepts echoes the opposition 
in his themes explored in his 1872 book The Birth of Tragedy between the 
“Apollonian”, represented in the plastic arts and standing for appearance, structure, 
logic, and rationality; and the “Dionysian”, conveyed in music, and standing for 
intoxication, frenzy and the shockingly direct encounter of the world (Nietzsche, 1999). 
This particular conception of a distinction between the Apollonian and Dionysian may 
have been influenced by Schlegel or Schelling and the typically romantic 
characterisation of Dionysus may have its roots in Hamann (see Bowie, 2013a: 65-66). 
In The Birth of Tragedy he suggests that these two elements find their harmonious 
balance in Greek tragedy. Throughout his works Nietzsche often advocates a 
compensatory return to the Dionysian. However, Nietzsche overlooks the Hamannian 
move that language provides the common root and conditions of possibility for both the 
a priori of “pure reason” advocated by rationalists and the a posteriori of “pure 
experience” advocated by empiricists. 
 
     Around a decade later Nietzsche’s picture of language in these essays from the late 
1860s and early 1870s is further developed in a section called “On the ‘genius of the 
species’” in The Gay Science (§354), published in 1882. In this section he follows 
Herder in positing an intimate relationship between language and consciousness. As I 
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shall argue below, Nietzsche advocates what might be viewed as a kind of reflexive and 
hermeneutical naturalism – which advances a broadly naturalistic understanding of 
language, whilst also being cognisant of how naturalising interpretations are 
linguistically mediated and the social and cultural implications of different kinds of 
naturalistic metaphors and tropes. While this offers an alternative to reductive forms of 
naturalism, Nietzsche sometimes overcompensates with too strong an emphasis on the 
metaphorical aspects of naturalistic accounts. He suggests that consciousness is “really 
only a net of communication between human beings”. Language “serves as a bridge 
between human beings” in order to organise the world for social action. However, his 
account departs from Herder’s account in its negative characterisation of the social and 
intersubjective character of language and rationality. Whereas Herder celebrates 
language’s sociality, its ability to creatively organise experience enabling literature and 
lifeworlds, Nietzsche presents this as a kind of degradation of primordial signal which 
might enable “higher” more nuanced and holistic genres of expression which are not 
subordinated to the debased epistemologies, rationales and imperatives of the “herd”. 
Thus he writes that while “all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique 
and infinitely individual”, but in making them conscious we make them “common and 
meaner”, “shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal” through a “great 
and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalisation”. 
 
     This analysis is consistent with his earlier views about “consciousness” as a late and 
weak form of creaturely expression, and his concerns about the subordination of human 
life to edifices of knowledge production and rationalisation as opposed to the more 
unified forms of expression (as exemplified in music), which refract through the whole 
human being, and project new values, ideals and horizons. It also echoes his 
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prioritisation of individual experience over “common” language, which is less plausible 
than Hamann and Herder’s conception of how language provides the conditions of 
possibility for individual experience through its articulation of granular distinctions 
which enable human thought, rather than simply constraining it. In contrast to Hamann 
and Herder’s affirmation of language, Nietzsche’s works exhibit a more generalised 
suspicion of the “commonness” of many different kinds of human practices, institutions 
and ideals. This mistrust and suspicion extends to human languages, which he often 
polemically portrays as repositories of stupidity and cruelty, and downplays the extent 
to which languages are multivalent and also enable many of the ideas and forms of 
expression which he admires. 
 
     Despite these issues, I would like to focus on two contributions that Nietzsche makes 
to philosophical debates about the relation between reason, language and experience. 
Firstly, he starts to unpack the philosophical implications of what a 
detranscendentalisation, rather than the purification, of human reason might look like: 
insisting on the physical embodiment, psychological proclivities, unconscious instincts 
and social, cultural and historical contexts of reasoning beings. His conception of 
genealogy reflects this interest in the detranscedentalisation of reason. While his 
proposals for the genealogical inquiry broadly follow from the historical and naturalistic 
ideals of the eighteenth century linguistic turn, Nietzsche proposes to be much more 
attentive to the contestation and psychological dimensions implicated in the formation 
of philosophical concepts. Secondly, Nietzsche proposes that philosophers should be 
more sensitive to the performative dimensions of philosophical ideas – paying attention 
to what they do and their effects, rather than just the extent to which they help us get 
closer to the truth. This is what Rorty picks up on in his pragmatist reading of 
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Nietzsche. In this regard, Nietzsche proposes that philosophers should not just study the 
composition of linguistic traditions, but may also contribute to them – in particular by 
proposing new values, ideas, metaphors which articulate new ways of being, new 
relations and new horizons of experience. Here there are also affinities with the Early 
German Romantics conception of a philosophical project which enables new forms of 
aesthetic experience and new kinds of political formations, rather than just focusing on 
uncovering the truth about our situation. This understanding of how language shapes 
collective life and social action also anticipates later insights associated with the 
analytic linguistic turn – including Wittgenstein’s suggestion that philosophers should 
focus on the many different kinds of things that language does (apart from just looking 
at its designative and truth-bearing capacities, as per Fregean and Russellian logical 
notation), and Austin’s work on the performativity of language. 
 
     Nietzsche also offers a more reflexive alternative to scientistic and overly reductive 
naturalistic readings of the fabric of thought. Some contemporary commentators such as 
Brian Leiter argue that Nietzsche should be read in the vein of David Hume, advancing 
a kind of “methodological naturalism” of “type-facts”, as opposed to “postmodern” 
readings associated with Foucault which deny the reality of “deep facts” of human 
nature and hold that “the claim of science to a special epistemic status is bunk” (Leiter, 
2002). However, I would argue that while Nietzsche shares the detranscendentalising 
and naturalising spirit of the Enlightenment, he holds a more hermeneutically 
sophisticated form of naturalism than the form that Leiter advocates, that is best 
considered as an alternative to either scientific naturalistic or postmodern readings. This 
does not necessarily lead to the epistemological laissez-faire that Leiter seems to fear. 
Nietzsche holds a form of dialectical, hermeneutical naturalism that is much more self-
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reflexive and cognisant about the epistemological, cultural and axiomatic underpinnings 
of scientific knowledge production than a reading which takes “scientific method” or 
“scientific evidence” as kind of epistemological given. 
 
     In this regard I would argue that it is vital not to overlook Nietzsche’s scathing 
critiques of Darwinism and his analyses of the anthropomorphisms, genealogies and 
value projections of naturalistic projects of all stripes, rather than thinking of his project 
as modelled on the natural sciences. Nietzsche’s philosophy combines and extends the 
radical critical spirit of Kant’s philosophy, the naturalising impulse associated with 
Enlightenment thought and the “thick” conception of rationality associated with the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn in order to scrutinise not only human values and 
institutions, but also to reflexively scrutinise the epistemological assumptions and 
metaphorical patterns which are braided into the fabric of thought through which he is 
conducting his inquiry. This is the sense in which he writes (with characteristic 
modesty): “I myself do not believe that anyone has ever before looked into the world 
with an equally profound degree of suspicion” (Nietzsche, 1986: §5). To read him as 
committed to a naive naturalism of “type-facts” undermines his aspiration for a critical 
and reflexive naturalism. At the same time, it is also vitally important to bear in mind 
that such a wide-ranging analysis does not automatically mean that he is committed to a 
kind of “meta-critical” Enlightenment project, whereby genealogical inquiry into the 
fabric of thought is considered to possess value in itself. On the contrary, I would argue 
that he retains a pragmatic and performative conception of critique, such that it should 
contribute to creating the conditions for or providing material for a transvaluation of 
values rather than “knowledge for knowledge’s sake”. Following Schlegel and other 
Early German Romantics, Nietzsche compels us to reflect on the creative function of 
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philosophy as well as its negative critical function, its musical, expressive, world-
projecting affordances, as well as its critical and analytical capabilities. 
 
     Bearing this qualification of his naturalism in mind, Nietzsche’s conception of 
genealogy can be read as a means to self-reflexively interrogate the contingent 
development of the fabric of our thought. Raymond Geuss provides a useful analysis of 
some of the main features of Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy (Geuss, 1999, 2001, 
2002). Genealogy, Geuss contends, is “the exact reverse of what we might call ‘tracing 
a pedigree’” (Geuss, 1999: 1). In tracing a pedigree, he says, we would typically aim to 
legitimise or valorise “some (usually contemporary) person, institution or thing” by 
tracing it “back through a series of unbroken steps of transmission to a singular origin” 
(2) which confers some sort of value or authority, such as the divine origin of the 
sceptre of Agamemnon, or the noble lineage of an aristocratic family. Genealogical 
inquiries can thus be contrasted with historical accounts which aim to legitimise or 
valorise their objects of study.  Instead they aspire to trace the “historically contingent 
conjunction” of many different lines of development with “no obvious or natural single 
stopping place that could be designated ‘the origin’” (4). Geuss suggests that a 
genealogy proceeds by “starting from the present state of … the object of genealogical 
analysis”, and then “works its way backward in time, recounting the episodes of 
struggle between different wills, each trying to impose its interpretation or meaning”, 
thus “disentangling the separate strands of meaning that have come together in a 
(contingent) unity in the present” with each strand as a kind of “branching node of a 
genealogical tree” (14). 
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     In Geuss’s account of Nietzsche’s work there is a strong sense that genealogy is 
likely to be deflationary and de-legitimising, by challenging and disenchanting received 
narratives and highlighting contestation and contingency in concepts which have 
become fundamental and venerated in the contemporary world. In his 1887 On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche’s presentation of the origins of Christian morality is at 
various times, violent, contradictory and mundane – in contrast to the more exalted 
narratives of the faith. Guess notes that for Nietzsche a genealogical enquiry is not 
valuable on account of its accuracy or fidelity in tracing past events per se, but in its 
ability to intervene, engage, open up new avenues for productive reflection, and to act 
“in the service of life” (23). However, in Geuss’s account this de-stabilising effect is not 
something that the genealogist is considered to consciously introduce. Rather it is 
presented as the probable outcome of the patient study of our values, ideals and 
concepts. Geuss says that Alexander Nehemas is “doubtless right” to suggest that 
genealogy is not “some particular kind of method or special approach” (17). Instead he 
suggests that it is a “more plausible and well-supported account of our puzzling history 
than other available alternatives” (23) or – more concisely put – “simply … history, 
correctly practised” (17). In Geuss’s view a genealogy “does not automatically imply 
the rejection of what is subjected to genealogical analysis”, but rather is “a summons to 
develop an empirically informed kind of theoretical imagination under the conditions of 
perceived danger” (Geuss, 2002: 212-213). 
 
     Today the Nietzschean conception of genealogy has become widely influential in the 
humanities and social sciences via Michel Foucault. Michael Forster outlines a brief but 
useful “genealogy of genealogy”, suggesting that the conception of genealogy that 
Foucault takes from Nietzsche can be traced back to eighteenth and nineteenth century 
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German philosophy – such as in the work of Hamann, Herder and Hegel (Forster, 
2011b, 2011c). Within this philosophical tradition which Nietzsche and, by extension, 
Foucault draw on, genealogy is held to be “explanatory” rather than “evaluative” 
(though it may of course stand in the service of evaluation). Forster identifies four 
characteristics of genealogical enquiry in this tradition. He suggests two “essential” 
features – “establishing contingency” as opposed to “universality and indispensability”, 
and “establishing historicity” as opposed to “immutability”, and “tracing diverse and 
multiple historical threads” (242-246). He suggests two further “typical” features are 
“highlighting origins in social oppression” and “highlighting implicit self-contradiction” 
(246-249). Foucault’s account of genealogy has much in common with Geuss’s reading 
of Nietzsche and Forster’s understanding of genealogy in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century German philosophy – including highlighting contingency, contestation, multiple 
historical threads and episodic development. Foucault inherits from Nietzsche a 
conception of genealogy as emphasising the “lowly beginnings” of our loftiest concepts 
(Foucault, 1984: 79), describing their emergence from the contingent “jolts”, 
“surprises”, “unsteady victories” and “unpalatable defeats” of history (80). While 
Foucault describes genealogy as a “meticulous and patiently documentary” empirical 
undertaking, this is often presented as standing in the service of strategic intervention to 
challenge and provoke re-evaluation of concepts and practises which have traction in 
the contemporary world.11 Nietzsche’s conception of genealogy may thus be understood 
as a way not just to scrutinise the development of the fabric of our thought, but also as a 
                                                
11 There are different assessments of the kinds of interventions that Foucault’s conception of genealogy 
affords. Colin Koopman suggests that Foucault’s genealogical method can be used to “make manifest the 
constitutive and regulative conditions of the present as a material for thought and action that we would 
need to work on if we are to transform that present” (Koopman, 2013: 18). Manfred Frank comments on 
the “conservative bent” of genealogical inquiry in Foucault’s work – as it aims to undermine the 
conditions of possibility for the formulation of normative critique in favour of what Foucault 
characterizes as a “happy positivism” (Frank, 1989: 112). 
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means to understand how our concepts might be otherwise. Genealogical inquiry in the 
Nietzschean tradition remains an influential approach for unpicking and rethinking the 
values, ideals and concepts which play a role in organising social worlds and 
coordinating social action. 
 
     For Nietzsche, genealogical inquiry is first and foremost an exercise in 
understanding the contingent formations of linguistic terms. The cultivation of a 
historical sensitivity to the development of language is vital in order to avoid being 
overly reactive in the use of language in philosophy. In Beyond Good and Evil he writes 
of the “unconscious domination” of philosophical concepts by grammar (Nietzsche, 
1966: §20). In Twilight of the Idols he famously wrote that “I am afraid we are not yet 
of God because we still have faith in grammar” (Nietzsche, 2005: 170). In another 
fragment he writes that “the last thing in metaphysics we'll rid ourselves of” is “that 
stock which has embodied itself in language and the grammatical categories” 
(Nietzsche, 2003: 124-125). Nietzsche critiques what he considers reactive responses to 
language in philosophy, advocating a proactive, creative use of language. Rather than 
abstracting formal structures and meta-linguistic rules to guide philosophers in their 
search for truth, he uses a range of metaphors to characterise the gathering of material to 
inform a philosophy of the future. As well as sharing the Early Romantics views about 
the importance of music as a model for philosophy, the concept of colour is also a 
recurring theme in Nietzsche’s work. On the one hand he compares genealogical 
enquiry to a “chemistry of concepts”, showing how “the most glorious colours are 
derived from base, indeed from despised materials” (Nietzsche, 1986: 12). Against the 
degraded subsumption of “common” language, he extols the hermeneutical sensitivity 
and analytical clarity of thinkers who can perceive subtle distinctions and gradations in 
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shade, colour, tone. Hence he writes of genealogy as a project “to collect material, to 
conceptualize and arrange a vast range of subtle feelings of value and differences of 
value which are alive, grow, beget and perish” (Nietzsche, 1966: §186). He says that 
philosophers of the future will perform actions of “many colours” (§215) and says of his 
own writing that he has “colours, many colours perhaps, many motley caresses and fifty 
yellows and browns and greens and reds” (§296). He will later write of his Zarathustra 
that “those who have eyes for colours will compare it to a diamond” (Nietzsche, 2005: 
234). Describing language in terms of colour stands in contrast to philosophical 
accounts which focus on distilling a narrow range of fundamental analytical operations 
with which to reason about the world. Rather than focusing on language’s capacity to 
designate objects and convey information, this comparison serves to highlight the fact 
that language can articulate subtle gradations of subjective perception as well as picking 
out aspects of the world. Nietzsche suggests that these fine gradations – which can be 
obtained through genealogical inquiry – can help to broaden the expressive repertoire of 
philosophers of the future. 
 
     This creative conception of philosophy is another point of convergence between 
Nietzsche and the Early German Romantics, who (as we saw above) are interested in 
bringing back the musicality, expressive wealth and affective dimensions of language 
which are subordinated in “thin” conceptions of rationality that we examined in chapter 
two. Following Hamann and Herder, these thinkers advance a more holistic conception 
of the philosopher as an embodied creature of memories, dreams and instincts – and 
argue that linguistically mediated rationality is better served by the full expressive 
capacity of embodied human creatures, rather than by attempts to purify reason or focus 
more narrowly on language’s essential “conceptual content”. They also share the 
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aspiration to put this thicker conception of rationality to work in the service of 
philosophical interventions to reshape the fabric of thought. Nietzsche suggests that 
philosophical reflection on language may not only facilitate more critical and reflexive 
use of language in philosophy, but also that in the longer term philosophers can propose 
“new names”, which may in the longer term become “new things” (Nietzsche, 1974: 
§58). Throughout his texts, Nietzsche presents philosophers as “experimenters” who 
face the task of creating new values. In his own work he proposes ways that language 
may serve as the basis for different forms of social organisation, such as overcoming 
what he describes as “herd” values and creating new narratives and metaphors to 
promote values such as independence, self- overcoming, nobility, and so on. We may 
see many of his most famous motifs in this light – such as his ideas of the “overman” 
and the “will to power”. Against the Darwinist narratives which characterise life as a 
fight for survival, he proposes an alternative conception of the “will to life” which 
would emphasise the overflowing abundance of creation. His Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
can be read as an attempt to create new fables, metaphors, images which embody new 
“life-affirming” values. 
 
     In drawing attention to these aspirations of Nietzsche’s thought my purpose is not to 
draw attention to the kinds of interventions he made and values he articulated– which 
were questionable regarding both his intentions and his success. Rather I would like to 
highlight how in addition to a thicker conception of linguistically mediated reason, 
Nietzsche had a correspondingly thicker conception of the different modes and registers 
of philosophy. Rather than seeking to purify reason in support of a conception of 
philosophy as a form of calculation (as per chapter two), Nietzsche sought to contribute 
to the enrichment of thought in the service of philosophy as a form of creative, 
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performative intervention into the fabric of our thought. Rorty’s reading of Nietzsche 
reinforces this reading. He proposed that through genealogical inquiry we can highlight 
the contingency, contestation and manifold constellation of divergent meanings 
implicated in the development of our thought in order to open up space for critical 
reflection. Nietzsche’s works exhibit a deep appreciation for how we are shaped by the 
fabric of thought, combined with an interest in reformulating the classical philosophical 
values of self-knowledge and virtue in light of a picture of linguistically mediated 
reason that has strong affinities with those that I have examined in the works of 
Hamann, Herder and the Early German Romantics. 
 
     Before concluding this chapter, there is one final issue that I will address: that of 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, how this relates to his views about language, and the extent 
to which his views overlap with or differ from other thinkers that we have looked at – 
including those of Hamann and Herder. It is first worth noting that while Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is one of the most renowned elements of his philosophy, it is also one of 
the most contested. There are only a few places in his corpus in which he explicitly 
states his views on this topic, and fewer still in his published works. For example, in his 
Genealogy of Morality he writes the following: 
 
From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous old conceptual 
fairy-tale which has set up a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge’, let us be 
wary of the tentacles of such contradictory concepts as ‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, 
‘knowledge as such’: – here we are asked to think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye 
turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active and interpretative powers are to be 
suppressed, absent, but through which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an 
absurdity and non-concept of eye that is demanded. There is only a perspectival seeing, only a 
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perspectival ‘knowing’; the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more 
eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our ‘concept’ 
of the thing, our ‘objectivity’. But to eliminate the will completely and turn off all the emotions 
without exception, assuming we could: well? would that not mean to castrate the intellect? … 
(Nietzsche, 2007: 87). 
 
Interpretations of Nietzsche’s perspectivism vary widely, including readings which 
portray him as committed to various forms of relativism, anti-foundationalism, post-
structuralism, pragmatism and naturalism (see, e.g., Schacht, 1985: 52-117; Clark, 
1991: 127-158; Leiter, 2002: 269-279; Gemes, 2013). Rather than giving a detailed 
hermeneutical exposition of Nietzsche’s views on the basis of the available textual 
evidence or an in depth examination of the many different competing interpretations of 
his claims, I shall presently focus on giving an outline of the different kinds of claims 
that Nietzsche’s perspectivism could be interpreted to commit him to in relation to his 
claims about language, and the implications that these have for the arguments associated 
with the legacy of the German linguistic turn discussed in this thesis so far. 
 
     I will structure discussion of these issues by examining the following claims in turn: 
 
(A) Languages engender different perspectives of the world; 
(B) We cannot “step outside” of the different perspectives of the world engendered in language; 
(C) We cannot adjudicate between different perspectives engendered in language; 
(D) Any perspective engendered in language is as good as any other; 
(E) Different perspectives of the world engendered in language are incommensurable; 
(F) Claims can only ever be evaluated in relation to a particular perspective engendered in 
language. 
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As per the discussion of the “philosophical terrain” in the introduction to this thesis, 
these claims might be used to articulate a multidimensional space to explore different 
arguments about language, perspectivism and relativism. This can serve as a heuristic 
guide to situate different thinkers in relation to, based on our interpretation of their 
probable acceptance or rejection of the various claims. 
 
     Of these claims, (A) is probably the least controversial – although there are, of 
course, stronger and weaker versions of this claim. Weaker versions of this claim might 
simply state that different languages portray the world in different ways: some 
languages attach genders to nouns, whereas others do not; some words convey a 
specific sense or sentiment which is hard to translate into other languages (such as the 
Dutch adjective “gezellig” or the German modal particle “doch”); there are different 
vocabularies to articulate different social roles (whether in the setting of a family, a 
school or an organisation) or to draw attention to different features of the world (such as 
vocabularies for making distinctions between different colours or meteorological 
conditions). Weaker versions of (A) state that different languages draw our attention to 
certain kinds of things in the world, or support different ways of seeing the world.  
 
     Stronger versions of (A) might claim that languages not only vary in terms of their 
representation of different pre-existing features of the world but articulating different 
features of the world, and creating the conditions of possibility for experiencing the 
world in different ways. Riffing on Ian Hacking’s reading of the HHH tradition 
(examined in chapter five), here we might consider this in terms of Nelson Goodman’s 
concept of “world-versions” – such that, as Hacking puts it, “to [language] we owe the 
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existences and structures that populate our world-versions” (Hacking, 2002: 139). Thus 
we might distinguish between: 
 
(A1) Languages engender different perspectives of the world – by representing different features 
of it in different ways; 
(A2) Languages engender different perspectives of the world – by articulating different world-
versions. 
 
In my view Nietzsche, Hamann and Herder make stronger claims than (A1), and are 
generally much closer to (A2). This is particularly clear in Nietzsche’s claim above that 
in the long run “new names” may lead to “new things” (Nietzsche, 1974: §58). Might 
we even go further, and following Goodman’s analysis in his Ways of Worldmaking 
(Goodman, 1978) consider an even stronger version of the claim, such as the following? 
 
(A3) Languages articulate different worlds. 
 
This is a point at which views about the plausibility of (A) may begin to diverge more 
widely. While (A1) type claims are arguably uncontroversial to the point of triviality, 
and (A2) type claims might be considered to resonate with debates in analytic 
philosophy about different kinds of “conceptual schemes” (including in the work of 
Quine, Rorty and Davidson), type (A3) claims are likely to elicit further questions about 
what we mean by “world”, what it means to articulate one, and – following discussions 
of Goodman’s work – what it could mean for there to be many different worlds, as 
opposed to world-versions. The transition from (A2) and (A3) arguably marks the 
transition from questions about how language gives shape to how we experience and 
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understand the world, to broader philosophical debates about realism and relativism, 
knowledge and truth. 
 
     What is at issue here is how to interpret claims that languages create worlds – in 
consideration of not just the designative and information encoding but also the world-
articulating capacities of languages. While Kant’s transcendental analytic aims to 
account for the phenomenological characteristics and enduring categories of experience 
which give form to the world for everyone (regardless of where, when and in which 
culture they live), Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritiques argue that such an 
account cannot be given without reference to the contingent formations of natural 
languages. In relation to these linguistically articulated world-versions we might ask: is 
that all there is? Can we meaningfully or intelligibly ask about the world outside these 
linguistic world-versions? This brings us to the claim (B): 
 
(B) We cannot “step outside” of the different perspectives on the world engendered in language. 
 
Here again we can distinguish between stronger and weaker claims of this claim. At its 
weakest, this claim might be considered to be trivially true: we always already see the 
world from our perspective, we do not see things from a “non-perspective”. This might 
be the basis for a somewhat deflationary (not untrue, but perhaps disappointingly 
inconsequential) interpretation of Nietzsche’s quote above – that we are always situated, 
in relation to knowledge as well as in relation to optics. We do not automatically possess 
a God’s eye view – that which Thomas Nagel calls a “view from nowhere”. Versions of 
(B) become stronger as we move from claims about our situation to broader claims 
about knowledge and reality – such as the following: 
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(B1) We cannot have access to any world outside of the perspectives engendered in language; 
(B2) There is no “real” world outside of the perspectives engendered in language. 
 
It seems to me that Nietzsche expresses a range of different and conflicting views in 
relation to each of these claims in different works and at different phases of his 
philosophical life. In relation to (B1) we can – again – distinguish between stronger and 
weaker claims. In “Truth and Lie” Nietzsche advocates what I have argued above is a 
pre-critical conception of experience which is, qua philosophical argument, 
unconvincing to the point of caricature – contrasting the Apollonian “lies” of linguistic 
worlds which abstract from experience, with the Dionysian “truth” of raw, primal, 
unmediated experience in a way which represents a step backwards from the insights of 
Kant’s transcendental analytic. In other later works (such as the Gay Science) Nietzsche 
has a more compelling historical and naturalistic sketch of how language 
intersubjectively articulates social worlds, evolving in response to the choices and 
circumstances of a linguistic community. In this regard I don’t think Nietzsche commits 
himself to the stronger versions of (B) such that we cannot access anything outside of 
our linguistic world versions. While some might consider passages such as “How the 
‘Real World’ Finally Became a Fable” – to commit Nietzsche to (B2) type claims, I 
would argue that many of these can be read in terms of a rejection of metaphysical 
dualism (such that if we let go of the idea of an underlying metaphysical reality, then the 
world around us is no longer merely “apparent”). This is supported by his assertions that 
there is but “one earth” and “one sun” (Nietzsche, 2007: 4). 
 
     As discussed above, Hamann and Herder also discuss not only how language 
provides the conditions of possibility for experience (in their linguistic reinterpretations 
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of Kant’s transcendental analytic), but also how language evolves in response to 
experience – thus implicitly rejecting the view that linguistic world-versions exhaust our 
experience of the world, and leaving room for encounters with a world outside of them. 
Andrew Bowie comments that “Hamann’s own counter to relativism is, of course, the 
God whose one creation is reflected in the diversity of natural languages” – and that a 
“regulative idea” of objectivity can fulfil an analogous function instead of Hamann’s 
God (Bowie, 2003: 49-50). As I shall argue in the following chapter, neither Heidegger 
and Gadamer reject the idea of a world outside or apart from our linguistic world-
versions. Furthermore, in my view none of these thinkers are committed to the idea that 
languages articulate worlds (A3) in the sense that we cannot meaningfully speak of a 
“world” outside of our linguistic world-versions, or that we must only speak of a 
“world” in relation to our linguistic world-versions. That said, I think there is a case for 
characterizing these linguistic world-versions as “worlds” in the broader sense that they 
profoundly shape the structure of our experience, our understanding of our surroundings 
and our situation and the ways in which we reason and relate to each other as social 
beings. Whilst these linguistically mediated worlds don’t exhaust our experience, this 
does not necessarily entail that there are straightforward non-linguistic or extra-
linguistic means of comparing claims, values or “ways of seeing” engendered in these 
worlds. 
 
     This brings us onto claim (C): 
 
(C) We cannot adjudicate between different perspectives engendered in language. 
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Nietzsche certainly does not suggest that we have no means to choose between different 
perspectives – indeed, it is a central part of his “new philosophy” to favour hierarchy 
and rank-order, rather than a “levelling” of perspectives as per type (E) claims that, e.g. 
all perspectives are equal which might be considered a paradigmatic claim of cultural 
relativism. In the Gay Science, for example, he states that it is “childish” to infer that 
“no morality is binding” from the fact that there is a plurality of different moral 
perspectives (Nietzsche, 1974: §345). Thus we can reasonably assume that Nietzsche 
would reject the following version of claim (C): 
 
(C1) It is not possible to adjudicate between different perspectives engendered in language. 
 
     The question thus becomes not whether we can adjudicate between different 
perspectives, but how we can and should do so. Depending on our response to (B) type 
claims about access to that beyond perspectives, we can examine (C) type claims not 
just in terms of de facto preferences or orderings of perspectives, but in terms of 
objective criteria. Here we might further distinguish between different types of 
objective criteria. Returning for a moment to Goodman’s vocabulary – Goodman claims 
that acknowledging a plurality of different world-versions does not mean that we must 
abandon talk of “rightness” (or, as he puts it, “rightness of rendering”) in relation to 
these world versions. Critics of Goodman such as Harry Siegel have suggested that how 
we read Goodman’s proposals about rightness depends on whether he is suggesting that 
there are “version-neutral” criteria of rightness, or whether criteria of rightness are 
“version bound” (Siegel, 1987: 152-153). Thus we might consider the following 
formulation of (C): 
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 (C2) We have no external, perspective-neutral means to adjudicate between different perspectives 
engendered in language. 
 
On this point there are significant divergences between different “schools” of 
interpreting (or making use of) Nietzsche’s works. While interpreters such as Leiter 
suggest that Nietzsche is committed to a methodological naturalism of “type facts”, 
which might be considered to provide objective criteria for distinguishing between the 
claims of different linguistic world-versions, in the discussion above I have suggested 
above why I don’t believe such a reading is plausible: I argue that Nietzsche remains 
too critical of the anthropocentric and axiomatic baggage of scientific claims to adopt 
these alone as the basis for objective criteria between different perspectives. It is also 
doubtful that he would embrace “post-modern” readings which would see him 
committed to the view such as (D) that: 
 
(D) Any perspective engendered in language is as good as any other. 
 
     Throughout his work he returns to the same set of values (e.g. self-overcoming, self-
creation, abundance, affirmation), but his commitment to these values is often expressed 
in terms of the legislating judgements of an elite group of “philosophers of the future” 
rather than a set of universal rules or principles to adjudicate between competing claims. 
On the one hand we might follow Heidegger in reading this dimension of Nietzsche’s 
work in terms of a metaphysics of power (largely advanced in his unpublished works 
and perhaps inspired by his early readings of Schopenhauer). On the other hand, we 
might follow deflationary readings which see him as less committed to an overarching 
monism of power – such as Robert C. Solomon’s interpretation of the will to power as 
an “elaborate thought experiment” (Solomon, 2006: 23). In either case, from 
6. The Plasticity of Thought: Novalis to Nietzsche 
227 
Nietzsche’s works it is not clear how the will to power would provide us with 
compelling perspective-neutral criteria to adjudicate between different perspectives 
engendered in language. This is in some ways unsurprising given Nietzsche’s critical 
views about justification, knowledge and epistemology. As Ken Gemes puts it, “there 
are more general reasons to think that Nietzsche was not particularly concerned with 
such things as a theory of truth or the metaphysics of facts” (Gemes, 2013: 558). This 
does not mean that by adopting something like Nietzsche’s picture of language and 
perspectivism we must necessarily rule out the possibility of there being perspective-
neutral criteria – simply that this is not something that it appears that he was particularly 
focused on providing an account of in his philosophical works. 
 
     Where does this leave us with regards to the two final claims? 
 
(E) Different perspectives of the world engendered in language are incommensurable; 
(F) Claims can only ever be evaluated in relation to a particular perspective engendered in 
language. 
 
Regarding (E) Maudemarie Clark argues that Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not 
incompatible with the view that “all human perspectives are commensurable”, but that 
there is not much textual evidence either way, perhaps as “Nietzsche may not have been 
very interested in the question” (Clark, 1991: 143-144). Type (F) claims are at the heart 
of philosophical debates about relativism. Following Maria Baghramian’s work on the 
varieties of relativism, we might distinguish between different kinds of relativism about 
truth, rationality, knowledge, concepts, interpretation and morality (Baghramian, 2004). 
The most pertinent of these in the present context is rationality – thus we might examine 
the following version of claim (F): 
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(F1) Rationality can only be understood in relation to a particular perspective engendered in 
language. 
 
Again – this is not an issue that Nietzsche appears to devoted significant attention to, 
but it is nonetheless crucial for evaluating the contemporary relevance and plausibility 
of his views on language and perspectivism. Developing the line of inquiry above in 
relation to Goodman’s work we might ask whether rationality should be understood as 
bound to particular linguistically articulated perspectives, or whether we can consider 
there to be perspective-neutral structures of rationality. These questions of whether 
rationality – (F1) – and ways of adjudicating between perspectives – (C2) – are 
perspective-bound, perspective-neutral or extra-perspectival are raised in relation to 
debates between Gadamer and Habermas, which I shall discuss further in the following 
two chapters. 
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7. Appropriating Language: 
Heidegger and Gadamer 
 
 
“Language always presupposes a common world” (Gadamer, 2004: 407)  
 
 
     In this chapter I look at how insights from the eighteenth century German linguistic 
turn are taken up by Heidegger and Gadamer in order to elaborate a more detailed view 
about how human beings simultaneously shape and are shaped by linguistically 
mediated traditions. Heidegger elaborates a model for how linguistic innovation is 
possible through the mutual shaping of language and Dasein, as in the paradigmatic 
case of poetic language. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics indicates the 
fundamental role of historically situated linguistic tradition in shaping our horizons, 
while also suggesting that this tradition is open to reconfiguration and that we cannot 
help but make this tradition our own. 
 
Heidegger on the Appropriation of Language 
 
     In this section I will highlight Heidegger’s contributions to rethinking the 
relationship between reason, language and experience – drawing on insights from the 
eighteenth century German linguistic turn. In particular, I shall focus on Heidegger’s 
account of how language plays a role in intersubjectively articulating the lived 
environments of embodied beings, as well as how linguistic innovation takes place at 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 230 
the intersection between language and experience, exemplified by the poetic 
reconfiguration of webs of language. 
 
     Before moving onto looking to these aspects of his work in more detail, I will briefly 
comment on what it means to read his works philosophically in light of ongoing 
revelations about his life and politics. The recently published “black notebooks” 
highlight the extent of his commitments to National Socialism and his anti-Semitism 
(see, e.g. Gordon, 2014; Fried, 2014; Rothman, 2014; Rée, 2014). The reprehensibility 
of Heidegger’s association with Nazism along with his anti-Semitic comments cannot 
be ignored or bracketed by contemporary interpretations of his thought. As Habermas 
comments this extends not only to Heidegger’s “entanglement” with National 
Socialism, but also his “retouchings and manipulations, his refusal publicly to detach 
himself from the regime to which he had publicly adhered” (Dreyfus & Hall, 1992: 
201). As Tom Rockmore writes, “to fail to take [Heidegger’s] Nazism into account in 
the interpretation of his philosophical and ‘post-philosophical’ thought” is to 
“endeavour to be more friendly to Heidegger than to the truth” (Rockmore, 1997: 301). 
At the same time, it is hard to see how we might “abandon Heidegger” entirely in 
making sense of twentieth century European philosophical thought, as some 
commentators have called for (Fuchs, 2015). Nor is it plausible – I would argue – given 
the nature and breadth of his work, to draw a clear and sharp line between his life and 
his thought. 
 
     Given the absence of a neat hermeneutical solution to this dilemma, contemporary 
readers of Heidegger are left with few options than to read him critically, keeping in 
mind both the gravity and inexcusability of his actions (both during and after the 
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Second World War) at the same time as trying to advance a sufficiently broad and 
empathetic hermeneutical perspective to understand and evaluate the philosophical 
import and implications of his work. The fact that we may find the views or actions of 
other philosophers abhorrent – whether, for example, in their support for slavery, 
racism, sexism, imperialism or totalitarianism – does not in my view justify a total 
hermeneutical suspension of the objects of our misgivings for the sake of a “purely 
philosophical” reading. On the contrary – I would argue that Plato’s views on slavery, 
Kant’s views on race and Nietzsche’s views on women are not a priori “irrelevant” to 
philosophical interpretations of their work. This does not preclude the possibility of 
more focused “pictures” of different aspects of their philosophical views, which may yet 
inform contemporary philosophical debate. 
 
     Heidegger’s 1927 magnum opus Being and Time may be read as an attempt to 
provide a post-metaphysical account of the “question of the meaning of being” partly by 
means of an innovative philosophical vocabulary to re-narrate and re-characterise the 
situation in which we find ourselves as finite human creatures imperfectly negotiating 
our environments. Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary – although unfamiliar-
sounding and perhaps initially defamiliarising in relation to the traditional language of 
European metaphysics – is in fact intended to refamiliarise his readers with our ordinary 
lived phenomenological worlds which in his view have remained inadequately 
accounted for in Western philosophy. Against the more or less self-transparent, 
autonomous and abstracted subjects of philosophy from Descartes to Kant to Husserl, 
Heidegger instead proposes his conception of living, embodied, mortal Dasein. The 
word Dasein (literally: “there-being”) is used by Heidegger to characterise how human 
beings experience and find themselves in the world without recourse to metaphysical or 
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philosophical accounts which focus on the “subject”. While philosophical accounts in 
the European philosophical tradition focus on certain very artificial conceptions of 
human subjects knowing and relating to the world as disembodied and disengaged 
entities focusing on a very limited repertoire of cognitive operations (such as 
designating things, exchanging information, and attempting to obtain true beliefs about 
the world), Heidegger instead proposes that Dasein is “thrown” into a lived world (or 
environment) of moods and things which appear and recede as we negotiate the 
situations in which we find ourselves. In his work he tries to account for the manifold 
ways in which we ordinarily find ourselves in the world, and to contribute to a more 
compelling philosophical account of how we actually relate to our environments. 
 
     Heidegger’s work combines an interest in the universal philosophical ambitions of 
Aristotle, Kant and Husserl; the theological and existential gravity of Duns Scotus and 
Søren Kierkegaard; and the literary worlds of Friedrich Hölderin and Stefan George. 
Against the comparatively austere and conceptual worlds projected by Kant or Husserl, 
Heidegger’s prose paints pictures of anxiety and uncertainty, provisional and partial 
knowledge, of things concealed and unconcealed, phenomenologically invisible and 
then coming to be “present-to-hand” in lived situations. This sentiment is exemplified in 
a 1919 talk in which he describes “lectern-seeing”. Heidegger says that in looking at a 
lectern he sees not “brown intersecting surfaces” but rather “the lectern at a single 
stroke” (Safranski, 1999: 94-95). The lectern is thus not something which we 
consciously perceive as sense-data, but rather “something [that] presents itself … from 
an immediate environment”. In our encounter with it, the lectern is – as Heidegger puts 
it – “worlding”, in that it plays a role in the composition and projection of a world, a 
lived environment. In his lectures and work in the 1920s before the publication of Being 
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and Time, he refers to this as the “hermeneutics of facticity”, and new mode of 
philosophically reading, interpreting and making sense of our lived, concrete, being-in-
the-world. This project will later be described as his “existential analytic”, in contrast 
with Kant’s “transcendental analytic”. Indeed, later in 1927 – the same year that he 
published Being and Time – Heidegger gave a lecture course proposing a 
“phenomenological interpretation” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Heidegger, 
1997). 
 
     In Being and Time Heidegger suggests that language plays an important role in the 
shared or public constitution of the worlds of Dasein. He writes that “communication” 
should be “understood in a sense which is ontologically broad”, as a kind of co-
articulation of being rather than as the “conveying of experiences, such as opinions or 
wishes, from the interior of one subject into the interior of another” (Heidegger, 1962: 
205). In this sense, Heidegger follows the trajectory charted out by Ian Hacking from 
conceiving of language exclusively or predominantly as a means of designating private 
mental representations to considering it as inter-subjectively articulating shared worlds 
(Hacking, 2002). In a claim which has an affinity with Wittgenstein’s comments about 
one-sided depictions of language in his Philosophical Investigations, Heidegger also 
suggests the inadequacies of “attempts to grasp ‘the essence of language’” in terms of 
concepts like expression, assertion, making-known, or the “patterning” of life (206). 
Instead, Heidegger suggests that language must be understood in terms of and in 
intimate connection with the existential analytic of Dasein. Heidegger traces the over-
emphasis on the propositional or assertoric character of language back to ancient Greek 
conceptions of logos in terms of the logic and grammar of the “ontology of the present-
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at-hand” (209). The assertoric aspects of language are, Heidegger argues, “derivative” 
(§33). 
 
     In contrast to one-sided philosophical accounts of language which focus on a limited 
range of its capacities (such as a limited range of logical operators, information 
encoding functions and canonical concepts) Heidegger argues for the necessity of a 
broader and “ontologically more primordial” account of the role of language in the 
phenomenological structuring of the being-in-the-world of Dasein (210). To this end he 
proposes that language “has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's 
disclosedness”, and that “the existential- ontological foundation of language is discourse 
or talk” (204). Discourse is the “way in which we articulate ‘significantly’ the 
intelligibility of Being-in-the-world” (204). In this sense, for Heidegger, discourse 
might be understood as part of the fabric of the shared lifeworlds of Dasein. His concept 
of “idle talk” (Gerede) denotes language in which “understanding and interpretation 
already lie in what has thus been expressed” (211). It entails through the use of phrases 
and expressions which are characterised by the “obviousness and self-assurance of the 
average ways in which things have been interpreted”, facilitating an “ever-increasing 
groundlessness” of Dasein. 
 
     While language thus features in his account of the constitution of the worlds of 
Dasein in Being and Time, Heidegger later wrote that a series of 1934 lectures on 
“logic” (in the Greek sense of logos, language) played a pivotal role in developing his 
thoughts around a theme that was to occupy a much more central place in his works 
over the coming decades, as he for the first time “dared discuss in a class the question of 
language” (Heidegger, 2009: xi). This marks the beginning of a period in which he will 
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make some of his renowned and apparently more cryptic claims about language – such 
as “language speaks us” and “language is the house of being”. In the 1934 lectures, he 
says that he wishes to embark upon the “necessary task of a shaking up of logic” 
(Heidegger, 2009: 6). In a move which follows in the footsteps of Hamann and Herder’s 
metacritical readings of Kant, Heidegger argues against traditional narrow conceptions 
of logic in favour of a broader understanding of the “science of the formal fundamental 
structures and rule of thinking”. Like Hamann and Herder, he argues that language is 
central to this enquiry. Heidegger contends that “philosophy originates only out of a 
sufficient understanding of language” (13). Echoing Hamann and Herder, Heidegger 
also makes a distinction between conceptions of language as living and dead. He 
contrasts the “bones” of language in a dictionary with the living sites “where [language] 
happens”, namely “among human beings” (21-22). Similarly, he opposes the scientific 
study of language as an ossified object (e.g. in linguistics or analytic philosophy), with 
coming to an understanding of the living language of Dasein in language and through 
language. Hence the logic of language is not the “cheap superiority” of “annoying 
formulas” (7) or the “dried up collection of eternal laws of thought” (7-8), but that 
which fundamentally fabricates (composing and giving form to) the social and historical 
lifeworlds of living Dasein. Language plays a central role in the composition of 
intersubjective worlds of lived thought and experience of embodied, mortal beings. 
 
     Echoing Herder and Nietzsche’s views on the relationship between language and 
consciousness, Heidegger argues that there is an intimate connection between language 
and what it means to be human. We cannot understand one without understanding the 
other. Hence, “language is only insofar as the human being is” (139). To attempt to 
study language apart from the lives of living, embodied mortal beings is to miss a vital 
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part of the picture – a similar point to Hamann’s critique of Michaelis’s prize-winning 
essay of 1759. Hence, as Heidegger puts it in his lectures, language must be understood 
“as the ruling of the world-forming and preserving center of the historical Dasein of the 
Volk” (140). “The world is not an idea of theoretical reason”, Heidegger writes, “but the 
world announces itself in the lore [Kunde] of historical being”, which “happens in the 
primal-event of language” (140). In order to understand the logic of language, we must 
not let it be “misused and levelled, distorted, and forced into a means of 
communication” (141). Instead, at the very conclusion of his lectures, he ends with note 
that distinctly echoes Hamann, Herder, the Early German Romantics and Nietzsche’s 
views about the paradigmatic character of poetic language: 
 
The essence of language essences where it happens as world-forming power, that is, where it in 
advance preforms and brings into jointure the being of beings. The original language is the 
language of poetry. (141) 
 
In making this claim Heidegger has a very particular kind of primal, originary, world-
disclosing poetry in mind. “True poetry”, he writes, “is the language of that being that 
was forespoken to us a long time ago already and that we have never caught up with” 
(141-142). Poetry is the language of the primordial past or projecting into the future, 
and the “true” poet “is never contemporary”. Here Heidegger emphasises the 
importance of learning to speak authentically (echoing comments in Being and Time), 
as well as the traditionary dimension of language (which will later become central for 
Gadamer). Michael Inwood highlights the distinction between Poesie and Dichtung in 
Heidegger’s works – with the former indicating poetry in a narrow sense, and the latter 
indicating all forms of creative language (Inwood, 1999). Like Hamann, Heidegger 
suggests that poetry (Poesie) in the narrow sense is the paradigmatic form of language 
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– but also that all authentic language can be considered poetry (Dichtung) in the broad 
sense, which “brings the entity as an entity into the open”, “opens up beings” and 
“makes world and history possible” (169-170). Here there are also parallels with 
Herder’s analysis of the relationship between language and experience – in particular 
the way in which language articulates aspects of the world to be experienced in a 
particular way. Taylor calls this dimension of language which “can open us to new 
possibilities” the “constitutive-expressive” – and gives the example of terms which 
facilitate the experience of different kinds of moods like “cool”, or new kinds of social 
relations such as “CEO” (Taylor, 2016). 
 
     Heidegger’s views on language are further developed in notes for a graduate seminar 
series in 1939 published as “On the Essence of Language” which give an extended 
interpretation, analysis and response to Herder’s views on the origins of language 
(Heidegger, 2004). In these notes he also explicitly connects his discussion of language 
with the work of “the three Hs” – namely Hamann, Herder, Humboldt (31), and alludes 
to Hamann’s works and thought, including his claim that “reason is language, logos” 
(43). He raises the tension between seeing human beings as “self-forming” and their 
formation and constitution within the social and historical fabric of language – the 
tension between shaping and being shaped by language. When we do shape language, 
he asks whether this can be considered part of a broader historical constellation, or 
whether it has the “character of a decision” (69). Again, he reiterates the living character 
of language and its relation to Dasein, discussing the roles of sounding and silence, 
hearing and hearkening. We can read these notes as Heidegger’s attempt at a 
phenomenological reinterpretation of Herder’s essay on the origin of language, akin to 
his earlier phenomenological reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Heidegger also 
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implicitly follows Hamann in seeing language as the origin of reason’s 
misunderstanding with itself. 
 
     In a section called “Language – Freedom – Word” – which I take to be critical for the 
question of shaping and being shaped by language – he develops his views about how 
linguistic innovation is possible. Alluding to the distinction between “negative and 
positive freedom”, Heidegger writes that “freedom from … leads at most to the 
destruction of the living being”. Instead, he argues, we should think of freedom in terms 
of “freedom for”, in terms of openness, receptivity and appropriation. This account has 
parallels with Hamann’s metacritique of Kant’s “thin” conception of rationality, 
whereby “liberation” from tradition, experience and language actually lead significant 
constraint of expressive repertoire. The act of making the case for a “thin” idealised 
pure rationality is itself enabled through “thick” linguistically mediated rationality. 
Hamann, Herder, the Early German Romantics and Heidegger all advance a model of 
agency in shaping language that is exemplified by poetry. Rather than a freedom from 
linguistic tradition, poetry involves a literacy with linguistic tradition such that an 
attentiveness to the affordances of linguistic mediation – for example through an 
intimacy with the genesis of terms, translation, and the application of language – 
enables the adept language user to reconfigure it, to craft it, to shape the living practices 
and institutions of linguistically mediated being. In order to do this, it is not enough to 
follow dictionaries, philological accounts and “dead” words on the page. We must 
develop an awareness of language as an act, as a craft, of language as a living fabric 
entangled and interwoven with the evolving environment in and through which human 
beings are. In Heidegger’s works this conception of linguistic innovation in terms of the 
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reconfiguration of a pre-existing fabric of meanings exists in dialectical tension 
alongside the idea that languages “speaks us”. 
 
     This helps us to make sense of why poetic language becomes such an important 
feature of Heidegger’s later works. His later works develop this distinction between 
language as a living process which is constantly being rearticulated, and language as a 
static object to be classified and formalised that echoes Hamann and Herder’s 
distinction between living and dead language. Thus Heidegger writes critically in his 
1959 essay collection On the Way to Language of attempts to come to an understanding 
of language through the “gathering information about a language” (as in linguistics or 
the scientific study of language), or through the development of a “super-language” 
through “metalinguistics” (as in analytic philosophy). However, while the distinction 
between language as a process and language as an object is useful in drawing attention 
to how he views the relationship between language and experience, and how authentic 
language (as Dichtung) is constantly being rearticulated, his speculative claims about 
language as an object are often untenable. For example, he writes: 
 
Metalinguistics is the metaphysics of the thoroughgoing technicalisation of all languages into the 
sole operative instrument of interplanetary information. Metalanguage and sputnik, metalinguistics 
and rocketry are the Same. (Heidegger: 1971: 58) 
 
This resonates with Heidegger’s speculative (“strongly essentialistic”, as Habermas puts 
it) accounts of modern technology, scientific rationality and the mechanisation of 
human reason which he characterises as “machination” (Machenschaft). In this vein he 
writes of the “modern mind, whose ideas about everything are punched out in the die 
presses of technical-scientific calculation” and of the “uniformly calculated availability 
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of the whole earth” (91, 105). Thomas Sheehan’s recent reinterpretation of Heidegger’s 
philosophy calls him out on this point – suggesting that Heidegger’s “deep history” (as 
in the above example connecting metalinguistics and rocketry) is actually a kind of 
highly idealised philosophical “meta-history” which is as “resolutely uncontaminated” 
by what actually happens as the Christian narrative of original sin (Sheehan, 2014: 286-
288). While he goes too far in his conclusions, the distinction between looking at 
language as a living process embedded into the environments and practices of embodied 
beings and looking at language in terms of the classification and formalisation of its 
features is a useful one for understanding Heidegger’s views on this topic. To focus on 
the latter at the expense of the former is to put the cart before the horse. And to 
understand the horse that gives language its living being, we must turn back to 
Heidegger’s account of poetic language. 
 
     Heidegger proposes to look at models for coming to an awareness of language as 
language and in language in the genre of poetry – through examining the experiences of 
language in the works of poets such as Stefan George. Comparing language to a “web 
of relations” he suggests that rather than “removing it” to obtain clarity on human 
reason and understanding, we should “loosen” the web of language which so often 
“compresses, narrows, and obstructs the straight clear view inside its mesh” in order to 
obtain a view of the “open togetherness” of the relationships between its elements (113). 
Heidegger alludes to Humboldt’s view that “language must be regarded not as a dead 
product of the past but as a living creation” (117). He highlights the latter’s view of 
what we might call an “appropriational” model of shaping language such that “the old 
shell is filled with new meaning”, “old coinage conveys something different” and “old 
laws of syntax are used to hint at a different graduated sequence of ideas” as 
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exemplified in literature, and “especially [in] poetry and philosophy” (136). As Sheehan 
comments, Heidegger’s conception of Ereignis (appropriation) is not meant to signal 
that human beings “take ownership” or “take command”, but is rather meant to signal a 
process of bringing things “into their own” – such that appropriation can be seen as the 
“opening of the clearing” (Sheehan, 2014: 233-234). This is not a vision in which 
human beings exercise mastery and control of language, but rather one in language can 
be reconfigured through a process of mutual rearticulation, of Dasein becoming 
receptive to the attunement between language and experience. 
 
     This appropriational model of the creativity of poetic language is the key to 
understanding some of Heidegger’s views on language which would otherwise look 
prima facie implausible (though many aspects of his views about language do remain 
questionable even in light of this interpretation, as I shall explore further below). For 
example, his suggestion that “man acts as though he were the shaper and master of 
language, while in fact language remains the master of man” (Heidegger, 1975: 144). 
With the appropriational model, Heidegger paints a picture whereby poetic creativity is 
understood as a form of “ever more painstaking” listening – both to language, and to 
being (214). Rather than the Platonic model of the philosopher with an impression or 
recollection of a higher, ideal realm imposing form onto stubborn material, Heidegger 
thinks that poetic language exemplifies the mutual articulation, the mutual shaping of 
language and Dasein. The poet becomes receptive to the affordances of language as a 
living movement, and receptive to the environmental world of Dasein, and loosens the 
web of language to open up space to move away from the deployment of ready-made 
fragments of “idle talk” or chatter which is unreceptive to being, and towards new 
translations and reconfigurations in the web of language. The poet exemplifies the 
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immersion into the movements of being and tradition. For Heidegger, self-conscious, 
autonomous agency is a myth of modern liberal culture, and freedom is rather to be 
obtained by softening and loosening the familiar formations and configurations of 
discourse and through freely working with pre-given material. Like Hamann, Herder 
and Nietzsche, Heidegger suggests that the mutual shaping that happens in poetry is 
paradigmatic for languages more generally. Hence, he writes “everyday language is a 
forgotten and therefore used-up poem, from which there hardly resounds a call any 
longer” (205). 
 
     Is this “appropriational” reading of Heidegger’s notion that “language speaks us” 
(such that we are to understand the sense in which “we are spoken” in terms of a “co-
shaping”) to be understood as simply giving a more plausible philosophical account of 
language, or does it also have a normative dimension such that Heidegger compels us to 
listen to tradition, to heed our cultural inheritance? Is his detranscendentalising, 
phenomenological account of rationality to be understood as contributing to a more 
plausible and insightful philosophical account of reason and the constitution of human 
thought, or does he in effect advocating a form of chauvinism in which we should 
render ourselves receptive to the imperatives of cultural tradition? Certainly in his 
lectures from the 1930s, he does not just talk in the abstract of any people, but 
specifically of the “we” of the German Volk. Furthermore, his accounts of language 
from this period are interspersed with critiques of the inauthentic universalising 
aspirations of liberal modernity, as contrasted with the immersion in authentic German 
cultural tradition. Does Heidegger’s project leave room for the composition of a global 
polis through the interweaving of different cultural traditions? Or does he essentially 
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advocate for a reactionary return to “authentic” cultural formations, a fragmentation of 
the world into irreconcilable and unbridgeable local environments? 
 
     There certainly does seem to be at least an implicit normative dimension in his 
discussion of language in terms of “building” and “dwelling”. He suggests that poetry is 
the “authentic gauging of the dimension of dwelling”, as the “primal form of building”. 
In poetry we “take measure” of being and our finitude as mortals in the world (219, 
225). However, he says that “not every building is a dwelling” (143), and the non-
dwelling forms of buildings that he suggests are highly suggestive of the kind of 
hubristic modernism of which he is critical in his other works on technology – speaking 
of bridges, hangars, stadiums, power stations, highways, dams and market halls. “Only 
if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build”, Heidegger writes (157). Through 
building alone we may become “homeless” in the world, and in every generation we 
“must ever learn to dwell” (159). There is no doubt that Heidegger sees the 
prioritisation of building over dwelling as a dangerous and pathological imbalance. Like 
Nietzsche, Heidegger argues that “Western metaphysics is based on [the] priority of 
reason”, and “Western ‘metaphysics’ is ‘logic’” – both narrowly and conceptually 
conceived (Heidegger, 1991c: 50). As Adorno and Horkheimer will also argue, 
Heidegger contends that “calculation” is paradigmatic of a narrow form of rationality 
which has come to dominate the modern world. In lectures in the 1950s, he warns 
against “the recklessness of exclusively calculative thinking” (Heidegger, 1991a: 129). 
He argues that the same formal, procedural, methodological rationality exemplified by 
Leibniz and Descartes in the seventeenth century has culminated in computers 
(“thinking machines”) and the atomic bomb in the twentieth century (101). With 
modernity comes the “unconditional and thoroughgoing demand” to make things 
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“mathematically-technically computable” (103), and modern technology urges us 
further and further towards the “thoroughgoing calculability of objects” (121). 
Ultimately, he contends, this imperative towards thinking as calculation will threaten 
what he calls “reflective thinking”: 
 
[…] we instead consign our speaking to electronic thinking and calculating machines, an 
occurrence that will lead modern technology and science to completely new procedures and 
unforeseeable results that probably will push reflective thinking aside as something useless and 
hence superfluous (15) 
 
     Indeed, challenging and attempting to suspend the rationalistic picture of the world 
presented to us in Western metaphysics is a prerequisite for real philosophical thought, 
Heidegger contends that “thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, 
glorified for centuries, is the most stiff- necked adversary of thought” (Heidegger, 1977: 
112). Arguably, much like other thinkers we have examined in the previous chapters, 
Heidegger does not reject this calculative conception of reason per se, but rather 
challenges the way it has been heralded as an exemplary and totalising model for 
philosophy and for human understanding more generally. Furthermore, like others 
before him Heidegger argues that pure reason should be understood as an exceptional 
case in the broader context of meaning and human life. In his 1954 essay “The Question 
Concerning Technology”, he argues that what characterises the “essence” of modern 
technology is not instrumentality, as others have argued, but rather enframing (das Ge-
stell) which “reveals the real as standing-reserve” (Heidegger, 1977: 21). Technology, 
which embodies the calculating and instrumental characteristics of modern rationality, is 
therefore contingent upon a form of the world revealing itself as available to us in a 
certain way. This mode of “enframing” enables the world of modern physics, a world 
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where nature appears “as a coherence of forces calculable in advance” (21). But the 
same mode of revealing also “points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth” (33) 
which is related to the “bringing-forth” [poiēsis, which also connotes “making, 
fabrication, production” (Inwood, 1999: 168)] of the “true into the beautiful” as poetry 
and the arts (34). 
 
     Heidegger characterises his ambivalence about the essence of technology by citing 
lines from Hölderin poem “Patmos”: “But where danger is, grows / The saving power 
also” (28, 34). The “extreme danger” of “enframing” – which through its dominance 
threatens to dethrone, eclipse and obliterate other forms of thinking about and 
apprehending being – upon reflection gestures towards the “saving power” of “the 
coming to presence of art” (28, 35). Like Hamann, Herder and the early romantics, 
Heidegger reinscribes an impoverishingly limited conception of instrumental reason 
into a broader and much richer context of being, life, language, poetry and expression – 
such that poetry and advanced industrial technologies have a common basis. He 
highlights the fundamental inadequacy of pure reason alone to the task of thinking about 
being by opening up and reformulating the terrain of philosophical debate with novel 
vocabulary and etymologically inspired reinterpretations of familiar concepts. Thus in 
his thought well-worn concepts like “logic”, “reason”, “being”, “truth” take on different 
and often unfamiliar lives and connotations, and he adopts new terms like “beyng” 
[seyn], “enframing”, “Dasein”, “the gigantic” or “the leap”. In doing so, he aims to 
move beyond the increasingly narrow orbits of Western metaphysics, and open up space 
for thinking about being and the world in new ways – including fresh perspectives from 
which to reflect on the complex and multivalent genealogies and significations of our 
philosophical ideas. In this sense he, like others we have looked at, responds to the 
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narrowing purification of reason with a recontextualising broadening out and opening 
up of philosophical debate. This is the context in which poetry as a paradigmatic form 
of listening to being becomes a vital task. 
 
     While some commentators have taken a narrower reading of Heidegger’s view of 
language as constitutively “world-disclosing” (e.g. Lafont, 2000), I think an 
“appropriational” view of shaping language through listening indicates a more complex 
relationship between human beings and their environments, between the experience of 
worlds and the mediation of this experience through language and other forms of media. 
In this respect I would follow Mark Wrathall’s suggestion that Heidegger is “not a 
linguistic constitutionalist” (Wrathall, 2010: 119-155), at least not in a narrow sense. 
While language plays an important and special role in giving form and structure to 
human worlds as worlds, and in articulating and disclosing human worlds it does not 
play this role in a manner which is exclusive or exhaustive. In my view this is 
commensurate with the eighteenth century turn of Hamann and Herder such that 
language is intimately connected with human consciousness, experience, culture, 
society and lifeworlds, but these things are not exhausted by language. The picture that 
Hamann and Herder paint of language and its relationship to experience show that 
language is a central and primordial source of form and shape in the fabric of our 
thought, they also intimate what might be read as a form of emanationism of creation. 
Language fundamentally shapes our experience, but our experience is not exhausted by 
language. 
 
     In my reading, this is something that Heidegger shares with Hamann and Herder, and 
others who draw on their contributions to the eighteenth century linguistic turn. 
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Hamann and Herder’s engagements with Kant lead them to a picture such that language 
provides the conditions of possibility for experience in a way which is analogous to 
Kant’s transcendental analytic of the categories which structure our phenomenological 
experience of the world. However, both Hamann and Herder warn against an overly 
rationalistic or scientific approach to language which proposes that we can purify an 
idealised conceptual vocabulary from language that would be preferable to the wealth of 
natural language – as such a view risks overlooking how language is actually put to 
work in life. As we saw in chapter five, in their view language makes it possible for us 
to experience the world, and in this way they provide an alternative conception to the 
empiricist conception of experience as a sensory epistemological input. While 
experience is enabled by and articulated through language, like Heidegger, Hamann and 
Herder also suggest that experience is what make linguistic innovation possible – and 
both also focus on the paradigmatic case of how poets become receptive to experience 
in their use of language. 
 
     On this interpretation Heidegger’s appropriational view of language might be seen as 
an attempt to reconcile language with its “outside” in a way which avoids subject-object 
metaphysics as well as what Wilfrid Sellars calls the “myth of the given”, namely 
perceptual experience as a kind of foundational epistemological input. Heidegger rejects 
what he considers the implausibly over-simplistic model of language in we abstract an 
idealised conception of rationality from grammar. This process of being misled by 
language is indeed partly responsible for certain outlooks in Western metaphysics, such 
as the model of a self-transparent, autonomous, reasoning subject which imposes its will 
on lifeless, dead material. Instead, Heidegger presents a model in which human beings 
mutually shape and are shaped by the fabric of thought, which is given form by 
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language as well as other forms of what Hacking describes as “meaningful media”. 
Language gives shape to human worlds, and different aspects of our environment are 
brought to awareness through language (as exemplified in poetry). It is, as Hamann and 
Herder suggest, social and historical fabric which organises and is profoundly entangled 
with human practices and institutions. Language is conceived in a broad sense – 
contiguous with and spilling over into other forms of meaningful media which are not 
just narrowly “linguistic”, including music and other forms of expression and 
meaningful media which give form to our worlds. In relation to this last point, several 
commentators have argued that Heidegger makes important contributions to thinking 
about media and communication – both in a broader sense – beyond language in the 
narrow sense, and specifically beyond the narrower conception of language advocated 
by some proponents of the analytic linguistic turn (see, e.g. Peters, 1999, 2015; Gunkel 
& Taylor, 2014). Taylor also places Heidegger within this broader expressivist tradition 
– which considers a broader range of “meaningful media” relevant to the philosophical 
study of language and reason, and which he traces back to the works of Hamann and 
Herder (as we saw at the end of chapter five). 
 
     What is the significance of this broad expressivist conception of language? While 
this is not something which is extensively developed by Heidegger, I shall briefly sketch 
the potential implications of this conception with reference to the works of Walter 
Benjamin, who shares Heidegger’s broader view of language which shifts from a 
narrower notion of conceptual material to include a wide range of meaningful media. 
Benjamin’s broad expressivist conception of language highlights the limitations of a 
disproportionate philosophical preoccupation with conceptual content. Several recent 
works have acknowledged the influence of Hamann in Benjamin’s early works (see, e.g. 
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Mehlman, 1983; Menninghaus, 1995; Bowie, 1996; Knoll, 1999; Jacobson, 2003). 
Hamannian ideas about language and experience play a central and formative role in 
Benjamin’s writings in the first few decades of the twentieth century. This view is 
supported by Hamann’s close friend Gershom Scholem’s contention that he considered 
Benjamin a “legitimate container of the most fruitful and most genuine traditions of a 
Hamann or a Humboldt” (Mehlman, 1983: 332). One of Benjamin’s earliest substantive 
reference to Hamann is in his 1915 essay “On Language as Such and the Language of 
Man”, where he presents a view of language which is influenced by that which Hamann 
presents in Aesthetica in Nuce.12 Benjamin was familiar with Roberto Unger’s 1905 
book Hamanns Sprachtheorie im Zusammenhange seines Denkens, which may well 
have been a source for this work. This conception of language is reiterated in 
Benjamin’s 1918 piece “On the Program of Coming Philosophy”, wherein Benjamin 
criticises the narrowness of Kant’s conception of experience which he claims is based 
on a scientific model of “naked, primitive, self-evident experience”. Instead he argues 
that philosophy must be able to accommodate a “higher concept of experience”, which 
can be obtained by “relating knowledge to language, as was attempted by Hamann 
during Kant’s lifetime”. 
 
     While direct allusions to Hamann in Benjamin’s later works are scarce, there are 
numerous ways in which Benjamin continues to draw on Hamannian themes in his later 
works. The notion that the fundamental categories of our experience and understanding 
                                                
12 I have yet to find a substantive allusion prior to 1915. This has been confirmed by conversations 
and correspondence with Benjamin and Hamann scholars (including Michael Schwarz, Winifried 
Menninghaus, Kenneth Haynes, Alexander Regier, Carol Jacobs and Angus Nicholls). 
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of the world are to be derived from language remains at the heart of many of 
Benjamin’s works. He continues to advocate a broad expressivist view of language (as 
in “On Language as Such”) – which includes not just words but other forms of human 
expression. He continues to hold that language and the arts have epistemological as well 
as genealogical priority over mathematics and science. He unpacks and explores the 
Hamannian notion that time has its origin in rhythm and breathing, and space has its 
origin in colour and painting. For example, he goes on to look at how our fundamental 
conceptions of the world (such as space and time) are shaped by architecture, 
advertisements, literature, fashion, urban planning, and so on. Benjamin’s forays into 
these areas are underpinned by a philosophical concern with how contemporary 
experience and understanding are constituted, mediated and organised. One interesting 
consequence of the elaboration of this move in the twentieth century is broadening the 
base of evidence that must be considered in relation to making sense of the 
intersubjective fabric of thought to include things which were previously considered 
beyond the purview of philosophy. 
 
     Benjamin’s broad expressivism draws on Hamann’s conception of the fundamental 
unity of different aspects of human life. He suggests that while there are distinct modes 
of understanding and dealing with the world – each with its own contingent and 
heterogeneous origins and distinctive aims and ideals – there is also a profound 
commonality between different forms and genres of human understanding. These 
conceptions of unity and universality are common to both hermeneutics and critical 
theory, albeit in a form which is very different to that associated with the analytic 
linguistic turn. While the latter proposes a conceptual universality predicated on a thin 
conception of rationality, the former both proposed a contingent constellation of 
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overlapping affinities to be excavated and elucidated via genealogical, critical, 
hermeneutical and dialectical inquiry. If analytic philosophy retained an aprioristic 
attachment to boiling down something like universal (or universalisable) pseudo-
Platonic forms and structures of human understanding, hermeneutics and critical theory 
sought alternative models for contingently bridging between the composition of 
lifeworlds, more or less sensitive to their respective historical, social and cultural 
constitution. Benjamin’s works represent an important moment of the broadening out of 
philosophical inquiry to examine how our understanding and experience of the world is 
shaped by language in the broadest possible sense. Given this picture, in his view it is 
imperative that we strive to accommodate as wide a range of “language material” as is 
relevant to our inquiry. Thus he extends his interest in language to include changes in 
the ways in which human beings relate to each other and the worlds around them 
manifested in advertising, administration, architecture, media and communications 
technologies, film and urban planning. 
 
     Benjamin’s works thus may be considered to illustrate and explore the philosophical 
consequences of a broad expressivist conception of language which goes beyond a 
focus on verbal utterances to look at language as a public “infrastructure” which 
constitutes the “materials of thought and experience” (Benjamin, 1999: 392). The 
Arcades Project is of interest as a philosophical work rather than as a form of “mere” 
cultural critique insofar as the constellation of phenomena under examination are 
constitutive elements of a “thick” picture of language and reason. In this sense 
Benjamin’s work may be seen as one of the immediate sources of inspiration for a 
“cultural turn”– such that human beings and human rationality cannot be understood 
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apart from the cultural contexts through which they were shaped, constituted and 
articulated. 
 
Gadamer on Bildung and Linguistic Tradition 
 
     Drawing on Heidegger’s views on the relation between language, reason and 
experience, Gadamer offers a closely related but complementary analysis on how we 
can simultaneously shape and be shaped by language. Gadamer’s account focuses on 
the way in which the horizons of our hermeneutical experience are shaped by the 
“prejudices” that we inherit from our linguistic traditions, and exercises caution against 
the Enlightenment “prejudice against prejudice” which advocates a purification or 
formalisation of the linguistic traditions in and through which we live. Gadamer aspires 
to articulate an alternative to the scientific conception of method, which he finds in the 
concept of Bildung as a kind of Heideggerian appropriation of tradition. The mutual 
shaping process that happens when we make language our own is exemplified in poetry, 
in dialogue and in play. 
 
     Following a brief correspondence, Gadamer went to study Aristotle with Heidegger 
in 1923 (Grondin, 2003: 91-108). Gadamer was intrigued by Heidegger’s conception of 
a “hermeneutics of a facticity” and the notion of hermeneutics came to be the defining 
concept in his philosophy. For present purposes Gadamer’s work can be considered as 
an attempt to extend some of the insights and moves from Heidegger’s novel account of 
Dasein in order to re-think how human beings understand, interpret and experience 
truth. As we saw in the last section, Heidegger was inspired by the idea of reconciling 
the Kantian aspiration to examine the conditions of possibility of experience with 
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insights from phenomenology, ancient philosophy, medieval theology and literature in 
order to provide a more compelling and plausible account of what it means to be a 
human creature in a world as a world. Gadamer drew on this work in order to provide a 
Heideggerian alternative to the narrow philosophical conceptions of an autonomous, 
ahistorical rationality that were – in Gadamer’s view – modelled on epistemological 
ideals and methods from the natural sciences. 
 
     This alternative programme culminated in his 1960 book Truth and Method, in 
which he questioned the centrality and applicability of a certain kind of scientistic 
conception of method to the humanist tradition – as advanced by thinkers such as 
Bacon, Descartes, Hume and Mill. Writing in the context of “a new wave of 
technological animosity to history”, the rise of “new statistical and formal methods”, 
and a growing “pressure toward scientific planning and the technical organization of 
research” (555), Gadamer sought to outline an alternative conception of humanistic 
inquiry to that of the model of the natural sciences which “wholly governed” the human 
sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) in the nineteenth century. He points to the triviality 
and tautology of examples in the Logique de Port-Royal, a widely used logic textbook 
from the seventeenth century, to illustrate “how little can be achieved in the human 
sciences by that idea of method” (17). He argues that the methodological rationality that 
is purported to be a model for all forms of human inquiry is in fact dependent on a 
complex set of historically situated “prejudices”, which structure human understanding, 
prejudices which the Enlightenment had taken upon itself to eradicate. “The 
fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment”, Gadamer writes, “is the prejudice against 
prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power” (273). Like Hamann, Herder, the 
romantics and Hegel, Gadamer affirms that “reason exists for us only in concrete, 
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historical terms” and that “it is not its own master but remains constantly dependent on 
the given circumstances in which it operates” (277). Hence, echoing Heidegger’s views 
on language, Gadamer writes: “history doesn't belong to us; we belong to it” (278). 
According to Gadamer, this means that rather than the autonomous, free standing, self-
governing rationality of the Enlightenment, “the self-awareness of individuals is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life” and “the prejudices of the individual, 
far more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being” (278). 
 
     For Gadamer, the drive to separate reason from tradition, to replace prejudice with 
scientistic methodology is futile and misleading. Alluding to Vico’s conception of the 
sensus communis or “communal sense” he says that “what gives the human will its 
direction is not the abstract universality of reason but the concrete universality 
represented by the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole human race” 
(19). This sensus communis, which was previously understood as traditionary, historical 
and social in nature, was “emptied and intellectualized by the German enlightenment” 
(27). In response to the Enlightenment’s programme of method, mechanism, 
objectification and abstraction, Gadamer suggests that “it is to the humanistic tradition 
that we must turn” (16). Drawing on a combination of history, aesthetics, romantic 
hermeneutics, Platonic dialectic and Heideggerian phenomenology, Gadamer argues 
that the humanistic tradition rather than scientific methodology contains within it better 
models for shedding light on truth and understanding in the human sciences. As 
“understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event” (299), we must strive to 
overcome the “artificial narrowness” (16) of the enlightenment conception of reason 
and come to a broader understanding of how our horizons are historically formed and 
historically contingent. However, we also need to overcome the objectivising 
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historicism of the enlightenment, which is reconstructive rather than dialogical. 
Through his hermeneutics, Gadamer seeks to resituate the rationalistic tradition into a 
broadly Heideggerian conception of being in the world and in history – and to posit 
alternative ways of thinking about truth and understanding to the extension and 
universalisation of method from the natural sciences. Language plays a central role in 
this alternative account. 
 
     In Truth and Method, he contends that “language is the medium of hermeneutic 
experience” (385). Like Hamann and Herder, Gadamer holds that rather than purifying 
reason from language and tradition, reason must be understood as being fundamentally 
enabled by and mediated through language and tradition. He also holds that language 
gives form and structure to our experience of the world.  “It is from language as a 
medium”, he contends, “that our whole experience of the world, and especially 
hermeneutical experience, unfolds” (453). Alluding to Humboldt, Gadamer writes: 
 
Language is not just one of man’s possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man 
has a world at all. The world as world exists for man as for no other creature that is in the world. 
But this world is verbal in nature. (480) 
 
In contrast to what Gadamer claims is the Enlightenment model of being liberated from 
tradition, he proposes a liberation from the imperative to be liberated from tradition (the 
“prejudice against prejudice”), in order to open up space for thinking with and through 
tradition which itself constitutes a richer and more reflective form of fluency and 
freedom. This has an affinity with what I described in the previous section as 
Heidegger’s “appropriational” model of language. Thus Gadamer describes the “fusion 
of horizons” which takes place in our appropriation of tradition such that our 
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apprehension of concepts of the past “also include[s] our own comprehension of them” 
(367). The interpretation and reception of cultural works is paradigmatic in this regard. 
The process of a “hermeneutically trained consciousness” coming to an understanding 
of a work is characterised by the “foregrounding and appropriation of one's own fore-
meanings and prejudices” (271). Hence Gadamer suggests that “the literary critic, as it 
were, weaves a little further on the great tapestry of tradition that supports us” (334). It 
is above all language through which this tapestry of tradition is constituted. 
 
     Gadamer proposes that philosophers should strive to become literate with this 
“thick” hermeneutical conception of human rationality as a linguistically mediated 
tradition – to understand its affordances and how it gives form to our thought. Like 
Hamann and Herder, Gadamer sees reason as a linguistic, social, cultural and historical 
fabric through which we are able to obtain an understanding and apprehension of the 
world (as a world). If we assume that rationality is transparent, autonomous and “pure” 
we may end up being beholden to the ways in which it is linguistically mediated, 
historically situated and socially constituted. Instead Gadamer proposes that we strive to 
come to an understanding of the prejudices, biases, background assumptions and 
epistemological formations which underpin our hermeneutical horizons. Alluding to 
Heidegger he characterises these as the “fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception” of 
our understanding (272). In some ways, this might be understood in terms of a 
contingent linguistic a priori which gives the fabric of our thought the shapes and 
tendencies that it possesses for us. Rather than try to overcome, transcend, eliminate or 
minimise these different biases, we must first learn to be literate with them, to work 
with and through the prejudices which “constitute the historical reality of [our] being” 
(283). Here we may be reminded of Herder’s conception of the wholly contingent one-
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sidedness of the metaphors which shape our perception, which we cannot entirely 
discard, but which we may understand and use more effectively by striving to obtain a 
many-sided understanding through the use of different terms, frames, lenses – through 
translation, as opposed to purification. 
 
     Like Schleiermacher, one of Gadamer’s main models for the understanding is 
conversation or dialogue. Thus he writes that “language has its true being only in 
dialogue, in coming to an understanding” (443). In order for conversation to occur, 
Gadamer contends that there must be a shared background of agreement, consensus or – 
as he later calls it – “solidarity”. This is the sense in which he says that “language 
always presupposes a common world—even if it is only a play world” (407). In 
conversation there is also a “fusion of horizons” akin to that which he previously 
described in relation to the reception of cultural works. One of the questions that 
Gadamer examines in Truth and Method is: how can we arrive at an understanding of 
new and unfamiliar things or of the views of others, given the many ways in which our 
understanding is fundamentally shaped by history and tradition? In other words, if our 
apprehension and understanding of the world is structured and mediated through the 
social, cultural and historical fabric of tradition, how is philosophical innovation 
possible? How can we reshape the fabric in order to apprehend new things and 
understand the world in a different way? This is a vital question for anyone committed 
to a “thick” conception of rationality. 
 
     Like Heidegger and others influenced by the eighteenth century linguistic turn, 
Gadamer attempts to shift the focus away from a strict dichotomy between subject and 
object. He rejects the possibility of either the mastery and autonomy of our 
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understanding implied by the subject-centred rationalistic picture, as well as the 
historical objectification of the understanding that he attributes to earlier historicist 
accounts deriving from the Enlightenment. He follows the Heideggerian move towards 
providing an account of the mutual shaping of human beings and their linguistically 
mediated understanding. In this sense he follows other thinkers in making language 
“public”, as Hacking puts it, and considering language a living intersubjective 
institution. For Gadamer the fabric of thought is something that is performed –
paradigmatically in discourse, in dialogue between living embodied beings. In this 
regard, the Platonic dialogues provide an archetypical philosophical model for coming 
to understanding in language. His account of the interpretation of texts is also 
essentially dialogical. Gadamer’s conception of “play” is also valuable in highlighting 
the intersubjective dimension of the emergence of understanding in conversation – 
highlighting how “all playing is a being-played” and how the “real subject of the game 
… is not the player but the game itself” (106). Gadamer’s notion of play echoes the shift 
from subjective mastery to the mutually shaping and intersubjective character of 
hermeneutical experience. This is reinforced by his discussion of metaphorical use of 
the word play to describe “the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of gears or 
parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats” (104). 
Gadamer proposes the concept of Bildung as an alternative to scientistic method. For 
Gadamer, Bildung is understood as an appropriation of the fabric of language, culture 
and tradition that shapes us such that “that by which and through which one is formed 
becomes completely one's own” (10). 
 
     Gadamer continues to develop the ideas in Truth and Method in his works over the 
coming decades. In a 1966 essay on “Man and Language” he suggests that “language is 
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the real medium of human being” which is “as indispensable to human life as the air we 
breathe” (Gadamer, 1977: 68). In contrast to this ubiquity and indispensability to human 
life, Gadamer suggests that the concept of language is a “recent development” (62). He 
writes that “language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool” (62). Rather 
– following Heidegger – it is something by which we are “always already 
encompassed”, which we only become conscious of in “exceptional situations” such as 
when things go wrong, when we hesitate or stumble, or when we can’t find the right 
words (62-64). Thus he echoes Hamann’s, Herder’s and Heidegger’s views about 
language being viewed as a living social institution: 
 
The more language is a living operation, the less we are aware of it. Thus it follows from the self-
forgetfulness of language that its real being consists in what is said in it. What is said in it 
constitutes the common world in which we live and to which belongs also the whole great chain of 
tradition reaching us from the literature of foreign languages, living as well as dead. The real being 
of language is that into which we are taken up when we hear it - what is said. (65) 
 
Gadamer also shares the view advanced by Hamann, Herder and Heidegger of the 
intersubjective character of language. Following his analysis in Truth and Method, in 
his later works Gadamer again follows Heidegger in shifting the focus of his philosophy 
of language away from a subject-centred view, suggesting that “speaking does not 
belong in the sphere of the ‘I’ but in the sphere of the ‘We’” (65). Following on from his 
metaphor of “play” (spiel), he also says that the “form of operation of every dialogue 
can be described in terms of the concept of the game” – again alluding the play of light, 
objects and forces (66). Much like Hamann’s contention in his Metacritique that 
language is at the heart of “reason’s misunderstanding with itself”, Gadamer suggests 
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that it is language which gives rise to philosophical misapprehensions about the 
possibility of “universal objectification” (78). 
 
      In a 1977 encyclopaedia article on hermeneutics, Gadamer’s views about the 
philosophical significance of language are summarised for a broader audience with 
particular brevity and force. “All human knowledge of the world is linguistically 
mediated”, he writes (Gadamer, 2007: 65). The “linguisticality of our being-in-the-
world” articulates “the whole realm of our experience”. In language we encounter the 
“heritage in/through which we live our lives” (65). He emphasises the impoverishment 
of Bacon’s conception of experience as a foundational input for science, as well as the 
views of “experts who have a craze for univocality in their one-sided, semantic 
epistemology” and “misunderstand what language is” (67). In a remark reminiscent of 
Hamann and Herder’s distinction between living and dead, Gadamer writes: 
 
They do not realize that the language of concepts cannot be invented, or randomly changed, or 
used and then put aside; rather, concepts arise out of the element in which we live and move in our 
thinking. In the highly artificial form of terminology we encounter only the ossified crust of the 
living stream of thinking and speaking. (67) 
 
With a nod to his debate with Habermas that will span the following decades, he also 
suggests that a “critique of ideology” that “imagines it is above all ideological 
presuppositions” is just as dogmatic as “positivistic social science” (68). Gadamer says 
that critical theory inherits a Kantian appetite for purification which manifests itself in 
the ideal of “undistorted” communication and “compulsion-free dialogue”, which 
Gadamer regards as mythological and unrealisable “pale abstractions” (69).  By 
contrast, he contends that hermeneutics looks towards the possibility of “genuine 
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dialogue” such that both parties are aware of the limitations and the finitude of their 
own understanding and horizons. Returning to one of the opening themes of his Truth 
and Method – namely the limitations of scientistic method and the articulation of 
alternatives – Gadamer says that one of the central tasks of a philosophical 
hermeneutics in this sense is “philosophical reflection on the limits of all scientific and 
technical control of nature and of society” (71).   
 
     In a series of radio broadcasts in 1970, he expresses his reservations about 
universalising a certain scientistic conception of method, at the expense of other forms 
of understanding: 
 
This form of science has uniquely changed our planet by privileging a certain form of access to our 
world, an access that is neither the only nor the most encompassing access that we possess. It is 
this access to the world by means of methodical isolation and conscious interrogation—in the 
experiment—which has enabled particular realms in which this isolation can be accomplished to 
spread out and attain a special hold on our ways of doing things. (94) 
 
The empiricist conception of experience exhibits a drive towards abstraction, 
decontextualisation and replicability, which has methodological advantages for 
scientific experimentation, but which is not suitable as a model in all circumstances. It 
is not only misleading but dangerous if it is taken as a universal model for all forms of 
human understanding. In remarks which echo those of the Frankfurt School that we 
shall examine in the following chapter, Gadamer expresses concern about the 
unconstrained and increasingly aggressive technocratic mediation of the lifeworld (see, 
e.g. Gadamer, 1998). Rather than looking towards idealised models for unconstrained 
communication (as Habermas later will), Gadamer looks to unpick the tangle of “social 
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solidarity” and “commonality” which is the precondition for conversation, and suggests 
that this can be found in historically situated, socially instituted and linguistically 
mediated tradition. Thus he writes, echoing Heidegger, that “it is tradition that opens 
and delimits our historical horizon” (Gadamer, 1977: 81). 
 
     In this chapter I have looked at how Heidegger and Gadamer propose that we can 
simultaneously shape and be shaped by language – with particular reference to 
linguistic innovation as exemplified in poetry as well as in the appropriation of 
tradition. In response to Kant’s “transcendental analytic” which focuses on establishing 
the limits of pure reason and the derivation of fundamental phenomenological 
categories, Heidegger’s “existential analytic” focuses on coming to an understanding of 
language as a living, evolving, intersubjective fabric at the intersection between history 
and our experience. Gadamer draws on Heidegger’s study to look at how we inherit 
linguistic traditions which provide us with the contours of our worlds and our 
experience, whilst also accounting for how these linguistic traditions evolve with 
reference to poetry, dialogue and play. 
 
     In the following chapter I shall examine Gadamer’s debates with Habermas about 
language, tradition and critique. In particular, I will examine their respective views 
regarding the question of to what extent (and how) we can overcome the limitations and 
prejudices that we inherit through our linguistic traditions. On the one hand, these 
debates can be seen to reflect the differences between Kant’s interest in a universal 
account of the structure of reason and experience in through his transcendental 
philosophy and Hamann’s insistence that such an account must dependent upon the 
particular, contingent structures of natural languages. On the other hand, this debate 
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provides us with a more in depth treatment of the issues raised at the end of the previous 
chapter regarding the extent to which rationality and the adjudication between linguistic 
world-versions can be seen as version-bound or version-neutral. 
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8. Shaping and Being Shaped: The 
Gadamer-Habermas Debates 
 
 
“We cannot pick and choose our own traditions, but we can be aware that it is up to us how we 
continue them.” (Habermas, 1992: 243) 
 
     In this chapter I shall examine debates between Gadamer and Habermas about 
language, tradition and critique. In the previous chapter I looked at Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic conceptions of how we shape and are shaped by language – 
including how linguistic tradition can be considered to “speak us” and their accounts of 
linguistic innovation in the paradigmatic cases of poetry and conversation. Habermas 
affirms and draws upon many aspects of these hermeneutic views of language and 
interpretation. However, he also contests Gadamer’s claim for the universality of 
hermeneutics, suggesting that hermeneutics is not able to provide an adequate account 
of extra-linguistic factors which lead to distortions and pathologies of linguistically 
constituted rationality. Habermas argues that this shortcoming should be addressed by 
means of a quasi-transcendental account of context-independent linguistic and 
communicative capacities. Gadamer’s rejoinder to Habermas and the subsequent 
debates that unfold between them have notable parallels with earlier encounters between 
Kant, Hamann and Herder. I shall argue that while Habermas’s aspirations for a 
reconstructed universality and emphases on the power of reflection are welcome, the 
status and contents of a quasi-transcendental analysis of universal communicative 
capacities stand in need of further elucidation. I conclude with some reflections on 
different conceptions of the universality of rationality – contrasting Habermas’s 
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proposals for a formalised reconstruction of the extra-linguistic conditions of 
communicative capacity with a detranscendentalised conception of the intra-linguistic 
and inter-linguistic communicative action required for consensus around different 
“styles of reasoning” to obtain in different settings. I conclude by suggesting that a 
critical theory of society with a serious interest in a more comprehensive analysis and 
engagement with the forms of reasoning operative within different social, economic and 
administrative contexts would be better served by the latter conception. 
 
Habermas on the Detranscendentalisation of Reason 
 
     Habermas is the last thinker that I shall examine in my thesis as part of a 
constellation of philosophers who contribute to an alternative conception of language as 
an evolving, socially and historically situated fabric of thought. However, as noted 
above, his relationship with the thinkers and texts presented in this thesis is not always 
straightforward. In this section, I shall examine how he draws on insights from the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn in German philosophy to bring the actually or 
historically existing social constitution of rationality into the philosophical picture. In 
the next section I shall look at Habermas’s views about the limits of the legacy of the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn – and in particular his critique of Gadamer’s universal 
hermeneutics and proposals towards a universal pragmatics. 
 
     Habermas’s initial interest in the linguistic turn and philosophical hermeneutics can 
be considered in relation to problems in two different areas. Firstly, in relation to 
philosophy of the social sciences, Habermas praises Gadamer’s critique of an 
“absolutism of a general methodology of the empirical sciences”, as manifested in the 
positivistic claims of philosophers like Popper (Habermas, 1988: 167). In his 1967 book 
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On the Logic of the Social Sciences Habermas discusses the “reconstruction of the 
buried hermeneutic dimension” both in relation to the “symbolically prestructured 
object domain of social science” (xiii), as well as in relation to the “fundamental 
assumptions” of social scientific theory (86). Secondly, the thick conception of 
linguistically constituted reason that emerges from the eighteenth century linguistic turn 
provides an alternative to the narrow conception of “instrumental reason” discussed by 
Adorno and Horkheimer. Habermas sought to build on this alternative conception of 
reason in the service of a reformulated version of the Enlightenment ideal of 
emancipation. 
 
     In order to better understand what Habermas was reacting against, I will briefly 
examine Adorno and Horkheimer’s views of rationality, particularly as described in 
their 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer’s views are profoundly 
informed by the work of Max Weber, who in turn draws on Nietzsche. Weber argues 
that modern western societies are increasingly driven by “instrumental rationality” 
(Zweckrationalität) rather than “value-rationality” (Wertrationalität). According to 
Weber’s account, whereas value-rationality is informed by fixed, absolute ends or 
values, which are non-negotiable and intrinsically important, instrumental rationality 
lacks absolute fixed ends and hence may continually re-calculate the relative priority of 
different ends. He says that instrumental rationality can be observed at work in the 
growing bureaucratisation, marketisation, quantification and scientism of areas of life 
that were previously governed by traditional religious, social and cultural values and 
practises. The rationalisation in modern societies is a major theme throughout Weber’s 
works on economics, law, administration and religion. Like the romantics and 
Nietzsche, Weber is critical of this increasingly narrow conception of reason as a 
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calculating instrument, and concerned about its deleterious effects on society. In his 
1905 classic The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber conjectures how 
the “mechanized petrification” and “convulsive self-importance” of instrumental reason 
might give rise to “specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart” (Weber, 2001: 
124). 
 
     In their 1944 account of “instrumental reason” Adorno and Horkheimer combine 
elements of Weber’s account of rationality with insights and approaches from Freud, 
Marx and Nietzsche to paint a very dark picture of the unexpected consequences of 
enlightenment rationality. One of their central contentions is that there is a kind of 
barbarism inherent within the enlightenment project, which they explicitly connect to 
the holocaust and the atrocities of the Nazi regime during the second world war – a 
claim which is later elaborated by Zygmunt Bauman (Bauman, 1989). They contend 
that technology is the “essence” of enlightenment rationality, which “aims to produce 
neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of 
the labor of others, capital” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 2). The logical culmination 
of the project to purify reason, according to Adorno and Horkheimer, is a “ruthless” and 
contentless instrumentality, pure method which has “eradicated the last remnant of its 
own self-awareness” (2). This purified reason “denounces the words of language, which 
bear the stamp of impressions, as counterfeit coin that would be better replaced by 
neutral counters” (2), and is suspicious of “anything which does not conform to the 
standard of calculability and utility” (3). Enlightenment rationality becomes 
“purposiveness without purpose”, “neutral with regard to ends” (69), with “no 
substantial goals” (70) and “devoid of content” (71). It liquidates objects through 
abstraction (9); it replaces concepts with formulae and causes with probabilities (3); it 
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turns everything - including living beings – into a “repeatable, replaceable process” 
(65); and it transforms thought into an “autonomous, automatic process, aping the 
machine” (19). Ultimately, Adorno and Horkheimer contend, this instrumental 
enlightenment rationality stands in the service of the flow of capital, about which it is 
incapable of critical reflection: 
 
[...] reason itself has become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus. Reason 
serves as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly purpose-directed and as 
calamitous as the precisely calculated operations of material production, the results of which for 
human beings escape all calculation. Reason's old ambition to be purely an instrument of purposes 
has finally been fulfilled. (23) 
 
“The formalization of reason is merely the intellectual expression of mechanized 
production”, Adorno and Horkheimer write. Their account of the “hollowing out” (218) 
and mechanisation of human reason is the centrepiece of a broader critical account of 
the failure of the enlightenment, and its complicity in the emergence of fascism, global 
capitalism, mass consumer culture, and new hitherto unseen forms of oppression, 
barbarism and violence. 
 
     In Habermas’s view this critique of instrumental reason goes too far. He considers 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s diagnosis of Enlightenment rationality to be too essentialist 
and deterministic, leaving too little room for non-oppressive forms of rationality that 
may be used in the service of social and political emancipation. Habermas advances an 
alternative conception of rationality through a move which has strong affinities with the 
linguistic metacritique of Hamann and Herder – which attempts to situate one-sided or 
pathological forms of rationality within the broader context of the operations of 
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linguistically mediated rationality in human lifeworlds. Instrumental reason is thus a 
derivative and deficient sub-specimen of a thicker “communicative” rationality which is 
inherent within the “natural” linguistic infrastructure of inter-subjectively constituted 
lifeworlds. 
 
     One of Habermas’s crucial contributions to the tradition that I have examined in the 
previous chapters is to highlight the consequences of more serious interdisciplinary 
engagements to bring the actually or historically existing social constitution of 
rationality into the philosophical picture. This can be contrasted with the view that this 
constitution can be effectively considered of secondary importance – as we see in more 
idealistic, aprioristic accounts (such as in contemporary analytic philosophy’s 
“armchair” thought-experimenters) which remain attached to a meaningful distinction 
between concepts and their contingent “instantiation” and mediation in social and 
historical formations which can be methodologically bracketed for the purposes of 
philosophical inquiry. This move to make the social and historical constitution of reason 
relevant to philosophical inquiry can be considered a “detranscendentalising” move 
which has affinities with Hegel’s critique of Kant. The analysis that he gives in his 1962 
book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is paradigmatic of this move 
(Habermas, 1991). 
 
     Habermas’s task in this work is to trace the emergence of Öffentlichkeit – meaning 
“publicness”, “openness” or “publicity” and most often translated as “public sphere” – 
which he defined as “a realm in our social life in which something approaching public 
opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1974: 51). Through a “social-historical analysis” he 
charts the rise of what he calls the liberal bourgeois public sphere from the eighteenth 
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century – along with associated conceptions of civil society, public opinion and the 
public use of reason. Central to this account are the institutions and practices of 
publicity and public opinion (such as “news letters”, journals, salons, coffee houses and 
societies) as well as the broader social, cultural, economic and political contexts of these 
phenomena – from the development of the family sphere to the rise of new technologies 
and industries. For Habermas these societal institutions and practices are not just 
contingent epiphenomena, they are an indispensable part of any plausible account of 
how public rationality is actually constituted. 
 
     Though the bourgeois public sphere is fatally flawed (for example, de facto 
restricting its membership to educated, property-owning men), Habermas holds that it 
plants seeds for the ideal of a universal public reason the legacy of which will provide 
normative standards against which actually existing structures of publicity can be 
measured. Echoing broader themes associated with other members of the Frankfurt 
School, the latter part of this book traces the “disintegration” of the bourgeois public 
sphere as a result of “neomercantilist refeudalization” commencing in the late 
nineteenth century which sees the aspiration for “unhampered communication and 
public rational-critical debate” (1991: 209) replaced with the consumption of mass 
media, commodification and manipulation. Though his account in The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere stops short of elaborating a more normative 
conception of what a non-exclusionary post-bourgeois public sphere might look like, its 
insistence on the importance of how public reason is mediated and given form in 
actually existing institutions coupled with a commitment to reworking universal, 
progressive ideals associated with the Enlightenment in the service of criticising and 
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improving these institutions makes it a milestone in the twentieth century legacy of the 
metacritical tradition. 
     In his 1981 book The Theory of Communicative Action draws on insights from the 
linguistic turn, as well as suggesting the need for a quasi-transcendental account of the 
universally shared conditions of possibility for communicative action. Habermas 
engages with the social theories of Durkheim, Marx, Mead, Parsons, Weber in order to 
further elaborate an alternative, detranscendentalised account of human reason which is 
capable of providing insight into its pathological consequences, whilst also leaving 
room for its emancipatory potential (Habermas, 1985a, 1985b). While The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere focuses on giving a social and historical account of 
the genesis of actually existing public rationality, The Theory of Communicative Action 
focuses on providing a framework for thinking about pubic rationality in order to 
strengthen and clarify the “normative foundations of a critical theory of society” 
(1985b: 396-397). Central to this account is understanding reason as a form of 
communicative action, which is performed by different publics in different contexts. He 
explicitly draws on and responds to the sociologist Talcott Parsons’s attempt to provide 
an account of systems of social action in his The Structure of Social Action (Parsons, 
1949). Rather than focusing exclusively on the theoretical reification of abstractions 
derived from the semantic structure of language, Habermas looks at the pragmatics of 
rationality as it is articulated in living social institutions. This entails a shift from 
rationality (in the singular) to rationalities (in the plural). One implication of this shift is 
that it is no longer plausible to exclusively focus on the excavation and purification of a 
single set of substantive a priori structures and categories of thought that will be held by 
everyone. Instead Habermas calls for collective inquiry into the conditions of possibility 
for communicative action in different settings – including “interdisciplinary research on 
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the selective pattern of capitalist modernization” (1985b: 397). Habermas argues that a 
quasi-transcendental analysis of the universal capacities of communication is also 
needed in order to provide the basis for reflection, and to guard against the subsumption 
of reason into linguistic tradition. 
 
     Habermas proposes using the concepts of “system” and “lifeworld” in order to 
ground the normative analyses of critical theories of society - suggesting that “that we 
conceive of society simultaneously as a system and as a lifeworld” (1985b: 120). On the 
one hand he suggests that we look for practices of rationality in the linguistic 
constitution of lifeworlds - a term which he draws from phenomenology in the tradition 
of Husserl and defines as “the context-forming background of processes of reaching 
understanding” (1985b: 204). Like Hamann and Herder, Habermas suggests that 
languages are repositories for social worlds. But these languages are not 
transcendentally separate from, but rather part of the fabric of intersubjectively 
articulated phenomenological lifeworlds. On the other hand, we can examine the 
rationalities which inhere within more formal systems which organise life – 
paradigmatically exemplified by markets and bureaucracies. Unhindered, these systems 
may begin to take over lifeworlds rather than serving them (e.g. through processes of 
marketisation and bureaucratisation) leading to various kinds of social pathologies - 
from alienation to exploitation. Habermas contends that the linguistically mediated 
communicative infrastructure of lifeworlds may provide resources for the normative 
critique and coordination of social action to redirect these systems and to counter their 
potentially damaging consequences. 
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     Habermas explicitly indicates his debt to the German “linguistic turn” in the 
eighteenth century – in particular regarding the “world-making character” of natural 
language (Habermas, 1999a: 417). He flags the importance of Hamann’s 
characterisation of language in his Metacritique as “a priori contingent and indifferent, 
but a posteriori necessary and indispensable”. Like Hamann and many other thinkers 
influenced by the eighteenth German linguistic turn, Habermas argues that language 
plays a central role in how we act, organise ourselves and experience the world around 
us – suggesting that “a language articulates in advance the conceptual space of possible 
encounters with anything in the world” and that “my linguistic knowledge organises my 
actual perception” (1999b: 139). Habermas differentiates his own contribution to 
philosophy after the linguistic turn in terms of his focus on pragmatics, arguing that this 
opens up space for a “dialectic of world-disclosure and learning processes within the 
world” and undermines the “monolithic and fateful character of a world view 
prejudging all and everything” (1999a: 440). He says that the turn from semantics to 
pragmatics means that the “pathologies of modernity can […] no longer be attributed to 
the semantics of an inescapably deforming pre-understanding of the world”, and also 
has the consequence that “philosophy can no longer solve the problem on its own” 
(441). 
 
     In this section I have highlighted how Habermas reiterates the picture of language 
that I have explored in the latter chapters of this thesis: that human beings shape the 
cultural forms which surround them, and are “shaped in turn by those intersubjectively 
shared symbolic and historical realities of culture and society” (Habermas, 2015). He 
thus argues that philosophy should be considered a “parasitic undertaking that lives off 
learning processes in other spheres”, in order to provide critical scrutiny of them as a 
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“secondary role of a form of reflection” (Habermas, 2015). However, this is only one 
half of the story. Habermas also emphasises the limits of this picture of linguistically 
mediated understanding, and sketches a quasi-transcendental account of the human 
communicative capacities that in some regards shares more in common with Kant’s 
Critique than Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritiques. How does he attempt to 
reconcile these two different objectives: to provide a quasi-transcendental account of 
universal linguistic capacities, as well as to draw on the legacy of Hamann and Herder’s 
linguistic metacritiques to provide a detranscendentalised account of human rationality 
as a socially and historically situated fabric of thought? Can he succeed in reconciling 
these two objectives? I shall examine these issues in the following section. 
 
Habermas’s Critique of the Hermeneutic Claim to 
Universality 
 
     While Habermas embraced many aspects of the “powerful movements of 
detranscendentalization” precipitated by Hamann, Humboldt, Hegel and Schleiermacher 
for opening up “a new continent of history, culture and society” (Habermas, 2015), he 
also had serious concerns about its claims about the fundamental role of tradition in 
giving shape to human understanding without a counterbalancing conception of the 
human capacity for reflection. These concerns were surfaced in debates between 
Gadamer and Habermas that started in the 1960s. Given the wealth of secondary 
literature on this topic (see, e.g. Misgeld, 1976; Wellmer, 1976; Mendelson, 1979; 
Ricœur, 1981; Jay, 1982; Shapiro, 1994; How, 1995; Cameron, 1996; Dallmayr, 2000; 
Palmer, 2000; Piercey, 2004), I shall keep my account focused on features of the debate 
which are most relevant in the present context. 
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     Gadamer’s hermeneutics played an important role in Habermas’s work. Gadamer 
invited Habermas to Heidelberg, where Habermas taught from 1961 to 1964. Habermas 
drew on and offered criticisms of Gadamer’s Truth and Method in his 1967 On the 
Logic of the Social Sciences (Habermas, 1988). In the same year, Gadamer offered a 
response to Habermas’s criticisms in an essay on “Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the 
Critique of Ideology” (Gadamer, 1985). Beginning with these early engagements in 
Heidelberg, the public debate between the two thinkers continued to develop over the 
following decades, including in a further essay from Gadamer in the same year, “On the 
Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection” (Gadamer, 1977: 18-43); in a 1970 
essay from Habermas “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality” (Habermas, 1989); and 
in a 1971 response from Gadamer “Reply to My Critics” (Gadamer, 1989b). In the 
present context I shall focus on the more substantive parts of the debates between 
Gadamer and Habermas which take place in the 1960s and 1970s. It is worth noting that 
Habermas’s work on universal pragmatics is not undertaken until the late 1970s and 
early 1980s after the debates with Gadamer were de facto over – though many of the 
main insights, moves and starting points for Habermas’s work on universal pragmatics 
are arguably present in the earlier debates with Gadamer, albeit in germinal form. 
 
     In this section I shall focus on Habermas’s initial engagement with Gadamer’s work 
in his On the Logic of the Social Sciences, where he both praises the seminal 
contributions of philosophical hermeneutics in general and Gadamer’s Truth and 
Method in particular, as well as expressing concerns about what he considers to be their 
serious limitations. On the one hand Habermas says that Gadamer has compellingly 
demonstrated that “hermeneutic understanding is linked with transcendental necessity to 
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the articulation of an action-orientating self-understanding” (Habermas, 1988: 230). He 
affirms the centrality of language in Gadamer’s work, adding that “it makes good sense 
to conceive of language as a kind of metainstitution on which all social institutions are 
dependent” (239). However, Habermas takes issue with the scope and implications of 
Gadamer’s claims. Thus he later describes the twofold task of his On the Logic of the 
Social Sciences as: (i) the “reconstruction of the buried hermeneutical dimension” in the 
social sciences (as discussed above); accompanied by (ii) “an argument against 
hermeneutics’ claim to universality”. In rejecting the hermeneutic claim to universality, 
he replaces it with a claim to universality of his own, which – in the present context – 
can be read as an attempt to combine Kant’s aspiration for universality pursued through 
his transcendental critique of pure reason with insights from the eighteenth century 
linguistic turn that developed from Hamann and Herder’s metacritique. Indeed, 
Habermas indicates this when he complements Cassirer on reading Humboldt “from the 
perspective of a Kant enlightened, rather than rejected, by Hamann” (6). Habermas 
proposes to pursue this course by means of an engagement with theoretical and 
empirical research in the social sciences and linguistics (in particular formal pragmatics) 
– in order to give a quasi-transcendental analysis of the universal conditions of 
possibility for communicative rationality.  
 
     Habermas argues that Gadamer overestimates our dependence upon tradition and 
underestimates our ability to obtain critical distance in relation to it through reflection. 
In particular, he suggests that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics places too great an 
emphasis on a contextualist conception of rationality – such that “the conditions of 
rationality change with time and place, epoch and culture” – and thus “gets lost” in an 
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“irrationalism” which “fails to acknowledge the transcending force of reflection that is 
also at work in it” (172). Thus he writes that: 
 
Gadamer's prejudice in favor of the legitimacy of prejudices (or prejudgments) validated by 
tradition is in conflict with the power of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the 
claim of traditions. Substantiality disintegrates in reflection, because the latter not only confirms 
but also breaks dogmatic forces. Authority and knowledge do not converge. Certainly, knowledge 
is rooted in actual tradition; it remains bound to contingent conditions. But reflection does not 
wear itself out on the facticity of traditional norms without leaving a trace. It is condemned to 
operate after the fact; but, operating in retrospect, it unleashes retroactive power. (170) 
 
Habermas is concerned that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics provides an 
inadequate account of the reflective and reasoning capacities of human beings which 
indeed derive a substantive part of their specific form and content from linguistic 
traditions (as Gadamer suggests), but which are not exhausted by these traditions. 
Whilst Habermas follows Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritical appraisal of 
Kant’s transcendental account of human rationality up to a point, he resists concluding 
that we can provide a complete account of reason with reference to the contingent 
structures of a particular linguistically articulated world-version. He reads Gadamer’s 
claim for the universality of hermeneutics as implying an identity relation between 
reason and a particular language, with no remainder. On the contrary, Habermas sees it 
as a crucial objective of a philosophy of language to leave such a gap between universal 
rational reflective capacities and specific linguistic traditions – as it is by means of this 
gap that we are able to exercise the freedom that is required to reformulate and critique 
them. Hence Habermas writes in a later essay that “reflexivity and objectivity are 
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fundamental traits of language, as are creativity and the integration of language into 
life-praxis” (Habermas, 1989: 249). 
 
     Without this universal reflective capacity, Habermas suggests that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics remains unable to account for or react critically to distortions in the very 
fabric of rationality. This is a particularly serious allegation precisely because of the 
“detranscendentalising movements” that took hold in the wake of the eighteenth century 
linguistic turn – which suggest that socially and historically contingent linguistic forms 
provide the conditions of possibility for reason as such, and which could thus render us 
“locked in” to particular deformed or distorted forms of rationality, undermining their 
emancipatory potential. Habermas thus suggests two major shortcomings of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics: firstly, as it focuses on a totalizing account of the role of linguistic 
traditions in giving form to rationality, as opposed to (following Kant) a more 
substantive conception of the universally held capacities for communicative rationality 
which also make it possible for us to critically reflect upon these traditions; and 
secondly, as it remains insufficiently attentive to the full implications of the 
detranscendentalising perspective on language that follows from Hamann and Herder’s 
linguistic metacritique – in particular overlooking the extra-linguistic social settings of 
linguistic traditions. In relation to this second point, Habermas accuses Gadamer of a 
kind of “linguistic idealism” (Habermas, 1988: 174) such that linguistic traditions are 
considered apart from the social, cultural, political and economic forms of life through 
which they are constituted, and appraised predominantly (if not exclusively) qua 
linguistic forms. 
 
     Habermas considers that without other complementary accounts of (i) universal 
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communicative capacities, and (ii) the broader societal contexts of actually existing 
linguistic traditions, the “linguistic idealism” of hermeneutics will lack the resources for 
a critique of linguistic reason, in both the Kantian epistemological sense and the 
Marxist political-economic sense of critique. If this is the case, then Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics will remain unable to account for the social processes upon which 
language depends, which mean that it can function as a “medium of domination and 
social power” (172), which gives rise to “distorted communication” and “pseudo-
communicative agreement” which cannot serve as the basis for emancipatory 
communicative action. Hence Habermas writes that: 
 
An interpretive sociology that hypostatizes language as the subject of life forms and of tradition 
binds itself to the idealist presupposition that linguistically articulated consciousness determines 
the material being of life-practice. But the objective context of social action is not reducible to the 
dimension of intersubjectively intended and symbolically transmitted meaning. The linguistic 
infrastructure of society is a moment in a complex that, however symbolically mediated, is also 
constituted by the constraints of reality: by the constraint of external nature, which enters into the 
procedures of technological exploitation, and by the constraint of inner nature, which is reflected 
in the repressions of social relationships of power. (174) 
 
In the context of social scientific research, this demands a combination of theoretical 
and methodological approaches which is together capable of appraising the whole 
“objective context” of linguistic traditions, which can be understood as a complex of 
“language, labor, and domination” rather than seeing tradition as a kind of “absolute 
power” that “completely sublimate[s] social processes” (174). Rather than just 
examining traditions per se through the lens of hermeneutics, such an outlook would 
aim to “indicate the conditions external to tradition under which transcendental rules of 
worldview and action change empirically” (174); as well as to “understand the functions 
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that cultural tradition serves in the system as a whole”, and particularly in relation to 
“the system of social labor and political domination” (187). 
 
     Habermas’s two-fold critique of Gadamer can be summarized by saying that the 
latter is too Kantian in his linguistic idealism (overlooking the extra-linguistic social 
and historical factors which shape linguistic tradition); and he is not Kantian enough in 
relation to his account of human reason (overlooking the enduring, context-independent 
capacities which make critical reflection on linguistic traditions possible). Thus 
Habermas writes in relation to the first point that Gadamer is “prevented by the residues 
of Kantianism retained in Heidegger's existential ontology from drawing the 
conclusions suggested by his own analyses” – towards a detranscendentalised account 
of “linguistic structures and the empirical conditions under which they change 
historically” (175). In this regard, Gadamer’s hermeneutics “is not objective enough” 
and “comes up against the limits of the context of tradition from the inside” (172). In 
relation to the second point, Habermas contends that Gadamer’s failure to recognise the 
universal dimension of Kant’s transcendental analysis of the reasoning capacities of 
human beings effectively means that hermeneutics is held hostage to a “dogmatic 
recognition of tradition” and unable to recognize or tackle distortions or deformities in 
human communicative capacities. 
 
     How does Habermas propose to address these issues with philosophical 
hermeneutics? In both cases he looks beyond philosophy in his response. In relation to 
the problem of linguistic idealism, Habermas suggests that hermeneutic approaches in 
the social sciences should be combined with other approaches which can give account 
of the broader contexts of linguistic traditions – including labour and domination. Here 
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he suggests that rather than rather than ceding to the constitutive role of linguistic 
tradition through an exclusive focus on “interpretive sociology” which focuses on 
understanding meanings in different settings, this must be augmented with other 
“empirical-analytic” and “normative-analytic” research approaches which can tell us 
more about the broader extra-linguistic social, economic and political structures which 
mutually shape and are shaped by linguistic traditions (in particular by engaging with 
sociological theory with scope and ambition to the structural-functionalism exemplified 
by Talcott Parsons). In this regard, Habermas can be considered to tackle linguistic 
idealism by drawing on the detranscendentalising tendency of German philosophy after 
the linguistic turn to give a richer empirical analysis of the broader social and historical 
conditions which make linguistic traditions possible, and which may also contribute to 
their distortion and deformation. Here he gives the example of the “theoretical” and 
scientific (as opposed to purely hermeneutical) aspects of psychoanalysis, which aspire 
to provide a holistic account of the psychodynamic development of human beings in 
terms of extra-linguistic instincts, motivations and drives – as well as being able to 
account for pathologies and distortions in development in terms of “lawlike hypotheses” 
(185). 
 
     In relation to his accusation that Gadamer is not Kantian enough – overlooking the 
universal character of his Critique – Habermas suggests that empirical research in the 
social sciences can help to elaborate the space for freedom that always already exists 
between human communicative capacities and particular linguistic traditions, thus 
avoiding the absolutizing claims that hermeneutics makes about how human reason can 
be fully accounted for with reference to these traditions. Thus he proposes an analysis of 
the “quasi-transcendental” system of rules and human capacities which make provide 
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the conditions of possibility for linguistic traditions (70). Why “quasi-transcendental” as 
opposed to the kind of transcendental account that Kant gives in his Critique? Habermas 
suggests that while these conditions can be considered to be universal, they can 
nevertheless potentially vary: 
 
[…] no one can seriously expect an empirical science to consist only of meditations on the 
transcendental structure of the social world. Clearly, a sociological investigation focused on the 
level of intersubjectivity cannot be conducted in the classical form of a transcendental analysis of 
consciousness, whether the analysis be a Neo-Kantian or a phenomenological one. Because the 
transcendental rules that an interpretive sociology must clarify are altered under empirical 
conditions, because they can no longer be considered to be invariant properties of a consciousness 
that transcends phenomena as such, they can be made accessible to empirical investigation. (1988: 
111) 
 
     How does Habermas envisage that such a quasi-transcendental analysis may be 
pursued? One line of inquiry issues from a distinction that he draws from Wittgenstein, 
who “conceives language games as a complex of language and praxis” (130). This 
distinction enables Habermas to separate analyses of the content of linguistic traditions 
(amenable to hermeneutical investigation), from the analyses of the extra-linguistic 
social conditions which make these traditions possible, which he describes as the “rules 
of communication processes” (117). Here he draws on theory and empirical research 
from linguistics, in particular noting Chomsky’s work on “a general theory of ordinary-
language structures” (68-69, 138, 141, 143), as well as work on the “metatheory” of the 
universal conditions that make all languages possible, the possibility of which he frames 
as follows: 
 
8. Shaping and Being Shaped: The Gadamer-Habermas Debates 
283 
Does not the language of the metatheory remain tied to the grammar of specific ordinary 
languages? Or can a categorial framework independent of culture be found that will not only allow 
correct descriptions of linguistic structures but also make possible the identification of that set of 
formal properties that systematically distinguish every traditional language from an arbitrary or 
accidental sequence of structural descriptions? (140-141) 
 
This formalised, theoretical description of the conditions that make all natural languages 
possible is the heart of Habermas’s quasi-transcendental analysis – which will be 
become his preferred means of demonstrating “the unity of analytic reason in the 
pluralism of language games”, as well as showing that “the relativity of linguistic 
worldviews and the monadology of language games are both illusory” (143). Habermas 
sees this unity in terms of what all languages share in common: 
 
Reason, which is always bound up with language, is also always beyond its languages. Only by 
destroying the particularities of languages, which are the only way in which it is embodied, does 
reason live in language. It can purge itself of the residue of one particularity, of course, only 
through the transition to another. This mediating generality is attested to by the act of translation. 
Formally, it is reflected in the trait that all traditional languages have in common and that 
guarantees their transcendental unity, namely, the fact that in principle they can all be translated 
into one another. (144) 
 
This interest in the late 1960s will later form the basis of his efforts towards a “universal 
pragmatics” which come to occupy a central role in his work from the late 1970s, 
wherein he aims to provide a “postmetaphysical yet nondefeatist” conception of reason 
by means of a rational reconstruction of the universal conditions of possibility for 
human communicative capacities (cf. Cooke, 1994). 
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Gadamer’s Metacritical Response to Habermas’s Critique 
 
     How does Gadamer respond to Habermas’s twofold critique of philosophical 
hermeneutics? Firstly, against the charge that he overlooks the context-independent, 
universal capacities for human communication (and the virtues of Kant’s transcendental 
analysis), Gadamer argues that hermeneutics precisely aims to provide such a basis in 
its claims for universality, and in doing so it does not fall prey to a kind of linguistic 
relativism that would render members of different linguistic traditions unable to 
communicate, nor a dogmatism in relation to tradition that precludes the possibility of 
reflection. Secondly, against changes of linguistic idealism (that he overlooks the social 
and historical conditions of possibility of linguistic traditions), Gadamer rejects 
Habermas’s claim that according to hermeneutics “linguistically articulated 
consciousness claims to determine all the material being of life-practice” (Gadamer, 
1977: 35) – and furthermore argues that Habermas’s “highly abstract concept of 
coercion-free discourse … totally loses sight of the actual conditions of human praxis” 
(Gadamer, 2007: 29). Despite Habermas’s claims for the extra-linguistic empirical basis 
for his quasi-transcendental analysis, Gadamer argues that this does not mean that the 
analysis itself can be considered extra-hermeneutical. I will examine each of these two 
counter-arguments in turn. 
 
     Gadamer argues that his universal hermeneutics provides a more compelling 
philosophical account of human communicative capacities and the possibility of 
reflection on tradition than Habermas’s proposed quasi-transcendental theoretical 
approach to linguistic action. He reaffirms his view that “language is the fundamental 
mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all-embracing form of the 
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constitution of the world” (Gadamer, 1989a: 147), and that through his hermeneutics he 
aimed to highlight “the essentially linguistic character of all human experience” 
(Gadamer, 1985: 275). Gadamer suspects that Habermas’s rejection of the hermeneutic 
claim to universality issues from a fundamental misunderstanding with the scope and 
character of linguistically articulated culture and tradition which is the subject of 
hermeneutical inquiry. In Gadamer’s view, while the world cannot be considered to be 
entirely subsumed by linguistic traditions without remainder (thus we can meaningfully 
talk about a world outside language), human understanding of the world is nevertheless 
delimited by linguistic articulation. Thus he reiterates his claim in Truth and Method 
that “being which can be understood is language”. The general scope that Gadamer 
claims for hermeneutics means that it can be considered to apply to all areas of human 
life and human understanding which are mediated by language, including everything 
from negotiating with others in the course of our everyday lives; legal and policy 
debates; the coordination of economic and administrative systems which underpin 
national and transnational labour forces; the activities of scientific and technical 
communities; and organising the protection and maintenance of planetary ecological 
systems. Thus Gadamer writes that hermeneutics extends beyond the interpretation of 
classical, literary and legal texts, and into the processes of interpretation operative 
within modern scientific contexts – such as in the creation and use of statistics: 
 
The hermeneutical question, as I have characterized it, is not restricted to the areas from which I 
began in my own investigations. My only concern there was to secure a theoretical basis that 
would enable us to deal with the basic factor of contemporary culture, namely, science and its 
industrial, technological utilization. Statistics provide us with a useful example of how the 
hermeneutical dimension encompasses the entire procedure of science. It is an extreme example, 
but it shows us that science always stands under definite conditions of methodological abstraction 
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and that the successes of modern sciences rest on the fact that other possibilities for questioning 
are concealed by abstraction. This fact comes out clearly in the case of statistics, for the 
anticipatory character of the questions statistics answer makes it particularly suitable for 
propaganda purposes. Indeed, effective propaganda must always try to influence initially the 
judgment of the person addressed and to restrict his possibilities of judgment. Thus what is 
established by statistics seems to be a language of facts, but which questions these facts answer 
and which facts would begin to speak if other questions were asked are hermeneutical questions. 
Only a hermeneutical inquiry would legitimate the meaning of these facts and thus the 
consequences that follow from them. (153) 
 
     The claim of hermeneutic extends as far as language is implicated in the articulation 
of social worlds and the coordination of social action. Gadamer suspects that Habermas 
considers linguistic tradition in a narrower sense – perhaps as a repository of traditional 
cultural “content”, as exemplified in canonical literary or historical texts in the 
humanities or in the customary values and ways of life that we inherit. On the contrary, 
Gadamer emphasises that in the context of hermeneutics linguistic traditions can 
incorporate any linguistic scheme which articulates a world for human understanding or 
social action in any context. Thus he contends that “language is not only an object in 
our hands, it is the reservoir of tradition and the medium in and through which we exist 
and perceive our world” (29), and that we live through it “not only in the concrete 
interrelations of work and politics but in all the other relationships and dependencies 
that comprise our world” (32). Hermeneutics does not just concern itself with “mere” 
culture or tradition (ideas which Gadamer traces the genesis of in his other work), but 
with “linguisticality that operates in all understanding” (29). Tradition does not simply 
entail that “texts and monuments” are passed down to us, but rather “it is the world 
itself which is communicatively experienced and continuously entrusted to us as an 
infinitely open task to pass on” (Gadamer, 2007: 26). 
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     Thus Gadamer contests Habermas’s argument that there is something in the 
hermeneutical interest in tradition which is either dogmatic or conservative. The 
hermeneutical interest in tradition is not dogmatic per se as traditions are always already 
continually reflectively re-appropriated. Hence, Gadamer writes: 
 
Now it is obvious that the phrase which I occasionally use, that much depends on establishing a 
connection with tradition, promotes misunderstanding. Contained within this is in no sense a 
preference for that which is customary, to which one must be blindly subservient. On the contrary, 
the phrase ‘connection to tradition’ means only that the tradition is not exhausted by the heritage 
one knows and is conscious of. In this way tradition cannot be relegated to an adequate 
consciousness of history. Alteration of the existing conditions is no less a form of connection to 
tradition than is a defense of existing conditions. Tradition exists only in constantly becoming 
other than it is. (Gadamer, 1989b: 288) 
 
The idea of culture and tradition as “objects” apart from us arises from a misleading 
objectivist conception of history which does not acknowledge the “operativeness of 
history in our conditionedness and finitude” (Gadamer, 1977: 28). However, in 
Gadamer’s view our means of reflectively appropriating, challenging and reconfiguring 
different aspects of these traditions (as Habermas values) are given to us through 
linguistic traditions. This is the sense in which human beings and linguistic traditions 
are mutually constitutive – as described in relation to Heidegger and Gadamer’s 
“appropriational” conception of language which we simultaneously shape and are 
shaped by. On this view the norms, values and practices of objectivity associated with 
modern science are also given to us through particular kinds of scientific institutions 
and forms of life which can themselves be considered in terms of linguistic tradition. To 
say that our communicative capacities are articulated through these various linguistic 
traditions is not to say that we are beholden to or that we must be deferential or 
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subservient to them. Likewise, while Habermas alludes to Burke and suggests that there 
is a conservative streak to Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Gadamer counters that there is 
nothing inherently conservative about tradition – and there are politically revolutionary 
and emancipatory political traditions (and even anti-traditional traditions), as well as 
conservative ones. While Habermas may try to argue that his quasi-transcendental 
analysis is “meta-hermeneutical” or “extra-hermeneutical”, Gadamer counters that 
Habermas’s critique is “itself a linguistic act of reflection” (30). 
 
     Gadamer is also very explicit that the assertion that “understanding is language-
bound … does not lead us into any kind of linguistic relativism” (Gadamer, 1989a: 
156). There is “no captivity within a language”, as evidenced by the process of learning 
a language other than our own (157). Indeed, Gadamer holds that the misplaced concern 
about being “stuck” in a language, issues from a fundamental misunderstanding about 
how linguistic traditions are continually re-articulated and about the centrality of inter-
linguistic communication to hermeneutics. Through its analysis of translation, 
conversation, play and what he calls the “fusion of horizons”, hermeneutics provides an 
account of how linguistic innovation is possible and how communication across 
linguistic traditions makes it possible to obtain shared understandings between different 
perspectives. Hermeneutics also presupposes a shared background of understandings, 
which Gadamer characterises as “solidarity”, which makes communication and 
understanding possible. While Habermas looks to provide an account of the extra-
linguistic preconditions for communication in quasi-transcendental terms, drawing on 
theoretical and empirical research in the natural and social sciences (especially 
linguistics), Gadamer implies that solidarity is a fundamental aspect of the 
hermeneutical perspective that does not stand in need of (quasi-)empirical support or 
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elucidation. Thus he contends that it is only in relation to the “measuring stick of an 
absolute knowledge” – i.e. a knowledge that we can never obtain – that the linguistic 
character of human understanding appears to imply a “threatening relativism” 
(Gadamer, 1989b: 283). 
 
     How does Gadamer respond to the charge of linguistic idealism? As I have alluded to 
above, Gadamer says that the hermeneutic insistence on the linguistic character of 
human understanding does not imply that there is nothing outside of language, nor deny 
the role of extra-linguistic phenomena which shape our linguistic traditions. He freely 
admits that “no one will deny that the practical application of modern science 
profoundly alters our world, and with it our language” (287). However, he does contest 
the suggestion that we can make claims about these extra-linguistic phenomena which 
are themselves non-hermeneutical or extra-hermeneutical. Thus while he admits of 
Habermas’s work on the social sciences that “one cannot deny that this socio-theoretical 
conception has its logic” (Gadamer, 1985: 283), at the same time he rejects Habermas’s 
claim to a privileged extra-hermeneutical insight, arguing that “in this game nobody is 
above and before all the others” (Gadamer, 1977: 32). In this sense he regards 
Habermas’s “meta-hermeneutical theory of communicative competence” which claims 
to be able to “get behind language” as a kind of “false ontological self-understanding” 
or “hermeneutically false consciousness” (Gadamer, 1989b: 287; 1977: 42). 
 
     For this reason, Gadamer suggests that “Habermas's concept of reflection and 
bringing to consciousness seems heavily burdened by its own dogmatism” (Gadamer, 
1985: 286). According to Gadamer, Habermas’s critical theory risks being deeply 
uncritical and unreflective about its own status – overlooking its contingent 
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development and attributing to it a special epistemic priority, rather than putting it on a 
par with other claims, arguments and texts in the hermeneutical universe. Picking up on 
claims about deformed or pathological rationality in critical theory, Gadamer says that 
there is a danger that the doctor/patient metaphor may carry authoritarian tendencies – 
such that critical theorists have privileged scientific insight into social reality in a way 
which is exempt to hermeneutical scrutiny and deliberation. It is precisely the 
totalisation of an allegedly extra-hermeneutical scientific mode of understanding that 
Gadamer sets out to critique in his Truth and Method, as well as to provide an 
alternative hermeneutical conception of truth and understanding, and to open up space 
for other non-instrumental modes of rationality and reflection. Gadamer hopes that 
Habermas may absorb more of the dialogical and historical self-reflexivity that he 
advances in his programme for a universal hermeneutics.  
 
     For Gadamer, Habermas’s universal frameworks, systems, schemes and 
categorisations of society (including extra-linguistic phenomena) risk misleadingly 
presenting themselves as extra-hermeneutical, rather than as historically contingent 
articulations which draw on a distinctly occidental theoretical heritage. In short, 
Gadamer warns Habermas against attempting to place his philosophical contributions 
outside the realm of hermeneutical deliberation in a way which aligns them with 
epistemically privileged scientific methodology rather than with the humanistic and 
hermeneutical inquiry for truth (as paradigmatically exemplified in aesthetic 
experience). Gadamer emphasises the importance of social “solidarity” that forms the 
background of shared understandings which makes collective inquiry possible. 
Investigating the conditions of possibility of communicative action – as per Habermas’s 
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project – should itself be considered part of “the conversation that we are”, rather than a 
scientific project set apart from it. In this vein he writes: 
 
I am of the opinion that with all our technical and scientific progress we still have not learned well 
enough how to live with each other and with our own progress. I would like to close with the 
following remark: What I have tried to make clear to you today is that hermeneutics as philosophy 
is not some kind of methodological dispute with other sciences, epistemologies, or such things. 
No, hermeneutics asserts something nobody today can deny: we occupy a moment in history in 
which we must strenuously use the full powers of our reason, and not just keep doing science only. 
(Gadamer, 2007: 120) 
 
Two Kinds of Universality, Two Kinds of Modesty 
 
     Gadamer and Habermas exemplify two philosophical traditions – hermeneutics and 
critical theory – which were both deeply influenced by ideas associated with the 
German “linguistic turn” of the eighteenth century. Both draw on Hamann and Herder’s 
linguistic metacritique of Kant’s transcendental analysis of human reason – including 
the latter’s insistence on a connection between capacities for reason and our experience 
of a world. Both remain committed to age-old philosophical vision of establishing a 
universal basis for linguistically articulated human reasoning capacities. However, there 
are significant differences between their respective suggestions about how this universal 
basis can be obtained – leading to debates between Gadamer’s universal hermeneutics 
on the one hand, and what will later become Habermas’s universal pragmatics on the 
other hand. Gadamer’s hermeneutics draws on Heidegger’s “appropriational” 
conception of language – focusing on how language articulates the shape of the worlds 
that we experience. We may reconfigure language by being attentive to its affordances 
and its attunement to the environments of our experience, as exemplified in poetry, 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 292 
conversation and play. Habermas is much more concerned with the role of reason in the 
organisation of social and political life. He takes as his point of departure the failure of 
universal reason to facilitate universal emancipation (as pursued by Leibniz and others 
in chapter two) – and thus considers it a priority to diagnose the “pathologies” of reason 
which not only inhibit social progress, but which have also facilitated catastrophes such 
as the holocaust. This entails looking beyond linguistic traditions, narrowly conceived, 
and towards their broader extra-linguistic social, cultural and political contexts. While 
both thinkers are influenced by the encounters between Kant, Hamann and Herder, for 
present purposes I would comment that Habermas’s quasi-transcendental analysis of 
universal communicative capacities might be considered in terms of a reformulation of 
Kant’s transcendental analysis of pure reason, and Gadamer’s insistence on the 
linguistic character of human understanding might be fruitfully compared with Hamann 
and Herder’s linguistic metacritique of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
 
     While there are significant differences between their approaches to establishing a 
universal basis for linguistically mediated human reason, are these two views ultimately 
irreconcilable? Need we follow either one or the other, or might we borrow from both - 
learning both from the Gadamerian conception of hermeneutical conversation as well as 
the Habermasian vision of being able to provide an account of universally shared 
communicative capacities with reference to their extra-linguistic conditions of 
possibility? Might we draw on both of their arguments to arrive at a perspective that 
would represent – as Habermas puts it – a “Kant enlightened, rather than rejected, by 
Hamann” (6)? Here I follow commentators such as Richard E. Palmer, who emphasises 
their possible “commonality” and “complementarity” (Palmer, 2000), rather than their 
irreconcilability. I will proceed with an account of their differences with respect to the 
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framework discussed towards the end of chapter six in order to explore the broader 
philosophical implications of their views – as well as to discuss which aspects of these 
views could be revised in order to enable a rapprochement between their respective 
positions. 
 
     Both Gadamer and Habermas agree that a substantive part of both the structure and 
content of human reason derives from particular linguistic traditions. Both thus 
recognise that the particular kinds of linguistically articulated reasoning processes – 
what Hacking calls “styles of reasoning” – are likely to exhibit some degree of variance 
from domain to domain: legal debates may thus rely on different sets of argumentative 
resources to those in high energy physics or cultural criticism, economics or theology. 
Likewise – there may be different kinds of reasoning processes articulated in the 
possible constructions of different natural languages. We can call this claim, (G0): 
 
(G0) A substantive part of both the structure and content of human reason derives from particular 
linguistic traditions. 
 
Both Gadamer and Habermas wish to give these heterogeneous genres of reasoning a 
common basis. Gadamer does this through his particular philosophical conceptions such 
as “solidarity”, “play” and “fusion of horizons” – through which he defends his claims 
that: 
 
(G1) Hermeneutics applies to human understanding in all settings; 
(G2) All communication presupposes a common basis of shared understandings; 
(G3) There is always the possibility of translation and communication between different linguistic 
traditions. 
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In his debates with Gadamer, Habermas expresses agreement with each of these claims 
(G1), (G2) and (G3) – which represents a substantive “common ground” between the 
two thinkers. What he doubts is that hermeneutics is able to provide an adequate 
account of universal communicative capacities – and in particular their extra-linguistic 
conditions of possibility. Thus Habermas proposes that: 
 
(H1) Hermeneutics is not able to provide an adequate account of the extra-linguistic conditions 
that underpin human communicative capacities; 
(H2) Other social scientific approaches and disciplines (e.g. linguistics, psychology) are able to 
contribute to an account of the extra-linguistic conditions that underpin human communicative 
capacities. 
 
While Habermas affirms theses (G1), (G2) and (G3), he fears that they cannot be 
adequately substantiated by hermeneutics alone. Hence he proposes that (H2) might 
provide a quasi-empirical support for (G2) and (G3). However, because of his 
commitment to (G1), Gadamer is not convinced by Habermas’s emphasis on (H2) if 
read as a kind of meta-hermeneutical or extra-hermeneutical proposition. This point 
becomes major a source of contention between the two thinkers. While Gadamer 
affirms the hermeneutical status of theses (G1) to (G3), it looks like Habermas is indeed 
interested in an extra-hermeneutical support due to his claim in (H1). This aspect of the 
dispute hinges on whether the universal capacities for communication are considered to 
have a hermeneutical or extra-hermeneutical basis. 
 
     There is a further metaphilosophical question about what “providing a basis” means 
in the context of Gadamer and Habermas’s debates. Do (G2) and (G3) require 
philosophical justification, scientific explanation, or rhetorical argumentation to 
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persuade us that they are the case? Whereas Gadamer suggests the hermeneutical and 
conversational character of his discussion about the universality of hermeneutics, 
Habermas’s interest in (H2) looks beyond hermeneutics towards empirical-analytic and 
normative-analytic research in the social sciences. While Habermas would likely agree 
that his discussions of (H2) indeed have a hermeneutical dimension, as per Gadamer’s 
(G1), he would also likely maintain that hermeneutics cannot provide an exhaustive 
treatment of the substantive social scientific claims about the extra-linguistic conditions 
of possibility of communicative capacities. There is indeed a hermeneutical dimension 
to scientific research, but hermeneutics cannot exhaust the ways in which science 
engages with the world in order to undertake empirical-analytic or normative-analytic 
accounts of phenomena. 
 
     Gadamer admits that his vision of hermeneutics is heavily skewed by his own 
philological training and background, but argues that this does not limit the relevance of 
the hermeneutic perspective in other domains. One question that it will be crucial to 
resolve in order to advance this claim to universality, is the extent to which 
hermeneutics can defend its value in relation to the development of scientific and 
technological knowledge, including the type of knowledge that Habermas associates 
with (H2). Though a more detailed discussion of this point in relation to debates in the 
history and philosophy of science is beyond the scope of this thesis, in the present 
context I think the plausibility of such a claim would partly depend on the conception of 
language being advanced. If we adopt a “narrow expressivist” conception of language 
that limits it to natural language, then this may limit the plausibility of hermeneutics in 
relation to the practices and institutions of knowledge production which depend on not 
just linguistically articulated theory formation and interpretative processes, but also 
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different ways of seeing and ways of knowing associated with – for example – imaging 
equipment, network analysis, graphical conventions, artificial languages, technical 
standards, computer software and so on. A “broad expressivist” conception of language 
which included not only natural language but other forms of “meaningful media” would 
be better equipped to account for the way in which scientific knowledge emerges 
through the interplay of people, concepts, theories, equipment and the phenomena under 
examination. Further conceptual resources in support of hermeneutical accounts of 
scientific and technological knowledge production might be found in Heidegger and 
Gadamer’s accounts of linguistic innovation as a kind of co-articulation and Hamann 
and Herder’s conception of the mutually constitutive relationship between language and 
experience. 
 
     Revisiting Hacking’s use of Goodman’s vocabulary of “world-versions” to discuss 
the “HHH” conceptions of language, we might also consider the question of what it 
means to “provide a basis” in terms of whether claims such as (G2) and (G3) are 
considered to be “version-bound” or “version-neutral” in relation to linguistic traditions. 
Gadamer’s claim for hermeneutic universality seems to be a version-neutral claim, yet 
he also freely admits the hermeneutic (as opposed to extra-hermeneutic or meta-
hermeneutic) character of his arguments. Might Gadamer’s claim for the universality of 
hermeneutics thus be construed as self-refuting? If his claims are just another part of the 
hermeneutic conversation, can they also be considered to “provide a basis” for the 
possibility of this conversation? While Gadamer is unambiguous and uncompromising 
in his insistence on the hermeneutic claim to universality and with regards to (G2) and 
(G3), he must ultimately accept that these claims are subject to the same degree of 
provisionality as other claims as part of the “conversation that we are”, as opposed to 
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the “absolute knowledge” that eludes mortal, finite beings. The possibility of being 
wrong is fundamental part of the philosophical outlook of Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
– which something he shares with others thinkers in this thesis including Heidegger (at 
least in principle) and Hamann. Hence (G1) type claims also apply to themselves. In 
this sense Gadamer’s hermeneutics also insists upon a certain kind of modesty and 
fallibility for all claims in all linguistic traditions – including its own. 
 
     Gadamer rejects the notion that this modesty leads to a kind of indefensible 
relativism. He argues that the implications of his modesty only appear intimidating in 
relation to an implausible absolute conception of knowledge derived from a 
misunderstanding of truth and method in the natural sciences. He argues that it is this 
very conception of absolute knowledge which leads Habermas to pursue (H2). While 
Gadamer sees his work on hermeneutics as contributing to a broader conversation in the 
pursuit of a better understanding of our situation – which entails an examination of our 
relation to linguistic tradition – he does not present this as a kind of scientific 
knowledge claim that would guarantee the possibility of universal communicative 
capacities. His claim is necessarily modest due to the provisionality of all historically 
situated, linguistically articulated knowledge claims, but that does not mean that he is 
unable to argue for the context-transcendent relevance or universal applicability of his 
conception of hermeneutics. 
 
     As Maeve Cooke argues, Habermas’s universal pragmatics is also “self-consciously 
modest” in a different way (Cooke, 1994: 166). As noted above, Habermas broadly 
affirms claim (G0) – that a substantive part of both the structure and content of human 
reason derives from particular linguistic traditions. His primary concern with his 
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universal pragmatics is to provide a quasi-transcendental rational reconstruction of (H2) 
– engaging with empirical research where possible, and having philosophical arguments 
as a “stand-in” or “placeholder” for empirical-analytic research where necessary. The 
purpose of (H2) is to provide a sound basis for (G2) and (G3). While the modesty of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics means that he restricts himself to a form of philosophical 
dialogue or “questioning” in the tradition of Heidegger’s existential analytic, Habermas 
is more concerned to provide a more substantive footing to enable reflection on possible 
distortions in our linguistic traditions to render them suitable for advancing a critical 
theory of society. However, while Gadamer considers his work as a contribution to a 
more substantive conversation about the character of rationality, Habermas deliberately 
imposes strict limits on his reconstructive task which is primarily intended to serve as a 
minimal standard to provide support for claims such as (G2) and (G3) as conditions of 
possibility for all conversation and communicative action. As Cooke writes of 
Habermas’s project: 
 
It acknowledges that it has little to say about the cognitive content of judgements and norms, that it 
does not provide a complete account of human experience and action, and that it is not a sufficient 
condition for human well-being. (166) 
 
If Gadamer’s modesty lies in his recognition of the provisionality of his hermeneutics as 
part of a broader conversation within a linguistic tradition, as per (G1); Habermas’s 
modesty lies in his recognition that while his rational reconstruction of the conditions of 
communicative competence is universally applicable, it also tells us very little about the 
structure and contents of human reason, as per (G0). In this sense while Gadamer can be 
considered to advocate a Hamannian modesty in his cognisance of the limits of his 
linguistically articulated claims about language, Habermas can be considered to 
8. Shaping and Being Shaped: The Gadamer-Habermas Debates 
299 
advocate a Kantian modesty in the pursuit of a universal but very minimal set of 
conditions of possibility of the communicative capacities which enable more 
substantive practices and institutions of linguistically articulated reason. 
 
     In conclusion, the debates between Gadamer and Habermas make a significant 
contribution to advancing a philosophical analysis of the issues that arise from Hamann 
and Herder’s linguistic metacritique of Kant’s transcendental analysis of reason. What 
are we to make of their two different visions of universality with their two different 
attendant forms of modesty? As discussed above, there is substantive agreement 
between the two thinkers with regards to theses (G0), (G1), (G2) and (G3) – which 
serve as the basis for claims of “commonality” or “complementarity” between their 
respective views. In my view (H1) and (H2) represent significant – though not 
insurmountable – challenges to philosophical hermeneutics. (H1) calls for a more 
developed account of the possibility of hermeneutical reflection on the extra-linguistic 
conditions which make hermeneutical experience possible. (H2) is a challenge to go 
further in developing the insights of Truth and Method in relation to reasoning 
processes, practices and institutions in the natural and social sciences which would push 
it beyond Gadamer’s core focus on paradigmatic cases of interpretation in dialogue and 
cultural criticism. Gadamer’s account of truth and interpretation in relation to 
humanistic inquiry goes some way to addressing questions about the adjudication 
between the competing claims of different world-versions that were raised towards the 
end of chapter six. However, as formulated, Gadamer’s work has much less to say about 
interpretation and knowledge claims in the natural and social sciences. 
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     As mentioned above, a philosophical hermeneutics which holds a “narrow 
expressivist” conception of language will struggle to provide an account of these 
processes. A hermeneutics incorporating a “broad expressivist” conception of language 
might fare better in addressing (H1) and (H2). To illustrate this point, we might consider 
the role that digital platforms and software algorithms play in mediating communicative 
action in a wide variety of settings. These may introduce “media effects” which shape 
the scope and meaning of deliberation through online channels – from filter bubbles and 
personalisation features, to the character limits and classificatory practices which such 
media afford. To some extent these media can participate in shaping the “styles of 
reasoning” – such as the annotation of genetic sequences in biomedical research, to the 
way in which evidence of human rights violations is organised and classified in a court 
of law. A philosophical hermeneutics with a narrow expressivist conception of language 
might consider these mediating infrastructures beyond its remit. A hermeneutics with a 
broad expressivist conception of language could look to account for how these media 
participate in the articulation of different “styles of reasoning”, thus engaging with the 
issues that Habermas raises in (H1) and (H2). 
 
     Rather than picking one side or the other, I would argue that there is much to be 
gained by drawing on insights from both Gadamer and Habermas’s contributions to the 
debate. On the one hand – as Habermas points out – the hermeneutical account of 
rationality would stand to benefit from more substantive reflection on its extra-linguistic 
conditions of possibility and the scientific and technical “styles of reasoning” against 
which Gadamer’s Truth and Method is reacting. On the other hand – as Gadamer points 
out – Habermas’s account of rationality could benefit from further reflection on its own 
hermeneutical status, and its performative contribution in relation to its stated objective 
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of encouraging more substantive engagement between different forms of 
communicative action. Here we might reflect upon the role of philosophy in “providing 
a basis” for communicative action by elucidating and underwriting the possibility of 
(G2) and (G3), as compared to Habermas’s vision of the role of philosophy as 
“interpreter” between different styles of reasoning, which would require a more 
substantive engagement with the actually existing and historical forms of rationality in 
different domains as per (G0). In this regard philosophers might pay heed to the 
emphasis that hermeneutics places on participating in intra-linguistic and inter-
linguistic communicative action, as opposed to accounting for its extra-linguistic 
conditions of possibility. This would entail a shift from uncovering a minimal common 
accord which makes communication possible, to contributing to the composition of a 
more substantive common accord within and across different domains and styles of 
reasoning, which has the potential to make a more significant contribution to human 
emancipation. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
“The eyes of the detranscendentalized reason have gradually opened for what it also can learn 
about itself from the world.” (Habermas, 2015) 
 
     In the preceding chapters I have examined a constellation of ideas about reason, 
language and experience in German philosophy – focusing on the legacy of Hamann 
and Herder’s linguistic metacritiques of Kant’s transcendental analysis of reason. 
Through this examination I have sought to highlight how different thinkers have sought 
to develop a conception of language as a socially enacted, historically situated fabric of 
thought. In this concluding chapter I shall discuss the broader philosophical 
implications of these ideas – with a particular focus on the possibility of reconciling 
insights from Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritique with a reformulated vision 
of the universality of reason that stands in the service of human emancipation. 
 
     To briefly recap the trajectory that I have taken in my thesis: I took Hamann’s 1759 
Socratic Memorabilia as a starting point. This was an open letter to Kant and Berens in 
which Hamann critiques the philosophical project of the abstraction, purification and 
the mechanisation of reason (chapter one). Hamann enlists the figure of Socrates in 
order to oppose the over-zealous abstraction of reason from the contexts in which it is 
used and performed: including from language, from “tradition” (broadly conceived) and 
from our everyday experience. In order to put Hamann’s position into context and to 
better understand what he was reacting against, from here I took a step back to briefly 
survey the development of a particular form of “pure reason” in German philosophy – 
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in particular looking at Leibniz and Wolff’s speculative attempts to initiate a calculus of 
pure thought (chapter two). Next I looked in more detail at Hamann, Herder and Kant’s 
respective reactions to the purification of reason and began to outline some of the key 
features of Hamann and Herder’s conception of linguistically constituted rationality, as 
opposed to the “thin” conceptions of rationality advanced by those inspired by the 
formal calculi of Leibniz and Wolff (chapter three). The next chapter revisited the more 
familiar story of the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy, focusing on the genesis and 
reception of the crucial phases of Wittgenstein’s work (chapter four). 
 
     Returning to the eighteenth century, I then contrasted the analytic linguistic turn with 
the earlier linguistic turn in German philosophy, looking at the potential implications of 
redistributing reason from the narrow logico-mathematical ideals of rationalistic 
philosophers to include a much wider variety of “meaningful media” through which 
reason is constituted in society (chapter five). The next chapter looked at how this 
“thicker” vision of rationality was taken up and reworked from the eighteenth and into 
the nineteenth century by the German Romantics and Nietzsche, who articulated an 
alternative constellation of ideals and imaginaries for reason in philosophy – advancing 
what they considered to be a culturally richer, more reflexive and transdisciplinary 
picture of the fabric of thought (chapter six). In the last chapter, I looked at how this 
“thick” picture of linguistically mediated reason was taken up in the hermeneutical 
tradition of Gadamer and Heidegger – focusing on their “appropriational” view of 
linguistic tradition (chapter seven). Finally, I surveyed debates between Gadamer and 
Habermas, looking at Habermas’s critique of the hermeneutic claim to universality, 
Gadamer’s counter-arguments and their respective conceptions of the common accord 
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which provides the conditions of possibility for linguistically articulated rationality 
(chapter eight). 
 
     How can this constellation of views inform a more compelling philosophical account 
of the relationship between reason, language and experience? In the preceding chapters 
I have discussed how different thinkers have developed a picture of language as that 
which gives form to both reason and experience. This commences with Kant’s 
transcendental account of the structure of reason and experience, and culminates with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical conception of reason and experience which is informed by the 
legacy of Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritique of Kant. The debates between 
Gadamer and Habermas that were examined in the previous chapter give rise to the 
following question: Is it possible to reconcile a context-sensitive pluralist conception of 
the many registers, practices and institutions of linguistically constituted rationality (as 
emphasised by Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritique as well as Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics) with the progressive ambitions of a context-transcendent conception of 
reason (as Kant and Habermas aspire towards)? Can such a philosophical conception of 
language overcome both the Scylla of an implausible cultural relativism and the 
Charybdis of a spurious ethnocentric universalism? 
 
     The crux of my philosophical response to these questions in light of the legacy of the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn discussed in this thesis is a shift from an emphasis on 
philosophical analysis to uncover common accord which can serve as universally 
shared “rules of the game”, towards an emphasis on communicative action to compose 
common accord between different linguistically constituted domains of rationality. I 
shall divide the following discussion into two parts. Firstly, I shall provide a brief 
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philosophical defence of this shift with a focus on the questions of relativism and 
contextualism that were raised towards the end of chapter six. Secondly, I shall discuss 
the broader implications of this shift from uncovering to composing in relation to recent 
debates about philosophical methodology and metaphilosophy. 
 
Philosophical Implications 
 
     One of the philosophical implications of the views of reason, language and reason 
presented in this thesis is a move away from aspirations to uncover and elucidate a 
single universal rationality (as per chapter three) and towards understanding a plurality 
of linguistically constituted rationalities. Does this therefore imply a problematic 
multiplication of reasoning standards that would undermine attempts to obtain anything 
more than local consensus around knowledge claims? Does the legacy of the eighteenth 
century linguistic turn lead to a kind of irrationalism or anti-rationalism (as claimed by 
Isaiah Berlin)? And if these claims about rationality are to be understood themselves in 
terms of a particular local “style of reasoning”, does this thereby limit their broader 
applicability, or potentially render them self-refuting? 
 
     I would like to argue that a pluralist view of reason (which we might call “poly-
rationalism”), does not lead to (i) a confinement of styles of reasoning to certain local 
contexts, nor does it (ii) undermine the possibility of common, context-transcendent 
styles of reasoning. Furthermore – following a comment from Gadamer discussed in the 
previous chapter – I would argue that accusations of “irrationalism” or “anti-
rationalism” may be predicated on a belief in a single underlying style of reasoning (or a 
“uni-rationalism”) that would require further empirical support to be defended. As 
Andrew Bowie comments in relation to Hamann: “the structures and practices involved 
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in a natural language cannot all be reduced to general rules which we know to be valid 
for all languages” (Bowie, 2003: 50). Philosophical projects to purify reason may be 
understood to considered to support a kind of uni-rationalism to the extent that they 
hold that the formal logical languages or metalanguages that they develop offer an 
expressively adequate and context-transcendent substitute for natural languages. 
Hamann and Herder’s linguistic metacritiques challenged this claim to expressive 
adequacy and context-transcendent substitutability for natural languages – and may be 
considered to advance a kind of linguistic poly-rationalism. Heidegger and Gadamer 
may be consider to advocate a kind of poly-rationalism insofar as they consider reason 
to be constituted in different linguistic traditions. Habermas too may be considered to 
advocate a form of poly-rationalism to the extent that he claims that the substantive 
form and contents of reason are constituted in natural languages – though he believes 
that this must be attenuated with a quasi-transcendental account of the extra-linguistic 
conditions which make all reasoning possible. 
 
    One way that the poly-rationalist can show that styles of reasoning are not confined 
to particular local contexts is through the possibility of translation. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that translation plays such a central role for many of the thinkers in this 
thesis – from Hamann and Herder’s emphasis on the importance of cultural translation 
to enrich the expressive possibilities of a language, to Gadamer’s account of translation 
in terms of his “fusion of horizons”. These thinkers see translation not only as an 
integral part of processes of intercultural understanding, but also as paradigmatic of 
processes of intersubjective understanding in general. While Gadamer effectively 
asserts or assumes that processes of translation are possible as part of his contributions 
to the philosophical conversation, Habermas’s universal pragmatics seeks to elucidate 
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that which makes translation possible through engaging with research, and by having 
philosophy act as a “stand-in” or “placeholder” for research which aims to provide a 
rational reconstruction of the conditions that make translation possible. While it is 
questionable the extent to which successful translation processes depend on the 
provision of a philosophical account of what makes translation possible, Habermas’s 
interest in empirical research in this area makes sense in order to shed light on the 
extent to which our communicative capacities are innate or acquired, which has 
implications for philosophical accounts of the common ground between different styles 
of reasoning. However, as Cooke argues, Habermas’s universal pragmatics must be 
construed as an elucidation of the universal conditions of possibility of reason, rather 
than as a more substantive account of the form of reason (which is given in natural 
languages). Either way, both Gadamer and Habermas provide the poly-rationalist with 
conceptual resources for accounting for the possibility of translation, which means that 
they need not be committed to a plurality of incommensurable, parallel rationalities. 
 
     Poly-rationalism does not preclude the possibility of common, context-transcendent 
styles of reasoning. We can find evidence of this in the many different kinds of social 
and historical cases of the contingent institutionalisation of common styles of reasoning 
across different domains, cultures or natural languages – from scientific research 
protocols, to technical interoperability standards, to accounting procedures to 
international and transnational legal frameworks. In his Austerlitz, W. G. Sebald 
discusses the significance of the coordination of time between station clocks for the 
emergence of a globalised modernity. In a similar vein, many aspects of the world that 
we live in are underpinned by transnational, transcultural, context-transcendent styles of 
reasoning – from the modes of dealing with time and space which issue from global 
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conventions such as Coordinated Universal Time (UCT) or the Global Positioning 
System (GPS); standardised processes for making calculations regarding weight, 
temperature, energy, electric current and luminous intensity; global procedures and 
standards for the management of money (e.g. accounting or budgeting); and 
standardised technical processes related to everything from plumbing to computer 
software. While many of these different processes have very different attendant styles of 
reasoning, these different styles have been very widely and effectively institutionalised 
in ways which provide the conditions of possibility of many aspects of collective life in 
our current moment. 
 
     One crucial difference between the uni-rationalist and the poly-rationalist, is that 
while the former might see these context-transcendent styles of reasoning as evidence of 
more fundamental common accord which stands in need of elucidation, the poly-
rationalist may more readily recognise the significant amount of social and political 
work that goes into obtaining de facto consensus around different styles of reasoning 
across different domains. As Sebald notes, before transnational institutions for the 
coordination of time people would often synchronise by means of their local station 
clock. Prior to the institutionalisation of internationally recognised standards for weight, 
traders would weigh goods at a local weighing house. Prior to the emergence of a 
conception of “world economy” in the inter-war period and convergence around a set of 
globally recognised accounting standards after World War II, there could be significant 
differences in the production of financial reports. Research in the history of the natural 
and social sciences may also be read in terms of the development of cross-domain 
consensus around different contingent styles and practices of reasoning – such as 
probabilistic reasoning (Hacking, 1990), experimental reasoning (Shapin & Schaffer, 
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2011), and quantitative reasoning in business, government, and social research (Porter, 
1996). Many of these accounts suggest that the emergence of these styles of reasoning 
should be understood in terms of the composition of shared institutions of reason rather 
than in terms of uncovering latent common ground. For a linguistic poly-rationalism to 
be plausible, it is worth reiterating the importance of an adequate conception of 
language in relation to these kinds of examples. While debates about language and 
translation often focus on natural languages, a broad expressivist conception of 
language (including meaningful media) combined with the recognition of “language 
games” which cut across multiple natural languages may offer significant advantages in 
providing a richer philosophical account of the varieties of context-transcendent styles 
of reasoning implicated in contemporary life. 
 
     Having discussed the possibility of a poly-rationalism which neither must retreat into 
a plurality of different local reasoning practices, nor precludes the possibility of context-
transcendent institutions of reasoning, I will now return to the issues regarding 
relativism, contextualism and universalism raised towards the end of chapter six – but 
focusing more specifically on “styles of reasoning”, rather than Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. The six claims that were discussed may thus be reformulated as follows: 
 
(A) Languages provide the conditions of possibility for different styles of reasoning; 
(B) We cannot “step outside” of the styles of reasoning engendered in language; 
(C) We cannot adjudicate between different styles of reasoning engendered in language; 
(D) Any style of reasoning engendered in language is as good as any other; 
(E) Different styles of reasoning engendered in language are incommensurable; 
(F) Claims can only ever be evaluated in relation to a style of reasoning engendered in language. 
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     Thesis (A) is one of the central tenets of the linguistic poly-rationalism examined in 
this thesis. Weaker versions of this claim – that language enables different styles of 
reasoning – are likely to be uncontroversial amongst even the most ardent of anti-
relativists. As discussed above, stronger versions suggesting that reason is language-
bound will depend on showing the possibility of translation and cross-language, cross-
cultural and context-transcendent styles of reasoning in order to avoid the implausible 
thesis (E) that languages articulate incommensurable styles of reasoning. Thesis (B) can 
be rejected as formulated, if we can show the possibility of inter-language and intra-
language translation between domains, and if we hold (following Hamann, Herder, 
Heidegger and Gadamer) that our experience of the world is not exhausted by language 
– and that there is a world outside language which can be considered to participate in its 
articulation and evolution (as in the paradigmatic case of poetic language). 
 
     Thesis (C) can also be rejected as formulated. Deliberation and adjudication 
regarding different styles of reasoning can be considered to be a substantive part of “the 
conversation that we are”, rather than something that can be agreed prior to or apart 
from the conversation. For example, in the case of controversies regarding the taxation 
of multinationals, two accountants can have very different conceptions of the tax 
payments that are due, not simply due to the “facts” regarding the financial affairs of a 
corporation (about which there may be substantive agreement), but also due to 
differences in the interpretive schemes and classificatory structures implicated in 
different styles of reasoning issuing from different linguistic traditions (or language 
games) of accounting – including definitions of legal entities and the character of 
different financial transactions. Such controversies can be considered to demarcate the 
fault lines between different competing styles of reasoning which play out in 
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conversations which can be considered in hermeneutical terms. That the two 
accountants are both in possession of the same universally held communicative 
capacities which make reasoning possible, does not enable us to establish a substantive 
common ground that can be considered to expedite the resolution of their dispute. 
Rather the question of the structure and character of the linguistically constituted 
rationalities of their respective outlooks may be considered to substantively enter into 
the conversation – whereupon they may analyse the patterns of agreements and 
disagreements of the styles of reasoning of the traditions that they have been 
respectively trained in. 
 
     Poly-rationalism does not imply commitment to (D), that any style of reasoning may 
be considered to be as good as any other. Some styles of reasoning may be considered 
more germane, more attuned, more effective than others in different settings. Here I 
think it is worth noting the difference between the commitments of poly-rationalism 
(the acknowledgement of a plurality of styles of reasoning), and what Hacking calls 
“anarcho-rationalism”, which he defines as “tolerance for other people combined with 
the discipline of one’s own standards of truth and reason”. Hacking writes that 
adherents to this view contend that: 
 
We cannot reason as to whether alternative systems of reasoning are better or worse than ours, 
because the propositions to which we reason get their sense only from the method of reasoning 
employed. The propositions have no existence independent of the ways of reasoning towards them. 
(Hacking in Hollis & Lukes, 1982: 65) 
 
One of the attractive features of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is that it 
recognises that reasoning about alternative systems of reasoning is not something 
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unobtainable, but something which routinely obtains as part of conversations in 
different settings. This deliberation does not appeal to metalinguistic conditions of 
possibility which are external to the conversation. Rather linguistically constituted 
understanding creates the conditions of possibility for reflection and deliberation about 
itself. Thus, we come to an understanding of language in language, as Heidegger puts it. 
Here we might also consider the analytical value of Wittgenstein’s shift from examining 
natural languages per se to looking through the lens of a plurality of language games. In 
this sense we may be considered to have not just a single style of reasoning, but a 
multiplicity of linguistically styles of reasoning which obtain in different settings – 
which we can draw upon, switch and translate between, combine and compare in an 
ongoing process of rearticulating the living linguistic traditions of which we are part. 
 
     For many of the thinkers examined in this thesis, it is precisely the thicker expressive 
repertoire of natural language (as opposed to formalised languages or metalanguages) 
which enables the dialectical conversation between different perspectives through which 
the “fusion of horizons” can occur. While formalised metalanguages may aim for the 
parsimony of a small number of fundamental operators (such as the “and”, “or” and 
“not” of Boolean logic), philosophies of language drawing on the legacy of the 
eighteenth century linguistic turn often emphasise the advantages of a broader range of 
communicative capacities – including aesthetic, affective and rhetorical dimensions 
such as musicality, irony, wit and humour. As emphasised by Romantic readings of the 
Platonic dialogues, adjudication between different perspectives and different styles of 
reason is not just a matter of loading the appropriate premises into a correctly calibrated 
argumentative apparatus, but of the art and diplomacy of moving towards a shared 
understanding. Languages provide the medium which these processes of mutual 
Conclusion 
313 
understanding can occur, and the common ground between different outlooks and social 
worlds. This emphasis on processes of intersubjective understanding between different 
perspectives provides us with grounds for rejecting type (E) claims that would suggest 
that there is a default incommensurability between styles of reasoning. While some 
styles of reasoning can be considered incommensurable (Taylor gives the example of 
the rules of football and rugby, as picking up the ball is allowed in one game but not the 
other) – this does not imply that all styles are necessarily so. 
 
     Regarding (F), while the poly-rationalist does not attempt to appeal to a single, 
commonly held and universal set of criteria for evaluating knowledge claims (as might 
the uni-rationalist), this does not entail that “all there is” is competing styles of 
reasoning, which may be each considered as good as any other. Here we might return to 
Goodman’s notion of “rightness of rendering”. Different styles have different criteria for 
“rightness”. Criteria for rightness in relation to legal judgements are likely to differ 
significantly from criteria in relation to literary translation or medical diagnoses. But 
this does not entail the strong relativist claim that we cannot meaningfully talk about the 
truth of different styles of reasoning or perspectives engendered in a language, nor the 
strong pragmatist claim that truth is purely a function of consensus. While it might be 
difficult to fruitfully compare styles of reasoning in completely very different domains 
or from very different historical or cultural contexts, this does not preclude the 
possibility of making evaluative judgements between different styles of reasoning per 
se. Charles Taylor argues against the “in-principle […] impossibility of non-
ethnocentric judgements of superiority” by suggesting there can be “valid transcultural 
judgements of superiority” – such as, for example, the judgement that theories of 
modern science are superior to those of Renaissance magi with respect to their ability to 
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understanding and predict the physical world (Taylor in Hollis & Lukes, 1982: 101, -
103). This line of thought means that we can avoid the conclusion that we cannot talk of 
validity or rightness in relation to judgements that obtain across different styles of 
reasoning. However, as Taylor points out, this does not imply that there is “a single 
argument proving global superiority” across the different possible aspects with respect 
to which the styles can be judged (103). We can thus envisage judgements between 
taking place between different rationalities as part of linguistically constituted reasoning 
processes, rather than by means of a global metalanguage. Taylor suggests the 
advantages of this thick conception of linguistically constituted rationality: 
 
But the concept of rationality is richer than this. Rationality involves more than avoiding 
inconsistency. What more is involved comes out in the different judgements we make when we 
compare incommensurable cultures and activities. These judgements take us beyond merely 
formal criteria of rationality, and points us toward the human activities of articulation which give 
the value of rationality its sense. (105) 
 
By endorsing thesis (A) but rejecting theses (B) to (F), a linguistic poly-rationalism can 
thus avoid some of the undesirable consequences often associated with relativism. In 
this regard it may be considered to have some affinities with the pluralism of 
philosophers such as Maria Baghramian, who adopts the analogy of map-making to 
unpack the implications of her views (Baghramian, 2004). Thus she suggests that there 
are many different maps and map-making practices that highlight different features of a 
terrain for different purposes and contexts; that there is “no single correct way of 
constructing or drawing a map” and no such thing as an “absolutely correct map”; that 
maps are always partial; and that “we can distinguish between better and worse maps 
but only in the context of our interests and projects” (240-242). I would argue that the 
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picture of language that emerges from the constellation of thinkers examined in this 
thesis has further advantages in accounting not just for how languages pick out features 
of the world or convey information, but also for exploring how languages provide the 
conditions of possibility for reason, experience and social action in a way which means 
that they can be considered to participate in shaping the very terrain that they also 
depict. 
 
Metaphilosophical Implications 
 
     The picture of language as a social and historical “fabric of thought” that is 
developed by the thinkers that I have explored in this thesis provides fertile ground for 
thinking about philosophy as a form of social and cultural praxis. In this section I shall 
look at how this picture can be brought to bear on recent “metaphilosophical” debates 
about aims and methods of philosophy. 
 
     Recent metaphilosophical debates in the analytic philosophical tradition have 
focused around two competing models for philosophy: armchair philosophy and 
experimental philosophy. Timothy Williamson proposes a view of armchair philosophy 
which centres around thought experiments which depend on no more than “our 
conceptual or linguistic competence” (cf. Williamson, 2005a, 2005b, 2008: 48). This 
vision depicts philosophy as a technical task for trained specialists whereby the 
apparatus of our thought should be refined, clarified and improved through a 
combination of rigorous argumentation, conceptual precision and thought-experiments 
to ascertain where lines should be drawn. Indeed, Williamson explicitly rejects the focus 
on language after the analytic linguistic turn, highlighting recent work in metaphysics 
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that looks beyond language, as well reinforcing a view of language that emphasises its 
capacities for designating and communicating about entities outside language. Instead 
he presents philosophy as a discipline concern with the cultivation of aprioristic 
reasoning, informed by developments in formal semantics. Like Frege and the 
philosophers of pure reason that I examined in chapter three, Williamson also advocates 
the creation of “mathematical models of fragments of philosophy” (2008). His view 
presumes that progress can be made on improving the apparatus of our thought apart 
from the contexts in which this apparatus is put to work in the wide world outside of 
philosophy. Perhaps we might call to mind the analogy between pure and applied 
mathematics, such that philosophers make theoretical innovations which can drive 
breakthroughs when they are applied to “real world” problems. Williamson’s work 
presents philosophy as exemplifying a standard of logic and rigour, inventiveness and 
intellectual honesty in human reasoning. 
 
     According to the conceptions of reason, language and experience examined in the 
previous chapters, this vision of “armchair philosophy” is inadequate to the task of 
advancing progress towards a conception of public reason fit for collective life in the 
twenty first century. This would represent a major backwards step from the insights of 
Wittgenstein’s later works, which urge philosophers to “take a look around” at the way 
in which language and thought is instituted in the world. One of the shortcomings of 
post-Wittgensteinian analytic philosophy has, as we saw in chapter four, been the failure 
to take this move seriously enough, remaining committed to an overly conceptual and 
aprioristic picture of language. This residual spirit of a kind of Platonic apriorism is 
perhaps partly what leads philosophers into thinking that philosophy can be conducted 
by “linguistically competent” speakers, set back from the actually and historically 
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existing institutions of language – such that philosophical analyses of reason and 
concepts can be undertaken without any corresponding regard for how any of these 
conceptions are actually instituted in and entangled with the world. In other words: it is 
perhaps a sublimated belief in enduring, quasi-autonomous conceptual and 
argumentative forms inherent within language that creates the conditions of apparent 
plausibility for an analytic philosophical project which strives to study concepts apart 
from their circumstances and reason apart from actual reasoning practices. 
 
     The philosophical tradition informed by the German linguistic turn contains a 
number of insights and moves which can be used as a corrective to this. For a start, 
following Ian Hacking, we can locate within this tradition the seeds of a conception of 
the publicity of language: as a shared fabric of meanings which are enacted and 
institutionalised in society, as opposed to conceptions which focus on its use as a 
representational tool to communicate individual experiences. Following such a move, 
we may shift our emphasis from specialist interventions to understand and recalibrate 
the conceptual affordances of language towards engaging with language “in action” in 
society and in history, and towards the circumstances and practices which make 
language meaningful. This entails broadening the horizons of philosophy to scrutinise 
not just the conceptual material (narrowly conceived) of linguistically constituted 
reason, but to have a more sustained engagement with its actually existing and 
historically contingent articulations – whether in science, law, politics, economics, art or 
everyday life (as recently argued in Taylor, 2016). We may quickly run up against the 
limits of armchair philosophy if we want to understand the genres of reasoning in 
relation to, for example, DNA sequencing, high frequency trading or legal evidence. By 
shifting the focus away from “thinking, without any special interaction with the world 
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beyond the chair” (Williamson, 2008: 1), and towards an understanding of reason “in 
action” both historically and in the present, we can thereby open up philosophy to new 
forms of evidence and understanding, whether in terms of specialised linguistic 
institutions or “meaningful media” and equipment that is implicated in the organisation 
of our thought and practices (whether measuring instruments, calculating devices, 
algorithms, or digital platforms). 
 
     One recent response to the perceived inadequacies of “armchair philosophy” has 
been a turn towards philosophical experimentation, which takes inspiration from a 
certain conception of scientific method. Proponents of “experimental philosophy” (or 
“x-phi”) have advocated the use of methods from the social sciences in order to 
empirically study moral beliefs and practices, for example. They have explicitly 
contrasted this with armchair philosophy – including through tongue-in-cheek images 
and videos of burning armchairs. However, it is arguable that some of the advocates of 
experimental philosophy appear to remain committed to the ends of armchair 
philosophy, and take to take issue mainly with the means and methods which it uses, 
namely the armchair philosopher basing their judgements on their own individual 
analyses and intuitions. Instead a range of techniques – such as surveys – can be used to 
elicit judgements and intuitions which can broaden the range of views that the 
philosopher should take into account. In the introduction to one recent volume on the 
topic, it is argued that experimental philosophy provides “evidence for conceptual 
analysis” (Machery & O’Neill, 2014: ix). Sometimes this amounts to empirically 
studying how different people respond to the kinds of “thought experiments” advocated 
by armchair philosophers, by conducting surveys on questions such as “In Universe A, 
is it possible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions?” (Weigel, 
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2009: 232). Another recent book on “philosophical methodology” presents a choice 
between the armchair and the laboratory as the best model for philosophy (Haug, 2013). 
 
     While the impulse of experimental philosophy to go “out into the world” is certainly 
welcomed, it risks not going far enough away from the armchair – deriving underlying 
intuitions from the armchair intuitions and reasoning processes of broader populations, 
rather than just the lone philosopher. At times the philosophical choice between the 
armchair and the laboratory sounds close to pre-Kantian disputes between rationalism 
and empiricism. Indeed, this is Christopher Norris’s contention when he suggests that 
the debate between armchair and experimental philosophy is a “rerun of various old 
debates” between rationalism and empiricism (Norris, 2013: 99). Here again we may 
benefit from following Kant’s linguistic metacritics Hamann and Herder, who attempt to 
reconfigure his phenomenological move away from a conception of experience as 
evidence (as per the empiricism of the natural sciences) towards a reappraisal of the 
conditions of possibility of experiencing the world as a world – replacing his aspiration 
to purify reason and the fundamental categories of thought with the study the role of 
language as a collective fabric of meanings which organises our experience of our 
environments. Taking inspiration from this outlook, we need not reject outright either 
the conceptual formalism exemplified by mathematics and logical philosophy nor the 
narrow empiricism of scientific experimentation. Rather, we can seek a more holistic 
appreciation of the conditions of possibility and plausibility of these ways of knowing, 
and to locate them within a broader ecology of ways of engaging with the world. 
Following Hamann and Herder we can happily reject the maximalist pursuit of the 
purification of reason and the decontextualisation of experience, as well as obtaining a 
better understanding of where these ideals come from by tracing their genesis from our 
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“ordinary” linguistic practices. As we have seen above (in chapter five) this is in 
keeping with the broadly historical and empirical character of the German 
enlightenment spirit associated with the Berlin Academy in the eighteenth century. The 
conception of language that I have examined in this thesis can inform philosophical 
reflection about reason, language and experience in a way which overcomes both 
armchair philosophy’s narrow conception of reason and experimental philosophy’s 
narrow conception of experience. 
 
     Many elements can be drawn from my account of its legacy beyond the eighteenth 
century. Many of the thinkers examined in this thesis propose that philosophers should 
become sensitive to a much broader range of registers of reason and experience – not 
just looking at concepts and arguments, but also – for example – the expressive registers 
and world-projecting capacities of our linguistically mediated reason. They argue that 
philosophers should aspire to become attuned not only with the multiple languages 
which organise experience of the world, but also with what Wittgenstein characterises 
as the manifold regions and passageways of the city called language – how language is 
actually instituted in different “forms of life”. The eighteenth century linguistic turn 
precipitates a shift from a philosophical interest in purifying a single universal reason 
(modelled on mathematical calculation and scientific investigation) towards becoming 
attentive to a multiplicity of linguistically mediated rationalities. In the remainder of this 
chapter I shall look at how the arguments and ideas that I have examined in this thesis 
can inform philosophical engagements with historical and the social scientific research 
in order to develop a more compelling, detranscendentalised account of reason, 
language and experience in different settings – whilst also retaining an aspiration for 
universality through communicative acts of translation rather than purification. 
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     While thought experiments and fictional historical accounts were staples of the 
Wittgensteinian philosophical programme, the metacritical tradition attributes much 
greater importance to the actually existing social and historical circumstances of the 
fabric of our thought. It advocates going beyond untangling “timeless” philosophical 
puzzles, and towards more compelling philosophical reflection upon the concrete 
communicative practices of human beings in different settings – from workplaces to law 
courts, urban spaces to social relations. For example, rather than using thought 
experiments in order to obtain analytical clarity about the definition of art, the meaning 
of justice or the problem of induction, the metacritical tradition suggests that 
philosophers should become more attentive to the actual and historical forms of 
reasoning, language and experience which shape cultural life, political institutions or 
scientific research. Thus Gadamer and Heidegger suggest philosophers should 
undertake hermeneutical enquiries into the formative traditions through which we know 
the world – that in our experience which we inherit, which originates beyond us, which 
we enact and which constitutes our horizons. Habermas and other thinkers associated 
with the Frankfurt School advance a programme for the “detranscendentalisation” of 
public reason by giving an account of the development or dynamics of its actually 
existing practices, instruments and institutions – as well as normatively intervening to 
reshape these in the service of continuing the pursuit of the universal ideals of 
enlightenment modernity, albeit in significantly modified form. 
 
     As we saw in Habermas’s work in the previous chapter, by cultivating a more 
substantive relationship with the social sciences philosophers can draw on a richer 
conception of the actually existing institutions of rationality. This can act as a 
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complement (and potential corrective) to historical research – to avoid mistaking the 
genesis of communicative infrastructures with their operations in the present. What do 
philosophical engagements with social science research look like in practice, with 
respect to the main concerns of this thesis? One model may be found in Habermas’s 
analysis of “public reason” with reference to a detranscendentalised account of its actual 
“publics”, which is anticipated in Hamann and Herder’s shift of emphasis from a 
universal rationality addressing a single imaginary global public to the many fabrics of 
thought enacted by different historically and socially specific linguistic communities. 
 
     Such a move need not entail a regression to a chauvinistic nationalism (which Herder 
is often accused of), as this kind of analysis of linguistically mediated rationality is 
entirely compatible with the ideals of a progressive cosmopolitanism – albeit one which 
emphasises the composition of a common world through processes of translation, rather 
than uncovering latent commonalities in an already existing global communicative 
infrastructure. As discussed above we can contrast two different conceptions of 
universality: one which aspires to discover or distil a conceptual apparatus of pure 
reason which is universally applicable, invariant of context and culture; and one which 
can only hope to compose shared understanding through communicative acts of 
translation and conversation to build commonalities between different socially and 
historically specific fabrics of thought. Habermas’s political philosophy provides one 
picture of what this shift – from thinking about universality in terms of purification, to 
thinking of it in terms of communicative acts of translation – might mean in practice.  
His work emphasises both strengthening transnational institutions (upwards towards 
global institutions), whilst also ensuring that these institutions are sufficiently well 
attuned, responsive and accountable to the interests and concerns of particular national 
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and subnational publics through the requisite legal and democratic mechanisms (hence 
his interest in democratic deficits, legitimation and constitutional theory). These moves 
prefigure a much more recent shift from “the public” to “publics” (cf. Calhoun, 1993; 
Warner, 2005). Recent developments in the social sciences also contribute to this project 
to obtain a richer, detranscendentalised account of public reason in philosophy, 
complementing Habermas’s historical narrative of the emergence of the bourgeois 
public sphere by looking at the actually existing institutions of linguistically mediated 
reason in different settings – from law courts to scientific laboratories to central banks. 
 
     Research in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) can serve to broaden 
philosophical imagination about how linguistically mediated reason is articulated 
through institutions and practices in different areas of life. STS developed from an 
interest in accounting for scientific and technological innovation, looking at the 
production of scientific knowledge as a kind of “distributed accomplishment” 
(including scientific equipment, standards, administrative processes and a wider range 
of meaningful media) as opposed to accounts which focus on the pioneering discoveries 
of a handful of innovators. Taking this move seriously means that we would have to 
multiply the range of phenomena considered relevant to provide an account of scientific 
and technical rationality, beyond traditional philosophical models of deduction and 
inference. Research in STS has challenged classical conceptions of scientific reasoning 
which (as we saw in chapters two and four) have been taken as paradigmatic in 
philosophy. In particular, social studies of science have shown that scientific research 
rarely conforms to the inferential models or formalised processes that have been 
invoked to explain breakthroughs and discoveries post hoc – instead depending on 
contingent social alliances, practices, cultural traditions and institutions of reasoning. 
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     Bruno Latour’s studies of knowledge “in the making” in laboratories, courtrooms, 
public administrations and engineering teams has culminated in his call for an 
“anthropology of modernity” – arguing that while attempts to give “a history of 
Reason” have focused on “truth and error in a single key”, what is needed is to become 
attuned to different forms of reasoning in their different contexts (Latour, 2013: 66). 
Thus he argues that: “Reason without its networks is like an electric wire without its 
cable, gas without a pipeline, a telephone conversation without a connection to a 
telephone company” (66). Rather than discussing reason in the abstract – or “reason 
without networks” as he calls it – Latour proposes to identify the different “modes of 
existence” (borrowing Étienne Souriau’s phrase) and the “keys” of reason in different 
areas of life. More sustained empirical engagement with what Daston and Galison 
describe as the “concrete practices of abstract reason” (Daston & Galison, 2010: 59) and 
what Hacking calls “styles of reasoning” (Hacking, 2012) in science and technology is 
particularly important given the paradigmatic role of scientific and technical rationality 
for many thinkers in the tradition that I have examined – from Heidegger to Gadamer, 
Horkheimer to Habermas. Especially given the fact that – as Friedel Weinert puts it – 
there is “serious doubt whether Habermas’s view of occidental science is adequate” 
(Weinert, 1999). 
 
     In this thesis I have advocated a broad, thick, expressive conception of language, 
which is contiguous with and spills over into other forms of “meaningful media”. As 
many commentators have pointed out, we find resources for thinking about the 
affordances of media – from music to the visual arts to digital media – in the tradition of 
thinkers that I have examined, from the German Romantics work on music, to 
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Benjamin’s writings on photography and film. As explored in chapter seven, Heidegger 
has also been a major influence on contemporary media theory and philosophy (Peters, 
2015; cf. Peters, 1999; Gunkel & Taylor, 2014). Combining Heidegger’s analysis of 
technology with recent work in STS, media studies and communication studies, John 
Durham Peters calls on philosophers to pay greater attention to the media and 
infrastructures which underpin our environments and organise our worlds of experience 
–  from sunsets to search engines, from timekeeping and navigational devices to 
architecture and agricultural techniques. Yet, he also maintains that “if there is an ocean 
that all humans swim in, it is language”, and that language is indispensable for 
understanding how human action is organised. Habermas has similarly been held up as 
a “founding philosopher” of the media and communication studies, “who examines the 
impact of media environments on culture and history, and who offers a media ecological 
approach for communication as a liberating activity” (Grosswiler, 2001: 30) and “treats 
the development of the media as an integral part in the formation of modern societies” 
(Thompson, 1995: 7). 
 
     From the linguistic turn in the eighteenth century we find the seeds of a more 
compelling account of how language is deeply interwoven into the fabric of social 
worlds. In this tradition language is not just a private vehicle for the transparent 
representation of mental content for individual thinkers, nor the imperfect raw material 
from which a superior formal language for dealing with concepts may be extracted, 
distilled and clarified by technical experts in armchairs. For many of the thinkers in my 
thesis language may be considered as a public communicative infrastructure which 
provides the conditions of possibility for experience of the world as such, and which is 
deeply implicated in the organisation of social life, institutions and practices – broadly 
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conceived. It is this very heterogeneity, this richness of different modes in different 
“forms of life”, which the eighteenth century provides us with resources for not only 
thinking about, but also contributing to. 
 
     Another consequence of the metacritique of pure reason advanced by Hamann and 
Herder is that there is no “neutral ground” outside language upon which philosophers 
can stand – whether to construct a formal metalanguage, or to step back and reflect 
upon our linguistic practices. We must, as Heidegger puts it, come to an understanding 
of language in language. The linguistically mediated character of philosophical reason 
means that we are indeed limited to reasoning with and through language, yet it also 
means that we have the full expressive wealth of language available at our disposal 
through which to reason. As discussed in the previous section, rather than discovering 
the basis of universal rationality latent in the depths of the grammar of our natural 
language or creating formal metalanguages through which such universal rationality can 
be obtained, another way to hold onto the enlightenment ideal of universality is through 
bridging between different local genres of rationality through acts of communication 
and translation. This entails a shift from conceiving of philosophy as a predominantly 
analytical, descriptive or deflationary enterprise, to also considering its performative 
and normative dimensions. This is partly what Hacking is alluding to when he says that 
the analytical linguistic turn in the Wittgensteinian model has effectively depoliticised 
philosophical inquiry into the social and political dimensions of language (Hacking, 
2002: 136). 
 
     The contributions of philosophers are as much a part of the linguistically mediated 
communicative infrastructures that they reflect on, as literary texts and legal documents. 
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As I have suggested above, in the tradition of German philosophy after the linguistic 
turn there is an acute awareness of philosophy as a form of linguistic praxis. Indeed, on 
the basis of their picture of linguistically mediated reason, philosophy cannot but play a 
performative role, insofar as philosophical texts, arguments and ideas remain part of the 
linguistic traditions that are transmitted between generations. Indeed, in Gadamer’s 
account, there is always a performative dimension to interpretation: we always make 
linguistic traditions our own as we inherit them. However, while many of the thinkers in 
the chapters above agree with this point – there is less consensus about how and how 
much philosophers can and should aim to reshape or contributed to the linguistically 
mediated traditions through which their inquiry is conducted. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, both Heidegger and Gadamer assert that language in some sense speaks us. 
Their “appropriational” model of shaping is less about an individual subject self-
consciously imposing their intentions onto linguistic material, and more about openness 
to a mutual reshaping of language and the experience of Dasein, as exemplified in 
poetic language. 
 
     By contrast, the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory places a much greater 
emphasis on critiquing and normatively reshaping our linguistically mediated 
communicative infrastructure as a means to advancing progress towards a critical theory 
of society – which in turn lies on the road towards emancipation from the pathologies of 
late capitalism. Here we may draw on Frankfurt School’s conceptions of critical 
reflexivity and “immanent critique” – from Benjamin’s reflections on the genesis of the 
political thought which he uses in his own work, to Habermas’s interest in finding the 
normative basis for political philosophy in everyday communicative acts. This tradition 
places an emphasis on critical self-knowledge: aspiring to learn more about the 
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assumptions and underpinnings of the fabric of thought through which one deliberates. 
This last point is where Gadamer accuses Habermas of retaining an implausible 
Enlightenment conception of being liberated from tradition: of the autonomous subject 
who strives for conscious self-knowledge which enables them to overcome their 
prejudices and rise above tradition in order to obtain a superior perspective and to 
reshape the fabric of thought in light of this knowledge. Whereas Habermas talks of 
overcoming communicative distortions, Gadamer believes it is precisely the aggregation 
of such distortions (prejudices) which give our traction to our communicative apparatus. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Habermas’ counters that Gadamer holds an 
unnecessarily conservative conception of how we are beholden to linguistic tradition, 
and argues that philosophy should contribute to the task of deriving the normative 
conditions for undistorted communicative action, which is vital to ensure that the 
lifeworld has the capacity to resist being subsumed by the twin dangers of unimpeded 
marketisation and bureaucratisation. 
 
     This tension – between on the one hand Heidegger and Gadamer’s “appropriational” 
model of reshaping linguistic tradition, and on the other hand Habermas’s interests in 
obtaining a stronger normative position from which to reshape our communicative 
infrastructure as well as in obtaining a broader empirical perspective on the concrete 
institutions of reason – opens up a space for thinking about the role of philosophy as a 
form of linguistic praxis. If Heidegger and Gadamer call us to be attentive to the way in 
which we inherit linguistic worlds and how these worlds shape our experience, 
Habermas focuses attention on the social and political (and not just the cultural or 
phenomenological) aspects of these linguistic worlds, and how we can aspire to change 
our communicative practices, rather than feeling beholden to what we inherit. 
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Heidegger and Gadamer beckon us to be attentive to the qualities and capacities of 
linguistic material, and to come to an understanding of language in language using its 
full expressive capacity and range. Habermas urges us not to let go of the enlightenment 
interest in the emancipatory potential of universal reason, albeit through a universality 
which must be assembled through processes of translation and acts of communication, 
rather than acts of philosophical distillation and semantic formalisation. 
 
     Where does this tension take us with respect to the question of the performative 
dimensions of philosophy? One final point I’d emphasise is regarding the types of 
interventions that philosophers make. Just as thinkers in the preceding chapters urge us 
not to have too narrow a conception of language, so too we should be wary of overly 
narrow conceptions of philosophy and what philosophy does. This echoes another 
recent argument along these lines made by Bruno Latour, who polemically poses the 
question of whether critique has “run out of steam”. He argues that if we adopt an 
overly narrow focus on critique, we risk becoming like “mechanical toys that endlessly 
make the same gesture when everything else has changed around them”, preparing 
graduates for “wars that are no longer possible, fighting enemies long gone, conquering 
territories that no longer exist, leaving them ill-equipped in the face of threats we had 
not anticipated” rather than adapting and revising their forms of intervention to “new 
threats, new dangers, new tasks, new targets” (Latour, 2004). Instead he advances the 
notion of “composition”, which “takes up the task of searching for universality but 
without believing that this universality is already there, waiting to be unveiled and 
discovered” (Latour, 2010). This accords with Habermas’s proposed shift in thinking 
about universality from semantics to pragmatics: moving away from uncovering 
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universally shared patterns of meaning and structures of reasoning to enabling 
communicative acts of translation and interaction. 
 
     The constellation of thinkers examined in this thesis offer a very rich set of 
arguments and ideas about the different forms that philosophy can take, and the 
different kinds of interventions it can make. Indeed, this is reflected by the fact that very 
few of the thinkers can be purely and straightforwardly characterised as philosophers – 
with many of their texts spilling over into cultural analysis, history, philology and 
theology, with a similarly diverse range of styles, from poetic and aphoristic language, 
to encyclopaedias and dossiers of quotations. While Plato’s allegory of the cave draws 
attention to a world of forms that lies beyond the physical world, the thinkers in this 
thesis seek to draw attention to the living language “out there” in the physical world 
beyond the cave of idealised philosophical forms. Being attentive to manifold contexts 
of language as a living institution is relevant not just for examining it as an object of 
study, but also for using it in the context of communicative action in philosophy. 
 
     How can this inform visions of philosophy beyond the armchair and the experiment? 
Just as Hamann draws inspiration from Socrates as a philosopher who thinks in public, 
in the agora amongst people in different circumstances of life, rather than as a technical 
expert distilling a formal apparatus for reasoning a world apart from where everyday 
reasoning actually happens – so we can consider the role that philosophy plays in 
performatively opening up space for thinking with and between different “forms of life” 
– informed by an empirical appreciation of current arrangements, as well as a historical 
sense of how they have come to be the way they are. This vision of philosophy 
resonates with Rorty’s vision of moral progress as “a matter of increasing sensitivity, 
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increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and 
things” (Rorty, 1999: 81). It can also draw on Habermas’s conception of philosophy as 
“interpreter” between “everyday communication” and “expert cultures” of rationality 
which are becoming increasingly “rarefied” and “esoteric” (Habermas, 1990: 1-20). 
Habermas suggests that this entails developing a stronger relationship between 
philosophy and the human and social sciences – as exemplified by the cooperation 
between the philosophy of science and the history of science.  
 
     In a recent speech, Habermas contrasts the “thin rational faith” and the “buffered 
self” of Kant’s transcendental philosophy with “the powerful movements of 
detranscendentalization” precipitated by Hamann, Humboldt, Hegel and Schleiermacher 
– which opened up “a new continent of history, culture and society” (Habermas, 2015). 
Habermas reiterates the picture of language that I have explored in the latter chapters of 
this thesis: that human beings shape the cultural forms which surround them, and are 
“shaped in turn by those intersubjectively shared symbolic and historical realities of 
culture and society”. He argues that philosophy should be considered a “parasitic 
undertaking that lives off learning processes in other spheres”, in order to provide 
critical scrutiny of them as a “secondary role of a form of reflection”. Despite his 
advocacy for the transcendentalisation of reason, it is on this very point that Habermas 
has been widely criticised: for being insufficiently attentive to actually existing social, 
political, economic and historical conditions – both in relation his earlier work on the 
public sphere as well as in his more recent work on European democracy (see, e.g. 
Calhoun, 1993; Dean, 2003; Streeck, 2016). This surely serves to reinforce his call for a 
stronger and more substantive encounters between philosophical inquiry and other 
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research approaches which aim to account for the evolving constitution of linguistically 
mediated forms of human understanding. 
 
     While Habermas situates his philosophy within the Kantian tradition of critique 
(cultivating self-understanding in order to overcome illusions and understand limits) – 
to what extent should this conception of critique be considered the predominant aim of 
philosophical inquiry? Here once again we may benefit from returning to Hamann and 
Herder’s metacritique of Kant, and the legacy of this turn to language in German 
philosophy. Their call for attention to language as a living fabric of thought remains 
relevant to the task of cultivating a philosophical praxis of thinking with and through 
the full expressive range of our linguistically mediated, historically situated and socially 
constituted capacities for understanding. This stands in contrast to the ideal and natural 
language branches of the analytic linguistic turn – whose primary interest in language 
lies in deriving an understanding of the conceptual structures and linguistic “rules of the 
game” which can assist with clarifying formal inferential reasoning processes or (dis-
)solving philosophical problems, as per Kant’s proposal that “method precedes all 
science”. The constellation of thinkers examined in this thesis provide a much richer 
series of engagements which show: how language provides the conditions of possibility 
for both reason and experience; how language is implicated in articulating social, 
cultural and political worlds; how innovation is possible within linguistic traditions; the 
fundamental relationship between languages and specific social and historically situated 
linguistic communities; and the porous crossing between verbal language and other 
forms of “meaningful media”. As I have discussed in the preceding chapters, these 
conceptions open up space for philosophers to reflect on and contribute to the public, 
evolving, linguistically mediated institutions of thought beyond what Hacking 
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characterises as the depoliticising vaccination of the Wittgensteinian paradigm of 
conceptual analysis. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 334 
Bibliography 
 
Aarsleff, H. (1981). Vico and Berlin. London Review of Books, 3(20), 6–7. Retrieved from 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v03/n20/hans-aarsleff/vico-and-berlin  
Aarsleff, H. (1982a). From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual 
History. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Aarsleff, H. (1982b). Letter: Vico and Berlin. London Review of Books, 4(10). Retrieved from 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v04/n10/letters  
Ahnert, T. (2004). “Newtonianism in early Enlightenment Germany, c. 1720 to 1750: 
metaphysics and the critique of dogmatic philosophy”. Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Science 35. 
Ameriks, K. (Ed.). (2000). The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Apel, K. O. (1973). Transformation der Philosophie, Volume 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 
Austin, J. L. (1956). A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 57, 1–30. 
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words. (J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisà, Eds.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Awodey, S., & Carus, A. W. (2006). Carnap’s dream: Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Logical Syntax. 
Synthese, 159 (1), 23–45. 
Bacon, F. (1863). “Novum Organum” in J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath (eds), The 
Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. VIII. Boston: Taggard and Thompson. 
Baghramian, M. (2004). Relativism. London: Routledge. 
Baker, G. (2002). Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use. The Philosophical Quarterly, 
52(208), 289–302. 
Bauman, Z. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Bibliography 
335 
Bayer, O. (2012). A Contemporary in Dissent: Johann Georg Hamann as Radical Enlightener. 
Cambridge, UK: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. 
Baz, A. (2012). When Words Are Called For. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Beck, L. W. (1966). Eighteenth-Century Philosophy. New York: Free Press. 
Beck, L. W. (1996). Early German Philosophy. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum. (Original work 
published 1969) 
Beiser, F. C. (1993). The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Beiser, F. C. (2005). Hegel. New York: Routledge.  
Beiser, F. C. (2006). The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Beiser, F. C. (2011). Review of Alan D. Schrift and Daniel Conway (eds.), Nineteenth Century 
Philosophy: Revolutionary Responses to the Existing Order, 317pp., vol. 2 of Alan D. 
Schrift (ed.), The History of Continental Philosophy (8 vols.), University of Chicago 
Press, 2010. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Retrieved from 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25677-nineteenth-century-philosophy-revolutionary-responses-
to-the-existing-order/ 
Benjamin, W. (1996). Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926. (M. Bullock 
& M. W. Jennings, Eds.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Benjamin, W. (1999). The Arcades Project. (R. Tiedemann, Ed., H. Eiland & K. McLaughlin, 
Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Berlin, I. (1965). “Two Enemies of the Enlightenment” (Hamann and Maistre). Columbia 
University. Retrieved from http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/  
Berlin, I. (1993, October 21). The Magus of the North. The New York Review of Books. 
Berlin, I. (1994). The Magus of the North: J.G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern 
Irrationalism. (H. Hardy, Ed.). New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. 
Berlin, I. (1999). The Roots of Romanticism. (H. Hardy, Ed.). London: Chatto & Windus. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 336 
Berlin, I. (2013). Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder. (H. Hardy, Ed.). 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bernstein, J. M. (ed.) (2003) Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Betz, J. R. (2008). After Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of J. G. Hamann. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
Blackburn, S. (2007). “Titans Who Bestowed Gift of Light”, Times Higher Education, 16th 
February 2007. 
Borges, J. L. (1999). Collected Fictions. A. Hurley (trans.). New York: Penguin. 
Bowie, A. (1996). From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary 
Theory. London: Routledge. 
Bowie, A. (1998). Introduction. In A. Bowie (Ed.), Schleiermacher: Hermeneutics and 
Criticism: And Other Writings. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bowie, A. (1999). “German Philosophy Today: Between Idealism, Romanticism and 
Pragmatism”. In A. O’Hear (ed.) German Philosophy Since Kant. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bowie, A. (2003). Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press. 
Bowie, A. (2007). Music, Philosophy, and Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bowie, A. (2010a). German Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bowie, A. (2010b). Philosophical Variations: Music as Philosophical Language. Malmö, 
Sweden: Aarhus Universitetsforlag. 
Bowie, A. (2013a). Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Bowie, A. (2013b). Adorno and the Ends of Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Bibliography 
337 
Boyle, N., Disley, L., & Ameriks, K. (Eds.). (2013). The Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of 
Post-Kantian German Thought (Vols. 1-4). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Brown, S. (1999). “Leibniz’s Formative Years (1646-76): An Overview”. In S. Brown (ed.) The 
Young Leibniz and His Philosophy 1646-76. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Brown, S. & Phemister, P. (2007). “Leibniz and the English Speaking World: An Introductory 
Overview”. In Brown, S. and Phemister, P. (eds.) Leibniz and the English Speaking 
World. Dodrecht: Springer. 
Calhoun, C. (Ed.). (1993). Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Cameron, W. S. K. (1996). On Communicative Actors Talking Past One Another. Philosophy 
Today, 40(1), 160–168. 
Carnap, R. (1935). Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & 
Company. 
Carnap, R. (2001). Logical Syntax of Language. London: Routledge. 
Carnap, R., Creath, R., & Nollan, R. (1987). On Protocol Sentences. Noûs, 21(4), 457–470. 
Carnap, R., & George, R. A. (1969). The Logical Structure of the World: And, Pseudoproblems 
in Philosophy. Open Court Publishing. 
Chaouli, M. (2002). The Laboratory of Poetry: Chemistry and Poetics in the Work of Friedrich 
Schlegel. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Clark, M. (1991). Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Clark, R. T. (1955). Herder: His Life and Thought. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Cloeren, H. J. (1988). Language and Thought: German Approaches to Analytic Philosophy in 
the 18th and 19th Centuries. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Coffa, J. A. (1993). The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Condillac, E. B. D. (2001). Condillac: Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge. (H. Aarsleff, 
Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 338 
Constâncio, J., & Branco, M. J. M. (Eds.). (2011). Nietzsche on Instinct and Language. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
Constâncio, J., & Branco, M. J. M. (Eds.). (2012). As the Spider Spins: Essays on Nietzsche’s 
Critique and Use of Language. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Cooke, M. (1994). Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas’s Pragmatics. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Corr, C. A. (1975). Christian Wolff and Leibniz. Journal of the History of Ideas, 36(2), 241. 
Crary, A., & Read, R. J. (2000). The New Wittgenstein. London: Routledge. 
Crawford, C. (1988). The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of Language. Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter. 
Dallmayr, F. (2000). Borders on Horizons - Gadamer and Habermas Revisited. Chicago-Kent 
Law Review, 76 (2), 825. 
Daston, L., & Galison, P. (2010). Objectivity. New York: Zone Books. 
Dean, J. (2003). Why the Net is not a Public Sphere. Constellations, 10(1), 95–112. 
Dewey, J. (1922, May 3). Review of “Public Opinion” by Walter Lippmann. The New Republic, 
pp. 286–288. 
Dewey, J. (1954). The Public and Its Problems. Athens, GA: Swallow Press. 
Drechsler, W. (1997). Christian Wolff (1679-1754) A Biographical Essay. European Journal of 
Law and Economics, 4(2-3), 111–128. 
Dreyfus, H. L., & Hall, H. (Eds.). (1992). Heidegger: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Dummett, M. A. E. (1993). Origins of Analytical Philosophy. London: Duckworth. 
Durkheim, É. (1965). Montesquieu and Rousseau: forerunners of sociology. Ann Arbor, MI: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Eco, U. (1995). The Search for the Perfect Language. J. Fentress (trans.). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Elden, S. (2013). The Birth of Territory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Emden, C. J. (2005). Nietzsche on Language, Consciousness, and the Body. Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press. 
Bibliography 
339 
Forster, M. (2010). After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Forster, M. (2011a). German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Forster, M (2011b) “Genealogy”. American Dialectic, 1(2): 230-250. 
Forster, M (2011c) “Genealogy and Morality”. American Dialectic, 1(3): 346-369. 
Forster, M. (2012). “Kant’s Philosophy of Language?”. Tijdschrift voor Filosofie. No. 74. 485-
511. 
Foucault, M. (1984) "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." The Foucault Reader. P. Rabinow (ed. 
trans.). New York: Pantheon. 76-100. 
Fowler, C. F. (1999). Descartes on the Human Soul: Philosophy and the Demands of Christian 
Doctrine. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Frank, M. (1989). What Is Neostructuralism? (S. Wilke & R. Gray, Trans.). Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Frank, M. (2004). The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism. E. Millán-
Zaibert (trans.). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Frankfurt, H. G. (1972). Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: Anchor. 
Fraser, N., & Gordon, L. (1994). A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. 
Welfare State. Signs, 19(2), 309–336. 
Fried, G. (2014). The King Is Dead: Heidegger’s “Black Notebooks.” The Los Angeles Review 
of Books. Retrieved from https://lareviewofbooks.org/review/king-dead-heideggers-
black-notebooks/  
Friedman, M. (2000). A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing. 
Friedman, M. (2002). Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger: The Davos Disputation and Twentieth 
Century Philosophy. European Journal of Philosophy, 10(3), 263–274. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 340 
Fuchs, C. (2015). Martin Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism: Philosophy of Technology and the Media 
in the Light of the “Black Notebooks.” tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique, 
13(1), 55–78. 
Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (Eds.). (2004). The Rise of Modern Logic: from Leibniz to Frege, 
Volume 3. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Gabriel, G. (2002). Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy. In E. 
H. Reck (Ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Gadamer, H. G. (1977). Philosophical Hermeneutics. (D. E. Linge, Trans.). Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1985). Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and the Critique of Ideology. In K. Mueller-
Vollmer (Ed.), The Hermeneutics Reader (pp. 274–292). New York: Continuum. 
Gadamer, H. G. (1989a). “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem”. In G. L. Ormiston 
& A. D. Schrift (Eds.), The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (pp. 147–158). 
Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Gadamer, H. G. (1989b). Reply to My Critics. In G. L. Ormiston & A. D. Schrift (Eds.), The 
Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (pp. 273–297). Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Gadamer, H. G. (1998). Reason in the Age of Science. (F. G. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Gadamer, H. G. (2004). Truth and Method. London: Continuum. 
Gadamer, H. G. (2007). The Gadamer Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings. (R. E. Palmer, 
Trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
Galison, P. (1990). Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical Positivism and Architectural Modernism. Critical 
Inquiry, 16(4), 709–752. 
Gálvez, J. P. (Ed.). (2010). Philosophical Anthropology: Wittgenstein’s Perspective. 
Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Basic Books. 
Bibliography 
341 
Gemes, K. (2013). Life’s perspectives. In K. Gemes & J. Richardson (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Nietzsche (pp. 553–575). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Gerhardt, C. I. (Ed.). (1875-90). Die Philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz. Volume I. Berlin: 
Weidmann. 
Geuss, R. (1999) Morality, Culture and History: Essays on German Philosophy. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Geuss, R. (2001). History and Illusion in Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Geuss, R. (2002). “Genealogy as Critique”. European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 10, Issue 
2: 209–215. 
Gillies, A. (1937). Herder’s Essay on Shakespeare: “Das Herz der Untersuchung.” The Modern 
Language Review, 32(2), 262–280.  
Giovanni, G. di. (2011). The Year 1786 and Die Bestimmung des Menschen, or 
Popularphilosophie in Crisis. In R. Munk (Ed.), Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and 
Aesthetics (pp. 217–234). Houten: Springer Netherlands. 
Glock, H. (2008). What Is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Goodman, N. (1978). Ways of World Making. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing. 
Gordon, P. E. (2014, October 9). Heidegger in Black. The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 
from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/heidegger-in-black/  
Grant, I. H. (2008). On an Artificial Earth: Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Gray, J. (2012). Hamann, Nietzsche, and Wittgenstein on the Language of Philosophers. In L. 
M. Anderson (Ed.), Hamann and the Tradition. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Gray, R. T. (1996). Buying into Signs: Money and Semiosis in Eighteenth-Century German 
Language Theory. The German Quarterly, 69(1), 1–14. 
Gray, R. T. (2009). Skeptische Philologie: Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Nietzsche Und Eine 
Philologie der Zukunft. Nietzsche-Studien, 38(1), 39–64. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 342 
Grondin, J. (2003). Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography. (J. Weinsheimer, Trans.). New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press. 
Grosswiler, P. (2001). Jürgen Habermas: Media Ecologist? Proceedings of the Media Ecology 
Association, 2, 22. 
Gunkel, D., & Taylor, P. A. (2014). Heidegger and the Media. London: Polity. 
Habermas, J. (1974) The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article (1964). (S. Lennox, F. 
Lennox, Trans.) New German Critique 3, 49-55. 
Habermas, J. (1985a). The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society. (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. (1985b). The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: 
A Critique of Functionalist Reason. (T. McCarthy, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Habermas, J. (1988). On the Logic of the Social Sciences. (S. W. Nicholsen & J. A. Stark, 
Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1989). The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality. In G. L. Ormiston & A. D. Schrift 
(Eds.), The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur (pp. 245–272). Albany, NY: 
SUNY Press. 
Habermas, J. (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press. 
Habermas, J. (1991). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. (T. Burger & F. Lawrence, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press. 
Habermas, J. (1992). Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas. (P. Dews, 
Ed.). London: Verso Books. 
Habermas, J. (1999a). Hermeneutic and Analytic Philosophy. Two Complementary Versions of 
the Linguistic Turn? In A. O’Hear (ed.) German Philosophy Since Kant. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bibliography 
343 
Habermas, J. (1999b). From Kant to Hegel and Back again – The Move Towards 
Detranscendentalization. European Journal of Philosophy, 7(2), 129–157. 
Habermas, J. (2015). Acceptance speech at the Kluge Prize Award Ceremony. Library of 
Congress, Washington DC. Retrieved from http://habermas-
rawls.blogspot.com/2016/04/transcript-of-habermass-acceptance.html 
Hacker, P. M. S. (2007). “Analytic Philosophy: Beyond the Linguistic Turn and Back Again” in 
M. Beaney (ed.) The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and 
Phenomenology. New York: Routledge. 125-141. 
Hacker, P. M. S. (2009). A Philosopher of Philosophy. The Philosophical Quarterly, 59 (235), 
337–348. 
Hacker, P. M. S. (2013). “The Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy” in M. Beaney (ed.) The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 926-947. 
Hacking, I. (1982, June 10). Is Locke the Key? The New York Review of Books. Retrieved from 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1982/jun/10/is-locke-the-key/  
Hacking, I. (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hacking, I. (1988). Locke, Leibniz, Language and Hans Aarsleff. Synthese, 75(2), 135–153. 
Hacking, I. (2002). How, Why, When and Where Did Language Go Public? In Historical 
Ontology (pp. 121–139). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hacking, I. (2012). “Language, Truth and Reason” 30 years later. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A, 43(4), 599–609. 
Hagenbach, K. R. (1865). German Rationalism, in Its Rise, Progress, and Decline, in Relation to 
Theologians, Scholars, Poets, Philosophers, and the People: A Contribution to the Church 
History of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. (L. Gage & J. H. W. Stuckenberg, 
Eds.). Edinburgh: T & T Clark. 
Hamann, J. G. (1967). Socratic Memorabilia. J. O’Flaherty (trans.). Baltimore, Maryland: The 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 344 
Hamann, J. G. (2007). Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language (Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy). K. Haynes (ed. trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Han, B.-C. (2012). Transparenzgesellschaft. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz Berlin. 
Haug, M. C. (Ed.). (2013). Philosophical Methodology: The Armchair or the Laboratory? 
London: Routledge. 
Hay, S. K. (2008). Hamann: Sharing Style and Thesis: Kierkegaard’s Appropriation of 
Hamann’s Work. In J. B. Stewart (Ed.), Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: 
Literature and Aesthetics. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 
Haym, R. (1954) Herder: nach seinem Leben und seinem Werken dargestellt. Berlin: Aufbau 
Verlag. 
Haynes, K. (2007) Introduction. In K. Haynes (Ed. Trans.), Hamann: Writings on Philosophy 
and Language (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Haynes, K. (2012). “There Is an Idol in the Temple of Learning”: Hamann and the History of 
Philosophy. In L. M. Anderson (Ed.), Hamann and the Tradition. Northwestern 
University Press. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (1896). Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Vol. 3. E. S. Haldane and F. H. 
Simson (trans.). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). The Encyclopaedia Logic. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. 
Harris (trans. ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (2008). Hegel on Hamann. (L. M. Anderson, Trans.). Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Hegel, G. W. F. (2011). Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. R. F. Brown and P. C. 
Hodgson (ed. trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. (J. MacQuarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell. 
Bibliography 
345 
Heidegger, M. (1971). On the Way to Language. (P. D. Hertz, Trans.). New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Heidegger, M. (1975). Poetry, Language, Thought. (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). New York: Harper 
Colophon. 
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. (W. Lovitt, 
Trans. Ed.). New York: Garland Publishing. 
Heidegger, M. (1991a). The Principle of Reason. (R. Lilly, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1991b). Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two. San Francisco: Harper Collins. 
Heidegger, M. (1991c). Nietzsche: Volumes Three and Four. San Francisco: Harper Collins. 
Heidegger, M. (1997). Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (2004). On the Essence of Language. (W. T. Gregory & Y. Unna, Trans.). New 
York: State University of New York Press. 
Heidegger, M. (2009). Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language. (W. T. 
Gregory & Y. Unna, Trans.). New York: State University of New York Press. 
Henrichs, A. (2004). The Last of the Detractors: Friedrich Nietzsche’s Condemnation of 
Euripides. Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies, 27(4), 369–397. 
Heinrich, D. (2008). Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism. (D. S. Pacini, 
Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Herder, J. G. (1799). Eine Metakritik zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Leipzig: Hartknoch. 
Herder, J. G. (1969). Herder on Social and Political Culture: A Selection of Texts. F. M. Barnard 
(ed. trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted in 2010. 
Herder, J. G. (2002). Philosophical Writings. M. Forster (trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hobbes, T. (1839). The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. William Molesworth (ed.). London: 
John Bohn. 
Hollis, M., & Lukes, S. (Eds.). (1982). Rationality and Relativism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 346 
 Horkheimer, M. & Adorno T. W. (2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
How, A. (1995). The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social: Back to Bedrock. 
Aldershot, Hants: Avebury. 
Hume, D. (1896). A Treatise of Human Nature. L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Inwood, M. (1999). A Heidegger Dictionary. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers. 
Israel, J. (2001). Radical Enlightenment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jacobson, E. (2003). Metaphysics of the Profane: The Political Theology of Walter Benjamin 
and Gershom Scholem. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Jauernig, A. (2014). Kant, the Leibnizians and Leibniz. In B. C. Look (Ed.), The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Leibniz (pp. 289–309). London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Jay, M. (1982). Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the 
Habermas-Gadamer Debate. In D. LaCapra & S. L. Kaplan (Eds.), Modern European 
Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
Kant, I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason. P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (trans. and ed.). Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (1997). Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward 
as Science. G. Hatfield (trans. and ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Khaldūn, I. (1958). The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history. Vol. 3. F. Rosenthal (trans). 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Kierkegaard, S. (1968). Concluding Unscientific Postscript. D. F. Swenson (trans.). Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Kompridis, N. (1994). On World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas and Dewey. Thesis Eleven, 
37(1), 29–45. 
Kompridis, N. (2006). Philosophical Romanticism. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Bibliography 
347 
Kompridis, N. (2011). Critique and Disclosure. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Koopman, C. (2013) Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity. 
Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. 
Knoll, R. (1999). Konfigurative Annäherung? Zu Walter Benjamin und Johann Georg Hamann. 
In K. Garber & L. Rehm (Eds.), Global Benjamin. W. Fink. 
Kuehn, M. (1987). “Hume in the Gottingische Anzeigen: 1739-1800”. Hume Studies, Vol. XIII, 
No. 1 (April, 1987), 46-73. 
Kuehn, M. (1997). The Wolffian Background of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. In Logic and 
the Workings of the Mind: The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern 
Philosophy (pp. 229–250). Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company. 
Kuehn, M. (2001). Kant: A Biography. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
La Mettrie, J. O. de. (1996). La Mettrie: Machine Man and Other Writings. (A. Thomson, Ed.). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Lafont, C. (1999). The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lafont, C. (2000). Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Latour, B. (1993). We Have Never Been Modern. (C. Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Latour, B. (2004). Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of 
Concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248. 
Latour, B. (2007). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (First 
Edition). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Latour, B. (2010). An Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto.” New Literary History, 41(3), 
471–490. 
Latour, B. (2013). An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns. (C. 
Porter, Trans.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 348 
Laugier, S. (2013). Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Lazzarato, M. (2012). The Making of the Indebted Man: Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. (J. 
D. Jordan, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Leibniz, G. W. (1951). Leibniz: Selections. P. P. Wiener (ed. trans.). New York: Scribner. 
Leibniz, G. W. (1966). “On the Art of Combinations”. In G. H. R. Parkinson (ed.) Leibniz: 
Logical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Leibniz, G. W. (1989). Philosophical Papers and Letters. L. E. Loemker (ed. trans.). Dodrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Leibniz, G. W. (1996). Leibniz: New Essays on Human Understanding. (P. Remnant & J. 
Bennett, Eds.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Leiter, B. (2002). The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche On Morality. London: 
Routledge. 
Lifschitz, A. (2012). Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth 
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Link, D. (2010). Scrambling T-R-U-T-H: Rotating Letters as a Material Form of Thought. In S. 
Zielinski and E. Fürlus (eds) Variantology 4. On Deep Time Relations of Arts, Sciences 
and Technologies in the Arabic–Islamic World: 215–266. Cologne: König. 
Lippmann, W. (1993). The Phantom Public. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Lippmann, W. (1998). Public Opinion. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
Llull, R. (2003). Ars generalis ultima. Y. Dambergs (trans.). Accessed 14 June 2014. 
<http://lullianarts.net/Ars-Magna/1-2-3-4.htm> 
Locke, J. (1894). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Vol. II. A. C. Fraser (ed.). 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Loemker, L. E. (1973). “Leibniz and the Herborn Encyclopedists”. In Ivor Leclerc (ed.) The 
Philosophy of Leibniz and the Modern World. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
Bibliography 
349 
Loemker, L. E. (1995). “Boyle and Leibniz”. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 16, No. 1 
(Jan. 1995). 
Lohr, C. (1984). “Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus”. Freiburger Zeitschrift 
für Philosophie und Theologie 31 [1–2] (1984): 57– 88. 
Lukács, G. (1971). The Theory of the Novel. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Lukács, G. (1980). The Destruction of Reason. London: Merlin Press. 
Machery, E., & O’Neill, E. (Eds.). (2014). Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. 
New York: Routledge. 
Malcolm, N. (1981, November 19). Wittgenstein’s Confessions. London Review of Books, pp. 
16–18. 
Mehlman, J. (1983). Literature and Hospitality: Klossowski’s Hamann. Studies in Romanticism, 
22(2), 329–347. http://doi.org/10.2307/25600431 
Mendelson, J. (1979). The Habermas-Gadamer Debate. New German Critique, (18), 44–73. 
Menninghaus, W. (1995). Walter Benjamins Theorie der Sprachmagie. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag KG. 
Mercer, C. (1999). “The Young Leibniz and His Teachers”. In S. Brown (ed.) The Young Leibniz 
and His Philosophy 1646-76. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Michaelis, J. D. (1771). A Dissertation on the Influence of Opinions on Language, and of 
Language on Opinions. London: W. Owen. 
Millan-Zaibert, E. (2000). Romantic Rationality. Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 10, 
141–155. 
Millán-Zaibert, E. (2007). Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Misgeld, D. (1976). Critical Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate Between Habermas and 
Gadamer. In J. O’Neill (Ed.), On Critical Theory (pp. 164–83). New York: Seabury Press. 
Moyn, S. (2012). The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 350 
Nassar, D. (2013). The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic 
Philosophy, 1795-1804. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Nassar, D. (Ed.). (2014). The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic 
Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nehemas, A. (1985). Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Nehemas, A. (1986). “What an Author Is”. Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 11: 685-691 
Neurath, O. (1936). International Picture Language: The First Rules of Isotype. London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 
Neurath, O. (1973). Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis. In M. Neurath & R. 
S. Cohen (Eds.), Empiricism and Sociology (pp. 299–318). Springer Netherlands. 
Newmark, K. (2012). Irony on Occasion: From Schlegel and Kierkegaard to Derrida and de 
Man. New York: Fordham University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (1966). Beyond Good and Evil. (W. Kaufmann Trans.). New York: Vintage. 
Nietzsche, F. (1968). The Will to Power. (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: 
Vintage. 
Nietzsche, F. (1974). The Gay Science. (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). New York: Vintage. 
Nietzsche, F. (1983). Untimely Meditations. (R. J. Hollingdale, Ed.). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (1986). Human, All Too Human. (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (1988). Chronik zu Nietzsches Leben. Konkordanz. Verzeichnis der Gedichte. 
Gesamtregister. (G. Colli & M. Montinari, Eds.). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Nietzsche, F. (1989). Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language. (S. L. Gilman, C. Blair, & 
D. J. Parent, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (1999). Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings. (R. Geuss & R. 
Speirs, Eds.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Bibliography 
351 
Nietzsche, F. (2003). Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks. (R. Bittner, Ed., K. Sturge, 
Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (2005). Nietzsche: The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols and Other 
Writings. (A. Ridley, Ed., J. Norman, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Nietzsche, F. (2007). Nietzsche: “On the Genealogy of Morality.” (K. Ansell-Pearson, Ed., C. 
Diethe, Trans.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, C. (2013). Philosophy Outside-In: A Critique of Academic Reason. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Norman, J. (2002). Nietzsche and Early Romanticism. Journal of the History of Ideas, 63(3), 
501–519. 
North, M. (1999). Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern: A Return to the Scene of 
the Modern. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Novalis (1997). Philosophical Writings. (M. M. Stoljar Ed. Trans.). Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Novalis. (2012). Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon. (D. W. Wood, 
Trans.). Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
O’Flaherty, J. C. (1988). The Quarrel of Reason with Itself: Essays on Hamann, Michaelis, 
Lessing, Nietzsche. Columbia, SC: Camden House. 
O’Flaherty, J. C., & Berlin, I. (1993, November 18). “The Magus of the North.” The New York 
Review of Books. 
Ormiston, G. L., & Schrift, A. D. (Eds.). (1989). The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to 
Ricoeur. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. 
Palmer, R. E. (2000). Habermas versus Gadamer? Some remarks. In L. E. Hahn (Ed.), 
Perspectives on Habermas. Chicago, IL: Open Court Publishing. 
Parkes, G. (1996). Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche’s Psychology. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Peters, J. D. (1999). Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 352 
Peters, J. D. (2015). The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Piercey, R. (2004). Ricoeur’s Account of Tradition and the Gadamer–Habermas Debate. Human 
Studies, 27(3), 259–280. 
Pinkard, T. (2002). German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Pinker, S. (2014). The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person’s Guide to Writing in the 21st 
Century. New York, New York: Viking Books. 
Pissarro, J. (2009). Greenberg, Kant and Modernism. Source: Notes in the History of Art, XXIX 
(1), 42–48. 
Porter, T. M. (1996). Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Pountain, C. J. (2008, November). The Genius of Language. University of Newcastle-upon-
Tyne. Retrieved from http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/cjpountain/genius.pdf 
Putnam, H. (1983). Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Rée, J. (2014, March 12). In defence of Heidegger. Prospect Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/arts-and-books/in-defence-of-heidegger  
Reill, P. H. (1975). The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press. 
Richardson, J., & Gemes, K. (Eds.). (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Ricœur, P. (1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. (D. Savage, Trans.). New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Ricœur, P. (1981). Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology. In Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation (pp. 63–100). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Bibliography 
353 
Rockmore, T. (1997). On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Rothman, J. (2014, April 28). Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism? The New Yorker. 
Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/is-heidegger-
contaminated-by-nazism  
Rorty, R., Schneewind, J. B. & Skinner, Q. (1984). Philosophy in History. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1987). “Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein”. Political Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4 
(Nov., 1987), 564-580. 
Rorty, R. (1992). The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Rorty, R. (1998). Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality. In Philosophical Papers: 
Truth and Progress. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin Books. 
Rush, F. (2011). Review of Michael Forster, After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the 
German Tradition, AND German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and 
Beyond. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 
Russell, B. (1937). A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Russell, B. (2013). An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Routledge. 
Rutherford, D. (1995). “Philosophy and Language in Leibniz”. The Cambridge Companion to 
Leibniz ed. Nicholas Jolley. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Ryle, G. (1968). Thinking and Reflecting. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 1, 210–
226. 
Ryle, G. (2009). Collected Essays 1929-1968. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Safranski, R. (1999). Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil. (E. Osers, Trans.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 354 
Safranski, R. (2014). Romanticism: A German Affair. (R. E. Goodwin, Trans.). Evanston, 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 
Saul, N. (Ed.). (2009). The Cambridge Companion to German Romanticism. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schacht, R. (1985). Nietzsche. London: Routledge. 
Schlaps, C. (2004). The “Genius of Language”: Transformations of a Concept in the History of 
Linguistics. Historiographia Linguistica, 31(2-1), 367–388. 
Schlegel, F. (1835). The Philosophy of History. (J. B. Robertson, Trans.). London: Saunders & 
Otley. 
Schlegel, F. (1855). The Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of Language in a Course of 
Lectures. A. J. W. Morrison (trans.). New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Schlegel, F. (1991). Philosophical Fragments. P. Firchow (trans.). Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Schleiermacher, F. (1996). Dialectic or, The Art of Doing Philosophy. T. N. Nice (trans. ed.). 
Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press. 
Senn, P. (1997). What is the Place of Christian Wolff in the History of the Social Sciences? 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 4(2-3), 147–232. 
Shapin, S., & Schaffer, S. (2011). Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the 
Experimental Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 Shapiro, S. E. (1994). Rhetoric as Ideology Critique: The Gadamer-Habermas Debate 
Reinvented. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 62(1), 123–150. 
Sheehan, T. (2014). Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift. London: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Siegel, H. (1987). Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism. 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
Sikka, S. (2007). “Herder’s Critique of Pure Reason”. The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 61, No. 
1 (Sep., 2007), 31-50. 
Bibliography 
355 
Sikka, S. (2011). Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Sluga, H. (1980). Gottlob Frege. London: Routledge. 
Solomon, R. C. (2006). Living with Nietzsche: What the Great “Immoralist” Has to Teach Us. 
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Stone, A. D. (2006). Heidegger and Carnap on the Overcoming of Metaphysics. In Martin 
Heidegger (pp. 217–44). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. 
Streeck, W. (2016, January 28). What About Capitalism? Jürgen Habermas’s Project of a 
European Democracy. Retrieved from http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2454-what-
about-capitalism-jurgen-habermas-s-project-of-a-european-democracy  
Surber, J. P. (2001). Metacritique: The Linguistic Assault on German Idealism. New York: 
Humanity Books. 
Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, C. (1995). Philosophical Arguments. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Taylor, C. (2009). A Secular Age. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
Taylor, C. (2016). The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Thompson, J. B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media. Cambridge, 
UK: Polity Press. 
Twyman, M. (1975). The Significance of Isotype. In Graphic communication through Isotype 
(pp. 7–17). Reading: University of Reading. 
Uebel, T. (2014). Vienna Circle. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014). 
Wallace, D. F. (2007). Consider the Lobster and Other Essays. New York: Back Bay Books. 
Warner, M. (2005). Publics and Counterpublics. New York: Zone Books. 
Weber, M. (2001). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. T. Parsons (trans.). 
London: Routledge. 
The Fabric of Thought: Reason, Language and Experience in German Philosophy from Hamann to Habermas 
 
 356 
Weigel, C. (2009). Experimental Philosophy Is Here to Stay. Analyse & Kritik, 31(2), 221–242. 
Weinert, F. (1999). Habermas, Science and Modernity. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), German Philosophy 
Since Kant. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Wellmer, A. (1976). Communications and Emancipation: Reflections on the Linguistic Turn in 
Critical Theory. In J. O’Neill (Ed.), On Critical Theory. New York: Seabury Press. 
Williamson, T. (2005a). “Past the Linguistic Turn” in B. Leiter (ed.) The Future for Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, T. (2005b). Armchair Philosophy, Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual 
Thinking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback), 105(1), 1–23. 
Williamson, T. (2008). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wilson, C. (1995). The Reception of Leibniz in the Eighteenth Century. In N. Jolley (Ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Leibniz (pp. 442–470). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Wirth, J. M., & Burke, P. (Eds.). (2014). The Barbarian Principle: Merleau-Ponty, Schelling, 
and the Question of Nature. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Wirth, J. M. (2015). Schelling’s Practice of the Wild: Time, Art, Imagination. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner 
& Co. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper and Row. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1975). On Certainty. (G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright, Eds.). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. (2001). Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, with a Revised English 
Translation (50th Anniversary Commemorative Edition). G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.). 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bibliography 
357 
Wolff, C. (1730). Philosophia Prima, Sive Ontologia, Methodo Scientifica Pertractata, Qua 
Omnis Cognitionis Humanae Principia Continentur. Frankfurt am Main, Leipzig: Prostat 
in officina libraria Rengeriana. 
Wolff, C. (2003). Logic, or, Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding: 
With Their Use and Application in the Knowledge and Search of Truth. New York: Georg 
Olms Verlag. 
Wolff, L., & Cipolloni, M. (Eds.). (2007). The Anthropology of the Enlightenment. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Wrathall, M. A. (2010). Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Yates, F. A. (1982). Lull and Bruno: Collected Essays, Volume 1. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Young, E. (1989). Edward Young: Night Thoughts. S. Cornford (ed.). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 2008. 
Zammito, J. H. (2002). Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Zammito, J. H. (2006). Herder on Historicism and Naturalism. Presented at the Herder and 
Anthropology conference, University of Oslo. 
Žižek, S. (2007). The Indivisible Remainder: On Schelling and Related Matters. London: Verso. 
Zusi, P. (2006). Toward a Genealogy of Modernism: Herder, Nietzsche, History. Modern 
Language Quarterly, 67(4), 505–525. 
 
 
